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2Abstract
This thesis seeks to examine Novalis's philosophy of practical knowledge
and to position it within the context of the work of other Romantic natural
philosophers and some aspects of contemporary science. His views on Ritter's
galvanism and the latter's significance for his thought in general are treated here
for the first time in full.
Contrary to most previous views, it is argued that a major part of Novalis's
outlook stems from his concept of practical knowledge and his reflection over the
term "experiment", which proves to be an extremely complex and central idea in
his thought. It is shown how this philosophy of his fmds most explicit expression
in the idea of a symbolic notation or a "phenomenal" calculus. These notions
merge in Novalis's idea of productive "Plastisirung". Particular attention is paid to
the symbolic use of phosphorus in the pneumatic debate and Ritter's galvanic
interpretation of the nerve. Beyond contemporary science, it is further shown how
broad an historical base Novalis channels into his notion of practical knowledge.
This should lead to a clearer understanding of Novalis's position within Romantic
natural philosophy, his debt to tradition, and his originality.
In the light of these fmdings, it is argued that Novalis's concern for
practical knowledge provides the basis for a possible form of consensus in his
thought. It is shown that there is an increasing tendency in his writings away from
a programme for classifying knowledge in general towards the idea of individual
knowledge and the case study, as is exemplified in his reception of Ritter's work.
It is also advanced that Novalis's notion of practical knowledge is a significant
methodological statement of early Romantic science, which also puts a new
perspective on thinkers such as Goethe, Humboldt, Schelling and Rifler.
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Abbreviations and a note on quotations
Abbreviations have been used for the following works. Their number in the
bibliography is indicated in brackets.
N=
Schrzften. Die Werke Friedrich von Hardenbergs, eds. Paul Kluckhohn and
Richard Samuel. Zweite, nach den Handschriften erganzte, erweiterte und
verbesserte Auflage in vier Banden und einem Begleitband, 5 vols., Stuttgart;
Berlin; Koln; Mainz: Kohlhammer, 1960-1988.
Vol.!. Das dichterische Werk, eds. Paul Kluckhohn and Richard Samuel together
with Heinz Ritter and Gerhard Schulz, 1960; 3rd enlarged and revised edition,
1977.
Vol.2. Das philosophische Werk I, eds. Richard Samuel, Hans-Joachim Mahl, and
Gerhard Schulz, 1965; 3rd edition, 1981.
Vol.3. Das philosophische Werk II, eds. Richard Samuel, Hans-Joachim Maid,
and Gerhard Schulz, 1968; 3rd edition 1983.
Vol.4. Tagebücher, Briefwechsel, Zeitgenossische Zeugnisse, eds. Richard
Samuel, Hans-Joachim Mähl, and Gerhard Schulz, 1975.
Vol. 5. Materialien und Register, eds. Hans-Joachim MähI and Richard Samuel;
index by Hermann Knebel, 1988.
Ritter, Johann Wilhelm: Beweis, daft em bestandiger Galvanismus den
Lebensproceft in dem Thierreich begleite, Weimar, 1798. (92)
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Primary sources are cited as they stand; no attention is drawn to any anomalies.
Sources are given in round brackets after quotations. The first number, given in
italics, denotes the number of the work in the bibliography; the following numbers
to the volumes and pages. Volume numbers are always given in arabic numerals. If
a work has parts and volumes, then the part is given first in Roman numerals.
Occasionally italicized words have been inserted in square brackets into quotations
for the ease of comprehension.
When German words or phrases are given in running text the endings have been
silently modified to integrate them into the sentence.
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When in the investigation of any nature the understanding is so balanced as to be uncertain to
which of two or more natures the cause of the nature in question should be assigned, on account of
the frequent and ordinary concurrence of many natures, instances of the Fingerpost show the union
of one of these natures with the nature in question to be sure and indissoluble, of the other to be
varied and separable; and thus the question is decided, and the former nature is admitted as the
cause, while the latter is dismissed and rejected. Such instances afford very great light, and are of
high authority, the course of interpretation sometimes ending in them and being completed.
Bacon (7, XXXVI).
Am Ende scheini alles Nachdenken auf ächtes Experimentiren zu fuhren - und die sog[enannteJ
Vernunftlehre - die Nothwendigkeit, Meihode, etc. des Experimentirens und Lebens, als eines
beszandigen Experimentirens zu enthalten und beweisen.
Novalis (N, 3, 402).
Aber was ist denn em thierischer Theil, und was der Korper, zu dem er gehorte? Es ist em System in
einander wirkender Krafle ... Aberjenes System ist selbst das was es ist, nichi durch sich allein, nur
in sofern ist es diefi, als es Theil is! eines hoheren dynamischen, des voilkommensten aber
organischen System, der Natur, und daft es uberhaupt ist, verdankt es seibsi der Natur. Sie ist das
Ideal aller organischen Wesen, absolut in sich beschlossen, ewig in sick und ewig das was sie ist,
bleibend, bleibend - Natur.
Ritter(R, 170-171).
Man kann Reitz oder Thatigkeit durch blofie Veranderung der Kettenglieder hervorbringen. Alles ist
Glied einer Ketie. Jedes neue Cued veranlafit Repraesentationen in den andern Gliedern - dadurch
Thatigkeit.
Novalis (N, 3, 612).
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Fig. 1. Ritter's sixty-eighth galvanic figure (Beweis, 1798).
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Intellectual history and early Romantic natural philosophy
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pluralism, immanent transcendence, narrative construction and experiment .
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practice for early Romantic natural philosophy.
6. Overview of Novalis scholarship relating to the context of the sciences,
philosophy and aesthetics.
Z Plan of work.
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1. Current perspectives of Novalis scholarship for intellectual history: ethics,
pluralism, immanent transcendence, narrative construction and "experiment ".
Before I define the methodological premises of this thesis in greater detail, as
concerns current debate over literature and science, and scientific historiography
(in section 2), I here wish first to offer the reader some initial perspective on
Novalis scholarship's relationship to intellectual history. This will, I hope, provide
the reader with a cogent and succinct introduction to Novalis's thought in terms of
current debate in intellectual history, as well as to this work's concern for
Novalis's notion of "experiment". Novalis's notion of "experiment" cannot be
treated in some philosophical vacuum within his works. It is necessarily involved
in the very centre and heat of the Novalis debate. The notion of "experiment" fits
into the present discussion in Novalis scholarship surrounding various forms of
postmodernism and the relevance of German Idealism to postmodernism.
An outline of Novalis's notion of "experiment" within the context of his writings
and life must first be given before embarking on this discussion of Novalis
scholarship's stance to intellectual history and the positioning of this thesis therein.
This work attempts to account for the views of the mature Novalis (1798-1800) as
they appear in his notion of "experiment" and in his "experimental philosophy" in
his theoretical and scientific writings. The term "experiment" is little used by
Novalis before his arrival at the Freiberger Bergakademie, and becomes
increasingly important for his notion of knowledge from the Freiberger
naturwissenschafihiche Studien and Das aligemeine Brouillon onwards. 1 He began
work on the Freiberger narurwissenschafthiche Studien in June 1798, and on Des
ailgemeine Brouillon in September of the same year. Both note-books were begun,
then, some time after his arrival in Freiberg in December 1797. His notion of
"experiment" was undoubtedly influenced by his time at Freiberg and is a direct
response to his scientific studies. Novalis's new interest in the sciences does not by
any means amount to an explicit dismissal of his previous philosophically oriented
studies in the favour of scientific "evidence". Rather, his scientific studies enabled
him to develop the other half of his outlook on knowledge. What he had already
gained from German Idealism about the primacy of the subject, and what he had
learned of the Neoplatonic tradition, mainly from Hemsterhuis (1721-1790), was
now complemented by concrete knowledge of actual scientific phenomena. All of
15
these currents together gave Novalis the material for his own model of natural
philosophy.
His remarks soon after his arrival at Freiherg, in a letter of 26 December 1797,
show just how his scientific studies were broadening his horizons, they afforded
him a new approach, and indeed a better understanding of knowledge in general:
Die Philosophie verstehe ich immer besser, je tiefer ich in die ubrigen Wissenschaften eindnnge (N,
4, 242).
Practical knowledge of the sciences reinvigorated his grasp of philosophy. Clearly,
the influence of the empirically-minded Werner (1749-1817) had a role to play in
the formation of the maturer Novalis's interests, both through his personality and
through his historical and philosophical attitude to the sciences. 2 Kant's (1724 -
1804) and Schellmg's (1775-1854) notion of dynamism and the latter's natural
philosophy were also key points of influence on Novalis's natural philosophy. As
already indicated, a major influence, too, was Ritter's (1776-1810) work on
galvanism, which covered a broad area including chemistry, "Physik" and
physiology. Ritter's work also enriched Novalis's views on organization and
excitability, that had already been fired by his reading of Brown in the previous
year. 3 Novalis's physical and chemical studies at Freiberg would also have
accentuated his interest, likewise inaugurated in the previous year, in affinity and
its Neoplatonic counterpart "Sympathie". Novalis had originally taken this idea
over for his own project from Hemsterhuis, and now it was to be deepened and
refined by a new empirical dimension. In addition, his reading of Goethe's (1749-
1832) scientific works, revealed in the perceptive essay Uber Goethe of August and
September 1798, gave further credence to his views that the roles of the artist and
the scientist could be combined in a method of inquiry. Numerous sources in fact
come together in a highly productive way. Herder's (1744-1803) Plastik, which he
read and made notes on at the same time as writing the essay on Goethe, gave him
useful conceptual tools with which he could then confront aspects of Kant's
epistemology in the Freiberger naturwissenschafihiche Studien. As his horizons
broadened, Novalis's notion of inquiry, his experience-oriented notion of
knowledge, finally became explicit towards the end of Das aligemeine Brouillon.
This was when he read of Plotinos (205-270), who afforded him both a model of
inquiry and of Nature. This enhanced the Neoplatonic stance he had assumed after
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studying Hemsterhuis. Both in the way of epistemology and regarding natural
philosophy, Plotinos gave Novalis a highly concrete intellectual edifice. The
central importance of Plotinos for Novalis lies in the former's philosophical style,
which Novalis interpreted as a form of "thatiger Empirismus". Moreover, Plotinos
puts forward an explanation of just how the cardinal force of "Sympathie" came
about through the reflection of the "One" upon itself, and how in turn man's act of
reflection is also caused by the universal force of "Sympathie". Besides, Plotinos's
hypostases gave Novalis a model of the universe which suited his notions of
organization and a creative Nature.
The notion of "experiment" and the associated concepts of practical knowledge,
knowledge formation and the aesthetics of scientific productivity have not been
dealt with fully in Novalis scholarship. The sciences have been treated in Novalis's
works, but this has mostly taken place in respect of medicine and mathematics.
Chemistry and "Physik" still remain relatively uncharted areas of Novalis's thought
(354, 152, 164). This work's uncovering of Novalis's view on phosphorus in the
pneumatic debate and Novalis's relationship to Ritter aims to contribute to some
extent to filling this lacuna in Novalis scholarship. However, this is not the central
issue here. The neglect of the issues of "experiment", practical knowledge and the
sciences other than medicine, and the predominant concentration of Novalis
scholarship on literary, moral and political aspects of Novalis's works is somewhat
surprising given the Romantic concerns for natural philosophy and reflection about
the limits of knowledge. Naturally, Romantic science has itself suffered neglect,
but, even given this neglect, there is much in Novalis's writings which points to
the cardinal importance of the sciences, their methodologies and their development
for his thought. It is particularly in the area of methodology that this work wishes
to assert the value of Novalis's scientific writings. Thus, as will be discussed, this
work goes beyond tackling specific doctrines, e.g. of natural philosophy, to the
study of methodologies. The end of the eighteenth century was an age of reflection
and it was the point when the institutionalized scientific disciplines, as we know
them today, were being formed: it is therefore highly probable, as the main thrust
of this work suggests, that a key concern of the Romantics - who, as Ziolkowski
has shown, were deeply involved in institutions (303) - lay in ascertaining proper
methodologies of knowledge, particularly with respect to the sciences. This context
is stressed by the editors of Romanticism and the sciences, who recognize that the
period is important for the foundation of the sciences:
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Indeed two "Scientific Revolutions" are now commonly recognized - a first revolution around the
turn of the sixteenth century, in which new mathematically and experimentally oriented branches of
natural philosophy were created, and a second revolution around the turn of eighteenth century, in
which was formed the federation of disciplines that we call "science" (159, 1).
Important too, as the editors further comment, is that it was a period of great self-
understanding:
The second revolution, however, is marked by enterprises in individual and cultural self-
understanding that are both more radical and more explicit. To start with we may note that the
major critical movements of the period which affect the arts and sciences are all enterprises in self-
understanding. This is manifestly so in the critical philosophies which explore the scope and limits
of human knowledge on the basis of an examination of the nature and powers of the human
cognitive faculties - the philosophies of Hume, Kant and Johann Heinrich Lambert, for example
(159, 1-2).
It is perhaps worth remembering that Novalis's encyclopaedic interest is not simply
the result of his "Genie", but reflect the concerns of this second revolution, and
that his overt interest in encyclopaedism and in the subject reflects the period's
own emphasis on self-understanding.
Importantly, Novalis had substantial knowledge of contemporary scientific
thought and inquiry. It is true that his method does not come up to the strictures of
a mathematical paradigm, but that was not his intention, and in his theory of
practice Novalis was endeavouring to show that analysis or logic were not enough
for inquiry, and that knowledge involved much more than logic. Novalis's model
of inquiry is, then, correspondingly broad, but often sufficiently practice-oriented
to remain concrete; indeed, he believed it had to be so, for the establishment of
truth to him relied above all on "Experimentiren". He remarks, for example, in a
key fragment in the Das ailgemeine Brouillon, how the commonly used form of
logic, the principle of contradiction, had, in his view, to be employed in
conjunction with "ein andres Vermogen" in an "experimental method", whereby
both logic and man's other faculties would complement one another. Such a
method would approximate to a type of "thought-calculus", gradually reaching
towards truth: at the very least, it would result in a better form of theory, since the
18
results would have been put through a process of "experimentation". The fruits of
Novalis's reading and his quest for a reliable method can be seen in the following
remark from the Das ailgemeine Brouillon:
Soilte es sich bestätigen, daB der Satz des Widerspruchs der Grundsatz des Denkverrnögens, der
Obersie der Logik, sey, so ware dies nur eine Indication , daB wir mit der Logik allein mcht viel
ausrichten könnten, daB das Denkverrn[ögenj allein keinen (groflen) Nutzen gewahre - sondern, daB
wir noch em andres Vermogen und seine Theorie aufsuchen rnufiten, die als dem Denkvermögen
und d[er] Logik entgegengesezt und ailein eben so nutzlos, als diese, in Verbindung mit diesen
gesezt werden rnüBten, urn daraus em zusammengeseztes Verrnogen - und zusammengesezte, sich
gegenseitig complettirende Theorieen und Handl[ungen] und Resultate zu erlangen und so fort.
Am Ende scheint alles Nachdenken auf ächtes Experirnentiren zu führen - und die sog[enannte]
Vernunftlehre - die Nothwendigkeit, Methode, etc. des Experirnentirens und Lebens, als eines
besthndigen Experirnentirens zu enthalten und beweisen (N, 3, 402).
Novalis here affirms the necessity of combining contrary approaches, and
concludes by asserting his fundamental belief in "experiment". It will be shown
how Novalis seeks to combine the ontological premises of scientific logic with
those of aesthetics. Novalis sees that science obviously leads to progress, but this
progression should be harnessed to aesthetics, and ultimately, a higher notion of
natural philosophy.
To turn now to the ramifications of Novalis scholarship for intellectual history:
these are best analyzed in a discussion which revolves around von Molmir's,
Neubauer's, Frank's, Uerlings's and this present work's stances to Novalis. All
these critics can be seen then as voices productively interpenetrating to afford a
better understanding of Novalis. As in the following sections of the introduction, I
will deliberately be letting various stances interplay in order to check areas of
genuine complementarity and to gain access to intermethodological enhancement.
Von Molnár and Neubauer have put Novalis into the postmodernist context in
different ways (336; 34C). In his essay of 1989 von Molnár sums up the concern of
his major work of 1987 which was to show the self-reflexivity of Novalis's thought
(335). Von Molnár does not make links to practical knowledge in the sense of
scientific practice and knowledge formation. Practical knowledge remains
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explicitly at the ethical level, and not at the other practical "ethical" level of
knowledge formation:
Effectively, the interrelatedness of science, language, and human conduct arises for Novalis within a
self-reflexive continuum where the sciences seem to refer to nature but actually point to the question
of intersubjective valence, acts of communication seem to refer to concepts but actually refer them
to the intersubjective context of human communality, communal organization ..." (336, 124-125).
Von Molnár sees Novalis's thought in essence as a project which seeks to poeticize
all realms of knowledge by treating them in terms of poetry and meaning creation
(336, 125-6). This is a view which importantly illustrates just how moral and
practically concerned Novalis's aesthetics are. However, do Novalis's views have
to be seen in terms of a communicative social construct, even given that von
Molnr avoids the common ontological relativism of sociologists by referring to a
moral regulative principle for the members of a community? Novalis's relationship
to Ritter shows precisely the reversal of such a view, for there the epistemology of
the individual's scientific discovery leads to a form of consensus. In Ritter's work
"acts of communication" refer first to the intersubjective context of the individual
inquirer and the phenomena under investigation. The ethical element of the early
Romantics' natural philosophy lies in the way they pay respect to Nature's own
subjectivity and purposiveness, and also in their experience-based (as opposed to
theoretically based) methodologies. In a second step one may begin to speak of the
way in which "acts of communication" refer to "the intersubjective context of
human communality". Novalis's view of phosphorus in the pneumatic debate does,
however, come closer to von Molnár's view of a moral social construct, since
Novalis appears primarily to be underlining the social uses of phosphorus as
consensual term or metaphor for the activities in the pneumatic debate. Thus
Novalis has both social and epistemological elements in his thought on the
sciences, although I would argue in general for the primacy of epistemological
elements. Another case of consensuality with sociological, ethical and
epistemological elements in Romantic natural philosophy that is worth mentioning
in this context is, as Sepper intimates, to be found in Goethe. Goethe sees the need
for scientists to be continually aware of the phenomenal foundations or core of
their subject matter. Goethe envisages an ethical element in the idea that scientists
must be able to work together and discuss matters at this basic level of the core of
their discipline before moving onto speculative work. The epistemological element
20
lies in the fact that agreement must be arrived at over foundational issues before
progressing into deeper layers of theory where the danger lurks that "reality can
slide ever further away, from appearance to substructure to sub-substructure".
Sepper remarks further:
For Goethe the core of a science is its subject matter, comprehensively worked out from everyday
experience and amplified by technical praxis. If scientists do not have a clear understanding of this
core, then they really do not know what their science is about. Although science does not stop at
this core, it begins there and also eventually returns. ... it is ... imperative that scientists cooperate
at this basic level, which means they have to share results, offer comment and criticism ... In doing
so they will fulfill one of Goethe's chief hopes, that scientists will devote careful attention to the
groundwork and purview of their science as a basis for more highly speculative work. If these
conditions are met, the science can be understood as single and continuous, despite changes over
time, because the constant reference to phenomenal foundations, even in cases of amendment,
returns the science to its point of origin (276, 188).
There is, however, a further aspect to von Molnár's views. Neubauer points out
that although von Molnár's work pays "attention to Novalis' concern with the
absolute and his position in the history of mystical thinking", von Molnár's prime
concern is to show that there is in Novalis's work "an intersubjectivity that is
founded on the subject and the community of subjects, and not on some
metaphysical entity" (340, 133). Neubauer then goes on to alert our attention to the
fact that, even given von Molnár's sociological streaks, his notions of the
"normative regulative principle" and the "ideal community of mankind" do have
absolute, metaphysical elements. These notions, as Neubauer remarks when
referring to a passage in von Molnár's work of 1987 (335, 201), leave a gap
between actual and ideal practice, and stress the ideal of poeticizing (the consensus
of poetry) to the detriment of the reality of Novalis's own practice:
Notice that in this explanation the intersubjective force of science comes not from some kind of
agreement between signifier and signified (or systems thereof) but from an agreement between the
communicants that is demanded of them by a "normative regulative principle". ... This leaves, as in
Kant's ethics, a gaping hole between actual and ideal practice ... One may judge action by the
standard of the categorical imperative but one cannot assume that it is defaclo the standard that
people use in deciding on action ... To what extent Novalis was aware of this gap between what is
and what ought to be, to what extent he thought it possible to proceed towards consensus of
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dialogical clashes between irreconcilable opposites, is a matter on which there may be legitimate
disagreement. But we must admit that all his notes, his fragments, his poetic works enact and
juxtapose different voices or discourses that do not merge - no matter how much he wished
consensus as an ideal. The rhetoric of this ideal should not overshadow the reality of his wnterly
practice (340, 136-137).
Neubauer is wise here to remind us of the passivity and pluralism in Novalis's
works. Equally, as Neubauer points out, as fragmentary as some aspects of
Novalis's works are, there is a definite epistemological element. Neubauer does
allow for "legitimate disagreement" here. He does himself refer to the
"metaphysical anchor" in Novalis's notion of language. According to Neubauer,
Novalis's notion of language is not entirely deconstructionist free-play, but falls
into a more differentiated category of deconstructionism, where language is seen as
a "nostalgic play with signs of a structure that has lost its center" (340, 133, 139
fn.4). A more direct anchor - which need not necessarily be interpreted
metaphysically - is found, I think, in Herder's Plostik. Another view on language,
that of Manfred Frank, will be discussed below. However, I side with Neubauer in
his defence of Novalis's pluralism against von Molnr's view of Novalis, which
tends towards notions of absolute morality. None the less, Novalis cannot be seen
as a fully-fledged pluralist, which is the stance Neubauer takes up more
emphatically at the end of his essay. There are instances in Novalis's thought
where open-ended pluralism is combined with cognitive gain and moral elements.
The concrete example of phosphorus can be seen, for example as an instance of
ethics in natural philosophy. Phosphorus was a readily employable "moral"
scientific principle that is embedded in the practice of the science of the time. This
principle is not as highly positioned as a strictly ethical principle. It is not absolute,
but transcendent in contemporary scientific practice. It is, admittedly, not
employable by von Molnr's "ideal community of mankind", but at least by the
scientific community. This pattern in Novalis's thought - of the transcendent as
opposed to the absolute - is also found in his views on eschatology and history, as
Uerlings argues in his description of Novalis's utopia as a "narrative Konstruktion
einer erhofften Tendenz" (354, 609-613).
Neubauer's view of Novalis's pluralism has however elements which are highly
congenial to, and are reflected in this present work, for Neubauer stresses the
questioning and experimental nature of Novalis's approach to inquiry (340, 137).
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Neubauer does seem to be suggesting a type of progressive pluralism which
approaches inquiry from as many vantage points as possible. For Neubauer it is
Novalis's notion of experiment that staves off any attempts at over-hasty absolute
consensus (340, 136). Thus, in a different way to this present work, Neubauer
arrives at similar conclusions over the "experimental", more practical and non-
absolute stance of Novalis to inquiry.
There are further aspects of modem philosophy which relate to Neubauer's work.
Neubauer sees two strands in Novalis's thought - that of pluralism which
"anticipates Paul Feyerabend's critique of methodological monism", and, secondly,
a strand which he is correctly "reluctant" to take up, that of Popper's hypothetico-
deductivism (340, 138). Neubauer's main claim is that Novalis's essential
productive pluralism argues against the primacy of the use of hypotheses in the
sciences. Neubauer's reluctance is also based upon another reason, since he earlier
refers not directly to the notion of hypothesis, but to Novalis's idea of scientific
thought as the sensuous representation of concepts and the "mental activity" of
"thought experiments", which is a stance very close to that I will take in the
present work's view of "experiment" (340, 131, 135-136). The epistemological
status of the hypothesis has not only been called into question by sociologists of
science, but also, as will be discussed, by debates over practical and tacit
knowledge. As will be mentioned, Toulmin recognizes the use of hypothesis in
modern physics, but the more experience-based sciences he sees as operating with
paradigmatic types, which, at the level of the medical practitioner, for example,
are a type of knowledge akin to Aristotle's notion of "phronesis". This view of
scientific knowledge has affmities with the Romantic use of ideal types, for the
types - such as the nerve, the plant's leaf, the magnet and geognostical rock forms
- are based upon real phenomena. One aspect of the ethical elements in early
Romantic natural philosophy lies, as will be discussed, in their concern for
experience-based methodologies: there is a definite real element in their ideal
empiricism. One must admit that the moralizing of scientific activities is a matter
which is difficult to see fully realized in Novalis's fragments, and in this sense
Neubauer is right again to be cautious in interpreting Novalis's views: the rhetoric
should not overshadow the reality. The case of phosphorus as the consensual
symbol and "mental experiment" of inquirers participating in the pneumatic debate
is but one instance of consensus in Novalis's thought. The case of Ritter is,
naturally, rather more substantial.
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Another issue which comes to light in Neuhauer's essay arises out of his
comparison of Novalis's and Derrida's notion of language. It would seem
worthwhile not only considering language, but to consider briefly what
"experiment" could mean to deconstructionists, particularly for the reason, as
Neubauer remarks, that postmodernists "pay little or no attention to romantic
science" (340, 130). Firstly, there is some gap between the relativism of de
Man's radical temporality and the ethical and epistemological elements of
Novalis's notion of "experiment". Putting this idea into Frank's terms, the
temporality of Novalis's notion of "experiment" is transcendent and part of a
tendency towards the absolute. Secondly, Derrida's notion of repetitive, never-
ending "diffërance" would appear at first sight to be perhaps compatible with
Novalis's idea of re-experiencing experience in concrete thought. Derrida's
"différance" would also appear to have affmities with Novalis's wish for endless
experimentation and the continual need to question the basis of statements and
thought. This is, however, not the case. Novalis certainly sees scientific
experiments as repetitions of a function in the way they circulate around
phenomena in inquiry, but also as variations - one could say transcendent
variations - on the path to formal theory. For Novalis experiment is repetition in
the sense of re-experiencing a past experience, but the phenomena or past
experience are translated into the language of the imagination in a process of
cognitive gain - as Ritter's discovery processes show. Novalis's view of
phosphorus does point to the endless repeatability of a phenomenon and its sign -
but it is, importantly, employed to a variety of arguably realized theoretical ends,
namely a considerable spectrum of views in the pneumatic debate. Realization
takes place since all the views form part of the gain in scientific knowledge over
gases (and other related subjects in the debate). Frank's critique of
deconstructionism can also be put to use in the context of "experiment" and
language. Frank argues for the use of the subject in interpreting signs and a
minimal identity of signs. As with Novalis, the implication is that signs are
variable but necessarily associated with meaning production and cognitive gain.
Frank remarks: "difference is never total but rather always partial" (170a, 433),
and argues for "a theory of the linguistic sign of the sort that simultaneously
explains its intersubjective understandability (according to a semiotic key that
vouches for the "minimal identity" of the signs) and the non-identity or non-
contemporaneity of its message" (170a, 439). This approach to language which
seeks to avoid Derrida's linguistic regress through the activities of the
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interpretative subject is also analogous to the way Novalis employs the subject in
experimentation to avoid what is now called the "Experimenter's Regress" - a
notion which will be discussed in more detail in chapter one and which refers to
the circularity in the relationship between practice and theory. Frank's notion of
language also bears some resemblances to the tenets of Herder's Plastik where
language is seen in terms of groups of works, whose meaning is accordingly
dependent on their context and the interpretation of the subject.
Let us now turn to Uerlings's notion of a "narrative Konstruktion immanenter
Transzendenf. This is an idea that incorporates several meanings. At the level of
language it argues that language operates indirectly using representations
("Darstellungen") (354, 230). Language is a process which illustrates the signified.
At the level of the ideal or "truth", language is transcendentally approaching truth
or the absolute in an asymptotic and temporal manner. As Uerlings remarks there
is no claim to "Verifizierbarkeit und/oder vollständige Realisierbarkeit" (354,
230). In this way Uerlings makes use of Frank's notion of language and his notion
of immanent transcendence (see below, section 6 of this chapter).
Uerlings's notion does, however, have its own particular identity. In an extended
sense, at the level of scientific inquiry, tlerlings's notion accords with the idea that
representations of phenomena ("Darstellungen") - such as Ritter's diagrams - can
be used in a process of discovery as mediators between the phenomena (the
signified) and knowledge. Uerlings's notion can also be applied to Novalis's
notions of history and utopia, as Uerlings himself does in his idea of a "narrative
Konstruktion einer erhofften Tendenz" (354, 609-613). His notion of a "narrative
Konstruktion immanenter Transzendenz" is, then, a highly interdisciplinary term,
as he himself points out (354, 230-231).
Uerlings's term also helps us to come closer to the answering the tricky question
about the Romantic genre of language. If we link Uerlings's important notion
"narrational" to Herder's Plastik, we can see how groups of words are used in a
narrational manner to convey meaning. This means that we convey meaning
indirectly through narration with a strong emphasis upon the context of the words:
this is an essentially aesthetic method of employing language. The narrational
relationship to language is like that of the painter to his materials: it is first in the
use and creation of language forms that meaning comes about. Discrete words, like
individual strokes and forms of paint do not convey meaning in themselves. On the
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other hand, one can equally maintain that for Herder a discrete tone such as a cry
is already on the path to convey meaning, not in the semiotic sense of the visual
letter, but instead in the sound of the word itself (51, 5, 11). This aspect of
language is directly related to the idea of narration which emphasizes the fact that
language is a sound. Poetry is to he narrated, i.e. read aloud, so that meaning is to
be conveyed by the sound of language itself: in this sense language is composed of
sound signs. This is a major part of Novalis's notion of language: it is his wish that
language in its highest form should be plasticized and given musical qualities (N,
3, 123-124). This moreover does not mean that language is an autonomous form of
conveying meaning with its own code since, in Novalis's view, language's
musicality is part of the whole of Nature's "language". Language, in its musicality,
comes ever closer to attune itself to the forms of the natural world. Novalis's
notion of language is also bound up with what I will refer to later as the
"experimental" and symbolic use of language (see below, section 5 of this
chapter). Language uses symbolic representations of phenomena (the signified);
"experimental" refers both to the essential experiential nature of language and the
idea of cognitive gain. Symbolism and "experiment" both point to the indirect use
of language in a temporal manner that moves towards gaining knowledge.
Uerlings's notion of the narrational goes one step further in underlining the poetic
nature of language in the way meaning is conveyed through sound. I have to
remain at the level of the symbolic and experimental so as to encapsulate not only
the aspects of Romantic verbal language, but also visual language. Rifler's use of
his diagrams shows that he does not treat them as discrete semantic units, but as a
whole and as a group of representations. The analogy of the sound signs of verbal
language to visual language is arguably found in those parts of Rifler's diagrams
which hover between the abstract and the mimetic, as a uniquely "concrete" form
of visual meaning.
A further aspect, which is worthwhile tentatively broaching now, is the usefulness
of Uerlings's term "narrative" for making links between literature and the sciences.
Only one aspect will be discussed briefly, that of the use of Uerlings's term for
explaining the relationship between Romantic science and alchemy in terms of
narrational techniques. Knoespel in a recent article offers an illuminating
interpretation of alchemical texts. Knoespel remarks: "Above all we need to
acknowledge that alchemy proceeds by employing a metanarrative and a series of
local narratives" (217, 100). Knoespel points out that alchemists are less concerned
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with the metanarrative as espoused in the final closure represented by the
phiospher's stone or "the ultimate transmutation of base metal into gold" (217,
99). They are far more concerned in narrating the stages of experimentation and
the stages leading to the attainment of the philosopher's stone (217, 100). What we
have in alchemy then is series of symbolic narratives leading up to the higher
metanarrative. In an analogous manner Ritter, and Novalis's use of galvanic
symbolism in the "Märchen" in Heinrich von Ofterdingen, show the use of a series
of symbols or individual narratives to attain scientific theory or a poetic statement.
In Novalis and Ritter there is an attempt to unite alchemy's concern with the
narration of psycho-physical events with modem science. Lavoisier's chemistry is
concerned with the purification of scientific language (217, 107), and shifts the use
of narrative towards social metaphors "used to describe the cooperation of chemists
in their new science" (217, 108). Novalis and Ritter, on the other hand, wish to
keep narration as a tool of scientific discovery and knowledge formation. Ritter's
and Novalis's use of what Uerlings terms "narration", in the sense of
representations of phenomena moving transcendentally to the attainment of
knowledge, can not only then be seen as appropriate for providing some solutions
to the modern problems of over-theorized science, but also can be viewed as
linking back to alchemical narrational concerns.
Finally I wish to reflect once again upon these stances of Novalis criticism in
terms of "experiment". "Experiment" has proven to be a highly flexible and
resourceful term. In the sense of the new and experimental it contains aspects of
the pluralism of postmodernism. One can think of Novalis's works in terms of the
fragmentary, endless experimentation and radical temporality, but this view has to
be corrected by the undeniable epistemological element in Novalis's notion of
"experiment". Views aboutthe plurality or epistemological status of Novalis's
thought, or as Neubauer puts this, the "centrifugal" or "centripetal" urge in
Novalis's thought (340, 136), cannot be properly resolved until more work is
undertaken on science and the relationship of science to literature in his works. I
would argue that perhaps there may be a shift from the more pluralistic stance of
Das aligemeine Brouillon to the beginnings of some consensus in Ritter's notion of
galvanism as also adopted by Novalis. An epistemological element is, as
mentioned, permanently present in Novalis's works, both in the sense of
"experiment", and in the manner his works are concerned with paths to utopia in
the immanent transcendence of the absolute, as Mähl and Uerlings have shown.
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The move towards a consensus in Novalis's reception of Ritter could perhaps be
interpreted as a move towards the epistemological status of a case study in
Toulmin's sense. This would coincide with the threatening theoretical closure of
the sciences of the time into disciplines: the case of Ritter would argue for
continuing interdisciplinarity and the value of individual discovery over "theory".
Following up from these epistemological concerns one can observe that
"experiment" points strongly to practical knowledge in the sense of ethics, but not
in the sense of a social construct of knowledge or a normative regulative principle.
Instead an instance of a lower level, more practical consensual understanding of
communication has been argued for in the example of phosphorus in the pneumatic
debate. Ritter's work too has many of these characteristics. "Experiment" above all
stresses the possibility of cognitive gain and shows how the subject is employed in
knowledge formation. This can be interpreted in terms of narration, representation,
experiential knowledge and practical knowledge.
The attempt has been made in this present thesis to approach German Idealism in
terms of productivity. This has been done so as to make the theoretical transition to
practical knowledge or tacit knowledge clearer. References to "paradigmatic types"
and "constitutive rules" will thus be made. This is useful for opening discussions
over German Idealism not, as is usually the case, in Idealist terms but in terms of
the concrete and empirical.
There is a utopian element in the idea of "experiment" since the concept implies
that men can manipulate and ultimately change nature, but this does not point
necessarily to the technological mastery over nature. Instead, in Romantic natural
philosophy there are ethical elements which strive to respect Nature's own
subjectivity. Progression should come about hand in hand with Nature. The notion
of "experiment" neither plays into the hands of a pure aestheticizing of nature nor
into the hands of hypothetico-deductivists. 4 The plasticizing and experiencing of
knowledge bridge science and aesthetics. Novalis's idea of a "symbolische Physik"
is charged with epistemological, natural philosophical, and even sociological
implications. These issues surrounding Novalis's value for intellectual history will
be reflected upon again at the end of section 5 of this introduction, once the
relevance of the concept of early Romantic productivity for intellectual history has
been sufficiently illustrated.
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2. Premises and methodology.
This work began, as many of its kind probably do, with a feeling of astonishment
and fascination at the way scientific notions can be intimately linked to those of the
philosophical, moral and artistic realms in the work of some particular thinkers (in
my case this occurred during my first reading of the maxims and aphorisms of
Goethe and Novalis). It is only too natural today to assume that science and the
humanities have really very little in common. Of course research, particularly in
the last decade and more, has worked considerably to change this presupposition.
However, even if the notion of the split between the two cultures of literature and
science seems to be a theme that has been over-worked, one must not forget that
this split, while extensively analyzed by intellectual historians into an open
resolution of a plurality of cultures, is still the current life and blood of any
education system. The split is, I want to stress, still very real. Moreover, even for
intellectual historians the analysis and dissolution of the two cultures as a bogus
concept has lead in general to a response oriented around the humanities (e.g.
around sociological perspectives, genres and rhetoric) and not always to a
resolution taking a more equal account of both scientific and artistic knowledge in
their points of transition. It is particularly with a conceptually "tighter" resolution
of the sciences and the humanities in early German Romanticism that this work is
concerned. It is in the role of practical knowledge, a notion of knowledge that lies
prior to the activities of arts and sciences themselves, that this work attempts to
fend off the relativism sometimes apparent in humanities-oriented responses to
intellectual history. In this sense, this work attempts to take a more equal account
of artistic and scientific knowledge since factors are studied which are prior to the
inception of both art and science.
Before treating these issues in greater detail, I wish first to give an indication of
the stance of this dissertation. The issues concerning the status of literature and
science studies are well enough known to allow me to forego a long and detailed
introduction to the subject. 5
 I wish instead only to delineate some key issues so as
to position this dissertation within the debate. It goes without saying that until the
1980's it was common, in the main, to explore the arts in terms of science. More
recently, the reverse approach has been undertaken under the banner of genre
studies. The value of genre studies, as I understand Dear's project, will he
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discussed in more detail below, but the main thrust of this approach, that science is
determined by literary style, is questionable. Common sense argues first of all
against such a viewpoint: it is difficult to imagine how science can be affected by
rhetoric alone. There are also some epistemological and linguistic problems raised
by such a stance in genre studies. It would seem, in nuce, that literature and
science studies point to the difficulties of upholding positions that tend towards
linguistic purism or scientific absolutism; none the less, projects such as genre
studies are, of course, seeking to bring science and literature closer together. 6 At
the moment, opinion over literature and science studies coheres around the project
of treating them both in terms of cultural discourse. This stance provides the means
to observe how both discourses move in and out of one another. Influence is then
more justly seen to be a bi- or urn-directional affair. These types of studies are
correspondingly broad, blending elements of many discourses, be they historical,
philosophical, scientific, social, psychoanalytical or literary. Thus, Rousseau and
Gillian Beer, for instance, have a more reflective stance to the way sciences and
literature effect one another than that of one-directional methods. Rousseau has
shown how notions of sensibility may have been imported into science from
literature, yet his fmal stance is cautious over the exact relationship between
science and literature (266). Gil lian Beer has undertaken work on Darwin and
Hopkins in the same manner as a study of cultural discourses (138; 140). This type
of reflectivity points to questions surrounding non-causal relationships between
science and literature. Naturally, giving up causal relationships entirely can lead to
another extreme: that of open-ended pluralistic discourses. This is, of course, a
necessary part of the development of this area of study in intellectual history:
exploration of the way literature and science interact in all possible forms is the
way forward. None the less, there is a large question haunting these explorations:
what is the new theory or new project going to look like that seeks to unite or draw
closer the arts and the sciences? This question must be permanently reasserted to
give the whole project perspective and, arguably, sense. Relativism is not always,
but can sometimes be just as much a danger as scientific absolutism or aesthetic
purism. Sociological relativism, as now increasingly found in studies in the history
of science, is another danger which threatens the sense of the whole project
concerning cultural discourse; although, as discussed below, there are sociological
perspectives in the history of science that cannot, given the sheer depth and breadth
of their analyses, be reduced in a facile manner to relativism.
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Returning to the question of the sort of theory needed to unite the project
revolving around the relationship of literature and science, Rousseau's and Beer's
reflective multiple discourse approach points to the gradual accumulation of
transitions between discourses. Weininger, in his introduction to the collection of
essays, Literature and science as modes of expression, taking up Elinor Shaffer's
stance, sees the answers to the question of a theory for science and literature lying
in "a new understanding of the nature of literature and of language" (131, xxii;
278). Significantly for this dissertation, Weininger sees potential here in Novalis's
thought. Commenting on Neubauer's work, Weininger points to Novalis's "insight
into the centrality of the imagination for all human constructions, including
science" (131, xix) and, further, commenting on von Moh*'s work, remarks on
the way "Novalis conceives of language as a bridge between theoretical reason
(science) and practical reason (ethics)" (131, xx). A possible answer to
Weininger's call for an exploration of the deeper relationship between literature
and science in terms of language will be undertaken in the light of Novalis's
reception of Ritter. The case of Ritter's work on galvanism is a realization of
Novalis's concern for natural philosophical productivity in the unification of
practice. It will be shown, in this instance, just how close "res" and "verba" come
to another. Importantly, this meeting of "res" and "verba" does not state that art
directly effects science: it proposes that it is through a common methodology that
they can at all meet one another, and this points more exactly to the positioning of
this dissertation in literature and science studies. Elinor Schaffer has pointed to
such further areas where a possible theoretical base for literature and science could
lie. She refers above all to the increased interest in practice, both in literary theory
and history of science. Among the variety of issues she raises, including the notion
of "dangerous knowledge", the most relevant ones for this dissertation are the
possibility of a language of the inner consciousness and the notion of practical
knowledge. When discussing the idea of consensuality and the use of models and
metaphors in knowledge formation she points, after Ziman, to the fact that
consensibility may be a more appropriate term for the consensus account of
knowledge formation, given the difficulties involved in stipulating a language of
inner consciousness (282, xvi; 302, 189). However, she also makes reference to
several areas of thought where the language of the inner consciousness may
become a possibility. Two of her suggestions will serve well to point the reader in
the direction which this dissertation is travelling. The notion of active knowledge
involved in the performance of knowledge is one. This approach to knowledge
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formation is linked up at hermeneutic levels with this dissertation's concern for
experiential knowledge as "experiment". Another path she points to is that
suggested in Toulmin's work on practical knowledge and the case study. I will
only briefly rehearse here the way in which these two approaches are relevant to
this dissertation, since these themes will elaborated upon throughout the course of
this work. I should like to argue that both of these approaches are, perhaps, of use
for offering up considerations about a type of theory for literature and science
studies. What this dissertation emphasizes is the cognitive gain in the notion of
"experiment". The use of experience brings the thinker closer to phenomena and
also to the experientiality of knowledge itself, and, in this sense, argues for
cognitive gain. The issues of experiential knowledge link up directly to Toulmin's
discussion of practical knowledge, and further, to the use of case studies in
knowledge formation. To express this aspect briefly, the idea of a case study, as
employed in this dissertation, implies the reconstruction of theory in an
interdisciplinary manner. Novalis's reception of Ritter's work illustrates just this,
and, in addition, argues for the particular role of the individual inquirer in such
processes of knowledge formation. Ultimately, the notion of unifying practice
proposed here argues for a language of the inner consciousness based upon the
interdisciplinary reconstruction of theory and the use of experiential knowledge.
These aspects of knowledge formation both work at bringing the languages
expressed in the purposiveness of Nature and of the individual inquirer's
imagination close together. Due to the particular role of the individual in this
notion of knowledge formation and consensuality, this understanding of Novalis's
thought (and, consequently, as is argued, of early Romantic thought in general)
cannot be seen alone in terms of the epiphanic. The unification of Nature's
purposiveness and man's consciousness is the major goal of the early Romantics,
but, this is, arguably, a project with some notable consequences for the notion of
individual knowledge. Furthermore, the type of aesthetics proposed here accords
with the idea of dangerous knowledge, since it is an aesthetics that has the rigour
and the goads of a scientific method (aesthetics is, of course, a key part of the
scientific method of the early Romantics). Interestingly enough, some of the works
in the history of science Elinor Shaffer refers to are not recent. This highlights the
way historians of science have, perhaps, in recent years, set aside the issues
concerning herineneutics, metaphor and this type of language use in the sciences.7
This dissertation shows the use of models and metaphors (as part of Novalis's
rhetoric of experiment) in reconstructing theory and in methodology. This is the
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meaning behind the notion of unifying practice: the path to consensuality afforded
by the use of such metaphors and models. This is the path that this dissertation is
travelling down, to work at offering up some form of epistemology for linking the
arts and the sciences. It is in this sense that this dissertation suggests tighter
conceptual links between the arts and the sciences than are perhaps found in more
pluralist approaches. In the conclusion the views of a historian of science, Jardine,
will be discussed in order to bring further perspective to the early Romantic
method. It will be tentatively considered to what extent they fare up to Jardine's
views of aesthetics in the sciences, and, also, how practicable their views are. In
this manner an attempt will be undertaken to add some more perspectives to the
roles of practical knowledge and aesthetics in the sciences. The purpose of this
work does not lie in making an explicit proposition for a theory for the field of
literature and science; it is far more my concern to compare, to contrast, and to
attempt to enhance different approaches in intellectual history. In effect, my main
concerns are to attempt some "translations" of the various approaches into another,
and to illustrate some aspects of early Romantic methodology which could be of
use for current debates over intellectual history.
I began my studies of Novalis under the premise that it would be best, given the
breadth of Novalis's scientific interests, to concentrate on one scientific discipline
and to present its links to Novalis's literary achievements. However, this approach,
rather more swiffly than expected, fell to the wayside. This state of events occurred
during my reading of Das aligemeine Brouillon. It was there that an irreversible
hunch overtook my previous interests. A problem arose for me in seeking to
interpret an important fragment which had hitherto not been adequately analyzed.
It dealt with notions of Neoplatonism, experiment, and method (N, 3, 445; see
below, chapter 2, section 1.7). What did this seemingly cryptic but clearly
intellectually cogent fragment actually mean? My hunch crystallized around
Novalis's extensive and cryptic use of the term "experiment". It was this pervasive
term which lead me away from the study of a specific discipline to the study of
many disciplines and their origins, methodologies and unities. It became clear that
work had to be carried out on that area of knowledge which is prior or common to
the disciplines. As remarked, this happened far quicker than expected, for it is not
often that a thinker's stance to knowledge as a whole can be encapsulated under a
one major notion. Not that this is the case entirely with the term "experiment";
there are many other key terms in Novalis's thought; none the less the term
33
"experiment" is a key term, and certainly a term under which much of Novalis's
thought can be analyzed with effective results. The difficulty of ascertaining key
notions is particularly the case with thinkers such as Goethe and Novalis, who are
wary of pinning themselves down to specific doctrines. The term "experiment", as
will be argued, possesses particular merits in this respect, since it has significant
undoctrinal implications. This dissertation attempts to show just how important the
issues arising out of Novalis's understanding of the term "experiment" were for
many of his activities, and indeed, how significant this understanding of
"experiment" is for early Romantic science in general. Furthermore, it will, I
hope, provide an epistemological and contextual base for further studies on
Novalis; equally, I hope it contributes to our awareness of early German Romantic
science.
There are two works to date which provide a general survey of the sciences in the
Romantic period: Gode-von Aesch's work of 1941, Natural Sciences and
Romanticism (175), and the recent series of essays in Romanticism and the
sciences, edited by Cunningham and Jardine (159). Romanticism and the sciences
offers a wealth of material showing the philosophical viewpoints and intellectual
traditions in an array of Romantic thinkers. The work provides sections on the
notion of Romanticism in its philosophical and institutional context, on the organic
and inorganic sciences and on science and literature. Gode-von Aesch's work, on
the other hand, chiefly studies the notion of organicism in Romantic thought. This
present dissertation wishes to complement these studies by viewing some key
examples of early German Romantic thought under the notions of practice and
methodology. It's outlook cannot pretend to be broad as the collection of essays in
Romanticism and the sciences, on the other hand it attempts to provide a modest
synthesis of early Romantic thought in the issues of practice. The synthesis
Gode-von Aesch strives to attain, as mentioned, is that of the idea of organicism in
the Romantic thought. With respect to Gode-von Aesch's work, this present
dissertation wishes to provide a methodological basis for analyzing Romantic
notions such as organicism. Gode-von Aesch emphasizes the Romantics' unfulfilled
quest of attempting to explain the whole of nature and their doctrine of organicism
(175, 12-13, 123, 267). This present work moves outwards from the key natural
philosophical tenets of Novalis and Ritter, and specifically not only from their
natural philosophical doctrines, but from their natural philosophical method. It is
this attempt to capture the tenets and moods of the early Romantics, as, for
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example, in Ritter's early work on galvanism, or the early experiments of
Schelling with forms of natural philosophical systems, that arguably puts the aims
of the early Romantics into a more appropriate perspective. This work treats the
genesis of Romanticism and attempts thereby to capture their views by a study of
the initial "workshops" where they formulated their key ideas. Unlike the above
mentioned studies, this dissertation does not attempt to tackle the later Romantics,
although a comparison is made in this introduction between the works of the early
Romantics and Oken. Perhaps this tentative comparison between the two can throw
some light upon the manner in which Romantic thought developed - but this is, I
wish to stress, only tentative. More importantly, this present dissertation wishes to
illustrate how a central concern of the early Romantics lies in the justification of
their views and how this is related to experimental practice and their notion of a
theory of practice.
It is of interest to note that Novalis is often cited by Gode-von Aesch and used
substantially by the editors in their introduction to Romanticism and the sciences.
The present work suggests that their recourse to Novalis as a keystone for the chief
characteristics of Romantic thought is tenable, but not entirely for the reasons they
put forward. The importance of Novalis for capturing the Romantic biocentric or
physiognomic view of the Nature (Gode-von Aesch) or for showing the Romantic
quest for the development of a multiplicity of disciplines (Cunningham and
Jardine) represent certain, specific, but selected aspects of the ways in which
Novalis is characteristic of Romantic thought. Cunningham and Jardine do further
point to Novalis's view that the experimental disciplines are to be seen in terms of
artistic production, but this notion is then discarded as being "so solipsistic as to
rule out communal enterprise" (159, 6-7). By contrast, it is an aim of the present
work to show how Novalis's ideas on a method of knowledge formation, as
formulated in his notion of practical knowledge, which is indeed related to artistic
production, was a method capable of communal enterprise, as this was undertaken
by key Romantics such as Rifler and Humboldt (1769-1859), and, not least, by
Goethe.8
Roy Porter comments that, although Romanticism and the sciences succeeds in
unraveling intellectual traditions, "a much more fully researched history of the rise
of the intellectual classes" is still needed to explain Romantic science or the
relationship between literature and science (281, 276). It would appear, however,
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that there is still work needed on analyzing the philosophical and scientific issues
of the age - many of which still lie open. Romanticism and the sciences provides a
mass of intellectual background which is in any case necessary for Porter's task.
But is Porter's view the only solution at this stage in Romantic studies? I think not.
What do all the fragments of Romantic thought point to? I say fragments, even
though many Romantics presented completed works, because their works remain
fragments given their intention to capture the whole of nature and experience.
Their works are certainly not unscientific half-fulfilled dreams, for there is a strong
empirical and philosophical base to their works. It is common to view the
fragments of Romanticism as the quest for unity, but if Romanticism is left at that -
as a unifying urge - this is of no explanatory help. My thesis argues for a different
approach. It studies, as mentioned, the genesis of knowledge in Romanticism.
Questions are posed about the causes leading to a belief in unity, and great
attention is paid to the steps undertaken to justify the idea of unity. Unity is
approached through a case study of Romantic science, in the work of Novalis, and
in its relation to Ritter, and also through the assessment of Novalis's philosophy of
practice. In this introduction an attempt is made to put the issues that arise out this
case study and of Novalis's philosophy into a proper perspective as concerns
intellectual history, Romantic thought, and a theory of practice or practical
knowledge.
Given its theme of the link of practice to Romantic thought, this work has a
particular place within the discipline of intellectual history. It is written in a spirit
that applauds the awareness of the need for reflection upon the traditional notions
of the disciplines, and stresses the need for interdisciplinarity. Indeed, the chief
subject is the notion of a correct method and the search for reliability in
knowledge. Where, one can say, is a better place to tackle such an enterprise
concerning the questions of reflection and method than in the era of the Romantics
where the disciplines as we know them today have their origins? This present
dissertation's stance to intellectual history has already been briefly sketched: in the
remainder of the introduction it s positioning will be more precisely elucidated.
Before treating the areas of genre and practical knowledge, I wish first to consider
the position of this thesis in relation to current historiographic methods in the
history of the sciences.
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History of science has currently two major movements, those taking the
internalist/intellectualist approaches and those taking the externalistlpraxis-onented
approaches. The sociologically oriented externalists pose a significant threat to
anybody combatting relativism. Social determinism is always implicit in such
approaches. Nevertheless, Shapin's and Schaffer's work (286), for example, has
done a great deal to open up the debate on how consensus is attained in the
sciences and their works cannot be reduced to a notion of relativism. I will return
to their work later when speaking of the importance of achieving a variety of
historical approaches when examining the history of science. For its main part, this
work makes no claims to any in-depth examination of the subjects that the
externalist interest theory approach tackles, such as the role of social, political or
professional interests in the attainment of consensus. Likewise, it does not trace the
breadth of material needed to satisfy a network theorist such as Latour (228; 229).
It does, however, offer much material on literary and aesthetic strategies leading to
consensus, which is indeed of interest to network theorists (210, 194-195).
Furthermore, of interest to externalists is the chapter dedicated to Novalis's views
on the pneumatic debate. There the contextualization of phosphorus broaches the
notions of the theatrical and the anecdotal in the sciences. The widespread use and
knowledge of phosphorus, both in the sciences and for purposes of entertainment,
place the substance in a social setting.
However, it is essentially an intellectualist approach that is here undertaken (the
chapter on the pneumatic debate is in essence also intellectually oriented). This is,
according to Jardine, what constitutes "the most fundamental level of content, the
content that underlies both the research agendas of the sciences and the factual and
theoretical doctrines of the sciences" (210, 152). Jardine also supports the interests
of externalist historians and praxis-oriented sociologists. He sees the primary
determinants of his notion of "the scenes of inquiry" manifested in the local
practices, institutions and technologies of the sciences. Jardine's ultimate aim is the
synthesis of both schools of thought, the internalists and the externalists, albeit as
he states with a significant emphasis on local practices, methods and doctrines.
Since this work has little externalist orientation it offers no synthesis in Jardine's
sense. At another level it does provide the beginnings of some synthesis of
internalist and externalist approaches in the period under examination. The reason
for this lies in its concern for practice, but only in an extended way could this be
interpreted as an externalist approach, since practice in the works under study here
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is defined in an intellectualist way. In fact the notion of practice here is heavily
imbued with the Romantic natural philosophical outlooks and with their aesthetics.
What this work hopes to provide, as a useful extension to sociological
contextualizations, is material on the more tacit practices of the Romantics and
their links to the Romantic natural philosophical theory. This can perhaps be seen
as having further externalist implications for the reason that it is argued that the
notion of practice applies to several major Romantic thinkers, and not to one
individual alone. The fmdings on Novalis and Ritter, which form the centre of my
focus, are also applied to Werner, Goethe, Humboldt and Schelling. In the context
of the present growth of externalist approaches, and the present state of research
into Romantic science, I argue that a fundamentally intellectualist approach is still
required to capture the aims of early Romantic science.
The way in which practice is approached here is, as already implied,
intellectualist in a particular fashion. Externalists have criticized traditional
intellectualist approaches of the post-Koyréan school for their metaphysical
determinism and for the way in which such approaches put forward an overly
passive role for the "cultural actor". Thus the externalists' point is that in the
writings of intellectualists "culture uses the actor" whereas in their works "the
actor uses the culture" (284, 111). By contrast, I here put forward an "active"
intellectualist approach since the thinkers under study are not seen to be passively
conducting their inquiries under the influence of the metaphysical, but instead, as
with Ritter for example, natural philosophy is seen to be actively made. The
Romantics present us with a field of "active" metaphysical works. The metaphysics
is undeniably there as an influence, but at the same time the metaphysics is
categorically not treated in a passive way. This approach is made possible since my
work concentrates on the details of discovery processes: the active metaphysics can
be seen at work in practice and in the process of knowledge formation. A similar
stance is argued for in relation to Goethe and Humboldt. The view ought to come
as no great surprise, given the Romantics' concern for the processes of history, but
the applications of this "active" intellectualism to Romantic natural philosophy
have been neglected. Von Engelhardt makes a related point regarding "historical
consciousness": the Romantic concern for history cannot be seen as passive, for in
their concern for processes they are continually absorbing tradition and adapting it
in a creative fashion. In fact, the Romantic notion of the process of history is
exceedingly broad, so that thinkers such as Novalis and Ritter are dealing at one
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and the same time with the history of thought, culture and nature. Von Engelhardt
comments:
The historical consciousness of the natural sciences in the Romantic period not only merits the
historian's attention, it is also of lasting significance. Today again the concept of development has
become a key-word for practice and theory. Nature, culture, the individual, society and science all
develop, and there arises the question of concurrence and divergence of the types of development in
these diverse realms of reality . . - In general, the development of science is nowadays not related to
natural evolution, but nevertheless some connections have become increasingly clear. Nature has to
be understood as part of culture, and in the same way culture has a natural foundation. The
development of culture threatens evolution, and achieving insight into the shared fate of nature and
culture is an essential task for the future (168, 65).
The last part of the quotation relates to the purpose and ethics of science and to
ecological issues. I will only briefly refer to these below when discussing the major
tenets of Romantic natural philosophy (see below, section 5).
Historical consciousness and tradition are key terms for understanding what can
be called an "active" intellectualist approach. Historical consciousness relates at
obvious levels to the history of nature, of the human race, of culture, of ideas. At a
less obvious level it relates to the major concern of this work: the history of the
practice of ideas and the ensuing notion of an epistemology of practice. This
work's approach arose out of the Romantic concerns - given their concern for
history it is not surprising that material is available on the history of discovery, of
the practice of ideas and of an epistemology of practice. That this is not only a
Romantic concern, but also a concern of history of science today can be illustrated
by the following examples, where related themes have been broached. Thus, for
example, Nickles's notions of generative justification and induction relate closely
to this work's concern for practice and know-how (more on the issues of practice
will be said below) (248). Hesse speaks of the role of models in science in building
up a "sufficiently complex observation language" for the attainment of formal
theory (196, 46). Two more works also serve to pin point the aims of this work.
Rudwick shows the emergence of a visual language for geology in his portrayal of
how diagrams were used to represent geological ideas in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries (268). Gooding' s work on Faraday's (1791-1867) use of
diagrams as non-verbal concepts during the process of formulating his theory can
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be viewed as a straight equivalent to one of this work's concerns: the role of visual
elements in discovery processes (176). However, this work analyzses the aesthetics
of diagrams in greater depth, and, given the Romantic context, provides an
epistemology of practice in Novalis's terms and in those of other early Romantic
thinkers. It is also concerned with the variety of ways theory or meaning is
conveyed - be it visually, in open-ended concepts or even in phenomena
themselves. The study of Ritter shows how his galvanic theory came into being and
how Novalis provides an appropriate epistemology for discovery processes based
upon his fundamental notion of a theory of practice and upon his reception of
Ritter's work. The genesis of ideas, how ideas are conveyed and the way the early
Romantics see idea, representation and phenomenon all folding together and
enhancing one another are the major concerns of this work.
The notion of open-ended concepts gives this work a particular niche in
intellectual history since it deals not alone with how the early Romantics had a
theory of practice, but also how they were operating, in their eyes, within a
tradition of ideas. They draw on a tradition of open-ended concepts and adapt them
consciously to their purposes. In this sense the history of the practice of ideas has a
particular significance: it covers the early Romantic epistemology of practice, their
own notion of a practice of ideas, and how they view a broader tradition of the
practice of ideas. Thus, this thesis does not treat the way metaphysics affects
empiricism alone, nor does it treat practice alone, nor does it treat social practice
as such, nor does it treat the literary practice of science alone (this work's
relationship to genre and rhetoric studies is considered fully below); instead, as a
whole, it treats the practice of ideas.
The particular awareness that the Romantics had for history and tradition is
highly related to a problem of our times: that of the methods of attaining consensus
in knowledge. The notion of a tradition of open-ended concepts is, admittedly, too
all-encompassing for a proper description of consensus. But I hope that my thesis
mitigates this problem by revealing the type of methods used to attain consensus in
early Romantic science by studying the particular case of Ritter's work on
galvanism. The key points of this analysis are then extrapolated to other Romantic
thinkers, with whom comparisons are drawn.
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Reference is made to other Romantics for the most part in this introduction. The
key parts of their notion of natural philosophical inquiry and method are compared
so as to gain, I hope, the beginnings of an overall view of consensus in some of the
main figures in early Romantic science.
The concern of Romantic thinkers for history and tradition, and the way in which
this work specifically approaches this phenomenon in what is referred to above as
the tradition of and the practice of ideas, reveal the fallacies about, and prejudices
commonly held, against, the Romantics. This work emphatically argues for the
Romantic concern for experimental practice and a philosophy of natural
philosophical practice. It is at pains to show that what is often held to be Romantic
speculation is in fact greatly concerned with the issues of practice. In particular,
under the issues related to tradition and practice, it is argued that the phenomenon
of Romantic natural philosophy did not come about by a change of "episteme" in a
Foucaultian sense. It is, I think, not the case that through the emergence of a
Romantic natural philosophical "episteme" that new approaches to inquiry were
made possible for the Romantics. This would lead to the interpretation that the
Romantics came to their fmdings and methods of inquiry through speculation. The
Romantics' concern for tradition and practice show that this view is untenable.
There is no denying that Romantic thought is composed of speculative elements,
but the type of speculation they undertook cannot be interpreted in the modern
pejorative meaning of the term. Romantic speculation involved a conscious
confrontation with and adaption of past theory and methodology. The work
Romanticism and the sciences, for example, has a wealth of examples to support
this view. When, for instance, Schelling speaks of "spekulative Physik" he is
highly aware of the historical career of the sciences. As will be discussed below, it
is, in his view, the task of natural philosophy to avoid the traps for the scientist
that the history of science reveals. A further prejudice often held is to belittle the
Romantics' alleged lack of empirical or experimental orientation. This prejudice is
here put aside by the study of the way the early Romantics, and specifically
Novalis, problematize the notion of "experiment" itself, both in practice and in the
epistemological approach to experimentation. A final prejudice dealt with in this
work is that the Romantics' quest for unity led, in the end, to no real gain in
"scientific" knowledge. Through this work's concern for "tighter" conceptual links
between the sciences and the humanities in the Romantics' notion of a theory of
practice, this relativist threat is, to some extent, fended off. On the contrary, it will
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be seen that the Romantic unifying urge did take a very specific form; this will be
seen by relating it to their notion of method, by defining key precedents, and by
showing examples, as in Rifler's work, where the unifying urge did lead to a real
gain in knowledge.
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2. Aspects of genre in early Romantic natural philosophy.
Before discussing the issues surrounding practice and "experiment", this thesis's
relationship to genre and rhetoric studies will be charted. Discussion of the stance
to genre and rhetoric studies has been postponed until now because of the need to
dedicate space to Novalis's and other Romantics' notion of language. Furthermore,
this thesis's relationship to genre studies can only properly be seen in the context of
practice and "experiment", which will need to be considered after some
introductory comments on genre.
Studies in the fields of genre and rhetoric have been concerned with the roles
played by literary and linguistic factors in the development of the sciences.
Latour's and Woolgar's Laboratoiy Life (230) opened up studies into the ways
scientists select and manipulate information in the presentation of their findings.
Gilbert and Mulkay's Opening Pandora's Box (174) traces similar themes
concerning the various uses of rhetoric scientists employ in denouncing or
approving of scientific work. Shapin's work on Boyle traces the rhetorical
strategies and beliefs underlying Boyle's science (285). Hannaway has shown how
Libavius's Aichemia is set out according to the precepts of the dialectician and
pedagogue Ramus and, further, how Libavius's work gave rise to a tradition of
didactically oriented chemical works up into the eighteenth century (184).
Anderson (133) reveals the rhetorical techniques Lavoisier used in changing the
direction of chemistry away from the previous philosophical chemistry to his idea
of modern quantitative chemistry. Importantly, Anderson relates this shift not only
in terms of chemical theory itself but also in terms of methods of explaining
experimental fmdings and in terms of changes in experimental practice. Dear
studies the narrative accounts of experiments in the works of Galilean and Jesuit
scholastic writers within the context of Aristotelian discourse of their time (161).
All of these works are concerned with the manipulation of language to scientific
ends, and the present work fits into this realm of intellectual history, albeit, as will
be argued, with important distinctions.
This dissertation's main claim to enter this area of study lies not, as might be
expected, in the treatment of the aphorism, although this approach is to a certain
extent implicit, since the majority of the references made to Novalis are to his
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aphorisms. But the genre of the aphorism in Novalis's and Ritter's work deserves,
I believe, separate attention: it would lead to a valuable and much needed analysis
of the structure and purpose of Novalis's encyclopaedic programme in Das
ailgemeine Brouillon within its full natural philosophical context. However, at this
stage of Novalis scholarship, it appeared far more pressing to concentrate on the
genre of "experiment" in early Romantic natural philosophy. The study of the
meaning of "experiment" for the Romantics is cardinal for an understanding of
their approach to inquiry. It is, I would contend, not the much discussed aphorism,
but the genre of "experiment" that explains much about the fonnation and structure
of the genre of early Romantic natural philosophical works themselves. As already
indicated, I approach the literary structures and factors within the early Romantic
natural philosophical works primarily through the early Romantic notion of
practice - which is a general form of knowing antecedent to, but reflected in, any
literary or linguistic techniques they employ. As opposed to treating language as a
discrete item, my work is primarily concerned with a way of experiential thinking,
the application of the Romantic world view to this way of thinking, and the
ensuing formation of knowledge. The argument goes beyond the study of the
discursive or formal word to analyze the notion of concrete and experiential
thought in concepts, symbols and visuals. Not only is it necessary to analyze this
part of Novalis's world view first of all - to put him on the map as a thinker in
ways which Novalis scholarship has not done so up to now - it also becomes a
necessity to explain the Romantic use of language itself.
The aim of genre studies, as Dear states, is to show that language is more than "a
transparent medium of communication" and that "language is in fact a shaper
(perhaps a realizer) of thought and an embodiment of social relationships" (160, 4-
5). Thus the goal, in Dear's view, is to provide a synthesis of the poles of social
and intellectual thought in the study of the cultural history of science. This would
then bridge the social and intellectualist divide by studying "the various means by
which individuals interact so as to create meaning and knowledge"(160, 9). My
findings do not disagree with the value of genre studies in this sense. My argument
never accepts the naive transparency of language, nor does it doubt the fact that
language can, to varying extents, shape thought, nor does it wish to call into
question the view that language reflects and assists social and intellectual interests.
The main part of this work is, however, concerned with a quite different matter,
which, it is argued, is more pertinent to an understanding of the Romantics at the
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present: namely that which is fundamental to the individual's own use of ideas and
language. The work discusses Novalis's views on ideas and language, Ritter's
process of discovery, Goethe's notion of scientific method etc., and then goes on
to draw conclusions about a notion of knowledge formation generally applicable to
key Romantic thinkers. The social aspects of language are treated only in the sense
that a common Romantic outlook is suggested, but this comes after the treatment of
individual attitudes to language. Methodologically, it was necessary to approach
the social basis of language (in the sense of a communal enterprise) by first
explaining and then extrapolating from the individual's use of language. It is not
primarily social relationships that are found in the Romantic use of language, for
their idea of practice is anterior to social considerations. Since early Romantics are
concerned with the creation of knowledge, and with finding new systems of
knowledge, it is understandable that notions of practice loom large. A notion of
practice was required to keep the breadth of their experimentation with knowledge
under control. The personal knowledge of the individual needed to be justified by
reference to practice before anything approaching consensus could be attained.
Thus it is that the Romantic use of language is not profitably explained only in
terms of social usage, or, in terms of the formal and the discursive. In this work
the tables are turned: language is not the shaper of thoughts, experience and
practical thought shape language. Language is not only an embodiment of social
relationships, but more so of the way the individual asserts himself. Language's
epistemological value is relativized; language is a tool, just as other forms of
knowing are tools too. All other forms of knowing have their own languages. It is
shown that for Novalis there were many forms of language - indeed, for him, all
purposive processes can be understood as languages. Written language itself is but
one of many "languages". What is key to Novalis is that all of these "languages"
need to be treated in a phenomenal way: that is, the language of the painter in
works of art, the language of the scientist in e.g. the depictions of his experiments,
the language of mathematics, or the language of the author in his literary texts, all
of these languages are treated as mediums of which the user has to gain practical
awareness. Important to Novalis is not written language per se but the plurality of
languages involved in knowledge formation. In dealing with knowledge formation,
Novalis thus turns his attention away from the languages themselves to a type of
knowing that is common to them all: the process of attaining skills in a particular
language, and this, in Novalis's view, is the capacity needed to have a feel for the
original forms of the various languages. Each area of knowledge creates its
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meanings using its own particular mediums. What is common, in Novalis's view,
to all the languages, is the way they create their meanings, i.e. the method of
treating knowledge phenomenally and experientially. Thus language itself (i.e. the
written word), in Novalis's understanding, is not the true fundament of knowledge
formation, even if, as cannot be denied, language does "shape" knowledge.
For the early Romantic thinkers under study in this work it is argued that it is the
various mediums of natural philosophy and the experiential approach to knowledge
formation, not written language itself, that bring about meaning and knowledge.
Their concern for the genre of "experiment" and experiential knowledge forms the
basis of my attempt to uncover a "tighter" conceptual link between the arts and the
sciences. This is an approach which does not seek, in the main, to show that the
arts affect the sciences (e.g through rhetoric), nor does it strive to reveal how the
scientific affects the arts (e.g. how key notions of natural history are reflected in
literary works); both of these effects are the inevitable outcome of my study; but I
hope to show a level that the arts and the sciences have in common; however, this
is, importantly, a unification of interests prior to literary and scientific interests. By
contrast, genre studies are generally concerned with the effects of language in its
own right. Dear shows how Aristotelian rhetoric effects the natural philosophical
debates around Galileo's work (161). Shapin and Schaffer describe how the natural
philosophy of Robert Boyle and the early Royal Society was concerned with
expressing the "matter of fact" and that they employed a highly descriptive genre
of experimental reporting (286). In his analysis of the changes in Reils's Archivfir
die Physiologie into the later journal, the Deursches Archivfiir die Physiologie,
Broman argues that genre and scientific theory operate together and change
together (147). All of these genre studies move away from the traditional
intellectualist study of doctrines to the study of practice at the levels of the
technical, literary and sociological. Through these studies of genre, the natural
philosophies of different epochs attain a new defmition. Galileo's natural
philosophy is based upon universal statements and axiomatic deductive
argumentative structures; Boyle's natural philosophy is one of "appearances".
Broman argues for the shift away from the early journal's interests in the
pedagogic, argumentation and individual conversations to the later journal's
concern for the descriptive and multiparty conversation (147, 32-33, 39). Broman's
work offers up an intepretation of Romantic natural philosophy in the shift from
Reil' s original concerns for seeking causes in individual phenomena to the later
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journal's Romantic natural philosophical approach where the causes were already
found in the dynamic relationships of phenomena. Thus, in Bromans's terms, it is
implied that Romantic natural philosophy is one of description based on dynamic
principles. Although this may appear to do a service to Romantic natural
philosophy, the key part of Broman's argument acts as a double edged sword.
Indeed he remarks that the later journal, in its shift to the descriptive, stood under
the "thrall" of Romantic natural philosophy (147, 35). This approach captures the
Romantic concern for practice at the level of empirical description, but overlooks
their concern for an epistemology of practice. Yet Novalis, Schelling and, of
course, Goethe, are all concerned with reflection upon, and experimentation with,
higher principles; furthermore the Romantics were greatly concerned with the
issues of the pedagogic (279, 42), which was present in the earlier journal but was
eliminated in the later "enthralled" journal. This is a case of genre studies where
analysis of issues such as literary form has ignored primary intellectualist issues.
The example supports my view that more analysis is still required of the
intellectual history of the Romantics before focussing solely on issues of genre.
Schaffer's notion of Romantic natural philosophy comes considerably closer to
my concerns. Firstly, and wisely, he discards the term "Naturphilosophie",
precisely for reasons such as the prejudice which is still latent in Broman's work.
Schaffer retains the term "natural philosophy" to keep in mind the links with
previous traditions of experimental philosophies and "the complex and important
connections between the changes in the culture of the sciences which took place in
the German lands from the 1790s" (271, 83). One should add, as is well known,
that the peaks of natural philosophy are traditionally seen in the pre-Socratics, the
Renaissance and German Idealism (145, 7). The Romantics, with their high level
of "historical consciousness", make explicit reference to these past traditions of
natural philosophy as well as to the rise of the modern experimental natural
philosophy. This work attempts to account for both of these strands of natural
philosophy and their effects on Romantic thought. It is particularly in Novalis's
notion of "experiment" that such a blend of traditions is traced. It is highly
significant in this context that Novalis's recourse to Plotinos is not primarily
concerned with natural philosophical doctrines, but with natural philosophical
method. As will be discussed, it is in Plotinos that Novalis finds a tradition for his
theory of practice.
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Schaffer defines the natural philosophy of the Romantics as one which analyzed
"active powers". In his view, Romantic natural philosophy "appealed to the active
powers of the genius to legitimate its natural knowledge" (271, 83). When Schaffer
points to the Romantic aesthetics as "the key to the status of genius in natural
philosophy" his interests come exceedingly close to those of this work. It is in their
aesthetics and notions of practice that the links between the powers of the observed
and their own powers of perception can be found. My argument can be seen as
presenting another part of the Romantics' story in addition to Schaffer's more
sociologically oriented interpretation in terms of power and performance. If
Schaffer's work offers us a study of the genre of genius in the Romantic period,
not in the form of a traditional intellectualist study of doctrines, but as a study of
practice predominantly in terms of the sociological, this work offers an
interpretation of Romantic science in the form of a study of practice at
epistemological and aesthetic levels. Where Schaffer closes his broad, in-depth
analysis of the time with terms such as "genius" or "sublime physics" this work
takes over to study Romantic method itself in-depth. Romantic natural philosophy
is thereby defined as "experimental", and under this term is understood its concern
for the practical knowledge of Nature, both in the phenomenon of thought and in
other natural phenomena. That, in turn, explains this work's interest in a "tighter"
conceptual link between the arts and the sciences in a philosophy of practice. The
early Romantic interest in practical knowledge is a unique blend of Neoplatomc
epistemology and ontology, the experience-oriented rise of science and German
Idealism. The Neoplatonic tradition, particularly as seen in Novalis's idea of a
"phenomenal" calculus, is an important source for early Romantic notions of
practical knowledge; the early Romantics criticize the empirical sciences for their
unreflective treatment of inquiry, but praise them for their return to experience.
The Idealism of Kant and Fichte is praised by the Romantics for having provided a
philosophical base for the subject, but Kant is criticized for his notion of science
and objective knowledge - precisely for his unwillingness to approach practical
knowledge in natural philosophy.
Within intellectual history there are, clearly, a variety of available approaches for
the historian. One of the most comprehensive approaches to consensus attainment
in the sciences is that presented in the interest theory work of Shapin and Schaffer,
Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle and the Experimental Life (286). A
particularly comprehensive array of factors are drawn up to show how consensus
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was attained. These include: material technologies, methods of communication
("literary technologies"), methods of assessment of experimental claims ("social
technologies"). There are, too, a variety of interests playing a role in the
attainment of consensus outside the immediate circle of pump operators such as
interests in the integrity of experimental natural philosophy; interests in the proper
places of public performance; interests in the expansion or preservation of existing
disciplines; interests in the conservation of moral, religious, social and political
beliefs and institutions etc. (210, 180). My own work does not attempt to draw up
such an exhaustive list of all possibilities involved in the consensus of the area of
early Romantic science it Ireats. But it does, I hope, provide some essential
groundwork for such an exhaustive approach. It is also argued that, within the
present state of scholarship on Romantic science, issues of practice are in need of
analysis.
The intentions of this work, although also interdisciplinary, are from the outset
different to the tenets of interest theory. This thesis's emphasis on the literary and
the scientific drove me, firstly, into finding their links at fundamental levels, and
to work downwards from the Romantic urge for unifying to fmd a common
philosophical base. The thesis, then, set out to find instances where the unifying
urge congealed into practical and concrete examples. A weakness of interest
theory, as Jardine points out, is that "whereas agents' claims about the roles of
rationality, reliability, calibration, proof, fact etc. in the formation of their beliefs
are suspect, being likely to belong to the secondary mechanism of legitimation,
their claims about the roles of interest may be taken on trust" (210, 183). This
means "that many of the declarations of interest assigned by sociologists to the
primary mechanism of consensus formation belong in fact to the secondary
mechanism of legitimation of already formed consensuses" (210, 184). My own
interest in the common base for the literary and scientific works of the Romantics
is an attempt to clarify some of the particularly significant primary mechanisms of
consensus in Romantic science. In this way I illustrate primary epistemological
factors in knowledge formation which form the base for the social use of
knowledge. Thus, a major notion treated in this present study, the early Romantic
concept of natural philosophical productivity, is epistemologically based, but
socially extendable.
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4. Novalis 's notion of "experiment" and the issues of practice in the context of
early Romantic natural philosophy.
Before embarking on the discussion of practice and the genre of "experiment",
and the further issues of genre concerning Romantic natural philosophical works, it
is appropriate now to briefly state under the following ten key points what
"practice" means in the context of this work.
Firstly laboratory practice is accounted for in a straightforward sense in the
analysis of Ritter's work on galvanism.
Secondly, knowledge is viewed in terms of practice as something experiential.
Particular examples of this form of knowing are concrete thought, symbols and
visual thought. Novalis's notion of "experiment" refers both to literal laboratory
experiments, thought "experiments" and the unity of both in inquiry. As will be
shown, this notion of experiential knowledge forms a substantial part of early
Romantic aesthetics in scientific inquiry.
Thirdly, Nature is treated as practical knowledge in the sense that it represents the
embodiment of purposive forces.
Fourthly, the notion of practice, as interpreted in early Romantic natural
philosophy, means that there is no question as to whether knowledge stems from
experience or whether it is possible to attain knowledge prior to experience since
knowledge is phenomenal and Nature in her purposiveness is "theory" herself. As
stated in the third point, from the early Romantic perspective as here understood,
Nature is living theory. Knowledge and phenomena are one and the same entity.
Schelling's natural philosophy, too, is concerned in this way with the links between
mind and matter, and strives to form the philosophical base for such an
undertaking. Clearly, the early Romantics discuss the a priori in the light of Kant's
philosophy, and like Kant, they are concerned with the limits of knowledge, but,
unlike Kant, they problematize areas which Kant would have deemed too
speculative (see below, p.64). Schelling's meaning of "das Absolute", as is
discussed below, refers to absolute experience, which is the entirety of knowledge
and purposiveness in Nature. Schelling, like Novalis, seeks to find the premises of
( LCNDjX)
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such knowledge. When speaking of the absolute Schelling indeed refers to the a
priori, but this cannot simply be equated with experience-free knowledge: instead,
Schelling, as Novalis, is referring to a higher form of empiricism and experiential
knowledge. Manfred Frank has shown how both Novalis and Schelling are
concerned with paths to the absolute. Frank has stressed the notions of time and
temporality in their thought, and this can be interpreted as their concern for
experience itself (see below, pp. 131 f.). Furthermore, the way the Romantics treat
experience and a priori knowledge should always be seen in the light of the
attempts to develop, refine and test the reliability of their methods. In this sense
the creation of the a priori is always stressed as experiential and as an activity.
The fifth point is that the early Romantic research programme cannot be simply
defined as following, for example, an organic or morphological paradigm in
distinction to the mathematical paradigm. The Romantic programme has aspects
which point to the holistic and universal laws of morphological inquiry, but,
equally, work such as Ritter's shows that the Romantics made real contributions to
mainstream science. Ritter's work on galvanism is deeply concerned with forms in
a morphological sense, and, importantly, aims to approach morphology in a way
which has quantitative characteristics. His work blends aspects of a quantitative
approach with qualitative elements into physics. Furthermore, within the
Romantics' concern for the universal also lies, inherent in their notion of the
practice of knowledge, their concern for experimenting with and adapting systems
of thought. Their understanding of universal laws is by no means reductive or
dogmatically all-encompassing.
The sixth point is that the "speculative" elements of early Romantic natural
philosophy such as their ideal types or archetypal phenomena were never meant to
form unbending principles of a natural philosophical doctrine. Due to their
philosophy of practice, such types are employed as open-ended concepts and are
meant to be employed in further inquiry.
The seventh point puts some historical perspective on the previous ones. Here,
practice refers to the teachings of Plotinos. Novalis was the first to rediscover
Plotinos for the Romantics (218, 28) and uses him explicitly to define his notion of
practical knowledge. In Plotinos Novalis sees the source of an enduring tradition of
practical knowledge which finds its epitome in Goethe's scientific works (N, 3,
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469). It is not only Plotinos's Neoplatonic ontology that is of interest to the
Romantics - i.e. the notion of continuity in his emanations - but also, importantly,
his notion of knowledge itself (as will be shown the former is, in any case, linked
up to the latter). In the present work, Plotinos's notion of knowledge is understood
in terms of practical knowledge and the practice of ideas. Lovejoy has extensively
traced the significance of the idea of the Chain of	 Being, and he dedicates a
section in his work to the subject of the temporalization of the notion of the Chain
of Being during the eighteenth century (238, 242-287); in the course of this
dissertation the ideas of temporality and the Chain of Being will be related to the
early Romantics' concern for "experiment" and practical knowledge. Thus, it will
be argued that Goethe and Novalis find important sources for their concepts of
concrete, experiential knowledge both in Plotinos, and also in Herder's Plastik.
Herder, importantly for the early Romantics, concerns himself with the notion of
continuity (249, 8) as well as with experiential thought. Indeed, to Heinroth's
description of Goethe's style of thought as "gegenständliches Denken", or Wolf
von Engelhardt's and Dorothea Kuhn's reference to Goethe's "anschauenden
Begriff", "zarte Empirie" or notion of "ahnden" (169, 228, 240), one can add
Plotinos's concept of "Betrachtung". This term was used by Friedrich Creuzer in
his 1804 translation of a part of Plotinos's works to impart the idea of active,
"living" thought, and Goethe found it appealing to his own way of thinking (218,
29-30). Adler, too, has pointed to the influence of Plotinos on Goethe's notion of
the "idea":
Nach Goethes Verständnis verschmelzen in der "Idee" "eidos" und "idea", d.h. äufieres und inneres
Anschauen. Dies durch Plotins Ideenverstãndnis vermittelte Konzept verhinderte bei Goethe eine
rein metaphysische Interpretation der "Idee". Die "Idee" ist auch äufiere Anschauung ("eidos")"
(129, 19).
Furthermore, although I treat the early writings of Schelling where Neoplatonic
influence is a factor (165, 82-82, 86-87), Schelling himself comes to an awareness
of the epistemological significance of Plotinos later in 1805 (218, 28). This is not
to say that Schelling does not concern himself with such an approach to
epistemology earlier: indeed, as is argued in this introduction, elements of such an
approach are present in his earlier writings up to 1801.
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To conclude these initial comments on Plotinos: my work found much of its
inspiration for its approach to Neoplatonism in Frances Yates's ground-breaking
work The Art of Memory (299). Yates's analysis of the tradition of memory
systems can, arguably, be read in terms of experiential thought and the practice of
ideas. Yates ends her work with reference to the links between memory systems
and Leibnitz's notion of "Combinatorik". In what follows, we will find in
Novalis's own notion of "Combinatorik" an attempt to link the tradition of
experimental philosophy with a stance to acquiring knowledge that bears
similarities to Yates's interpretation of the manner in which ideas are treated by the
Neoplatonists.
The eighth point, like the seventh, adds historical perspective to the others.
Intellectual history of the past decades, in its various forms, has been deeply
concerned with practice. The main thrust of this work moves away from the
common sociological, literary or linguistic approaches in intellectual history to one
more concerned with specific epistemological and aesthetic approaches, as
manifest, in the concerns of the early Romantics themselves. Language, however,
does not remain untreated. This work can be seen as arguing with Manfred Frank
for the particular role of language in German Idealism, and for the distinction
between itself and the notions of language found in Structuralism and
Deconsiructionism. Frank argues for the role of the subject in language, as when
he remarks:
Signification has a certain leeway with regard to how it is disposed; it is always inscribed anew - to
be sure, within reasonable limits - by individuals into the "mark" and has, as Humboldt says, "no
permanent place even in writing" (170a, 408-409).
This view of language stresses both the role of the subject in interpreting signs and
the flexibility of language - which stands between a reductive view that words have
no meaning in themselves and the view that words can mean anything. Frank's
views are of importance in defming the symbolic, "active", phenomenal nature of
early Romantic views of language. 9
 As already indicated, this work can be seen as
extending Frank's view of early Romantic thought to the Romantic notion of
scientific and natural philosophical productivity (see below, pp. 131 f.). However,
as stated, the main concern of this work lies more in notions of practice than with
language, although language necessarily is drawn in to the discussion. Reference is
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made in this introduction to the current debate on practical and tacit knowledge.
Notions of practical knowledge are worthy of study in their own right, and even
more so in the case of the early Romantics where practical knowledge operates in
conjunction with the attempts to formulate systems of nature and the attempt to
find reliable methods of knowledge formation over a broad spread of disciplines.
This work is concerned with the "reconstruction" of theory in Dewey's sense. An
attempt is made to uncover not the formal theory or doctrine, but the inner or
"working logic" (Dewey, Toulmin) of early Romantic forms of knowledge. This
task is naturally undertaken by analyzing and re-presenting early Romantic
practices. Thus there are thoroughly hermeneutic aspects to this work, as there are,
too, in the notion of practical knowledge itself, since practice concerns individual
knowledge. In its concern for practice this work is accordingly concerned, as Janik
remarks on practice, with what "could be described epistemologically with Kant as
the condition of the possibility" of a practice at all, or with what Collingwood calls
the "absolute presuppositions" of practice (208, 52-54). For the early Romantics,
the notion of ideal types and their method of knowledge formation in their natural
philosophy are argued to be their "absolute presuppositions". Their natural
philosophy is, as will be seen, not based upon doctrines, but upon factors
concerning individual practice.
Within the context of the significance of individual practice to the Romantics it
should be noted that the auto-experimentation or self-experimentation of the
Romantics is not dealt with here. Clearly, their experiments on their own bodies
are ripe material for a notion of individual knowledge and the role of the subject in
inquiry. Humboldt's galvanic experiments on his back, Ritter's investigation of
polar effects of galvanism on his own eyes, and Goethe's self-experiments in the
physiological part of his Farbenlehre are all signs of the concern for experiential
knowledge. Goethe's physiological work indeed is a concern of a later scientist
such as Johannes MUller (a pupil of Helmholtz). This aspect of early Romanticism
is important for defining notions of tacit, sensual and experiential knowledge, and,
indeed, approaches the theme of "dangerous knowledge". None the less, I wish to
concentrate not so much upon knowledge acquired from the senses alone (as in the
literal experimentation on one's own body) but rather on the notion of sensual
thought, and on linking this aspect of activity with aesthetics and knowledge
formation. This area of research in itself makes a contribution to understanding and
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reassessing the Romantics; for their fundamental experimental and methodological
concerns are in need of clarification.
The ninth point concerns practice in the sense of ethics. This work treats, in the
main, the epistemological elements of the Romantic philosophy of practice, but
these are bound up with, and form part of, ethics. This area of Romantic thought is
arguably of great significance today to debates on ethics in science. This thesis
provides definitions of Romantic thought on knowledge formation in discovery
processes and in their attempts to construct systems of natural philosophy. In these
definitions lie material for interpreting some aspects of ethics in the sciences.
However, because of the need to define and delineate notions of knowledge
formation as a subject matter in its own right, this work does not analyze the strict
ethical notions of German Idealism, as arise in Kant's, Fichte's, Schelling's, and
indeed, Novalis's works. Clearly, this area of German Idealism has already been
extensively	 none the less the relationship of German Idealism's ethics to
knowledge formation still largely remains an open area of study.
The tenth point concerns the distinctions in, and the purposes, and significance of
early Romantic natural philosophy's concern for practice. Novalis's notion of
practice is more embracing than that of Kant and Schelling. Kant is wary to keep
practical knowledge apart from strict scientific methods (although in his Kririk der
Urthellskrafi he does broach the issues of aesthetics and morals in the sciences - but
not as intimately as is the case with Novalis and Schelling). Schelling, in his
System des transcendentalen Idealismus, halts ostensibly at drawing an analogy
between knowledge formation in general (i.e. in his tracing of the developmental
"epochs" of the "Ich" - a process which is also linked to artistic methods of
production) and Nature's own "epochs" of development, without making reference
to natural philosophical-scientific methods of production (although it is importantly
argued below that Schelling tacitly offers significant statements on natural
philosophical-scientific methods of production in his System and elsewhere).
Novalis goes further in terms of unifying knowledge by offering us a stance from
which practical knowledge, ethics and science can be seen as one form of thinking
in his encompassing notion of "experiment". Clearly, however, Schelling's natural
philosophy has in itself, through its volume and breadth, much to offer the sciences
in terms of philosophical orientation, and his philosophy did play a role in the
development of the sciences. Moreover, Schelling's continual development of his
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natural philosophical systems does undoubtedly concern issues of practical
knowledge, since he was attempting thereby, like Novalis, to fmd a reliable natural
philosophical method. Schelling was, too, concerned with the experimental validity
of his ideas and the link between his natural philosophy and strict empirical
inquiry. In comparison to Schelling, Novalis's work is far slighter and he
composed no system of natural philosophy, but there is a wealth of material
concerning the activity of systemizing itself. The latter aspect of his work was due
to his chief concern for a reliable method and his interest in practical details.
However, in contrast to Schelling, Novalis had no direct effect on the sciences.
But, it is argued in this work that Novalis had an influence on the sciences via
Ritter, and in this indirect way, his effect on the sciences can be interpreted as
significant. I show that Novalis and Ritter had much in common; but I do not go so
far as to study the influence of Novalis's aphorisms on Ritter: that is a subject of
further study. None the less, I hope that this work forms a significant base for such
an investigation. In addition, Novalis and Schelling can be seen as complementing
one another in ways which lead to a fuller and more coherent picture of early
Romantic natural philosophy: where Novalis elaborates on aesthetics, practical
knowledge, modes of systemization, and on the needs and practices of individual
inquiry, Schelling develops a comprehensive system and methodology of natural
philosophy designed to cover an exceedingly broad range of factors concerning
many areas of the sciences. Furthermore, what Schelling states on philosophy and
aesthetics, when seen in terms of knowledge formation, is also of great relevance
to a notion of practice, and hence, also to the sciences, as will be argued below.
Finally, the figures of early Romantic science under discussion here, such as
Goethe, Novalis and Schelling, have in general much material to offer current
debate over the status of theory. Through its analysis of Romantic notions of
practical knowledge this work attempts to fend off the relativism sometimes found
in present debate over intellectual history. Systems theory, for example, as
Halliburton points out, has now developed social systems to such an extent "with
unprecedented power and exhibiting not only unprecedented complexity of
organization but unprecedented flexibility and resourcefulness" (182, 87). Systems
theory is capable of soaking up "almost anything" and also of becoming ever more
complex and resourceful (182, 88). Literary or genre theory, on the other hand,
runs the danger, of reducing thought to literary form or treating it exclusively in
terms of semiotics. Derrida's work goes further in attacking any approaches to
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literature where the explanation "is a formalist one, in terms of semiological
structures, or a "thematic" one, in terms of, say, Marxist or Freudian theory"
(187, 20). The problem of all of these discourses, as Halliburton states, is firstly
that their "noise" endangers proper communication, and secondly, that "the
question of ends seems indefmitely deferrable" (the latter point particularly refers,
in Halliburton's view, to deconstructionism) (182, 74-75). Moreover, Derrida, as
Shaffer has argued, runs the danger of blocking off any chance of reinstating the
value of free rational inquiry. It is particularly in Derrida's assault on Kant's role
in the shaping of the modem university that Shaffer finds due cause for concern: in
undermining the Enlightenment reason of Kant, Derrida "attacks reason in its
citadel: in Kant he attacks the greatest philosopher of modern times, attacks him in
the act of making a programmatic statement of the powers and duties of free
rational inquiry" (280, xx). This work argues strongly against any relativism such
as Derrida's, and, as far as Kant is concerned, this work is at pains to show that
although the Romantics do differ from Kant, their thought is in many ways an
extension of Kant's. Kant, in fact, was their legitimizing springboard for a variety
of views (see below, pp.64-67). If the Romantics, in going beyond Kant and in
their unifying urge, are interpreted as tending towards the relativism of open-ended
theory, then this work argues that their concern for practice (the means of attaining
knowledge) puts reigns upon this tendency, and, indeed, sets concrete precedents
(the outcomes of their inquiries) within their encompassing natural philosophical
outlook (their absolute goals or theoretical ends). It is their "working logic" and
experiential approach to thought that keeps relativism at bay.
The issues of practice for the Romantics will now be traced in detail. Initially I will
concentrate on Novalis's remarks on methodology, and the early natural
philosophical works of Schelling up to 1801, before moving on to other Romantic
thinkers. In Schelling's highly programmatic work of 1800 - programmatic for his
notion of natural philosophy - System des transcendentalen Idealismus, Schelling is
primarily concerned with setting the bounds of natural philosophical knowledge. In
this sense, the work lies squarely in the "critical" tradition of German Idealism.
For here, Schelling constructs the history of the "Ich", taking the "Ich" through its
developmental epochs. He also constructs the moments of matter, and views
matter's development as analogous to the development of the "Ich". Another of his
major concerns is thus to show that man's development is part of Nature's
development: this is his notion of natural history. Schelling's System des
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transcendentalen Idealismus is not a full blown natural philosophical system, nor
does it, in essence, give guidelines for natural philosophical method. What
Schelling does here is to draw analogies between philosophical production, the
productivity of natural forces and aesthetic production. His tracing of the history
(the "epochs") of man's knowledge, Nature's development of forces and aesthetic
production can be read in terms of knowledge formation." However, as will be
discussed below, Schelling draws a sharp line between aesthetic production and
philosophical production (in the latter scientific production is also implied). In the
great task of drawing up his analogies between the development of the "Ich",
matter, and art, and in his wish to state the objective primacy of aesthetic
production, the natural philosophical elements of scientific production are not fully
presented. In distinguishing between philosophical (as mentioned, implied here is
also scientific production) and aesthetic production, Schelling ostensibly leaves
little space for aesthetics in scientific production. Naturally, his very act of
drawing analogies between philosophical, scientific and aesthetic production
provides vital clues as to how aesthetics can be employed in scientific production.
In three ways it will be shown that Schelling's early natural philosophical thought
can be read in terms of the aesthetics of natural philosophical-scientific production:
firstly, in his notion of experiential knowledge and knowledge formation,
secondly, in the implications of the analogies he draws between modes of
production in different realms, and thirdly, in his notion of "Zwischenglieder".
Novalis, from the very start of his natural philosophical thought, is directly
concerned with natural philosophical production and the aesthetic elements therein.
It is perhaps Novalis's stance here that leads him to remark in 1800: "Was die
Schel[lingschel Nat[url Phillosophie] eigentlich sey?" (N, 3, 666). Although
Novalis, like Schelling, was concerned with setting the bounds of natural
philosophy, he was clearly hoping for more explicit material from Schelling on
natural philosophical production, practice and method. Novalis proposes a method
for the sciences which is most aptly summed up in his remark calling for a
"Philosophische Geschichte der Entdeckungen" (N, 3, 86). Novalis believed that
the history of discovery processes, i.e. our methods of discovery in the sciences,
would reveal the history of Nature herself. Elsewhere he remarks: "Der
Geisterwelt gehort das erste Capitel in der Physik" (N, 3, 601). With both of the
above statements Novalis is referring to the same purposive force that gives rise to
the activities, "method" and processes of man's intellect and phenomena. Firstly,
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Novalis is stating that what man undertakes in inquiry is a part of the history of
Nature itself. Secondly, Novalis is making the point that the beginnings of science
belong to the realm of ideas and spirit. To discuss final causes in Nature
necessarily entails the evocation of a first purposive force. The study of Nature's
purposiveness is, to Novalis, the study of Nature's own "method". Analysis of
Nature's "intelligent" formative forces allows Novalis to see the development of
phenomena as the process of Nature's own formation of knowledge. To Novalis,
purposive processes imply that intelligence, i.e. knowledge, is at work. Following
on from these ideas, Novalis further implies that in discovery processes it is
possible to perceive the original purposive force at work. This is so, in Novalis's
view, because during this process man is intimately linked to Nature. In
investigating natural phenomena and discovering Nature the inquirer enters into a
close dialogue with phenomena, and it is this moment of dialogue, the mediation
and interplay between the inquirer and the observed, that is the point when the
inquirer is closest to Nature's secrets. It is not alone in the fmally attained theory
that the inquirer comes to understanding Nature, it is rather that this understanding
essentially takes place in the actual process of inquiry itself. Novalis argues that the
process of inquiry is directly linked to the processes under observation. If the
inquirer succeeds in hitting upon a key principle of Nature he will come closer to
the phenomenon by empathizing with it. It is in this act of empathy that the
inquirer "absorbs" the phenomenon, retracing the phenomenon's own being and
activity. In this way Novalis remarks that the inquirer should have an inner sense
for Nature:
Zum Experimentiren gehort Naturgeme, d.ist, wunderartige Fähigkeit den Slim der Natur zu treffen
- und in ihrem Geiste zu handein. Der ächte Beobachter ist Künstler - er ahndet das Bedeutende und
weifi aus dem seitsamen, vorUberstreichenden Gemisch von Erscheinungen die Wichtigen
herauszufuhlen (N, 3, 179).
The inquirer should retrace Nature's activities using the power (i.e. "virtue") of his
own sense for Nature. How Novalis justifies this view will now he delineated in
more detail.
For Novalis and Schelling, time and history themselves point to the notion of
method. Since they view knowledge as a process, knowledge is seen as history in
the making. This type of history is primarily concerned with "how" things come
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about and "how" we arrive at knowledge rather than with "what" we know about
objects. ScheHing's philosophy above all aims to provide guidelines for a
"construction" of Nature, i.e. the explanation of how knowledge and purposiveness
come about within Nature as a whole. Similarly, Novalis is concerned with the
"how" of natural forces and "how" scientific theory comes about in discovery
processes. The question of how history occurs is a prerequisite to any portrayal of
history itself: to them history can only arise out of a proper method.
Important to the debate on method are Novalis's and Schelling's notions of
practical knowledge. The discussion on method involves the resolution of
theoretical and practical activities in inquiry. Within this field the notion of
"experiment" is particularly useful in defining the philosophical parameters. To
experiment by no means implies a testing of a given theory, nor is the act of
experimentation a direct form of induction from natural phenomena, or, even more
crassly, a direct deduction of theory from the given phenomena under
investigation. Direct induction or deduction from phenomena are methodologically
impossible since any inquirer is always to some extent theorizing with nature, i.e.
the inquirer always comes to phenomena from a particular theoretical stance.
Inquiry involves a definite mediation between theory and phenomena. Novalis
concerns himself intensively with the notion of "experiment" and he uses the term
"experiment" to mean both the testing of experience and the testing of ideas. In his
notion of testing ideas or knowledge itself Novalis proposes that our way of
forming knowledge should be put under closer scrutiny. In essence Novalis is
concerned here with avoiding the rift between the inquirer and natural phenomena.
The problem of this rift is indeed a subject of current interest and has led historians
of science to suggest that today's science is often only involved in the testing of
theory and no longer directly tests nature itself (177, xiii, 14). Novalis's solution
to this problem lies firstly in his notion that knowledge is something experiential
itself and, secondly, in his proposal of a method of inquiry that works outwards
from phenomena. In his notion of experiential knowledge Novalis makes the
distinction between formal, analytical knowledge and a type of knowledge that
mediates between theory and phenomena. In order to mediate between theory and
phenomena Novalis proposes the use of representative symbols of the imagination.
Within his notion of a scientific method, representative symbols are taken by
Novalis to mean those powerfully laden empirical notions which are attained by
our perception and knowledge of particularly significant phenomena themselves.
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However, before discussing representation, the notion of experiential knowledge
should be treated in more detail. One of Novalis's sources for his view of
experiential forms of knowledge is Herder. It is from Herder's Plastik that Novalis
obtains the view that the inquirer is capable of having a "feeling" ("Gefühl") for
ideas. Herder plays upon the two meanings of "GefUhl", that literally of the senses
and that of an inner sense (294, 34). Herder's reasoning behind this viewpoint lies
within the notion, as he remarks, that it is a "Metaphysisch- und Physisch
erwiesener Satz, daB nur korperliches Geflihi uns Formen gebe" (52, 71). Herder
directly links sense perception to "the mental activities of knowing, feeling and
willing" (294, 36). It is this experiential approach to thought that gives justification
to Novalis's notion of "experimental" knowledge. Having a "sense" or "feel" for
ideas implies that ideas can be experienced. When Novalis speaks of the use of
representation in inquiry he thus refers to those ideas and concepts that can be
"felt". In the present context of the term "experiment", it is important to note that
Novalis refers to representation through his notion of the "Plastisirungsmethode" or
its synonym the "Experimentalmethode" (N, 3, 123). To Novalis, genuine
"experimenting" requires a secure experiential knowledge of the concepts and of
the phenomena under observation. In this way the rift between theory and nature is
to be resolved since theory has to be firmly rooted in experiential knowledge:
theory should not be allowed to drift away from nature, and knowledge itself is
viewed as a phenomenon that can be experienced. The ability to "experiment", in
Novalis's view, involves an array of skills and experience in handling phenomena.
Such skills entail the development, simplification and combining of experiments.
Novalis stresses too the ability to select and order phenomena according to a
"taste" or "sense" for Nature ("Naturgeschmackvolle oder Natursinnreiche
Auswahl und Anordnung"). Last, but not least, "experimentation" also requires the
ability to represent phenomena, both exactly and synthetically:
Der ächte Naturliebhaber zeichnet sich eben durch seine Fertigkeit die Experimente zu
vervielfaltigen, zu vereinfachen, zu combiniren, und zu Analysiren, zu romantisiren und
popularisiren, durch semen Erfindungsgeist neuer Experimente - durch seine Naturgeschmackvolle
oder Natursinnreiche Auswahl und Anordnung derselben, durch Schãrfe und Deutlichkeit der
Beobachtung, und artistische, sowohi zusammengefafite, als ausführliche Beschreibung, oder
Darstellung der Beobachtung aus (N, 3, 256).
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To conclude with the significance these experimental skills have for Novalis's
notion of experiential knowledge: one can say that the act of experimentation is, to
Novalis, the literal viewing of theory in phenomena, or to state this point
otherwise, experimentation is the experiencing of theory within phenomena. This
act of knowledge is quite different to the testing of a theory alone, for Novalis
demands a specific closeness to phenomena, both in our experiential knowledge of
phenomena and in our skills in working with phenomena. It is this specific
proximity to phenomena and "feel" for Nature which, in Novalis's view, allows
for a more precise and comprehensive rendering of Nature.
Schelling, too, proposes a similar experiential approach to knowledge formation
in his Einleitung zu dem Enrwu,feines Systems der Narurphilosophie. There
Schelling states that all knowledge stems from experience:
Wir wissen nichi nur diefi oderjenes, sondern wir wissen ursprunglich uberhaupl nichis als durch
E,fahrung. und minels: der Erfahrung, und insofern besteht unser ganzes Wissen aus
Erfahrungssätzen (109, 278).
Schelling further defines there what he means by a priori knowledge, and it is
importantly not formal-theoretical knowledge. To Schelling a priori concepts are
those concepts gained from experience which are "necessary" ("nothwendig"). He
explains his notion of experiential principles ("Erfahrungssätze") in the following
way:
Zu Satzen a priori werden diese Satze nur dadurch, dafi man sich ihrer als nothwendiger bewufit
wird, und so kann jeder Satz, sein Inhalt sey Ubrigens weicher er wolle, zu jener Dignität erhoben
werden, da der Unterschied zwischen Sãtzen a priori und a posleriori nicht etwa, wie mancher sich
eingebildet haben mag, em ursprunglich an den Satzen selbst haftender Unterschied, sondern em
Unterschied ist, der bloB in Absicht auf unser Wissen und die Art unseres Wissens von diesen
Sätzen gemacht wird, so daB jeder Satz, der für mich bloB historisch ist, em Erfahrungssatz,
derselbe aber, sobald ich umnittelbar oder mittelbar die Einsicht in seine innere Nothwendigkeit
erlange, em Satz a priori wird (109, 278).
Schelling is remarking how a priori knowledge comes about, namely in a process
stemming from experience. Thus, Schelling's goal, like Novalis's, is not to
approach knowledge from the formal-theoretical hut above all from the
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experiential. Naturally, experiential knowledge here does not refer to plain
empiricism, nor to Hume's notion of empirical knowledge, but to a distinct notion
of experiential knowledge that can only be valued within the whole framework of
Schelling ' s natural philosophy. Schelling' s greater goal in his natural philosophy is
to find the principles that lie behind natural phenomena. In Schelling's view, since
Nature is an organic whole within which the parts stem from an original a priori
principle, it should be possible, by finding the necessary ("nothwendig")
principles, to "construct" a view of the nature.' 2 Schelling remarks:
Die Einsicht in diese innere Nothwendigkeit aller Naturerscheinungen wird freilich noch
voilkommener, sobald man bedenkt, dais es kein wahres System gibt, das nicht zugleich em
organisches Ganzes ware. Denn wenn in jedem orgamschen Ganzen sich alles wechselseitig tragt
und unterstützt, so mufite diese Organisation als Ganzes ihren Theilen präexistiren, mcht das Ganze
konnte aus den Theilen, sondern die Theile muBten aus dem Ganzen entspringen. Nicht also wir
kennen die Natur, sondern die Natur ist a priori, d.h. alles Einzelne in ihr ist mm Voraus bestimmt
durch das Ganze oder durch die Idee einer Natur uberhaupt. Aber ist die Natur a priori, so mnI es
auch moglich seyn, sie als etwas, das a priori ist, zu erkennen, und dies eigentlich ist der Sinn
unsrer Behauptung (109, 279).
It is within the context of the notion of an a priori purposive Nature that Schelling
refers to the paradoxical sounding notion of necessary and a priori experiential
knowledge. When Schelling refers to the absolute he refers to the totality of
knowledge and purposiveness expressed in Nature's activities as a whole. When
Schelling speaks of the a priori he is searching for the absolute premises of
knowledge, as visible when he remarks that "alle Erscheinungen in Einem
absoluten und nothwendigen Gesetze zusammenhangen, kurz, daB man in der
Naturwissenschaft alles, was man weiB, absolut a priori wisse" (109, 276-277).
Such a priori knowledge has the status of the evidential "Das Evidente und
Gewisse" (109, 279). In this light the a priori cannot be interpreted simply as
experience-free knowledge: instead in the Romantic search for the evidential
premises of the a priori they are seeking the fundamental premises and boundaries
of total experience. Thus it is, too, that Schelling refers to the creative act of
experimentation ("Prophezeiung"), which is an act that has to employ the
"Construktion" of "speculative Physik" (109, 276, 280). Schelling points out that
discrete empirical experimentation is not enough in itself, since the experimenter
must bring the powers of the subject to his aid, otherwise the experimenter will
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never find his way beyond the phenomena he is investigating: Schelling thus
implies that an experiment in this sense will never escape the regress of
unreflective empirical investigation of phenomena "daB es [das Experiment] nie
über die Naturkräfte, deren es sich selbst als Mittel bedient, hinauskommen kann"
(109, 277)). Thus it is that the subject role's in Schelling's "speculative Physik" is
that of a mediator between plain induction and scientific theory. It is through this
mediation that true experimentation is made possible in Schelling's view:
Es ist daher begreiflich,dafl speculative Physik (die Seele des wahren Experiments) von jeher die
Mutter aller groBen Entdeckungen in der Natur gewesen ist (109, 280).
It is important to note that although Schellingrefers to the absolute principles of
knowledge, his own natural philosophical works show that this is his goal, but that,
in practice, Schelling is continually searching for the boundaries and likelihood of
such absolute principles, and that there is a considerable amount of change in, and
reassessment, of such principles in his natural philosophical endeavours.'3
Schelling seeks to resolve the perennial problem of mind against matter by
viewing man's knowledge as part of the purposive organic whole of Nature.
Indeed, Schelling's concept of the "Ich" directly promotes the idea that man's
knowledge is evidential: "Ich bin! Mein Ich enthält em Sein, das allem Denken und
Vorstellen vorausgeht" (105, 167; 273, 246). In his notion of the intuition
("Anschauung") Schelling argues that man is capable of intuiting the key forces
and phenomena in Nature. In the act of intuiting man creates Nature for himself,
he constructs phenomena (244, 30). In the way the intuition can seek out and select
significant phenomena the inquirer can arrive at necessary, evident and a priori
knowledge. It is in this way that Schelling speaks of experiential knowledge within
his natural philosophy. This form of experiential knowing is not a purely objective
knowledge of empirical phenomena, instead it is part of the whole creative process
of Nature: it is part of Nature in the making, and, as has often been remarked
upon, the act of the intuiting is concerned with the process of "natura naturans"
and not the state of "natura naturata" (221, 114). In the context of
"experimentation", Schelling states that it is the task of natural philosophy to
supply the empirical scientist with the necessary evidential principles with which to
conduct experiments. With this in mind Schelling defines the notion of
"experiment":
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Jedes Experiment 1st eine Frage an die Natur, auf weiche zu antworten sie gezwungen wird. Aber
jede Frage enthält em verstecktes Urtheil a priori (109, 276).
"Experimentation", in Schelling's view, is the creative act of constructing Nature
with the proper evidential principles. In the act of construction Nature is "brought
forth":
Jedes Experiment, das Experiment ist, ist Prophezeiung; das Experimentiren selbst em
Hervorbringen der Erscheinungen (109, 276).
Consanguineous with Schelling's view is Novalis's belief that the inquirer should
seek out "wircksame Begriffe" to inquire into natural phenomena. As the concept
of "wircksame Begriffe" implies (i.e. "effective", literally physical concepts
pertaining to force and matter), Novalis seeks certain key experiential notions as a
basis for inquiry. Both Novalis and Schelling thus advocate a type of philosophical
empiricism. Novalis gives this form of inquiry a name: "thatiger Empirismus"
(active empiricism) (N, 3, 445, 600). Active empiricism refers at one level to the
experiential nature of ideas and the way our perception of phenomena involves
mediation between theory and phenomena. In this process of mediation ideas
obtain a form of physicality as the terms "thatig", "wircksam" and "Plastisirung"
suggest. "Thatiger Empirismus" also refers to the whole of Nature in the way it
suggests that Nature operates according to fundamental purposive principles. In
finding a method that remains close to experience the inquirer retraces Nature's
own forces. Nature's purposiveness needs to be matched by an adequate method,
and this is why the "philosophical history of discoveries" is brought into discussion
by Novalis. Like Schelling, Novalis sees a purposive structure in Nature which is
analogous to the purposiveness of human consciousness and thought.
Both Novalis's and Schelling's views on knowledge go a considerable way
beyond Kant. It can be said that much of what Kant intimates (in the realms of
natural philosophy, aesthetics and ethics) is then realized by the Romantics, or to
put it otherwise, much of what Kant deems regulative for aesthetics and natural
organization becomes constitutive for Romantic views on knowledge and
phenomena. Clearly, Novalis's and Schelling's views of knowledge owe much to
Kant. Without Kant's reassertion of the subject they could not have developed their
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own critical apparatus. Equally, Novalis and Schelling are, as is Kant, concerned
with the absolute premises of knowledge. Furthermore, Kant's notions of aesthetic
and teleological appraisal in his Kritik der Urteilskraft treat the ordering of nature
in terms of perception, the imagination and understanding: such an approach has
many parallels to Romantic natural philosophical endeavours.' 4 In addition, Kant's
notion of judgement, with its emphasis on the process and practice of, as opposed
to the formal use of judgement, shares the concerns of the Romantics for
experiential, concrete knowledge.' 5 None the less, Schelling's "Anschauung" and
Novalis's notion of "Plastisirung" give knowledge an ontological base in a way that
Kant's notions of knowledge in his Kritik der reinen Vernunfi do not. By viewing
knowledge as part of natural processes the rift between Kant's judgements and the
world of the "Ding an sich" is overcome. Schmied-Kowarzik has pointed out how
Schelling's notion of "Konstruktion" is quite distinct from Kant's, since Schelling
begins with the assumption that our thought is part of the world of the "Ding an
sich":
Für Schelling dagegen wird das Konstrukt der Welt von Dingen an sich jenseits der Sinnenwelt
hinfJ1ig, da wir mit der wirklichen Erfahrung unmer schon bei den Dingen an sich sind (274, 77).
Kant does hold the opinion that knowledge begins with experience, but he does not
back up this view with an ontology of nature in the way that Novalis and Schelling
do. Importantly, Kant separates "Anschauung" from "Verstand", whereas thinkers
such as Herder, Fichte, Novalis and Schelling place particular importance on the
role of the "Anschauung" in knowledge formation. Furthermore, although Kant
does indeed raise the notion of a "construction" of knowledge in his concept of
"synthetische Urtheile a priori" (synthetic a priori judgements), this form of
knowledge does not resolve the rift between our judgements and the the world of
the "Ding an sich". Mathematical judgements and those implied in the regulative
principles of reason ("Grundsätze des reinen Verstandes") of his own philosophy,
according to Kant, do "construct" new knowledge (166, 194). Synthetic a priori
judgements (through the assistance of "Schemata") do, to an extent, bridge the gap
between experience and theoretical knowledge since they produce knowledge
which is applicable to experience without being directly derived from experience
itself. Synthetic a priori judgements do act as mediators between theory and
experience, but within the context of the whole of Kant's philosophy they do not
have the ontological significance that the Romantics see in types of knowledge that
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mediate between theory and phenomena. For one, Kant limits synthetic a priori
judgements to mathematics and to the regulative principles of reason. Secondly,
Kant is cautious about the extent to which we can gain proper objective knowledge
of phenomena - only by respecting the limitations of our faculties is this possible,
and it is within these bounds that Kant puts forward his view of valid objective
knowledge. Admittedly, in his later critiques, Kant extends his thought, treating
moral knowledge, and also the problems of the organic sciences, as for example,
the use of morphotypes or organizational plans in comparative anatomy within the
scope of a teleological framework (235, 122). However, precisely the type of
capabilities related to the realms of the moral and of practice which Kant attributes
to the human mind Novalis and Schelling wish to concede to scientific knowledge
as well. Within a natural philosophy of science they see the possibilities of bridging
the gap between man's thought and the world of the "Ding an sich". To do justice
to Kant, one must state that, just as his earlier philosophy can be seen as setting
strict limits to man's capability of knowing, and, also, as a justification of
conventional Newtonianism, his views on dynamism and the organic can be seen as
a crucial springboard for Schelling's natural philosophy (164, 25; 165, 75-77; 221,
113-114).
In his Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der Naturwissenschaft Kant puts forward a
dynamic notion of matter based upon the forces of attraction and repulsion. Kant
deduced this analytically by examining the a priori conditions of matter. Schelling
accepts this but goes further to question the origins of the forces. Scheffing argues
that this can only be done synthetically by deducing the forces from the activities
of the mind. This importantly provides the conditions for the possibility of the
outer intuition ("Bedingungen der Moglichkeit der äuBerer Anschauung") (106,
216; 165, 74-75). There are, however, further substantial differences between
Schelling and Kant, even though Kant's influence is visible. In his Metaphysische
Anfangsgrunde Kant divides the science of matter into four areas: "Phoronomie",
the study of quantitative motion; "Dynamik", the study of qualitative motion;
"Mechanik", the study of relative motion; and "Phänomenologie", the study of
matter according to notions of motion and rest ("Modalität"). Schelling, in his
Ideen, puts forward a physics based upon quantitative, qualitative and relative
motions. In his notion of qualitative motion he introduces chemical aspects, and
discards Kant's "Phänomenologie", whose task is taken over by chemistry.
Whereas Kant rejects chemistry as being incapable of attaining the status of a
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science, Schelling positions chemistry above "Mechanik", and indeed views
chemistry as the necessary fundament to mechanics, providing it with its contents
and its various applications. Schelling thus converted Kant's mathematically
oriented physics into a quite different entity (259, 53-55). Of further influence on
Schelling, as mentioned, were Kant's notions of the organic and purposiveness in
nature as expressed in his Kritik der Urtheilskraft. Kant's notions were developed
considerably by Schelling in his Von der Weliseele (and in later works) into his
idea of the "absolute" or "general organism", from which the conditions for the
inorganic and the validity of mechanical principles were to be deduced (165, 76-
77; 107, 349, 500; 109, 70, 326).
Kant's later views on knowledge and the sciences are more amenable to the
Romantics than those in his Kritik der reinen Vernunfi - even given the way a
thinker such as Schelling considerably adapts Kant's views. However, putting these
Romantic extensions of Kant's thoughts aside, the main issue here is to note the
fundamental ontological difference between Kant and the Romantics, even though -
from their perspective - Kant had in fact done much ground work for them.
Novalis's and Schelling's views on the make-up of knowledge can thus be briefly
stated in the following way: knowledge is a part of Nature, and like all phenomena
knowledge is a process. Since acts of knowledge are part of the process of Nature
they are experiential. Schelling's "Anschauung" and Novalis's
"Plastisirungsmethode" are those acts of knowledge where man creates
("constructs") Nature herself. Both attempt to put forward models of an inner logic
of knowledge (a "working logic") that are neglected by those who are concerned
with formal, theoretical knowledge alone.
At this point a further analysis of the issues surrounding practical knowledge
should be given so as to put both Schelling's and Novalis's thoughts into a greater
context, reaching back to the ancients and up to the modern arena of this century.
Such a broad contextualization has recently been undertaken by Jonsen and
Toulmin, the authors of The Abuse of Cosuisriy (211). To differentiate between
notions of theory and practical knowledge it is illuminating to look back to the
tenets of Plato (427 - 348) and Aristotle (384 - 322). Whereas Plato stresses the
formal perfection of geometry and the "episteme" (i.e. theory) in both science and
ethics, Aristotle draws a line between the theoretical nature of scientific knowledge
and the circumstantial nature of ethics (211, 62-63). Aristotle refers to theoretical
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science as "episteme" and he calls practical skills "technai". He introduces,
however, a further notion to practical knowledge, that of "prudence" or
"phronesis", and this plays a major role in his ethics (211, 37). "Phronesis" refers
to practical wisdom gained from experience and the ability to deal with particular
individuals and actual situations (211, 37). "Phronesis" involves human perception
and judgement and is a very different capability to that of "episteme". Whereas the
"episteme" of science operates according to "universal principles" and is deductive
in nature, "phronesis" requires experience based judgements and the direct
perception of "ultimate particulars" (211, 66). Aristotle states:
In this respect, phronesis and episteme are opposed. The intellect masters the basic definitions of a
science, which are not further demonstrable [and argues from these definitionsi; but phronesis deals
with the "ultimate particular" [to eschatonl, and this is an object of perception [aisthesisj
rather than episteme.'6
It is important to note that "phronesis" is a higher form of experience than plain
sensual perception. Aristotle compares the way "phronesis" picks upon ultimate
particulars to the way a triangle is perceived in mathematics. The ultimate
particulars are perceived not "by normal sense perception, to be sure; but in the
kind of way we recognize that the triangle (say) is an ultimate element [eschatonj
in mathematics".' 7 Jonsen and Toulmin remark how "phronesis" thus operates
according to "paradigmatic or type cases" (211, 66). The crucial point is that for
"phronesis", unlike "episteme", no deductive proof is required to recognize that "a
triangle is triangular", or in the realm of morals that "an act of cruelty is cruel"
(211, 66). "Phronesis" is based upon the experiences the individual has made and
provides "certainties of a distinct and distinctive kind" (211, 67). The form of
knowing that Aristotle proposes through "phronesis" possesses similarities to
Novalis's and Schelling's idea that man is capable of arriving at significant
judgements through experiential knowledge, and also that paradigmatic types, i.e.
open-ended concepts, are used to form knowledge. Clearly, however, Aristotle
deems "phronesis" only suitable for ethics, whereas the Romantics sought to apply
the sort of knowledge gained through "phronesis" to the sciences as well.
In this context it should be noted that - as mentioned earlier - Novalis finds his
classic ideal not in Aristotle or Plato, hut in Plotinos. Novalis sees in Plotinos's
philosophical style a way of coming to knowledge that steered between the formal-
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theoretical and the concrete-experiential. Novalis finds in Plotinos precisely the
sort of natural philosophical approach he himself espoused: a way of coming to
knowledge that ontologically linked man's thought to phenomena. Plotinos's
emanations and his notion of "Sympathie" provide Novalis with a model of natural
philosophy that both explains thought phenomenally and provides a picture of a
purposive natural world.'8
There are, further, key issues ensuing from Jonsen and Toulmin's study that
relate directly to modern notions of practical knowledge. It has already been noted
that modern science contains the danger of an alienation from the world of
experience: in many aspects science today is no longer in touch with the natural
world but only with theory. Jonsen and Toulnun point out that in scientific theory
today the general ideas, although not divorced from actual objects, "refer directly
only to preselected objects, which exemplify them precisely enough to be relevant
to the theory" (211, 30-31). Physicists concern themselves directly only with
"circumstances and cases that are "abstracted" (i.e., selected out) as being relevant
to their central theoretical goals" (211, 31). To illustrate this view Jonsen and
Toulmin remark how the physicist studying gravity is directly interested in the
movements of planets, but not in "the fluttering of a falling sheet of paper" (211,
31). The other factors effecting the fall of the sheet of the paper, such as air
currents, cannot be separated in practice from the gravitational factors. Moreover,
Jonsen and Toulmin assert that the scientific theory of the modern physicist may
indeed not refer beyond the world of temporal experience, but, none the less, the
theory seeks to state the atemporal, "covering all relevant cases, anywhere, at any
time" (211, 32). This approach to science differs from that of Schelling and
Novalis in three cardinal ways. Firstly, it differs from the Romantic concern for
the experiential, and, secondly, it differs from the Romantic concern for the
process of Nature, which is anything but atemporal since the Romantics are
concerned with the process and change within Nature. Thirdly, when Novalis and
Schelling select particular forces or phenomena, they do so in the belief that the
chosen items are evidential, experiential and form part of a purposive whole of
Nature.
Of relevance to the issues of practical or experiential knowledge is also the way
in which Jonsen and Toulmin distinguish between the theoretical activities of the
physicist and the practical knowledge of clinical medicine. They argue that medical
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diagnosis involves the use of a taxonomy of known conditions and the ability to
classify the patient's condition in terms of "types" (211, 40). The method of
clinical medicine works upon substantive as opposed to formal claims. The
conclusion of the diagnosis in clinical medicine is viewed not as a necessary
entailment of its fmdings, but as a "rebuttable presumption" (211, 42). The
conclusion of the findings of clinical medicine is not atemporal, "but thoroughly
circumstantial" (211, 42). The method of clinical medicine, whereby types of
symptoms are linked with types of diseases, is altogether based upon analogical
argument (211, 41). This approach to method, in its use of analogy and evidential
types, is not dissimilar to the views of the Romantics. A further similarity lies in
the open-ended nature of clinical medicine's "rebuttable presumptions" and the
natural philosophical concepts of the Romantics. Novalis views phosphorus, for
example, as a key symbolic concept within the pneumatic debate. Phosphorus, in
Novalis's view, was both a key notion underlying much of the pneumatic debate,
and also a key chemical notion for the furtherance of the debate: phosphorus was
an open-ended concept, standing for a variety of theoretical viewpoints, and in this
way was not limited to a single atemporal theory. Where clinical medicine and the
Romantics most probably part is over the notion of circumstantiality. Novalis and
Schelling do not see types in general (i.e. their notions and principles of natural
philosophy) as purely circumstantial but as part of the greater purposive process of
Nature. Their types transcend the temporal, but are not atemporal since they are
part of the continuing process of Nature.
Pertinent to the analysis of issues surrounding the notion of practical knowledge,
and recalling the example of Aristotle, it is of relevance that current debate over
practical knowledge has also been directed at the philosophy of Ludwig
Wittgenstein (1889 - 1951). Janik makes the point that Aristotle's ethics are based
around the notion that the individual must learn practical wisdom in his or her own
way. They must follow the examples (i.e. paradigms) set by others but interpret
them individually (208, 51). Janik links Aristotle's ethics to tacit knowledge by
alerting us to the fact that the practical wisdom conveyed by the person who is
setting the example can only be transferred indirectly. Practical wisdom cannot be
taught or expressed in terms of formal knowledge or rules. An exemplary action is
an indirect way of passing on wisdom. Janik remarks that "hints and examples are
vastly more important than formal rules" for the individual who strives to gain
practical knowledge. He continues:
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In this sense practical wisdom is tacit knowledge, for it is genuine knowledge: the practically wise
person "hits the mark" but the how is only indirectly communicable (208, 51).
Thus Janik sees Aristotle's concept of practical life resting "wholly upon tacit
knowledge" (208, 51). This view of practical knowledge, since there are no formal
rules, begs the question as to how exactly this sort of knowledge is then formed.
The example above of the method of clinical medicine given by Jonsen and
Toulmin is one answer. Another answer is found by Janik in the thought of
Wittgenstein and the differentiation made between regulative and constitutive rules.
To Wittgenstein it is impossible to formulate explicit, formal (regulative) rules
which govern human behaviour. Language and meaning is constitutive of human
behaviour, and "this means we can never get outside of it to observe it" (i.e. to
produce formal rules on behaviour) (208, 52). In fact, as Janik points out, taking
up Wittgenstein's line of argument, to follow explicit rules of behaviour is
logically regressive:
If it were necessary to have an explicit rule according to which we learn how to imitate, say, the
dance teacher's step, we would also need another rule to apply to that rule and so on ad infinitum
(208, 52).19
When one learns by example, be it from the dance teacher or from the sports
coach, one perceives a certain type or model (a constitutive rule). The learning
process involves the imitation of models (i.e. constitutive, open-ended rules): we
learn analogically and "invent new ways of using old models" (208, 52). The
analogical method of using constitutive rules explains why constitutive rules can
contain both the knowledge of tradition and the seeds for innovation on the part of
the learner. This explains why, as Göronzon has commented, Wittgenstein views
concepts not as rules themselves:
Wittgenstein perceives a concept as a set of activities that follow a rule, in contrast to regarding the
concept as a rule ... In this way, the concept becomes related to its usage. The use of the concept
determines its content. It is our usage or practice that shows the way in which we understand
something (178, 10).
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This analogical and experiential approach to knowledge gaining is also commented
on by Novalis. He remarks that knowledge arises out of a productive use of
tradition, and that the knowledge passed down by tradition is recreated anew by the
learner:
(Aus der Tradition ist Lehre geworden) (Alle Lehre bezieht sich auf Kunst - Praxis). Man mufi die
Wahi-heit überall vergegenwartigen - überall repraesenziren (im thãtigen, producirenden Sinn)
können (N, 3, 445).
The truths of tradition are not followed as formal rules: the truths are seen as forms
of practice themselves which in turn can only be understood by creative
reenactment through their experiential "representation" by the learner. As already
noted, representation refers to the notion of plasticizing or "feeling" ideas, and it
is, according to Novalis, through a "feel" for the practical factors within a
tradition, and not through formal rules, that one can best understand the knowledge
within a specific tradition. Tradition offers the learner a wealth of experiential
knowledge, an abundance of open-ended models and paradigms, which the learner
can then innovate upon. It is in this sense that the natural philosophy of Novalis
and Schelling seeks those aspects of phenomena and man's thought which form an
inner logic of Nature. Both man and other natural phenomena are "innovating"
upon the paradigms of key natural forces. Putting the question of the evolution of
forces aside and to speak of the development of knowledge alone, the inquirer's
relationship to tradition, in Novalis's view, is not put down to a sheer linear
cumulative collection of scientific facts. It is well known that Thomas Kuhn has
shown how advances in the sciences often involved the tidying up of innovative
approaches and fmdings so as to make them appear that they fitted into a perfect
linear progression of scientific knowledge. 2° Novalis's remarks about tradition
arguably go further: behind the progression of the sciences lies a certain method
and inner logic. In his notion of representation Novalis looks beyond formal theory
to the origins of theory itself and the way ideas are formed. In his notion of
"Plastisirung" lies an answer to the way knowledge is gained: it is an answer that
leads away from theory alone to the proposition that there is a relationship between
objects, language, and our ideas. Novalis's notion of representation promotes their
relationship by proposing that types, models and analogies are key factors in
scientific discovery. Tore Nordenstam has underlined how this approach to thought
has often been traditionally neglected:
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There are things which are so close to us that it is difficult for us to see them, like our languages
and our bodies. The discovery of the central roles of our language and bodies in human existence is
late one. It belongs to our own century (250, 64-65).
Its acceptance most probably belongs to this century, but as, for example, the
thoughts of the Romantics - such as Novalis - show, it is an age old preoccupation.
Further, coming back to the modern context, Ziman, in his concept of reliable
knowledge, argues for the key role of analogy within scientific communities. The
way scientists arrive at consensus is through "analogous personal experiences and a
language in which something can be said about inner consciousness" (302, 189);
within the area of reliable scientific thought itself "we can scarcely avoid the
conclusion that most of our thinking is analogical and metaphorical" (302, 25).
Referred to earlier were also the works of Hesse (1%), Rudwick (268) and
Gooding (176) for their interests in models and visual language, which are factors
directly linked to the notions of metaphor and analogy. Novalis's idea of
representation indeed concurs with these types of concerns in modern philosophy
and history of science.
Novalis fits his notion of representation out with a method, as will now be
shown. He sees inquiry having to move outwards from evident principles and
phenomena (N, 3, 603). In doing so, Novalis proposes the use of an "experimental
calculus" ("Experimentencalcul") operating with representative symbols and
notions (N, 3, 435). Through the employment of significant symbols in an
increasing series of experiments progression in inquiry is attained. Novalis
comments:
Ansicht eines Experiments in einer steigenden Reihe von Gesichtspuncten (N, 3, 91).
To use the example of phosphorus again, it can be said that Novalis sees
phosphorus as the "common denominator" of much of the pneumatic debate.
Novalis implies that this debate can be summarized as a series of experiments and
an ideal calculus based upon the substance phosphorus. Further, in Novalis's view,
phosphorus attained the status of a natural philosophical principle or symbol, not
only through its widespread use, hut also, concomitant to its use, because it was a
potent symbolic concept. As a symbol phosphorus contained within itself the seeds
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of a variety of theoretical stand points concerning matter theory. These included,
amongst others, notions of chemical affinity, deflagration, vitalism - notions which
were precursors to an idea of energy -, and even ideas of planetary motion.2'
Novalis attributes the same sort of symbolic potence to the nerve in galvanic
theory. Here, the use of the nerve, in Novalis's view, opens up the study of the
unity of inorganic and organic forces. He saw that the concept of the nerve in
Ritter's work on galvanism made it possible to discuss notions of circuits, forces,
chemical affinity, excitability and organization all at one fell swoop. Around the
symbolic notion of the nerve a calculus of discovery is erected, and it is the nerve
which guides the process of discovery. It is particularly in the diagrams that Ritter
made of his galvanic experiments that Novalis finds most explicit expression of an
ideal calculus in operation, because it is in the diagrams that the real formulas
("reale ... Formeln") of the ideal calculus are most visible. Novalis views Ritter's
diagrams as a type of symbolic language that mediates between his galvanic theory
and the phenomena investigated in the experiments.
The link between Novalis's "experimental calculus" and mathematical calculus
lies in the way symbols are employed as constants within an "experiential"
formula. To Novalis, the fundamental method of mathematical calculus is
expressed in the way relationships between objects are used to attain further
results. In Novalis's ideal calculus, symbols of significant phenomena are
combined with and related to other phenomena under observation in empirical
work. Out of the synthesis of their combinations and relationships new knowledge
is gained. Novalis had read Condorcet's (1743-1794) work, Entwurfeines
hisrorischen Gemahldes der Fortschritte des menschlichen Geistes (2(1), where
hopes are raised for the possible extension of the method of mathematical calculus
to other areas of knowledge. Novalis comments on this work:
Nach Condorcet lehrt der Inf[initesimal CalcUl ... eine Methode, die, da sie sich auf alle
Combinationen veränderlicher Gr[öBenj und auf alle Hypothesen ihrer Veränderungen erstreckt, auf
gleiche Weise fir alle Dinge, deren Veranderungen eines bestimrnten Maa&s fähig sind, entw[ederl
die Verhaltnisse ihrer Elemente, aus der Kenntnifi der Verh[altnisse], weiche die Sachen gegen
einander haben, oder die Verhãltn[jssej der Sachen, wenn nur die ihrer Elemente bekannt sind,
bestiminen lehrt (N, 3, 425; 20, 234-235).
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To Novalis this meant that by studying the affmities of things for another
("Bestimmungsverwandtschaftslehre"), and by using their combinations, discovery
could take place (N, 3, 424). To some extent, this was a mathematization and
extension of eighteenth century affinity theory. In other words, by studying the
relationships of known objects, further knowledge about the objects can be
obtained.
Condorcet remains vague about actual examples of the extension of the method of
calculus to other areas of knowledge. Novalis, however, gives several examples of
how he believes it can be used in an extended sense, as in the cases already given
of phosphorus and the nerve; a further case is given below in the context of
Werner's mineralogy. Novalis' s source for an ideal calculus lies, however, not in
Condorcet, but elsewhere in the philosophical style of Plotinos, in Hemsterhuis,
and also in the work of Werner. In fact numerous sources play a role in shaping
Novalis's notion of an ideal calculus. One can, for example, further cite, first, the
thoughts contained in Leibnitz's (1646-1716) Theodicee and "Combinatorik" (7(7),
and then, the scientific method of Goethe and of Ritter. Hemsterhuis's notion of
the "sympathy" between man's ideas and phenomena, and the adjunctive
proposition that man has an innate knowledge of the combinations of phenomena,
form an important starting point for Novalis's concept of "Combinatorik" or ideal
calculus. It could even be argued that Novalis's whole view of knowledge can be
put down to his notion of an ideal calculus and representation. To "romanticize"
means making a natural philosophical science of knowledge, including literature,
too (N, 3, 256, 280-281). The skill of romanticizing, which Novalis believes is an
as of yet unknown art ("Diese Operation ist noch ganz unbekannt" (N, 2, 545), lies
in drawing relationships between the finite and infinite, the everyday and the
transcendent. Through representation a relationship is formed between otherwise
disparate things:
Die Welt mufi romantisirt werden Indem ich dem gemeinen emen hohen Sinn ... gebe so
romantisire ich es - Umgekehrt ist die Operation für das Höhere, Unbekannte, Mystische,
Unendliche - dies wird durch diese VerknUpfung logarythmisirt - Es bekommt einen gelaufigen
Ausdruck. romantische Philosophie. Lingua romana (N, 2, 545).
This well-known remark shows how Novalis interprets the method of mathematical
calculus and the way he views it in terms of his wider notion of an ideal calculus.
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Fundamentally, Novalis views mathematical calculus as an activity which draws
relationships between things in order to gain knowledge. In Novalis's literary
works not only is scientific material used as a source, but also the same
"plasticizing" method used in the sciences is employed to "construct" the texts. As
in his notion of scientific method, in literature sequences of significant symbols are
used: the difference being that in literature the symbolic calculus is used to propose
a vision of the human state, and in the sciences the calculus of the discovery
process is used to attain a theory about natural phenomena. In the final instance,
however, both literature and science, by virtue of their common natural
philosophical stance, are attempting to put forward a view of man's position in
Nature.
Schelling does not explicitly propose the use of an ideal calculus for inquiry, but
he does comment on the relationship between the method of mathematical calculus
and his method of natural philosophy. When speaking of the task of all science
Schelling remarks:
Moglichkeit der Darstellung des Unendlichen im Endlichen - ist höchtes Problem aller
Wissenschaften (108, 14).
The natural philosopher is concerned with formulating the great infinite series of
Nature, but unlike mathematical calculus which operates using combinations
("Zusammensetzung"), the infinite series of Nature arises through "Evolution".
Schelling states that the infinite "evolutionary" series can be viewed as operating
according to a "function". Importantly, the key factor within the "function" must
be a concept of "activity" ("der Begriff einer Thatigkeit"). Schelling says of the
issues surrounding the adequate expression of the infinite series of Nature:
Wie mul3 man sich nun aber eine unendliche Reihe vorstellen, wean sic nur die aufiere Darstellung
einer ursprunglichen Unendlichkeit ist? Mufi man glauben, daB das Unendliche in ihr durch
Zusainmensetzung erzeugt werde, oder vielmehr mufi man sich jede soiche Reihe in Continuitãt, als
Eine ins Unendliche flieflende Funktion vorstellen? - DaB in der Mathematik unendliche Reihen aus
Gröfien zusammengesetzt werden, beweist nichts für jene Annahme. Die ursprUnglich unendliche
Reihe, wovon alle einzelnen (in der Mathematik) nur Nachahmungen sind, entsteht mcht durch
Zusammensetzung, sondem durch Evolution, durch Evolution Einer in ihrem Anfangspunkte schon
unendlichen Gröfie, die durch die ganze Reihe hindurchfliefit ... Der eigentliche Begriff also für
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eine empirische Unendlichkeit ist der Begriff einer Thatigkeit, die ins Unendliche fort gehemmt ist
(108, 15-16).
Schelling's natural philosophy strives to find the key forces and phenomena which
occur and develop along the infinite series of Nature. The series is referred to by
Schelling as "Epochen", and, also, importantly for the present discussion, as
"Reihen" (221, 115-117, 125). The notion of a "series" or "row" of objects in
experimentation is part of Novalis's concept of a calculus. The notion of "rows"
forms also part of Werner's thought as is discussed below in his mineralogical
method. The type of concepts ("concepts of activity") required by Schelling for the
establishment of a series of Nature are clearly related at ontological and
epistemological levels with Novalis's notion of "wircksame Begriffe". However, it
should be noted that Schelling's views here are concerned with establishing a
philosophy of nature, and are not directly related to Novalis's concern with a
method for scientific discovery itself. At another level one can say that Schelling's
natural philosophy is concerned with the discovery of Nature itself, but the
distinction made between Schelling and Novalis is just. In his notion of method
Novalis refers not only to the discovery of Nature's first principles but also to
discovery processes in the laboratory, as his views on the use of phosphorus and on
Ritter's work on galvanism show.
Schelling's use of what he calls "Zwischenglieder" or "Mitteiglieder" (mid-terms)
is, however, more comparable to Novalis's concern with scientific discovery. The
"Zwischenglieder" are terms, taken from the empirical sciences, that mediate
between the activities of the strictly empirical inquirer and the principles of the
"Naturphilosoph". An example of Schelling's use of "Zwischenglieder" has been
shown by Poser. Poser comments how Schelling, in his Aligemeine Dedukiion,
refers to a line ABC in the first instance in a formal geometric fashion (258, 134;
111, 8-9). Schelling then goes on to use the line ABC to illustrate the properties of
a magnet:
Aber diese drei Punkie sind diejenigen, weiche zu der Construktion des Magnets nothwendig sind.
Denn in jedem Magnet findet sich a) em Punkt, in weichem nur die positive Ksaft ihre Wirkung
aüliert ... b) Bin Punkt, wo der Magnetismus weder ± noch -, wo also eine vollige Indifferenz ist.
Dieser Punkt ist der gemeinschaftliche Grenzpunkt beider Kräfte und entspricht dem oben
abgeleiteten Punkt C. ... Da ich den Magnet als reine Lime betrachte, so kann ich auch nur von
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einem indifferenten Punkt sprechen; am wirklichen Magnet nennt man die ganze gleichgultige Stelle
den Aequator des Magnets. c) Einen Punkt, wo nur die negative Kraft herrschend ist, weiche von
dem Gleichgewichtspunkt an allmãhlich zunehniend endlich in jenem ihr Maximum erreicht (111, 9-
10).
When the line ABC is linked to the phenomenon of the magnet, unlike the example
of the geometrical line, the line becomes a representation of a phenomenon. In this
instance Schelling is directly theorizing with phenomena. In his scheme of a
magnet Schelling shows how theory can be given a definite form, and vice versa,
how phenomena can be represented as theory. This enables the inquirer to gain a
concrete idea of the theoretical issues at hand. Schelling's use of the term
"Zwischenglieder" does, then, concord with Novalis's view of representation in
inquiry and its use in expressing key empirical concepts. Like Novalis, Schelling is
close here to the scenes of discovery. The difference between the two thinkers is
minimal and lies in Novalis's extension of representation to the abstracter and more
mathematical sounding notion of an ideal calculus.
Moreover, in his use of the term "Zwischenglieder", Schelling appears to erect a
greater barrier between his natural philosophical activities and those of the strict
empirical scientist of his time than there actually was. In his Einleirung zu dem
Entwurfeines Systems der Naturphilosophie Schelling states that it is the task of
empirical science to fmd the "Zwischenglieder" and that it is the task of his natural
philosophy to ascertain their lack:
Diese Zwischeng!ieder aufzufinden, ist das Werk der experimentirenden Nachforschung. Die
spekulative Physik hat nichts zu thun a!s den Mange! dieser Zwischenglieder aufzuzeigen (109,
279).
Surely, one can argue, given the defmition of principles and "Zwischenglieder" in
his natural philosophy, are they not anyway of empirical value? Schelling's point is
however to establish a difference between "blind empiricism" and a more critical
form of scientific inquiry. Seen in the greater context of practical knowledge and
the issues surrounding the formation of knowledge, the apparent conflict between
the a priori and a posteriori in Schelling's work is not a methodological problem as
one critic, Poser, thinks (258, 134-136). Part of the problem of Poser's approach,
and also of Heckmann's, 22
 is that they take terms such as "empiricism" and
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"experiment" at face value, without stressing analogous forms of experiential
thought in other parts of Schelling's philosophy. Schelling's notion of human
thought has many experiential aspects, just as his notion of natural philosophy can
be seen as a higher form of empiricism. Schelling is not concerned with formal
knowledge, instead he seeks to unite the practical and the theoretical, and his
philosophy offers a strong fundament for beginning upon this task. His natural
philosophical activities are necessarily linked to and bound up with the activities of
the empirical scientist. The difference between Schelling's principles and
"Zwischenglieder" would need to be discussed in detail in a separate study, and its
resolution would probably lie firstly in the difference in value between his
principles and "Zwischenglieder" when viewed in light of the sciences of his time.
Secondly, the answer would probably be seen in the development and change of
key "Zwischenglieder" into higher level principles within his natural philosophy.
The main point to make here, however, is that Schelling's principles and
"Zwischenglieder" and Novalis's "wircksame Begriffe" are particular notions based
upon material from the empirical sciences which are in turn given a significant
position within their natural philosophical approach to inquiry. Important to note,
too, is that, although Schelling' s "Zwischenglieder" are not as directly related to
discovery processes as Novalis's notions of discovery, the way Schelling works
with them is intended to give guidance in inquiry. In this sense, Schelling's
"Zwischenglieder" are methodologically of equal importance to discovery as
Novalis's notions of "wircksame Begriffe", notation, symbols and "Plastisirung".
Both Novalis and Schelling wish to select and show the relevance of key empirical
terms for inquiry; they wish also to show how the terms can be put to use to assist
the inquirer. The empirical scientist can be helped when empirical terms are placed
within a greater natural philosophical context. The empirical scientist can further
be assisted, in their view, when methods are suggested for working with and
refining the terms, be it through Schelling's forms of reasoning and the style in
which he describes phenomena (e.g. in the example of the magnet) or through
Novalis's use of an ideal calculus and notation.
Schelling's notion of "Zwischenglieder" raises important questions about the role
of aesthetics in his natural philosophy. In his System des transcendentalen
Idealismus Schelling proposes significant links between aesthetics and philosophy.
In fact, aesthetics is the culmination of philosophy. It is art which provides the
final objective step in the progress of the "Anschauung" in Schelling's
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transcendental philosophy towards higher levels of knowledge; Schelling states that
his transcendental philosophy coheres as a whole when seen as such a progression:
DaB ferner dci ganzc Zusammenhang der Transcendental-Philosophie nur auf einem fortwahrenden
Potenziren der Selbstanschauung beruhe, von der ersten, einfachsten im Selbstbewufitsein, bis zur
höchsten, der ästhetischen (110, 631).
Aesthetic production thus goes through the same stages as philosophical
production. The aesthetic intuition resolves philosophy's problem of conceiving the
absolute by realizing the absolute in a finite work of art (110, 624-5). In its attempt
to conceive the absolute, philosophy works at synthesizing the infinitely opposed
activities of the spirit and nature (such as attraction and repulsion, subject and
object) into ever higher forms of knowledge. Philosophy partially resolves the
infmite dichotomy of opposed activities ("die unendliche Entzweiung
entgegengesetzter Thatigkeiten") by referring to ever higher forms of knowledge
(and natural forces), culminating in the "produktive Anschauung"; art, on the other
hand completely ("vollstandig") (110, 626) resolves this antithesis in a product:
Jenes produktive Vermögen 1st dasselbe, durch weiches auch dci Kunst das Uninögliche gelingt,
nãmlich einen unendlichen Gegensatz in einem Produkt aufzuheben" (110, 626).
This cannot, however, be seen as Schelling's fmal view on the natures of art and
philosophy. It would appear that the concrete nature of Schelling's
"Zwischenglieder" can arguably be seen as a type of lower level aesthetic intuition.
They are certainly different from Schelling's Kantian sounding notion of a
"Schema" which he attributes to philosophical knowledge. Schelling remarks that
what the "Schema" is to the philosopher, the "Symbol" is to the artist. Here,
Schelling differentiates between the way the artist in dealing with ideas employs
symbols as a form of communication and the way that the philosopher uses
"Schema" to transmit his concepts (110, 510). Schelling's employment of an
"ideal" magnet has, however, more to its epistemological status than a concept. At
the level of knowledge formation it can be interpreted as scientific art: the ideal
magnet is a product of the imagination, and it is thus a product akin to those
produced by Schelling's aesthetic intuition. In his System Schelling remarks that
both philosophy and art use the imagination, but that it is only art that provides a
product (110, 626): crucially it is a natural philosophical "Zwischenglied" such as
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Schelling's magnet that both employs the imagination and is a product of the
imagination.
There are, moreover, further ramifications to Schelling's notion of
"Zwischenglieder" in the context of his views on aesthetics in his System des
transcendental Idealismus. It is the objectivity of art that leads Schelling to the
notion that the "Gedicht" of Nature remains hidden "in geheimer wunderbarer
Schrift" (110, 628). Schelling desires to bring science back to its original point of
genesis, that of poetry ("Poesie"), and he suggests the appropriate "Mitteiglied" for
such a task is mythology (110, 629). This task he undertakes in his later
philosophy and the sense of the task lies not in the study of individual artists, but in
the study of races (110, 629). The study of races in terms of mythology clearly
dovetails neatly into Schelling's quest for a study of the human spirit and its links
to the spirit of Nature. None the less, Schelling, at this point in his work, leaves
many questions surrounding natural philosophy open. Mythology is a
"Zwischenglied" at the highest level of theory: however, lower level
"Zwischenglieder" such as his ideal magnet, with their aesthetic connotations, are
of great interest for defining his notion of natural philosophy itself before steering
on to his notion of mythology. Such lower level "Zwischenglieder" also bring
Schelling closer to the works of other early Romantics. For the relationship
between the arts and the sciences such lower level "Zwischenglieder", if seen as
types of natural philosophical principles, and if viewed in the way they link artistic
and scientific modes of production, are valuable for gaining insights into how
scientific ideas are not merely reflected in texts. This interpretation of his
"Zwischenglieder" moreover also bears upon his higher level natural philosophical
principles themselves. Schelling refers to philosophical knowledge as "künsthch"
and to art as original and natural ("ursprungliche und natürliche") (110, 628), but
is this entirely fair to his own natural philosophy? One can argue that his natural
philosophy, like art, does provide products, and natural and original ones at that.
There is little difference arguably between a natural philosophical principle of
Schelling's such as polarity and Goethe's "Urpflanze". The former refers to a force
and the latter to an object, but both are dynamic, generative models. Viewed in
this manner, there is a certain aesthetic quality to Schelling's natural philosophical
principles. Schelling is not literally an artist, but he is certainly a philosophical
artist. 23
 Schelling would appear to allude to this when he remarks:
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Netnht, kann man sagen, der Kunst die Objektivität, so hört sie auf zu seyn, was sie ist, und wird
Philosophie; gebt der Philosophie die Objektivitiit, so hört sie auf Philosophie zu seyn, und wird
Kunst (110, 630).
To conclude, if lower level "Zwischenglieder" and key natural philosophical
phenomena and forces are viewed in this light, they also provide links between the
arts and the sciences in terms of knowledge formation, and, further, in terms of
purposive processes in nature in which the human spirit is bound. Such is the case,
for example, regarding the manner in which Novalis treats Ritter's notions of
galvanism in the "Märchen" in Heinrich von Ofierdingen, or regarding the way
Goethe treats affinity in Die Wahlverwandtschafien.
Finally, moving away from the role of aesthetics to issues of scientific inquiry
itself, a further observation on the purpose of Novalis's and Schelling's natural
philosophy must be made. Novalis and Schelling were both aware of the enormity
of the exercise of singling out particular notions and phenomena. For both of them
natural philosophy was an ongoing task and the real importance of their activities
lay in fmding the correct method with which the task could be carried out, and in
setting an agenda at all for natural philosophical inquiry. Schelling argues that the
empirical sciences need natural philosophy because of the danger of the
hypothetical holding up progression in inquiry. When science adheres too
resolutely to a particular theory, natural philosophy should be called upon to
reassess the situation in its fuller context and reset the agenda of inquiry:
1.. .1 da aber jede neue Entdeckung uns in eine neue Unwissensheit zuruckwirft, und indem der eme
Knoten sich lOst, em neuer sich schürzt, so ist begreiflich, daB die vollstãndige Entdeckung aller
Zwischenglieder im Zusammenhang der Natur, daB also auch unsere Wissenschaft selbst eine
unendliche Aufgabe ist. - Nichts hat aber den ins Unendliche gehenden Progressus dieser
Wissenschaft mehr aufgehalten, als die WilIkür in Erdichtungen, womit so lange der Mangel an
gegrundeter Einsicht verborgen werden soilte. Dieses Fragmentarische unsrer Kenntnisse leuchtet
erst dann em, wenn man das bloB Hypothetische vom reinen Ertrag der Wissenschaft absondert, und
darauf ausgeht, jene BruchstUcke des grofien Ganzen der Natur wieder in einem System zu
sammien. Es ist daher begreiflich, daB speculalive Physik (die Seele des wahren Experiments) von
jeher die Mutter aller groflen Entdeckungen in der Natur gewesen ist (109, 279-280).
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It is the scope of Novalis's and Schelling's natural philosophy (i.e. their agenda)
and their method (i.e. their views on experiential knowledge) that avert the dangers
of hypothesis in inquiry.
The philosophical empiricism of Novalis and Schelling is not unique. Goethe,
too, gave much attention to the topic. However, before discussing Goethe's views,
let us turn our attention to a pre-Romantic thinker who had a great influence on the
Romantics: the geologist Werner. The far reaching significance of Werner for
geology has often been neglected (231, 112). The importance of Werner's geology
for a general theory of rock formation, reaching beyond the antipathies of the
Neptunist and Vulcanist camps, has been illustrated by Rachel Laudan (231, 87-
200). Werner's role in the development of geology in terms of chemistry and
geological method has also been emphasized recently (172). I wish now,
tentatively, to reassess another aspect of Werner's approach to the sciences: that of
his notions of practice. Werner's influence on Novalis cannot be disputed: Novalis
studied under Werner at the mining academy in Freiberg and was himself a
practicing inspector of mines. Novalis came to Freiberg after his studies of Kant
and Fichte and was greatly effected by the "empirical" world he found there. After
some initial concern over the plainness of his scientific and technological studies,
Novalis's world view underwent major changes: it was at Freiberg that Novalis
began to form a philosophy that was to unite contemporary science, Neoplatonism,
and German Idealism. Within the area of practice Werner's influence on Novalis
will now be traced; Novalis's views on Werner's mineralogical and geognostical
theories are not dealt with here since that is worthy of a study in itself. Such a
work would undoubtedly need to treat Werner's notions of classification and
encyclopaedism and relate them to Novalis's classification project in Dos
ailgeineine Brouillon. Furthermore, a full account of Novalis's and Werner's views
on chemistry would need to be delineated so as to see how the progression of
chemical ideal types to geognostical ideal types form part of greater picture of their
natural philosophy. Werner's chemistry has been dealt with by Fritscher (172), but
his notions of encyclopaedism are still an uncharted area. An in-depth study of
Werner's relationship to Novalis is still outstanding. It will further be suggested
that Werner affected Humboldt's views on practice. Extrapolations will also he
made from Fritscher's recent article on Steffen's employment of Werner's
geological theory to show links between practice and Werner's notion of geological
ideal types. Furthermore, for the history of science itself, it must be noted that the
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potential multiplication effect of Werner's views, given the large array of
influential and international students he taught, makes him a figure worthy of
study.
With Werner it is tempting to speak of time and history alone when discussing his
views of the sciences and knowledge: geology, seen as the history of the earth,
naturally lends itself to this interpretation. Method, however, is also a crucial
element of Werner's thought. Importantly, key methodological issues are raised in
an area of Werner's work which is not concerned directly with history, namely his
mineralogy. In his geognosy, history clearly plays a role, but equally so does his
view on method. In his mineralogy Werner classifies the minerals and rocks by
ordering them in rows ("Reihen") or suites ("Suiten") according to particular
experiential principles. The suites show the gradual changes and the relationships
between the minerals and rocks. In the mineral collection of Pabst von Ohain
(1718-1784), for example, Werner ordered the minerals in suites according to
various viewpoints such as "Bruch, Durchsichtigkeit, äufierer Gestalt" etc. 24 Of
significance for Romantic method are Werner's notions of "Reihung" and
"Mischung", for with these terms Werner demands that the inquirer should directly
theorize with the phenomena under investigation. "Reihung" involves the task of
observing the transitions ("Ubergange" and "Aneinanderstoflen") between
minerals; the notion of "Mischung" demands that the inquirer should observe the
effect the chemical composition of minerals has on their external appearance (181,
51-54). This ordering of rocks according to empirical principles undoubtedly
influenced Novalis. Werner's terms of classification are notions that are evident
and sensually based, and the way Werner employs them is highly akin to Novalis's
later method of sensual representation in his notion of "Plastisirung". Novalis
praises Werner for his strict adherence to the experiential, for it is in the emphasis
on experiential, as opposed to formal knowledge, that Novalis views the possibility
of ordering phenomena at all:
Wenn Werner zuförderst auf vollst[andigej und gutgeordnete Fossilbeschreibungen dringt, so hat er
sehr recht.
Die Beschreibung ist die Seobachtung des Fossils. Vollständigkeit und richtige Ordnung sind die
wesentlichen Best[andjth[eile] einer Beobachtung ... Die Ordnung hangt von der Beschreibung ab. -
Sic ist das Resultat d[erj Beschrleibung]. Ordnung ohne Beschr[eibungj ist Behauptung, ohne
Beweis (N, 3, 142).
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An experiential approach to investigating phenomena that employs sensual
representation gives rise to theory itself. Such an approach provides a natural
history that orders phenomena in a way that does not lose sight of their character,
letting them guide inquiry themselves: in this manner phenomena are ordered as
closely as possible according to Nature and not according to formal theory. Such
an approach also upholds the need for the inquirer to develop a feel and sense for
Nature through description and the direct theorizing with phenomena involved in
experiential thought: attaining a sense for nature is the primary prerequisite of the
ability to order phenomena. When Novalis emphasizes description he is not
arguing for plain induction; it is precisely the description of phenomena that allows
mediation between theory and phenomenon, and, further, allows the inquirer to
build up his practical knowledge. This in turn provides the base for further inquiry
and the formulation of theory.
Werner also, in accordance with Novalis's idea of testing theory (i.e. testing the
way we perceive phenomena), experimented with different forms of ordering the
rows of minerals. Here, in a highly concrete manner, the meaning behind
Novalis's notion of "experiment" in the testing of experiential knowledge can be
understood. Different theoretical viewpoints are physically shown in the various
forms in which the minerals are ordered.
Furthermore, in an illuminating comment on Werner's mineralogical work, Von
den a%!3erlichen Kennzeichen der Foflulien (124), Novalis extrapolates from
Werner's method and links it up to his own notion of an ideal calculus. Novalis
refers to Werner's use of colour terminology and suggests that the mineralogist
should be equipped with the significant mineral colours and the general rules of
mineralogical classification. Using these principles in a symbolic calculus, the
inquirer should be able to come to his own conclusions about classifying rocks and
minerals. The Wernerian experiential terms form the base of a mineralogical
discovery process:
Der Oryktognost braucht nur die Hauptfarben hinzustellen - und die allg[emeinej Regel zu geben,
daB der Schüler suchen soil recht viele concrete Farben ins Gedãchtnifi zu fassen. Dadurch wird er
vorbereitet - zu der Kunst - Farben im Kopfe zu zerlegen und zu nuschen ... Diese Kunst gehort in
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die Bildungslehre der Fantasie ... Der eigentliche mineralische Chynust ... Iehrt den mineralischen
chem[ischenj CalcUl (N, 3, 151-152).
Finally, reference to tacit knowledge has to be made with respect to Werner. It is
well known that he had an extraordinary sense for the materials that he worked
with (348, 23, 53-55). The fact that Werner "knew" where to place a stone in a
classification system by having a "sense" or "feel" for the stones themselves is
intimately linked to the experiential principles of his system. It can be said that this
type of tacit knowledge of the stones and minerals is a prerequisite for the creation
of his classification system.
The above portrayal of practical and tacit knowledge has argued that the path
from experience to theory involves mediation. The implication is that experiential
knowledge always plays a role in knowledge formation, and that selectivity and
interplay between the inquirer and the phenomena are key factors at this stage of
inquiry where defmitions are made that lead to a final formulated theory. Although
Hofbauer, in a recent article, has argued forcefully for the picture of Werner as an
Enlightenment sensualist empiricist concerned, above all, with the description of
nature, this view does not give enough credence to the selective nature of Werner's
method and the fact that it contained powerful tools for the formation of knowledge
(198, 549-55 1). Naturally, the discussion about Werner's method is not greatly
helped by merely stating that Werner had an indefinable tacit sense for the
materials he worked with. The notions of tacit and practical knowledge do more
than that, however, since they imply a certain capacity for selectivity on the part of
the inquirer, and, also, the related ability to theorize with phenomena using
experiential open-ended terms. Not only Werner's mineralogical classification
system and his notions of geognosy, but also his entire teaching programme can be
seen as being formed to institutionalize important constitutive rules for geological
practice (not regulative rules). Setting open-ended rules for geological practice
forms, in turn, the basis for the future of geological theory itself. The immense
importance of Werner's mineralogical system and his institutionalization of
petrographic mapping are but two examples of his achievements in this area of
knowledge. 25
 Furthermore, even if Werner had no explicit geognostical theory
(198, 554), his views certainly embraced concepts which travel towards a notion of
natural history ("Naturgeschichte") - a theme which will be returned to below.
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Goethe was a great admirer of Werner and a supporter of his Neptunist theory.
Whether Goethe's notion of practice was affected by Werner is not the subject of
analysis here. The main issue is to stress similarities in approach between early
Romantic thinkers, including Goethe in this category, with the necessary
reservations. Later, it will be shown, for example, that Humboldt's turn to
Vulcanism does not negate the influence of the Neptunist Werner, since the aim of
this study is to steer beyond doctrines to a deeper level of consensus in the early
Romantics by examining their notions of practice, and, as will be further
elaborated, their use of ideal types.
Goethe's views are of great interest to Romantic science since his life's work on
the sciences is an embodiment of what came to be Romantic practice. A series of
recent works, to varying extents, have treated Goethe's methodological interests.
In 1984, BOhler, in his essay, 'Naturwissenschaft und Dichtung bei Goethe', has
drawn comparisons between Goethe's notions of aesthetic or philosophical
productivity and his notions of scientific productivity. Böhler remarks:
Was tut die eine - die dichterische Tãtigkeit -, was die andere - die wissenschaftliche Forschung -
mcht tut? ... Die Stufenfolge ist ... "Ansehen" - "Betrachten" - "Sinnen" - "VerknUpfen", eine
Reihung, die den Prozefi der wissenschftlichen Beobachtung bis zum Punkt der Theoriebildung
umschreibt und die uns ziemlich unproblematisch und wohi auch unumstritten scheint. Diese
Reihung ist nun aber mit einer weitern Stufenfolge verknUpft: "Bewul3tsein" - "Selbsterkenntnis" -
"Freiheit" - "Ironic". Diese zweite Stufenfolge könnten wir als einen Prozefi des reflektierenden
Selbstbezugs bezeichnen. 1st der erste Prozefi, der der Theoriebildung, em Prozefi der Welterfassung
und damit nach auBen genchtet, so der zweite em soicher der Subjekterfassung und somit nach
innen gerichtet (143, 328-329).
The notion of a row, as has been and will be further discussed, is a key pattern in
early Romantic thought. Further, quite specific alignments of aesthetic and
scientific productivity with one another will be seen below in Goethe's notion of
experiment in the light of Goethe's views in his essay, Der Versuch a/s Vermirtler
von Objela und Subjeki (41).
In 1987, in the illuminating collection of essays edited by Amrine, Zucker and
Wheeler, Goethe and the sciences: a reappraisal (132), there are many critics who
deal with Goethe's methodology. Böhme, for example, refers to the
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"intersubjectivity" of Goethe's scientific method (144, 164-169). Böhme points out
how Goethe meaningfully upholds his distinction between objective and subjective
colours. Böhme argues that Goethe, "by giving the conditions of the experiment",
assures "intersubjectivity" for both types of colours, and, thus, provides the
grounds so that both types of colour phenomena can be reproduced (144, 167).
Hegge, among others, takes the notion of experiment a step further and argues that
Goethe's understanding of experiment takes a stand against hypothetico-
deductivism and notions of the testing of theory. Instead, the experiment's main
feature lies in its use for training the sensory imagination (1w), 212). This, I would
add, is important for understanding the experiential-cognitive approach to
"experiment" that links Goethe and Novalis. Zajonk makes use of Polanyi's notion
of tacit knowledge to explain what lies behind Goethe's idea of the archetype (301,
241; 256, 144). To Zajonk, Goethe's science is concerned with perception and
scientific discovery, and this cognitive orientation in Goethe's thoughts on the
sciences, as Zajonk further remarks, "is what Polanyi would call a perceived
coherence. Goethe would perhaps go further and call it the universal in the
particular, the ideal in the real" (301, 241). Furthermore, Zajonk briefly intimates
that he would like to view Novalis as akin to Goethe in this respect. He sees in
Novalis's idea of man's inner organ a form of knowing that acquires its wisdom
about nature through a close association with phenomena, and not through
hypothesis (301, 241-242).
Another critic, as will be discussed below in detail, Sepper, in his work of 1988,
Goethe contra Newton. Polemics and the project for a new science of color (276),
has most effectively examined Goethe's view of scientific method.
Another significant work is Adler's,	 published in 1987, namely "Eine fast
magische Anziehungskraft". Goethes "Wahlverwandtschafien' und die Chemie
seiner Zeit (129). This shows the unity of aesthetics and science in the above novel
of Goethe's. In the realm of its study, chemistry, and in the great detail of the
multiple levels of interpenetration of aesthetic and scientific thought, Adler's work
arguably underlines more clearly the blend of science and aesthetics in Goethe's
notion of knowledge than the essays of the collection referred to above. Adler
shows how a whole string of interdependent factors - within the realms of natural
philosophy, scientific thought and literature - move in and out of their various
areas of knowledge. In the depth of its portrayal of the interpenetration of a variety
of factors in Goethe's thought, Adler's work is a major step forward in Goethe
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scholarship, and also, consequently, offers a new understanding of early Romantic
thought. Adler's work can thus be read highly profitably in terms of natural
philosophical productivity since, as mentioned, its distinction lies in the way it
portrays a variety of levels of practical, aesthetic, and intellectual interpenetration.
Adler remarks:
Betrachtet man ... die gesamte Darstellung der "Wahlverwandtschaft" ... als Ausdruck einer "Idee",
so erweist sic sich als ungemein reich gegleidert: sic erstreckt sich von einer Morphologic der
Beziehungen zu einer Erkenntnistheorie; von einer Typologie chemischer Verhältnisse zu einer Serie
von Parallelen un menschlichen Leben. Die "Verwandtschaft" bildet den Kern der "Idee"; die
"Wahlverwandtschaft" ist ihre hOchste Entfaltung. Symbolisch steht diese auch für den ganzen
Komplex. Emma! äuBert sich die "Idee" im Menschen, emma! in der Chemie. So liefert die "Idee"
das "Model" oder "Urbild" der Beziehungen und Verhãltnisse im Roman. (129, 140).
Adler's interpretation of Goethe's notion of "Idee" in terms of experiential
knowledge, and in terms of its recourse to Plotinos, has already been discussed
(see above, p.51). It is clear that the "Idee", in Goethe's view, is both a tool of
knowledge formation for the sciences and also for literature. In both cases
concrete, symbolic and constitutive knowledge formation takes place. The fact,
too, that the notion of "Wahlverwandtschaft" is the key symbol of the entire
"Komplex" of Goethe's thought which Adler deals with readily recalls Novalis's
idea of a "phenomenal" calculus: for there ideas and phenomena are drawn
together and compared in a process of interpenetrative concrete knowledge
fonnation. This view of Goethe's thought comes exceedingly close to Novalis's
idea of knowledge, and their proximity will be discussed at various stages in this
work.
However, Goethe scholarship, until recently, has, in general, not treated Goethe
in terms of the issues of practice as understood in this dissertation. This was
because of the prevailing picture of Goethe as the non-philosopher. This has partly
come into being because of Goethe's hesitant stance towards Kant, and also
because he sometimes dismissed German Idealism and the Romantics. Goethe had,
of course, read Kant and tookcognizance)f his ideas - but his final stance towards
Kant is probably ironical, as was Novalis's, too. An instance of Goethe's
distancing from German Idealism - in the form of Schelling - takes place, for
example, in 1802, but up until then Goethe held Schelling in great esteem.26
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Importantly, Kleinschnieder has shown the seriousness of Goethe's project in
Kantian terms (213). Kleinschieder's analysis provided a much needed defence of
Goethe's views on the sciences at a time when they met more general hostility.
None the less, to understand Goethe as a philosopher, one has, arguably, to search
beyond Kant. Sepper's work on Goethe, although highly illuminating on Goethe's
colour theory and his relation to Newton (1642-1727), says little about the broader
contemporary context of Goethe's methodology: there is virtually no reference to
German Idealism. Goethe's scientific methodology is, however, analyzed in great
depth in its own terms. Sepper does bring Goethe's science into the modern context
by showing how Goethe's concern for appearances and the phenomenal has a
certain validity in fending off the dangers of modern science's tendency to
abstraction. In this way Goethe's wish to keep the phenomena ever in sight has a
genuine value in keeping research progammes aware of their origins and purpose
(276, 188). However, although Sepper's views on Goethe's methodology do come
exceedingly close to the concerns of this work, his conclusions do not create the
overarching conceptual view of practice that this present work is seeking. It is
correct, as Sepper does, to speak of the methodological variety Goethe was aiming
at in his notion of "Vorstellungsarten" (a point already made by Kleinschnieder
(213, 9 1-129)), and also of Goethe's view that science cannot be reduced to a
single method, but instead to the whole experience of human beings. Valid as well
are Sepper's remarks on Goethe's view that the aperçu anticipates the whole, i.e.
the aim of a particular branch of inquiry, and the concomitant thought that science
is thus related to art in the way it produces wholes which lead to ever more
comprehensive wholes (276, 194). These comments are perhaps of too general
value and tend to relativize the achievements of Goethe, although in other respects,
such as Goethe's scientific method, Sepper shows the value of Goethe's thought. I
wish to complement Sepper's work by adding further dimensions to Goethe's
thought in terms of practical knowledge and early Romantic views of practice. I
will return to Sepper below when speaking of Goethe's use of the term "Formel"
and will draw comparisons with Novalis's methodology.
Other historians and critics such as Hildebrandt (197), Koch (219), Nisbet (249),
Wolf von Engethardt and Dorothea Kuhn (169) provide a wealth of information on
the type of traditions Goethe was working within, but do not link the processes of
inquiry with Goethe's own epistemology. These critics all work at defining
91
Goethe's notion of "Anschauung", "Symbol" etc., and then pass on to an
interpretation of the "Urphänomen" or ideal type as related to such notions of
thought. 27 Taking Nisbet as an example, it can be seen that where these works
essentially draw their boundaries is at doctrinal explanations. It is, of course, upon
the necessary base of such explanations that this present work seeks to forge on.
Nisbet shows how Goethe merged the traditions of Neoplatonism and empiricism.
The Neoplatonic notion of continuity in phenomena, as manifested in the Chain of
Being, is thus seen to be linked to Goethe's notion "that the data furnished by
experiments should be presented in continuous series" (249, 38). Nisbet further
shows how Goethe's three stages of inquiry are linked to Bacon's. Where Bacon
speaks of "senses and particulars", "middle axioms" and "general axioms", Goethe
refers to "das empirische Phänomen", "das wissenschaftliche Phänomen" and "das
reine Phänomen" (249, 27). Thus, "both thinkers believe that scientific
generalization is a process of subsumption whereby the particular law is
subordinated to the general until the comprehensive law, to which all individual
cases are subject, is discovered" (249, 33-34). Importantly, as Nisbet points out,
Goethe does not acquiesce with Bacon's notion of induction, since Goethe saw that
any inquiry into nature always involves theorizing, as Goethe remarks: "so kann
man sagen, daI3 wir schon bei jedem aufmerksamen Buck in die Welt
theoretisieren" (249, 34; 40, I, 4, 5). This is not to say that Goethe argues for
hypothetico-deductivism; instead Goethe refers to the fact that we always come to
phenomena from a certain theoretical viewpoint: phenomena cannot be purely
inducted. Importantly, Goethe refers here also to his notion of experiential thought.
Nisbet then goes on, in a similar manner to the other Goethe scholars mentioned,
to discuss the link between experience and idea in Goethe's "doctrine" of the ideal
type. Koch goes one significant step further by uniting Goethe's view of science
and literature in terms of the symbolic, but again this is carried out in the manner
of explaining a doctrine (219, 253-285).
Koch's views come close to the analysis of Goethe's methodology in this
dissertation. Koch highlights how Goethe stresses the use of the "Anschauung" in
the ordering ("Ordnen") of experimental results or observations. The odermg
gives rise to a concept which is more than just a plain analytical statement, since it
arises out of an intuition which synthesizes the series of phenomena. The resulting
concept is, in fact, a mixture of the formal concept and the intuition, "der
anschauende Begriff" (219, 59-60). What Koch does not do, as is also the case for
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Wolf von Engelhardt, Kuhn and Nisbet, is to link the process of attaining intuitive
concepts to the process of gradually ordering experiments and observations which
lead to ever increasing clarifications of the fmally attained intuitive concepts. This
would require a study, neither of Goethe's finally attained theories nor of the
doctrines he held, nor even of his scientific method alone, but, instead, of his
scientific works in terms of aesthetics and science. The analysis would lead most
probably, as the analysis of Riner's work given later here, to the picture of layered
steps in inquiry, based upon key symbolic phenomena, coming ever closer, in the
tightening of a symbolic argument and demonstration, to the finally attained theory
inherent in the notion of the "Urphanomen" (this can also be referred to as ideal
type or "reines Phänomen"). Therein lies the key to the genre of Romantic
philosophical method - that is the core structure repeated in Goethe's, Ritter's and
Humboldt's work - and also, it can be argued, in Schelling's genetic method of
natural philosophy.
The reason why this method of Goethe's has not been pointed out lies, as said, in
the fact that critics and historians spring immediately to an explanation of the ideal
type itself, or to explaining how Goethe could at all think in the way he does and
pay so much heed to the intuition. It also perhaps lies in the fact that Goethe issues
some highly rhetorical and apodictic comments about the differences between the
scientist and the artist in a key work of his treating scientific method, Der Versuch
als Vermittler von Objekt und Subjekt (41). There it is stated that the artist must
entertain ("unterhalten") and thus leave his work open for further interpretation,
whereas, in contrast, the scientist must spell out his intentions down to the very last
detail (41, 13). But these thoughts of Goethe give the impression that the scientist
only lays down formal, irreversible, objective knowledge - when in fact Goethe is
speaking the whole time about the process of inquiry: in a curious way his
intentions regarding an open-ended process leading to final attainment of inquiry is
quite easily overlooked. Furthermore, although Goethe is letting us peek into his
methodological workshop, he is not telling us all. In his effort to stress the
objectivity of his method he is at pains, as mentioned, to sever any obvious links to
the arts. Not only does his effort to underline the objectivity of his scientific
method make it difficult to see the importance of the details of the process of
inquiry, his essay also makes it exceedingly difficult to propose links between his
notions of scientific and artistic method. Goethe almost implies that the artist has
no method worthy of the public's attention when, at another point in the essay, he
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suggests that it is best for the artist to remain quite silent about the workshop of his
method:
Man hat in den wissenschaftlichen Dingen gerade das Gegenteil von dem zu tun, was der Künstler
ratlich findet: denn er tut wohi, sein Kunstwerk nicht öffentlich sehen zu lassen, bis es vollendet ist,
weil ihin mcht Ieicht jemand raten noch Beistand leisten kann ... (41, 8).
This is the more curious since Goethe speaks elsewhere quite openly and in-depth
about the issues of aesthetics. Naturally, Goethe is campaigning in this essay for
more openness and reflection on methodology in scientific circles. Goethe is also
referring here to the publicizing of unfinished literary works, and not directly to
aesthetic method. None the less, it is easy to misunderstand this remark of
Goethe's as a downplaying of aesthetics to the benefit of the scientific method.
Moreover, even given Goethe's rhetorical needs here, it is precisely the
combination of his scientific works and his work on aesthetics that leads Novalis to
praise Goethe for his "active empiricism". The link between Goethe's aesthetic and
scientific method, however, can be found, but it is couched in mathematical terms:
once again, it would appear to throw the reader off the scent. The link lies in the
following statement where Goethe refers to the "higher experiences" gained by the
accumulation, refinement and reduction of a series of experiments:
Eine solche Erfahrung, die aus mehreren andern besteht, 1st offenbar von einer höhern Art. Sie steilt
die Formel vor, unter weicher unzahlige einzelne Rechnungsexempel ausgedrückt werden ... Diese
Bedächthchkeit, nur das Nãchste ans Nãchste zu reihen, oder vielmehr das Nãchste aus dem
Nãchsten zu folgern, haben wir von den Mathematikern zu lernen (41, 13).
Lenoir comments on this remark of Goethe's:
Goethe saw this method as analogous in the experimental domain to the method whereby a
mathematician, through an act of intellectual intuition, seizes upon the formula that links the various
statements of proof into a necessary unity, the logos that enables him to see the individual
components of the proof as aspects of the whole (235, 123).
Lenoir's reading, while correct at the level of a direct interpretation of the text,
does not treat the full implications of the context. Lenoir's wording can be
misunderstood; it almost sounds as if the "higher experience" alone brings order to
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the series of experiments. Sepper offers a subtler reading of Der Versuch als
Ver,nitt/er by stressing that the "higher experience" is based upon a fundamental
experience:
For instance, each isolated experience of looking at objects or displays through the prism gives a
single "fact" to be reckoned with. But by means of constant comparison, contrast, simplification,
and recomplication, Goethe is able to represent these many apparently isolated facts as different
moments of a single dynamic phenomena, moments that correspond to the vazying conditions of the
basic experiment (276, 69-70).
Sepper here rightly stresses Goethe's view that the "higher experience is linked to
an initial experiment - this brings out the phenomenal base of Goethe's notion of
the "higher experience". Further, Sepper reminds us that Goethe's argument for a
sequence of experiments that lead to the "higher experience" lies in his concern for
"a naturally significant order" of the phenomena in experiments (276, 76). What
Goethe refers to as the mathematical method is his view, as Sepper summarizes,
that the demonstration of experiments "must be so consequent that any gap in the
demonstration will be immediately obvious" (276, 77). The mathematical method,
in Goethe's view, is analogous to his own experimental method since it concerns
itself more with "Darlegungen, Rekapitulationen als Argumente" (276, 14). Sepper
emphasizes that Goethe is concerned, first and foremost, with methodology and not
theory itself. It is Goethe's concern for the phenomenal and experiential that
underlies his view:
No matter how good the fit, the observed phenomena ought not to be supplanted by an abstract
theory, for, at the very least, knowledge about how one is to apply the theory is itself
metatheoretical and therefore metamathetical. Goethe's method, to demonstrate through judicious
experimentation phenomenal wholes that unify the appearances - to elucidate the form and structure
of the phenomena - is a prequesite for the scientific application of mathematics (276, 76).
The other meaning behind Goethe's reference to mathematics, as Sepper
comments, is the notion of an infmite series: "The superexperiment, whether
continuously or discretely varied, allows one to approach phenomenally a limit that
may not be reachable in fact ..." (276, 74). The fundamental experiment or the
"higher experience" can be interpreted as an "upper limit" towards which and
within whose bounds all experimental inquiry in the given field is oriented. Sepper
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is concerned with Goethe's colour theory, but phenomenal "upper limits" are also
manifested in Goethe's notion of the "Urpflanze", the intermaxillary bone, and the
notion of chemical affinity. It is in the notion of a phenomenal infinite series that
an overarching conceptual view of practice can be found in Goethe's work - a
notion that links aesthetics and scientific method. If we return to Nisbet's view that
Goethe unified empirical and Neoplatonic elements in his notion of a series of
experiments, the meaning of scientific inquiry conveyed in Der Versuch als
Vermirtler can be better understood in terms of a type of "phenomenal" calculus.
Nisbet remarks:
The same Leibniz who propounded the principle of continuity also invented, independently of
Newton, the differential calculus, whereby continuously varying quantities in the physical world
could be expressed in mathematical language. Goethe, too, believed that the data furnished by
experiments should be presented in continuous series, except that, in this case, the series is one of
gradual visible distinctions rather than gradually varying quantities (249, 38).
It is the notion of the use of experiential concepts in a "phenomenal" calculus that
links Goethe's views on the sciences to the arts. It is a general symbolic method,
not only a scientific method. In this light, Goethe's notion of inquiry anticipates
Novalis's notion of treating inquiry "symbolically". Not only do both Goethe and
Novalis view inquiry as having to move outwards from fundamental phenomena,
and then, through "Vermannigfaltigung" (Goethe) or "vervielfältigen" (Novalis)
come ever closer to a refinement of experimental results into a "phenomenal" form
of theory, but also, they both underline the symbolic method of inquiry in the
general method of a "phenomenal" calculus. The relevance of the Neoplatonic
notion of continuity taken up by Leibnitz will be discussed below (see chapter two,
section 1.8). Essentially Romantic notions of continuity and experimental
methodology express a phenomenalization of Leibnitz's notions of continuity and
notation in mathematics. Herder too argues for the principle of continuity (249, 8);
his notions of knowledge formation in his Plastik could then, perhaps, be extended
to the idea of a phenomenal form of notation. Thus, the Romantic use of the
Neoplatonic notion of continuity can be seen as a qualified response to the needs of
empirical science. The analysis of the influence of Plotinos on Novalis in chapter
two will bring these various threads of Neoplatonism, empiricism and Romantic
thought together in more detail.
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For whatever reasons Der Versuch als Vermirtler was not published until very
much later after its inception. One reason, clearly, is Goethe's fear of an attack on
his scientific method, another reason lies in some of the above anomalies discussed
relating to the links of aesthetic and scientific method. Even Schelling stops short
of directly linking scientific and artistic methods of production. As discussed art is
an extension in methodological terms of philosophy, and art has the ultimate
objective status. In terms of knowledge formation there are however scientific
modes of production which have aesthetic elements, as has been shown with the
Schelling's use of "Zwischenglieder". Thus, although he does stop short of directly
linking scientific and artistic methods in his System, he by no means denied the
link, since there are tacitly accepted bonds formed in his philosophy. Novalis's
notes on the subject were, of course, private. It is through the uncovering of these
private or tacit thoughts that this work, as mentioned, wishes to put forward a new
understanding of the early Romantics.
Having spent considerable time on explaining the concept of experiment and the
epistemology of practice typical of the early Romantics, it is now appropriate to
tackle the realizations of their method in scientific theory and this form of theory's
relationship to natural history. Romantic scientific theory, as espoused in the
notions of types and ideal types, needs to be placed both in the context of their
notion of practice and in that of the natural history of their time.
The Romantic idea of experiential knowledge has so far been taken to mean
representational forms of knowledge that mediate between theory and phenomena
within the scope of the purposive processes of Nature. Ideal types also fall into this
category of knowledge, but in a heightened sense. Ideal types are the experiential
notions that are the ultimate forms, forces or causes of natural phenomena. These
ultimate phenomena transcend temporal history since they are fundamental to an
understanding of phenomena throughout time. Ideal types can only be understood
as part of the process and continuum of Nature. Schelling's "gemeinschaftliches
Ideal" (common ideal), Novalis's notion of a "Kraft" (an original force), or
Goethe's "Urpflanze" (primordial plant) transcend history, because, like their
common natural philosophical method, they are part of history in the making.
Within the context of the ideal type it will also be shown, for example, that
Werner's geognosy embraces notions which lie within the scope of a Romantic idea
of "Naturgeschichte". In doing so, Werner's geognosy incorporates thoughts which
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certainly go beyond Kant's idea of descriptive natural history ("Naturbe-
schreibung"), and also beyond Kant's idea of natural history ("Naturgeschichte").
Kant is unwilling to employ ideal types that transcend time (235, 124).
Schelling's notion that an ideal is realized throughout the whole of the processes of
nature is quite opposed to Kant's notion of a "Naturgeschichte" as a genealogy
where stem-kinds ("Stammgattungen") are only to be found in the past (210, 29,
39). Schelling remarks in his Erster Eniwurfeines Systems der Naturphilosophie:
Die Naturgeschichte 1st bis jetzt eigentlich Naturbeschreibung gewesen, wie Kant sehr richtig
angemerkt hat. Er selbst bringt den Namen Naturgeschichte für einen besonderen Zweig der
Naturwissenschaft, nämlich die KenntniB der allmAhlichen Veranderungen, welche die
verschiedenen Organisationen der Erde durch Einflusse der ãufiern Natur, durch Wanderungen von
einem Klima in das andere u.s.w. erlitten, in Vorschlag. Allein wenn die oben aufgestellte Idee
ausfilhrbar ware, so würde der Name Naturgeschichte eine vie! höhere Bedeutung bekommen, denn
alsdann wUrde es wirklich eine Geschichte der Natur selbst geben, nämlich, wie sie durch
continuirliche Abweichungen von einem gemeinschaftlichen Ideal - insofern also frei - deswegen
aber doch nicht gesetzlos bildend - well sic doch besthndig innerhalb der Grenzen ihres Ideals bleibt
- die ganze Mannichfaltigkeit ihrer Produkte allmãhlich hervorbringt, und so das Ideal zwar nicht
im Einzelnen, aber doch un Ganzen realisirt (108, 68).
With his notion of the "gemeinschaftliches Ideal" - an example of an ideal type at
the highest level as a first cause - Schelling argues for a history and development
of forces, and this Kant was not prepared to do. As remarked, the ideal type is
neither temporal nor atemporal, it transcends time in being part of the continuity of
the process of Nature.
Moreover, Kant's notion of an organic life force is based upon Blumenbach's
(1752-1840) notion of the "formative drive" ("Bildungstrieb"), and this is a
regulating vital force (235, 121-122). This force is opposed to Schelling's concept
of a force that actually causes matter. Schelling's notion of force here refers both
to his original force and the role forces play in general in his natural philosophy,
for his forces preempt matter. Using analogies and the principle of polarity,
Schelling contructs a view of Nature that navigates beyond Kant's views of science
and natural history. Admittedly, in his later critical works Kant's notion of
teleology suggests that one can proceed beyond descriptive natural history by
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assessing similarities in anatomical structure. Lenoir remarks on Kant's teleology
of the organic realm:
He [Kant] argued that the agreement of so many species, not only in their skeletal structure but in
the organization of other parts as well, suggests that they nught all be united by a fundamental
ground plan (235, 122).
Within this teleological framework Kant believes it possible to go quite far in
explaining organic forces with the use of physics and chemistry (235, 122). In his
notion of natural history, Kant blends together the use of mechanical laws with his
notion of "Naturzwecke" (natural purposes) in the organic realm. Thus the study of
mechanical linear causes is combined with the study of final organic causes within
the field of comparative anatomy (235, 120-122). However, Kant's views on
teleology categorically do not propose a history of forces or a study of ideal types
in the Romantic sense. Kant's notion of morphological types is temporal (235, 123-
124; 210, 39). The possibility of proposing ideal types is inextricably bound up
with the questions of method, epistemology and perception: here Kant's views also
had a role to play. As discussed, in his Kritik der Urtheilskraft, Kant considerably
expands his philosophy from the subjects dealt with in the Kritik der reinen
Vernuft. In the later work Kant speculates on the powers of the intellectual intuition
to grasp the inner workings of the natural world. This work was read by thinkers
such as Goethe, Schelling and Novalis, and it undoubtedly influenced them; none
the less Kant is not willing to apply the powers he speaks of to the sciences. Their
relevance to the sciences, in his view, remains within the realm of the regulative or
of speculation.
An overview of Goethe's notion of the "Urpflanze" will serve to depict an
approach to natural history and their use of ideal types which can also be regarded
as typical of the early Romantics. It will, furthermore, serve as an introduction to
Humboldt's biogeology.
Goethe's chief approach to the sciences can be described as morphological, but,
given his concern for method, it is more precise, at an encompassing level, to refer
to his approach as typical of the Romantic quest for symbolic knowledge and a
"phenomenal" calculus. Goethe's key terms in his scientific works are
"Urphanomen", "Gestalt", "Typen", "Metamorphose", "Analogie", "Polaritat",
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"Steigerung" and "Compensation". The notion of the "Urphanomen" conceives of
nature as a whole; the "Urphanomene" bring forth the forms in the natural world,
as for example, of plants or of light. Goethe's view of the "Urphanomen" is to a
large extent based upon the Neoplatonic ideas found in Bruno and Leibnitz
surrounding the notion of the monad. The monads are individual entities forming
part of the greater entity of Nature. Goethe uses the symbol of the processes of
breathing, the "Diastole" and the "Systole", to explain his own view of the monad.
In his view of plants and animals there takes place a continual contraction
("Zusammenziehung") and extension ("Ausdehnung"), analogous to the continual
process of breathing in and breathing out (243, 58-59). In Goethe's eyes the monad
develops in its own right and also reacts to its environment. The way the monad
comes into being is analogous to all areas of life - as is epitomized by the rhythm
of contraction and extension. Goethe's idea of the monad is a development of
Aristotle's entelechy, of the notion of the unchanging form of Bruno's monad, of
the closed windowless monad of Leibnitz and of the latter's notion of a pre-
established harmony. The harmony of the individual and the ability of the
individual entity to change are united in Goethe's notion of the monad (243, 58-59;
249, 19-22). Within the context of the monad one can say that particular plant
forms are varied throughout the plant world. Within each plant lies the potential to
develop upon the fundamental plant form of the "Urpflanze"; the plant's
development can be put down to this inner potential and its adapting to a particular
environment (243, 95).
The "Urphanomene" are the final stations of Goethe's ideal phenomenal inquiry.
They are the results of the various levels of phenomena, investigated in observation
and experiment, reduced to their most fundamental form. For Goethe the botanical
"Urphänomene" are the "Urpflanze" and the leaf. The plant organ which makes the
"Urpflanze" real is the leaf: Goethe sees the leaf as the plant form upon which all
other organs of the plant are varied through the processes of contraction
("Zusammenziehung") and extension ("Ausdehnung"); all other organs are analogs
of the leaf. The leaf is an extension of the stalk; the sepal is the contraction; the
petals are an extension; the generative organs are a contraction; the fruit are the
fmal extension. The whole development is viewed by Goethe as a process of
"Steigerung" (enhancement) and also as the metamorphosis ("Metamorphose") of
the leaf. The process is further viewed by Goethe in terms of "Polarität" (polarity),
which provides the continual attraction and repulsion inherent in things. This
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fundamental tension of "Polarität" is then employed by the principle of
enhancement to bring about further development in plant forms (243, 104-106).
Goethe's views on ideal types are sometimes misunderstood as being merely
"ideas", but this is not the case. The leaf is real, just as the "Urphanomen" of
turbid light (249, 41). Admittedly, Goethe began with the idea of the "Urpflanze",
but he then moved on to employ real "Urphänomene". This is important to modify
Kantian interpretations of Goethe (213; 260, 146), and to emphasize the
epistemology of practical knowledge that underlies the notion of the
"Urphanomen". Goethe's ideal types are phenomenally based and thus enable the
employment of a "phenomenal" calculus.
Humboldt's close relationship to Goethe and the latter's notions of morphological
and ideal types can be clearly traced in his biogeology. In his 1806 Ideen zur
Physiognomik der Gewachse (57) Humboldt singles out seventeen plant types -
such as grasses, palms, cacti, conifers, lianas, horse-tails, mosses and lichens - to
which all plants belong (243, 140-142; 191 fn. 91/92; 247, 182). By virtue of
being based on vegetation and nutrition organs, and not on Linnë's generative
organ based taxonomy, Humboldt's taxonomy allowed for considerably more
transitions between plant species and also for more room for "compensations"
(243, 159). Both of these factors appealed to Goethe. The tight linking of
phenomena through transitions adheres to Goethe's notion of experimental inquiry
- in this case it is applied to the rules of observation and classification. Humboldt's
notion that certain plant organs or physiognomic plant groups could be varied at
the cost of other members of the plant type is a biogeographical extension of
Goethe's notion of "Compensation" for the morphology of organs (243, 160-162,
191).
Humboldt's work is of great significance for an understanding of a Romantic
epistemology of practice, not only through his definition of ideal plant types but
also because of his employment of a visual language in his works. Before he
undertook his expeditions, Humboldt expressed an interest in what he called
"Pasigraphie" (literally: general sign language). Humboldt's notion of
"Pasigraphie" closely resembles Novalis's notion of the "lnstrumentalsprache": a
language both of the mental tools employed in investigating phenomena, and also a
visualization of literal scientific instruments used in experiment and observation.
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Humboldt's first attempt at a such a sign language - in his 1797 work on galvanism
- was highly abstract (54). He drew up formulae for galvanic circuits, denoting
conductors as letters (54, 89-1 00). Although his work in the area of chemical
physiology was something of an achievement, it did not lead to a discovery as
significant as Riner's, where physiology and galvanism were experimentally
linked, nor, arguably, was his sign language as developed as Ritter's was for
treating galvanic phenomena. In fact, Ritter's sign language can be seen as the
insertion of formularistic features into diagrams. Even given his valuable findings
in galvanic inquiry, Humboldt's major achievements were really in the area of
biogeology, and it is in this area, where he was a master, that he developed his
visual language. Humboldt's all-embracing biogeological reliefs are well known:
on a single sheet a vast variety of information concerning climate, vegetation and
other factors are comprehensively displayed. His achievements in the bounds of
what he termed "Pasigraphie" are less well known. Whilst his biogeological reliefs
employ names, tables and often mimetic-realistic diagrams, his one existent
pasigraphic chart of 1803 (elaborated on in 1832) employs genuine symbols which
hover between the abstract and the mimetic (see Fig. 2). Humboldt's pasigraphy
treats not biogeology but geognosy, and this brings traditions and influences into
play other than Goethe alone. 28 The pasigraphic chart of Humboldt's displays rock
strata in terms of types: the chart can be seen as the morphology of strata. The
source of influence on this morphology may be sought, arguably, in the geologist
Werner, under whom Humboldt had studied. Humboldt's pasigraphic chart depicts
various rock formations in a semi-abstract way with a legend providing the key to
the formations (137, 246). The pasigraphic chart of 1803 was a part of Humboldt's
thought to which he often returned in his later geognostical writings (136, 35; 58,
364-375; 60, 1, 457). In 1832 he introduced arrows to the chart of 1803 to convey
further aspects of geognostical theory. Rock formation caused by precipitation and
erosion is termed "exogen" by Humboldt and is depicted by a downwards pointing
arrow. Plutonist and Vulcanist theories of igneous rock formation are described by
Humboldt as "endogen" and are depicted by upwards pointing arrows (136, 35;
137, 246). The combination of rock strata abstractions and the arrows, like his
biogeographical reliefs, lead to a dense and informative presentation of ideas. In
this visual language of Humboldt's we once again find the Romantic notion of a
"phenomenal" calculus: it is the symbolic method of treating phenomena, based
upon experiential types, depicted for example in the symbolic, semi-abstract
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characteristics of Ritter's galvanic diagrams. Humboldt's pasigraphic chart is not
mimetic, nor abstract, but what can be called "concrete". Humboldt's geognostical
arrows in his pasigraphic chart are related at an epistemological level to Ritter's
galvanic arrows in his diagrams of galvanic experiments. Both their arrow forms
are symbols of natural processes. That Humboldt, as Ritter too, understood his
symbolic language as an attempt at a "phenomenal" language of Nature itself can
be seen when he speaks in his 1803/1804 Essay de Pasigraphie (56) of his wish to
express geognostical phenomena only in eighteen signs, in an analogous way to the
manner in which human thought is expressed in the twenty-four letters of the
alphabet:
Je m'arrête a 18 characteres qui me suffirent pour former un Tableau geologique tel qu' avec 24
lettres d'alphabete nous exprimons toutes nos pensées (56, 39).
The entirety of the language of geognostical phenomena can be reduced to eighteen
natural types.
As already commented, Humboldt's pasigraphy has received little attention from
historians, apart from Beck. 29
 Beck points to Humboldt's own reference he makes
to the geologist's concerned with formation, Lehmann (1713-1767), Whitehurst
(1713-1788) and Ferber (1743-1790) (136, 34). Humboldt's pasigraphy has a
deeper tradition than this. Although the geologists mentioned did concern
themselves with formation, Humboldt's pasigraphic depiction takes strata charts on
quite some way. Whitehurst, for example, like Humboldt, is concerned with
vertical depictions of the interior of the earth, in contrast to the traditional method
of using horizontal coloured charts of the earth's surface. Humboldt split his
mapping projects up into two groups: those concerned with strictly scaled vertical
profiles ("Höhenkarten") and those depicting rock formation ("Formationskarten"),
where strict scaling was discarded for the benefit of the explication of formative
processes and strata. The symbolism of Humboldt's pasigraphic chart is more
complex than those of previous stratigraphic charts, and, above all, his use of
arrows to depict two cardinal modes of rock formation recalls the Romantic use of
key types. Clearly, all the strata depicted can be viewed as types, but it is the
formations depicted by the arrows (the "endogen" and the "exogen") that are the
original types common to all the types. The arrows depict what Goethe would call
"higher experiences" such as are manifested in his "Urphanomene".
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In this context, it is a pity that Rudwick's stimulating essay on the visual
language of geology concerned itself predominantly with Great Britain and France
(268). There is a missing link here in Rudwick's account, and it may he that the
Germans had some role to play in the development of the visual language of
geology, but only tentative suggestions can be made here on this topic. As
remarked, Humboldt's diagram of 1803 forms a significant jump in stratigraphic
mapping. Another source of influence on Humboldt's diagrams has to be found
other than the geologists mentioned above by Beck. Furthermore, in Rudwick's
account there is little that is applicable to Humboldt at this time. In Rudwick's
delineation of the visual language of geology there is a time gap between
Whitehurst's stratigraphic diagrams of 1778 (127) and those of Farey in 1811 (27),
Cuvier and Brongniart of 1811 (21), and Smith in 1817 (114). Humboldt's source
may well lie close to the mining academy in Freiberg, as for example in Trebra's
(1740-18 19) work of 1785, Erfahrungen vom Innern der Gebirge nach
Beobachiungen gesammelt (118), or in Voigt's (1752-1821) work of 1782,
Practische Gebirgskunde (119), although the latter is sparsely illustrated. 30 Trebra,
who was sub-director of the mines at the Mining Academy in Freiberg, on the
other hand, is a significant exception in the history of geological illustrations.
Rudwick points out that geological illustration only took off in the 1820's with the
arrival of cheap wood engraving - up to then the visual language of geology was
under fmancial restraint (268, 154-158). Trebra's work, however, contains five
"Vignetten" and sixteen engravings: within these are a variety of illustrative
approaches, ranging from the realistic to the abstract, including maps of mines and
their sections, details of rocks, area maps with some profile depicted, and
stratigraphic diagrams. 3 ' There is nothing in these visual techniques as complex as
in the work of Humboldt in 1803 or the work of Cuvier and Brongniart in 1811
(there could not be, given the status of geognostical theory at that time). Trebra
was, however, aware of the power and use of illustration, and argued that his
illustrations were every bit as evocative of the powers of nature as the conventional
and fashionable pictures of volcanoes, for they portrayed objects "wo die Natur,
wenn gleich stiller, geräuschloser, und Iangsamer vielleicht, dennoch aber nicht
weniger mächtig, allumfassend, und Ehrfurcht erweckend wirkte ..." (118, vi).
Trebra is referring to the inner processes of the earth, which were soon to be the
subject of Werner's Kurze Kiassfi/wtion der verschiedenen Gebirgsarten (125) of
1787.
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This leads us to one major influence on Humboldt, that of Werner. The extent to
which Werner effected Humboldt in terms of visual language is difficult to
pinpoint: Werner did make use of stratigraphic sketches in his lectures at the
mining academy (289, 98-105). More influential than such sketches, however, are
probably Werner's geognostical notions, which, as forms of ideal types, lend
themselves to interpretation in terms of visual and experiential forms of
knowledge. The teachings of Werner form perhaps the missing link in Rudwick's
history of the visual language of geology, and it will now be argued that Werner's
influence went far beyond doctrines of geology to the practical knowledge of
geological theory.32
Within Werner's geognosy lie the seeds for a history of natural forces in the
inorganic realm and the rudiments of a framework within which geognostical ideal
types can operate. Werner divides rock strata into two main groups: the
"Kieselreihe" ("siliceous acid" - i.e. siliceous earth) and the "Kalkreihe" ("carbonic
acid" - i.e. carbonate of lime). This division into two groups is of great import for
a natural philosophical interpretation of geognosy. The two groups firstly form a
typical Schellingian polarity with which the forces of Nature can be constructed.
Secondly, the two groups are linked to chemical forces. The "Kieselreihe"
corresponds to oxidized matter and the "Kalkreihe" to deoxidized matter (173,
499; 116, 8-15). Thus, in Schellingian fashion, a constructive analogy is made
between forces of one realm (the chemical/physical) and another (the geognostical
realm). Fritscher points out that although no work of Werner's explicitly refers to
these links of the chemical and the geognostical realms, Werner did in all
probability hold lectures on the subject. Furthermore, Werner's pupil, Fuchs
(1774-1856), formulated a theory of the earth based on such principles and did so
with explicit reference to Werner's views on geognosy (173, 500; 32). Thirdly, the
link of geognostical and chemical forces in turn implies an attempt at the
construction of the history of forces, moving from the small scale of the chemical
realm to the large scale realm of geognosy. Rupke, too, points to the latent natural
philosophical implications of Werner's geognosy and also to the notion of a
"directionalism" of forces implicit in his views (269, 25 1-252). Fourthly, a
fundamental principle for "Naturphilosophie" is implied and proposed: that of
chemical affinity. The ultimate cause behind Werner's geognostical theory is that
of chemical affinity since that is the force that governs the oxidization and
deoxidization of matter (173, 499). Within the context of Schelling's natural
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philosophy it should be noted that although he argues for oxygen as a key natural
philosophical principle, as for example in his Ideen, he does also there see
cohesion ("Kohäsion") and affinity as key principles (164, 26-30). In his 1801
work, Darstellung meines Systems, Schelling states:
Der chenusche Procefi, in seiner Ursprunglichkeit, beruht einzig darauf, daB zwei differente Korper
durch Berührung wechselseitige Cohasionsveranderungen in sich setzen, und jeder derselben semen
Zustand auf Kosten des Indifferenten wiederherstelle (112, 184).
The notion of "Kohäsion" forms the basis of his view that the whole of matter can
be seen as an infinite magnet, and of the corollary, that matter evolved from the
original substance of iron (129, 138-139; 112, 157). Werner's geognosy, when
seen in the light of Schelling's natural philosophy, breaks the bounds of both
Kant's "Naturbeschreibung" (descriptive natural history) and "Naturgeschichte"
(natural history). For his geognosy suggests a history of forces through its linking
of analogous processes in chemistry and geognosy, and in the way it promotes the
fundamental principle of affinity as the cause behind geognostical phenomena. The
notions of affinity and the two major rock groups can be interpreted as the
Romantically styled ideal types of Werner's natural history.
All these aspects of Werner's geognosy have been shown by Fritscher to have
been taken up by Steffens (1773-1845). Steffens took Werner's ideas and applied
Schelling's method to them and made their Romantic natural philosophical
implications explicit. Fritscher further points out how Steffens extended Werner's
above views on geognosy to the organic realm (173, 500; 116, 27, 29, 32, 34,
91). Steffens again does this in Schelling's style of natural philosophy through the
use of polarities and analogies. This step in Steffen's interpretation of Werner's
ideas probably went beyond Werner's intentions, but the other aspects of Steffen's
interpretation of geognosy do reflect Werner's concern for forces in nature, both at
the strict chemical or physical level and at the geognostical level. It cannot
categorically be said that Werner was conducting natural philosophy in the style of
the Romantics. The reason that we cannot categorically state this is because Werner
never did lay down a complete theory of the earth from which we can draw direct
conclusions about his natural philosophical views. What can be said is that Werner
worked with particularly significant analogies and used them within an implicit
framework of a purposive natural world: when this framework is expanded and
107
taken to its logical consequence it has a strong appeal to the Romantics. Thus
Werner's importance for the Romantics lay not alone in his natural history, i.e. as
a particular theory, but also in his approach to theory, i.e. his method. It is firstly
in his method and his use of key experiential concepts that Werner shows an
explicit affinity to the styles of thought found in Novalis and Schelling. Secondly,
as with the Romantics' view of forces and phenomena, method and theory are
anyway bound together in Werner's mineralogical and geognostical ideas. In
Romantic notions of purposiveness in Nature attempts are undertaken to explain
"how" Nature develops, that is to say, the Romantics strive to find Nature's own
"method". Schelling's ideal "Funktion" or "Thätigkeit" and Novalis's notion of
Nature's own representational powers are definitions of Nature's own intelligent
formative force. The often presumed poles of method and theory or of mind and
matter are united in Novalis's and Schelling's thought through their proposition
that man and Nature are governed by the one and same purposive force. In this
way Novalis's notion of representation applies equally to Nature as it does to
human knowledge. In his idea of the "Figur" Novalis speaks of the same power of
representation, be it in human "figures" of thought (i.e. the practice of thinking in
symbols in experiential knowledge) or in the "figures" (forms) phenomena produce
in their activity (N, 3, 123, 612). Equally, in this light, the possible effects of
Werner's experiential approach to theory on Humboldt's notion of a geognostical
sign language - as the language of Nature's geognostical phenomena and forces -
become more justified. Humboldt's own symbols of his pasigraphy are
manifestations of Nature's representative powers.
Furthermore, with Werner, it can be argued that notions of purposiveness in
Nature come readily to light in his method and even in his personality, and not
only in his views of geognostical phenomena. The sensual way Werner treated the
study of minerals, for example, implied that the inquirer had direct contact to the
laws and forces of the natural world. The way Werner could transfer this type of
sensual knowledge into a theory based on experiential principles implies a link
between the inquirer's theorizing capabilities (the mind) and the objects under
observation (matter). In other words, it is the tacit and practical knowledge that
Werner espoused that also influenced the Romantics, and not his notions of
mineralogy and geognosy alone. The distinct way in which Werner's method was
concerned with the formation of knowledge and discovering constitutive, open-
ended rules is of importance here. Since, in Novalis's view, it is through method
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and practice that wisdom is transferred it can be said that those who understood
Werner's method were already formulating his probable theory. In Werner's work
lies already the mixture of practical (ethical) knowledge and science that the
Romantics were seeking. It can be said that Werner sought to give his students not
"episteme", but "phronesis", or to be precise, Werner sought to blend "episteme"
and practical knowledge.
A comparison with Lorenz Oken, a man whose work can be seen as an extension
and adaption of the early Romantics, will serve further to define the early
Romantics' notion of practice. Oken's work, although bearing similarities to the
views of the early Romantics, also reveals some considerable differences. Attention
has already been drawn to Schelling's increasing concern for practice in his natural
philosophical works up to 1801 after his Ideen. Schelling problematizes the issues
of practice and in this way he possesses similarities to other thinkers such as
Goethe and Novalis in their quest for a reliable method. Schelling draws a subtle
frame around the questions concerning the links between mind and matter, firstly
by arguing for links in terms of analogies (e.g. the analogies between the moments
of Nature's history and the moments of human thought), and secondly by posing
questions as to how such links could at all be possible. He carries out the latter by
constructing a philosophical base that accounts for human thought as part of the
greater processes of Nature, as espoused in his notion of the "Weitseele". Oken
takes a far more defmite stance towards natural philosophy in his notion of
"Mathesis". Quite remarkably, he systematically presents a highly comprehensive
natural history of spirit and matter in Nature. Although Oken does lay emphasis on
experiential knowledge and "experiment" in his notion of natural philosophy, he
foregoes the problematizing of the notion of experiment which is involved in
searches for methodological positions. Instead Oken wishes to let experiment and
theory interplay far more directly under the guidance of his notion of "Mathesis".
Oken views "experiment" in terms of empirical knowledge that is taken for
granted; speculation is viewed in his system of knowledge as a necessary pole of
empirical knowledge. Nevertheless, as mentioned, experiment and speculation
interact closely with one another in Oken's view. Instead of attempting to resolve
the problems of experiential or practical knowledge through problematizing, Oken
views "experiment" as an information source ("eine reine objektive Erfahrung") for
his notion of speculation, and speculation, in turn, is closely linked to the ground
of knowledge in experience and experiment. Oken thereby views experiment and
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speculation in terms of a closely knit knowledge process. In his work of 1802,
Ubersi c/u des Grundrisses des Sistems der Natu,filosofie, Oken states:
Den Geist zu finden sei unser höchstes Ziel, nicht erstes. Das Experiment ist das Erste. Ich glaube,
dafi dadurch dar Werth des Experiments sowie die Würde des menschlichen Geistes gesichert ist
Die Spekulazion thut Verzicht auf ihre Anmafiung für sich ohne Erfahrung zu erfinden. Das
Experiment bescheidet sich mit der Gediegenheit und Reinheit des Schauens und stolz den ersten
Platz zu behaupten, die Basis des Gebäudes zu scm überlãfit sie den höchsten Platz und die Spitze
der Pyramide dein Geiste. So ist alles an seinem Plaize; die Spekulazion ruhend auf den festen
Gebaude emer rein objektiven Erfahrung (79; 225, 38f.).
Oken's "Mathesis" is then placed above experiment and speculation as a guiding
structure within which experiment and speculation operate. This "Mathesis" is
divided up into two parts: "Pneumatogenie" (the science of the immaterial whole)
and "Hylogenie" (the science of the material whole) (259, 57-58). His "Mathesis"
presents the arithmetics of the exchange between matter and spirit; its aim is to
delineate the identity of matter and spirit. Oken derives the entirety of phenomena
from the original zero, God. Below "Mathesis" in Oken's system come
"Ontologie" (the study of individual appearances or things) and "Biologic" (the
study of the effects of the spirit in individual things) (80, I, viii; 259, 57-58). In
his "Biologie" Oken' s "Mathesis" finds its strongest role, since it is the aim of his
"Mathesis" to systematize known phenomena and to predict unknown phenomena.
In this way for example, Oken wishes to use the number and hierarchy of plant
organs to ascertain the number and hierarchy of plant classes (259, 65). He goes
further, given the ordering of the plant classes and their subgroups, to calculate the
total amount of plants in the world, and arrives at the figure of 65 536 (259, 65).
It becomes clear that Oken's natural philosophy, although flrmiy rooted in early
Romantic thought, is a considerably different undertaking, both in terms of
epistemology and in terms of a natural philosophical system. Thinkers such as
Goethe, Novalis and Schelling are more concerned with showing the links between
mind and matter or inner and outer nature through questions posed around the
genuine problems of practical knowledge. If they do show physical links of mind
and matter - as for example in the reality of their ideal types - then this is only
undertaken in a piecemeal way in comparison to the sweeping systematic
representation of the links of spirit and matter in Oken's natural philosophy. The
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early Romantic approaches to natural philosophy are far more akin perhaps to case
studies in disciplines or areas of a discipline, guided by key natural philosophical
principles, than full blown systemizations. Within their chosen areas - as, for
example, Ritter's notion of galvanism, or Goethe's view of flowering plants - the
early Romantics do lay claim to knowledge, but it is precisely at this point that
they halt, for in the background of their natural philosophical activities there
always looms the question of the reliability of their method, and, in essence, the
very "experimental" nature of knowledge formation. The early Romantics are
concerned at the lower level of the justification of knowledge, and only rise up to
higher levels of formal theory if empirical results allow them to do so. Schelling's
natural philosophical works under discussion here - those up to 1801 - can be also
seen as setting the bounds of natural philosophical inquiry. Behind the works lies
the permanent question as to how natural philosophy can be justified and the wish
for experimental proof of natural philosophical notions.
In general early Romantic natural philosophy can be interpreted as the concern
for the justification of fundamental experiential insights, such as Goethe's
"Urpflanze", Ritter's view of the nerve in his galvanic theory or Schelling's insight
into the identity of matter and spirit, or his notion of polarity. Moving outwards
from these fundamental "Thatsachen", i.e. (in their view) key experiential notions,
they move on to substantiate and elaborate them. In this way they are deeply
concerned with the origins of knowledge and the need to keep the "phenomenal"
origins of knowledge permanently in view. Their concern for the genesis of
knowledge and method is of importance for the development of the disciplines
where the danger of obfuscation of the original aims of the disciplines is only too
readily apparent. In this way the early Romantics make a significant conthbution to
notions of consensus or knowledge formation since their works do dwell to a great
extent at the level of methodology, and do test the ways nature, culture and thought
can possibly be linked.
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5. Conclusion on methodology and premises. Summary of the issues of genre and
practice for early Romantic natural philosophy.
In the above discussion of the early Romantics' concern for practice, it has been
shown how their view of the genre of experiment explicitly treats notions of
discovery and knowledge formation: in "experiment" experience and theory are
united. Their style of inquiry can be seen as one based upon as near as possible a
comprehensive analysis of key phenomena (as mentioned, Schelling's natural
philosophy can also be interpreted in this light in terms of the analysis of key
insights). The process of inquiry involves variation, repetition, contrasting,
simplification and re-complication of fundamental experiences and experiments.33
One can speak of the early Romantics' highly descriptive style and the movement
in their works to higher principles and open-ended concepts, and the combination
and unification of laboratory experiments with thought experiments. Their
experimental procedure can be viewed as a "phenomenal" calculus where rows of
experiments are understood as operating according to fundamental phenomenon,
or, as Goethe puts it, according to the "formula" of a "higher experience". It is in
this overarching symbolic approach to knowledge formation that this work argues
for a "tighter" conceptual link between the arts and the sciences, for the base of
this approach to knowledge formation lies in a general concern for the issues of the
practice of knowledge.
In terms of genre, literary or linguistic and aesthetic factors, early Romantic
inquiry can, arguably, be viewed in terms of the tenets of Herder's Plastik.
Language is treated as a whole, where groups of words, symbols and descriptions
of groups of experiments lead to meaning, as opposed to discrete words,
phenomena, experiences or experiments. In this way, for example, one can,
perhaps, speak of three uses of language. Firstly, there is the inductive, plain and
directly descriptive use of language (but this is not a reality, since, as argued, pure
induction of knowledge cannot take place); secondly, one can speak of the formal,
discursive or deductive and semiotic use of language, where language abstractly
represents reality; thirdly, there is the "experimental", concrete-discursive use of
language, where language is symbolic (i.e. concretely representative) of reality. In
the latter use of language, in literary and scientific texts, symbols are used
progressively and are varied to attain final meaning. The latter method applies to
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early Romantic natural philosophy and describes the importance of the genre of
"experiment" and notions of practical knowledge in their natural philosophy. The
way these fundamental concerns of the Romantics also apply to an "experimental"
visual language of diagrams has been shown in Humboldt and is later dealt with in
Ritter's use of diagrams. The use of a visual language in diagrams is a further
aspect of aesthetics relevant to the study of Romantic genres. Novalis's notion of
the "Figur" in fact embraces language in its broadest sense, treating language in
terms of the symbolic, the phenomenal and the visual, and traces paths of meaning
where ever it is possible in inner nature (the phenomena of human thought) and in
outer nature (the phenomena of the outer world).
This work aims to contribute to genre studies by examining the early Romantic
use of the term "experiment" and their concrete-discursive, symbolic approach to
language. This will, hopefully, provide some base for further studies of Romantic
genres. Such studies would investigate further links between literature and science.
The aphorism can be studied as a literary form affecting the sciences; or Novalis's
notion of encyclopaedism could be construed as a project defining the symbols of
the disciplines; or, further, it could be shown how Novalis conveys science and
natural philosophical method to the public in his literary works. Underlying the
early Romantics' views of language lies their chief concern for the history of
practice of ideas and the epistemology of practice. In this concern, arguably, lies
the form of consensus in inquiry pertaining to the early Romantic thinkers. In
dealing with this aspect of Romantic thought the present work is thus not
concerned explicitly with genre studies but rather with a differentiated approach to
the history of ideas. This approach sees how the early Romantics are highly aware
of the way ideas are taken over from tradition and pays close attention to the way
these ideas are creatively used in practice. The Romantic use of the principles of
continuity and notation in the Neoplatonic tradition are key examples of such a
historical awareness and creative response. Tradition is viewed by the Romantics in
terms of open-ended concepts which form part of the organicism of knowledge,
and, in general as part of the purposive whole of Nature. Their own open-ended
concepts, such as are found in their ideal types, are also seen in these terms as part
of the tradition of practical knowledge. The other side of this work is linked to the
previous and is concerned with a philosophy of practice as such - the unraveling of
Novalis's epistemology of practice and its application in the main to Ritter and
also, as an extension, to other Romantic thinkers as shown above. Thus, as a
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whole, this work is concerned with the practice of ideas, and that is why it does
not deal with docthnes as such, but, in an "active" intellectualist manner, it treats
the genesis of ideas. It considers how ideas are justified through practical
knowledge in terms of discovery processes, epistemologies of practice and natural
philosophical principles.
In its study of the early Romantics this work takes a wary path between two poles
of relativism: that of the Romantics' unifying urge and that of open-ended practice,
the latter being implicit in the treating of knowledge as a phenomenon. By
examining their philosophy of practice and the empirical aspects of their ideal types
the threat of relativism has, I trust, to a degree, been mitigated.
In terms of the accumulation of truth one can argue that Romantic science has
posed many questions which are still unanswered today, that they began to answer
some of these questions, but that our ignorance of the answers they sought should
not obscure the validity of their inquiries. Such beginnings of key answers are to
be found in Goethe's morphology, Humboldt's biogeology, Rifler's "constant
galvanic force", and in the issues surrounding practical knowledge. These ideas
were, in part, taken up by mainstream science: Rifler's ideas, for example,
affected Oersted and Faraday. As concerns "experiment" and practice, these ideas
merge with relevant issues today. In addition, their extension of practice to the
ethics of science has also become highly topical. Goethe's views have been readily
associated with the ecological movement. Within Humboldt's plant physiognomy,
also, lie obvious ecological issues. Behind his notion of biogeology lies the idea
that only a particular number of plant types can exist and that they exist at the cost
of one another. This can be extended to the notion that the world has limits upon
its resources and limits to its capacity to respond to effects on the environment.
Ethics are part of the Romantic notion of natural philosophical inquiry: their
inquiry attempts to meet Nature on her terms. Their attempts to seek Nature's
language are readily apparent in their experiential approach to inquiry; in doing so
they pay heed to the link of purposiveness in the inner nature of human thought
and the external nature of the outside world. Novalis also makes remarks on what
constitutes the "healthy experimenter", as will be discussed later - again, this can
be seen to be concerned with the ethics of scientific practice. In fact, for the
Romantics, practice in the more literal sense of knowledge formation is invariably
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linked to practice as ethics. This work argues that the early Romantic concern for
practical knowledge is a major concern of theirs, and one of lasting value for us.
Finally, I wish to reflect on the value of Novalis's thought for intellectual history.
In this introduction I have steered our attention to productivity as a general natural
philosophical task, and I still maintain this view for several reasons. Firstly, the
centrality of natural philosophy for Novalis (and other thinkers such as Goethe and
Schelling) lies in the scope of their undertaking, which has to be seen in terms of
uniting man's consciousness with the purposiveness of natural phenomena.
Secondly, Romantic natural philosophy is an undertaking which points directly to
the epistemological, religious and historical problems of modern science. Thus,
Jardine, for example, refers to the manner in which man's faith now resides to
some extent in the "juggernaut of science" (210, 236). Jardine comments:
It seems that we have tacitly invested in the fate of science much that was once openly invested in
sacred and spiritual histories of mankind with their promises of redemption and a millennium (210,
236).
In this context a recourse to Novalis's notions of natural philosophy means not only
an examination of science in a discrete sense, but also of his notions of utopia, to
see where science and utopia move in and out of their own debates. There is a
strong case for studying Novalis in terms of natural philosophy in this broad sense.
The "juggernaut of science", which was already taking up significant dimensions in
Novalis's own time, has to be changed, in his view, into an interdisciplinary,
imagination-oriented undertaking. Novalis's literature fits into this project as part
of a broad programme of knowledge and "Bildung". His notion of "experiment",
and indeed his own career as a mine inspector, show that his project was not
without practical elements. Of course one must side with Neubauer and be cautious
here: there is a gap between rhetoric and reality. None the less, I would argue that
critical historical reflectivity is a dimension of Novalis's thought that should be
taken seriously and is of use to debates on knowledge and the sciences, and, more
obviously, of use to discussions on the relationship of literature to the sciences. As
concerns the centrality of natural philosophy to Novalis's work, an attempt is made
in this present work to approach this in an open and neutral manner by analyzing
productivity. This hopefully makes this work more accessible to non-historians of
science: this work provides links to literary theory, as has been seen. Arguably,
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however, the essential "genre" or category that is under study in this work is not
that of language alone but the "genre" of practical knowledge and productivity. In
analyzing issues of productivity this work's stance, as mentioned, is that of
"active" intellectualism. It has been argued that although there are sociological
elements in Novalis's thought the primary determinants are intellectual. Finally, to
reflect once more upon the value of Novalis scholarship for intellectual history, it
has been seen that his form of German Idealism is in many ways is a capable tool
for attempting to bridge a variety of stances in debates over intellectual history.
Novalis's ethics, aesthetics, notions of utopia, scientific method, natural
philosophy and practical knowledge all offer up possible solutions or the
beginnings of alternative approaches to the quandaries of intellectual history.
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6. Overview of Nova/is scholarship relating to the context of the sciences,
philosophy and aesthetics.
The neglect of the topic of "scientific" reflectivity in Novalis scholarship can be
put down to two salient factors. Firstly, it was the image of Novalis as an ethereal
dreamer and the negation of Romanticism by positivist tendencies in the nineteenth
century that led, perhaps understandably, to an emphasis on the artistic sides of
Novalis's natural philosophy to the detriment of the scientific aspects of his natural
philosophy. Dilthey set the tone here in 1865 in his work Das Eriebnis und die
Dichtung by entirely discounting Novalis's thoughts on the sciences and by
praising the originality of his notions on the "Wissenschaften des Geistes" (310,
212). Importantly, Dilthey's work was reprinted in 1905 and this affected Novalis
research in the 1920's. Dilthey also drew upon Olshausen's short but disparaging
work of 1905 (341; 354, 150). Olshausen points to major sources in Novalis's
thought such as Brown, Baader, Rifler and Werner; he finds too some aspects of
Lull's and Leibnitz's notions of the ars combinatoria in Novalis's works, but his
final view is that Novalis was not intellectually capable of understanding the
sciences of his time (341, 75). Pixburg's 1928 work, Novalis als Naturphilosoph
(342), as well as Kluckhohn's work of 1941, Das Ideengut der deutschen Romannk
(323), can be seen as standing quite in the Dilthey tradition of Novalis scholarship.
Both argue for the centrality of "Erlebnis" in Novalis's thought. Where Kluckhohn
stops at the level of attitudes, as in stressing Novalis's "Seelisches SicheinfUhlen in
die Natur" (323, 28) this work aims to show some of the concrete steps Novalis
envisaged undertaking in his understanding of nature.
The second factor in Novalis scholarship effecting the neglect of Novalis's notion
of reflectivity in the sciences arises in the works which do take Novalis's views on
the sciences seriously. This was, of course, arguably the major leap in Novalis
scholarship itself. The need to reinstate the value of Novalis's views on the
sciences, and to show how his views were reflected in his literature, was a major
task in itself. The major concern of these works lies however predominantly in
analyzing aspects of Novalis's natural philosophical doctrine or in showing at a
doctrinal level how Novalis's natural philosophy is linked to his literary works.
There are exceptions to this, as in Neubauer's work on the influence, not just of
mathematical calculus, hut also of the tradition of the ars combinatoria on
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Novalis's thought (339). Other works, such as those of Hamburger (318), Dyck
(311) and Hansen (319), also treat the importance of the notion of mathematical
calculus, as a method, with vaiying points of emphasis, for approaching Novalis's
thought. Neubauer is the only critic who has extended the notion of mathematics in
any depth to Novalis's literature, but, Neubauer's views (in his early works) do
not, perhaps, do full justice to Novalis's philosophy. Neubauer, although he has hit
upon a key link between literature and the sciences in Novalis' s work, has, in most
of his earlier criticism, undermined the unity of the arts and the sciences in
Novalis's thought. Although Neubauer sees the relevance of mathematical calculus
to Novalis's literature, the relationship is a semiotic one, and here Neubauer views
literature as essentially split from reality, and as an autonomous form of
knowledge. However, Neubauer has recently made significant extensions to his
earlier views, as has been discussed above. This present work sides perhaps more
with Uerlings than with Neubauer in seeing that the solution to Novalis's work lies
to a great extent in answering questions within the framework of early Romantic
utopian notions. This work, however, is chiefly concerned with the natural
philosophical elements within Novalis's thought and sees them as a premise of
utopian notions. Of course, key factors within such an utopian perspective, such as
eschatological, and, indeed, natural philosophical ideas themselves, are cardinal to
attain an understanding of the way Novalis envisaged his attempted union of the
arts and the sciences. One of the best works in Novalis scholarship, Mähl's
Goldenes Zeitalter (331), has treated Novalis's eschatological thoughts in great
detail and will continue to be a key starting-point for any research into notions of
early Romantic utopia. Given its subject material Mähl's work is also necessarily
concerned to some extent with Novalis's ideas of knowledge formation. Uerlings
is, too, well aware of the importance of this area of Novalis's thought, and points
explicitly to the difficulties of pinning down Novalis's concept of language, and
hence, of knowledge itself (354, 192). Of equal importance to Novalis's thought
are his notions of knowledge formation in their natural philosophical context. This
present work, in tackling notions of scientific reflectivity and production, and in
linking these to aesthetics and a general mode of production, provides, I hope, a
useful base upon which Novalis's eschatological and natural philosophical notions
can be further developed and delineated.
Most of the work on Novalis's relationship to the sciences centres around the
disciplines of mathematics and medicine, but there are strong arguments for
118
approaching other disciplines, as can be seen in the importance of the geologist
Werner and the physicist Ritter for Novalis. There are only two works to date
which attempt in any depth to show how scientific methodology and Novalis's
notion of literature meaningfully interpenetrate, and that is Schmid's work on the
relationship between Novalis and Werner (348) and Neubauer's work on
mathematics. Neubauer's work will be discussed separately below. Schmid shows
how Werner's method of ordering mineralogical suites is linked to the way in
which Novalis orders, "classifies" and develops types of personality in his novel,
Heinrich von Ofterdingen. Schmid's work will also be dealt with shortly in more
detail; for the moment it can be taken as an example of what Novalis scholarship
has fundamentally neglected. In varying ways Novalis scholarship has omitted to
analyze this interpenetration of Novalis's interests, either by discussing his natural
philosophy only in terms of the sciences or specific disciplines within the sciences,
or by relating scientific doctrine to literature in the terms of a mirroring of
empirical knowledge, or by relating a scientific method in a not entirely
appropriate manner to Novalis's literature (arguably in the case of Neubauer's
semiotic use of "Combinatorik), or, indeed, by showing how in Novalis's literature
a pure aestheticizing of nature takes place. No critics, apart from Schmid and
Neubauer, have shown how Novalis's aesthetics are linked to a scientific method.
This is because Novalis's fundamental methodological base for inquiry and
knowledge formation in general has not been treated in its proper relationship to
the sciences. This work, by analyzing Novalis's methodological groundwork in his
notion of "experiment", arguably provides the path to treat the interpenetration of
Novalis's scientific and literary interests in a broader picture of his natural
philosophy than has hitherto been portrayed. Schmid, whose work does provide an
instance of the interpenetration of Novalis's aesthetic and scientific interests at a
methodological level, that of the relation of Werner's mineralogical method to
Novalis's literary method, does not, however, feel up to explaining Novalis's
notion of a "symbolische Physik", and instead pays attention to the cosmological
aspects and organicism of Novalis's encyclopaedism (348, 77, 78 fn. 1). Also
Mahoney, a critic who has most substantially analyzed scientific themes in
Novalis's literature, does not consider himself capable of explaining Novalis's idea
of symbolic notation, even though he does discuss what he refers to as Novalis's
"Praktische Physik" (scientific productivity is not explicitly mentioned by him, but
it is implicit in his remarks here) (332, 30-37). Instead Mahoney drops the subject
of scientific productivity to analyze Novalis's more purely aestheticizing of Nature
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in his literary works. This present work does not treat Novalis's literature for the
reason that his general theory of productivity in its relationship to natural
philosophy has still to he spelt out. Mahoney, for example, takes a stance often
found in Novalis scholarship when he refers to the unresolvable fragmentary nature
of Novalis's views on scientific methodology (332, 37). This view, in turn, leads a
critic such as Mahoney to analyze Novalis's literary works in terms of his
"naturphilosophische Spekulation", i.e. in terms of natural philosophical doctrines
(332, 37). Mahoney treats aspects of Novalis's natural philosophical doctrine, such
as a dynamic view of phenomena, and is importantly the first and only critic to link
these aspects in depth to Novalis's literature, but Mahoney incorrectly views
Novalis's literature in terms of the ultimate eschatological (Novalis) or
mythological (Schelling) Romantic goal of man's reunification with Nature. Such a
stance, which pays no respect to Romantic views on knowledge formation and
productivity, inevitably concludes that Novalis's literature shows nothing but the
premature and inconsequential nature of his thought ("mangeinder
Folgenchtigkeit") (332, 76). It is somewhat unjust and even absurd to expect a
Romantic such as Novalis to produce all the solutions for the presentation of some
fmal meaning in Nature. This is, of course, not a problem of Novalis scholarship
alone: literary critics in general have been rather too swift in undermining
Romantic thought. Romantic irony, for example, is all too often seen as a negation
of truth and as opening up paths to relativism. The issues concerning the absolute
in Romantic thought have been admirably treated by Manfred Frank and aspects of
his work will be outlined below. That the present work coincides with his work's
concerns is seen in the way he treats the absolute not as immanent, but as
transcendent. The absolute in Novalis's work can only be seen in terms of
mediation, and not in terms of its outright presence. The present work's recourse
to Novalis's notion of productivity releases the pressure caused by the high
expectancies of critics concerned with Romanticism and opens up research to the
problems of how such high ideals cannot be directly revealed, but rather
transcendentally and asymptotically presented through symbols, representations,
examples, cases, and methodologies in Novalis's scientific and literary writings.
Thus, the notion of productivity, which accounts for the unity of aesthetic and
scientific productivity, is arguably a prerequisite for the study of Novalis's literary
works themselves. The notion of a general theory of productivity preempts the fact
that there is link between Novalis's aesthetic and scientific views since it is
concerned with the formation of knowledge necessary for both spheres of activity.
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Before coming to further conclusions on the relationship between Novalis's
scientific and literary thought, an overview of the works on Novalis and the
sciences needs to given. This overview will be mostly chronological, but the
chronology will be broken for discussion of thematic links between the works,
Novalis's thought and the further outlooks on Novalis scholarship. A series of
early works all importantly contributed to dismantling Novalis's excessively
aesthetic image. In 1929 Richard Samuel gave substance to Novalis's scientific
knowledge in his portrayal of Novalis's professional activities as a mine inspector
(344, 1929). This work of Samuel's was then extended by Schulz in 1958 (349). In
1937 Wagner undertook an analysis of a broad range of Novalis's scientific
interests in his notes and showed how his thoughts were in tune with contemporary
scientific knowledge (355). In 1929 again, Kate Hamburger traced Novalis's
mathematical writings in the light of Kant's epistemology and notions of
mathematics (318). Hamburger highlighted the way Kant and Novalis viewed
mathematics in the creative sense of Kant's synthetic a priori judgements, and how
Novalis's thoughts accounted for contemporary notions of infinitesimal calculus.
She further argued how Novalis went beyond Kant in his notions of space and time
to arrive at a stance more comparable to the modem theory of relativity (318,
178). Martin Dyck's work of 1960 on mathematics (311) took a different but
equally productive approach by treating Novalis's thoughts in a more purely
mathematical sense and by linking Novalis's views in detail to contemporary
debate. A recent work by Hansen analyzes Novalis's reception of contemporary
mathematics in great depth. Hansen takes issue with Hamburger and denies that
Novalis had a full understanding of the mathematics of his time (319, 490-491).
Hansen sides more with Dyck, who felt that Novalis's notions of mathematics are
"from the strictly mathematical point of view, unrigorous" (319, 491; 311, 20). It
is a pity that Hansen makes no reference to Burwick's stimulating analysis of
Novalis's reception of LaGrange and Euler (amongst other thinkers of the time) in
terms of his own notion of light (3C, 120-138), for it is precisely on Novalis's
ingnorance of Euler and Lagrange that Hansen bases his view that Novalis was no
mathematical adept (319, 332-335, 393-403, 435-442, 493-496). Hansen's view
here is symptomatic of his approach, because, unlike Burwick, Hansen makes little
attempt to knit Novalis's thought together in terms of the possible connections
made by Novalis between the various disciplines - except under the questionable
overarching notion of mathematics. Hansen views continuity in Novalis's thoughts
in his salient interest in mathematics and in his application of mathematical
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methods to notion of knowledge. Hansen also criticizes Dyck for overplaying
Novalis's use of mathematics for religious ends (319, 491; 311, 23). Although
Dyck, as Hansen remarks, significantly refers to Novalis's use of mathematics for
methodological purposes (311, 75, 93-94), Hansen argues that this is Novalis's
main aim throughout his work:
Es ist die Mathematik für Novalis aber primar kein Wissen ..., sondem vielmehr em methodisches
Instrument und Darstellugsmedium zur Beschreibung und Ordnung eines soichen Wissens" (319,
492).
The present work agrees with this view of Hansen's to some extent, but also argues
for continuity in Novalis's notion of a general method of experiential knowledge
and in his continuing reception and adaption of Ritter's notion of galvanism.
Hansen, for example, quite misleadingly interprets Novalis's reception of Rifler,
viewing Rifler's galvanic experiments in terms of a "verfehienden
wissenschafflichen Zugriff" (319, 472). This view will be refuted at length in
chapter four of this thesis. As far as mathematics is concerned, Hansen correctly
underlines the importance of infmitesimal calculus. He points to the appeal
mathematics had to Novalis for its predictiveness (319, 402), but gives no concrete
examples of how Novalis adapted his notion of calculus to the sciences. Hansen
also takes a "comfortable" positivist stance when he remarks how far Novalis was
from the objective ideal of the sciences (319, 497) and thereby overlooks the
essence of Novalis's thought which is concerned with problematizing the issues of
experimental proof and practical knowledge. It will be shown how in Rifler's work
the subject has to be brought into inquiry in order to enable predition (see below,
p.359-360). Hansen further sees Novalis's encyclopaedic project as a "Vernetzung"
of disciplines and approaches to knowledge (319, 420-432). The generality of the
systems-theoretical sounding term "Vernetzung" does not in itself however afford
the reader much light on the real priorities of Novalis's encyclopaedic project.
More research is still required into Novalis's encyclopaedism so as to avoid such
interpretations which tend more to relativize than to problematize or reassert
Novalis's thoughts. Hansen's work, however, provides a much needed and
invaluable overview of Novalis's thoughts on the sciences and offers a wealth of
information in addition to that presented in the notes given by the editors of the
historical-critical edition, and also in Balmes's commentary in the smaller recent
edition (1978-1987) of Novalis's works (2).
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Schmid's work of 1951 (348) provides valuable information on the relationship of
Novalis to Werner, and gives an overview of Werner's personality, teaching
methods, mineralogical and geognostical theory. Schmid points to the importance
of Werner's notion of encyclopaedism to Novalis and emphasizes the fact that
Novalis's own encyclopaedic project ran parallel to the lectures Werner gave on
'Enzyklopädie des Bergwerkswissenschaften' from Easter 1798 to Easter 1799
(348, 79). He tends, however, rather like a recent critic, Hegener (32(J), to remain
too much within Novalis's own terminology to draw detailed conclusions about
Novalis's encyclopaedism - a more exact analysis of Das aligemeine Brouillon is
still required in terms of the relationship of the individual disciplines to one
another, and in terms of Novalis's notion of symbolic physics. It must be assessed
which substances and principles were perhaps key to Novalis's notion of a
symbolic science. The assessment in this present work of Novalis's views on Ritter
shows that Novalis was well versed in the area of galvanism, and although I try to
treat Novalis's views on chemistry in some detail, more analysis is still required of
hi thoughts in this area. Schmid's work cannot however be compared to
Hegener's, for the latter's circularity of argument tends to reduce Novalis's
encyclopaedic project to a mere comparative project and opens up Novalis to
criticism as a "playful" relativist. Hegener sees the key to Novalis's encyclopaedic
thought lying in the notion of "Entwicklung" and views Novalis's project as
"Entwicklung der Wissenschaften zur philosophisch-poetischen
Gesamtwissenschaft" (320, 71). Although Hegener is here correctly stressing that
Novalis's thought rests upon the notion of knowledge as a process (320, 70), his
work is, perhaps, of questionable value for understanding how Novalis came to
terms with the sciences of his time or, indeed, for explaining Novalis's thought
itself, since he often analyzes Novalis's thoughts tautologically within their own
thought structure and terminology. Schmid, in contrast has much to offer on the
structure of Novalis's encyclopaedism, and through his work on Werner alone
surpasses Hegener's interpretation of Novalis's encyclopaedism. Schmid is far
more concerned to set priorities in Novalis's encyclopaedism, and views it as an
enterprise which seeks to unite Werner's empirical stance with Fichte's Idealistic
stance. Where Werner positions mineralogy and geognosy at the centre of his
encyclopaedic classification system, Fichte provides the basis in his
Wissenschaftslehre for putting a discipline itself at the centre, as a universal science
itself, and for viewing other disciplines as its modifications (348, 114). Schmid
states, "So spricht Novalis von einer 'doppelten Universalität jeder wahrhaften
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Wissenschaft'" (348, 114; N, 3, 269), and refers to the following lines Novalis
noted in Das aligemeine Brouillon under the heading "Enzyklopadistik": "Eine
entsteht, wenn ich alle andern Wfissenschaftenj zur Ausbildung der Besondern
benutze" (Werner's method and his employment of geognosy as the key to his
system), "Die Andre, wenn ich sie zur Universal wissenschaft mache und sie selbst
unrer sic/i ordne - alle andre Wissenschaften als thre Modificationen betrachte. Den
Ersten Versuch der ieztern Art hat Fichte mit der Philfosophiej unternommen. Er
soil in allen W[issenschaften] unternommen werden" (N, 3, 269). This aspect of
Schmid's work has also scarcely been accounted for in Novalis scholarship,
although an exception is Uerlings (354, 184-193).
Given the paucity of material on Werner's notion of encyclopaedism, Schmid
proposes that Novalis himself may well give us the most helpful summary of
Werner's thoughts here (348, 82). Novalis himself states:
Encyklopaedie ist, nach Werner, eine richtige Ordnung und Aufzahlung der Kenntnisse, die man zu
Erreichung eines Zwecks, nöthig hat - (eine Philosophie des Studiums -) Sie besteht aus 2 Theilen -
deren Einer eine systematische Beschreibung der zu erlangenden Kenntnisse und Fertigkeiten - und
ihrer Quellen und ihrer Folge liefert - der andre aber die Regein des subjectiv zweckmäfiigen
Studiums und Exercitiuins - in Beziehung auf Zeit - Ordnung und Folge der Beschãftigungen -
groBern oder kleinern Zweck - Karacier des Kopfs - Neben und Hulfsstudien und Ubungen -
begreift. Diesen nennt man Methodologie (N, 3, 394-395).
Here are important references to the notion of practical knowledge. The passage
shows the emphasis Werner, as later Novalis, laid on scientific skills and skills in
general. Unfortunately, Schmid can fmd no material relating to the second part of
Werner's encyclopaedism, which treats the personal methodology and skills of the
student and inquirer. None the less, Schmid points out that this "methodology" of
Werner's encyclopaedism may perhaps be found in the work of a student of his,
Franz Reuss (1761-1830), who took up Werner's ideas, for Reuss speaks of the
"ganz speziellen Methode des Geognosten". Schmid comments on Reuss's notion
of geognostical method:
Es ist dort von der Veigleichung der Beobachtung, ihrer Erhebung zu ailgemeinen Gesetzen,
erneuter Prufung und kritischer Beurteilung usw. die Rede, von der Wechselerklarung der
Wissenschaften und Hilfswissenschaften, ihrer Anwendung aufeinander und gehörigen Verbindung,
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der Erganzung von Ergebmssen, die in verschiedenen Wissenschaften gewonnen sind, dauemder
Uberprufung der Satze des Systems, Selbstdenken usw. (348, 67-70, 84; , 3, 820 ff).
Here the systematic relevance of Werner to Novalis's own views on the
methodology and classification of knowledge are readily visible in the continual
testing and reassessing of theory and empirical results. Scarcely touched upon by
Schmid are Novalis's notion of knowledge formation and the significance of the
more tacit issues of Werner's approach to inquiry, as are apparent in Novalis's
comment on Werner's notion of encyclopaedic methodology. The brief analysis
given in this present work goes beyond eulogistic claims about Werner's admirable
personality to show more concretely what it was that drew the Romantics to
Werner, and how aspects of individual and practical knowledge were relevant for
theory building.35
As well as Schmid's portrayal of Novalis's encyclopaedism, his further
achievement lies in his analysis of Novalis's literature. This is where Schmid
applies scientific methodology - the practice of mineralogical classification and
inquiry - to Novalis's own aesthetic method. Schmid offers an analysis of Heinrich
von Ofterdingen in terms of what he calls "Variationen". The term sums up, in
Schmid's view, the fundamental method of Werner's mineralogical classification
system which employs the categories of "Gattierung, Reihung, Bildung von
Verwandtschaftsystemen mit Hilfe von Abanderungen und Ubergangen ... Suiten-
oder Reihenbildung" (348, 266). Schmid views two factors as essential to
Novalis's interpretation of Werner's method, that of ordering minerals in rows in
general ("das Prinzip der Reihung (Variationsreihen) Uberhaupt"), and the notion
of enhancement in the ordering of minerals ("das Prinzip der aufsteigenden Reihe,
der wachsenden Vervollkommnung ihrer Individuen") (348, 266). Schmid argues
for three main persona types in the novel, that of the poet, of the empirical
scientist and of the woman (348, 266). How far these categories are exactly true
cannot be decided here, suffice it to say that there are many interweavings of these
personae, which would point to a more complex picture then he offers. The figure
of Fabel in the "Märchen" stands, for example, for woman, for the creative
imagination of the poet, and indeed for philosopher and scientist, since she plays a
major role in controlling events in the "Märchen" and "rediscovering" or restoring
the world. Even given these queries, the main gist of Schmid's work is to link
mineralogical method to aesthetics. Schmid also points to the importance not only
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of Werner's mineralogical method, but also of aspects of his theory, i.e. his
classification system, for Schmid refers to the implications in Heinrich von
Ofierdingen of the blue rock type, "Cianit", taken from Werner's mineralogical
classification. Schmid argues that this mineral class forms part of the link in the
symbolism in the novel between the mineral, plant and "human" realms:
Agncola hatte schon em Mineral Cyanus benannt; von ihm hatte es Werner Ubernommen und zum
Gattungsnamen erhoben. So haben wir in den Namen des Ofterdingen: Heinrich - blaue Blume -
Mathilde - Cyane eine Verbindung von Mineraireich - organisch - pflanzlichem und menschlichem
Naturreich vor uns" (348, 229).
Schmid unfortunately does not analyze the further significance of the rock type
within Werner's system, for it would be important to ascertain whether this rock
type, employed as a key symbol in Novalis's literature, could also be used as a key
symbol for mineralogy in the same way that, for example, Novalis stresses the
importance of phosphorus as a major symbol and principle in chemical inquiry.
Schmid's approach to Novalis's thought is an example of the type of analysis of
Novalis's literature which avoids the demands that some critics place on the
Idealism of the Romantics. For by studying aesthetics in terms of scientific
method, and by pointing to the possibility of the way Werner's theory is
interlinked with his methodology, Schmid both stresses the process of Novalis's
employment of symbolism and also the richness of his symbolism. Schnud
therefore brings out how Novalis was concerned with a method of attaining an
ideal state or original harmony. Schmid does not explicitly make this point, since
he is more concerned with the organicism of Novalis's thoughts, but his work can
profitably be read in terms of Novalis's views on practical knowledge.
Other critics have been concerned with form in Novalis's works, and one of the
best examples is Striedter's work, Die Fragmente des Novalis als 'Prafigurazionen'
seiner Dichtung (353), but none have linked a scientific way of thinking so well to
his artistic method. Sthedter's work, however, offers a far subtler approach to
aesthetics, argumentation and form in Novalis's thought than that of Schmid.
Striedter's work of 1953, like Schmid's, also suffered from not being published,
but, unlike Schmid's, it was eventually published in 1985. Striedter treats
Novalis's aphorisms as "Prafigurationen" of his poetic writings and thereby
masterfully shows the undeniable continuity of Novalis's works. Striedter views
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Novalis's fragments in terms of knowledge and poetics. Striedter shows how
Novalis employs his fragments to approach the absolute of "Postulate" by the
negation of purely formal knowledge or logic. The fragments are thus viewed as a
type of "indirekten Steigerung" (353, 65) forming another type of knowing which
is concerned with the processes of history and the dialectics of eschatology (353,
71). In his fragments as well as his poetry Striedter argues that Novalis is
employing the fundamental method he learnt from Fichte, that of the "Hin und her
Direktion" of inquiry, and that Novalis is continually combining or playing off
these two movements of thought against one another. Striedter sees four main
structures of this type of thought in Novalis's works:
Darstellen des Gegeneinanders von Realem und Idealem in Form einer ironischen Brechung; das
Produzieren eines Gesprachs, sei es in Form seiner Darstellung im Dialog, sei es in Form seiner
Inzitation durch Fragmente; das Zur-Sprache-Bnngen des eigenen Innern, des Gemüts, in einer
Form, die selbst das Gemüt zu bewegen sucht und zu remer Bewegung oder reiner Musikalitãt
tendiert; und schliefilich das Darstellen des Individuums und seines Weges als eines Verwandlungs-
und Bildungsprozesses, als einer 'Potenzierung', in einer Form, die das Endliche zum Abbild des
Unendlichen werden läBt (353, 123).
Striedter's analysis of the epistemology of Novalis's aesthetics, if linked up to
Novalis's notions of natural philosophy, could provide a highly coherent picture of
Novalis's thought. A few corrections are required however on the way he
interprets the role that the absolute plays in Novalis's thought. He tends to view
Novalis's own adaption of the notion of Kantian and Fichtian absolute postulates in
a way that obscures Novalis's empirical and experiential interests:
Das Vorhandensein und Wirken absoluter Postulate wird zum Hinweis auf em inneres, von aller
äufleren Erfahrung unabhangiges Vermögen des Menschen, em Absolutes zu setzen (353, 81).
The implications of Striedter's statement here depend on how one wishes to
interpret the meaning of the a priori in German Idealism. It has been argued above
that the meaning of the a priori in German Idealism cannot unproblematically be
associated with experience-free knowledge. Novalis and Schelling, as well as Kant
or Fichte, stress the idea of a higher type of empiricism, although the former
navigate considerably further than the latter into this area of thought, and certainly,
the more one seeks to account for the role of natural philosophy and science in
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Novalis's thought, the more one can see the implications of Novalis's own form of
higher empiricism and the way that Novalis is essentially seeking a notion of whole
experience. For Novalis and Schelling, man's inner "Vermögen", is bound up with
Nature and "outside experience". With respect to the notions of autonomous or
experience-free thought, Novalis does indeed allude to the musicality of human
thought, but this is not an autonomous musicality, it is a musicality or "Plastisiren"
that is in tune with and part of the greater musicality of the forms of Nature. The
human dilemma, and its great hope, in Novalis's view, is that, although human
thought is part of Nature, it is still in need of much perfection before attaining the
status of the "Absolute" (N, 3, 123-4). None the less, the major tenor of Striedter's
work lies in this direction concerning the process and historicity of knowledge.
Indeed, a combination of Schmid's and Sthedter's approaches to Novalis's
aesthetics could lead to a reading of Novalis's Heinrich von Ofterdingen which
would employ and seek to unite Novalis's notions of philosophy, eschatology,
aesthetics and natural philosophy. Schmid's mineralogical and methodological
interpretation lends a certain reality to the novel which fends off a common
interpretation such as Lukcs's, which condemns the novel as a mere romanticizing
of the world. Furthermore, it is more than probable that, if one were to combine
Schmid's interpretation with further geognostical and galvanic aspects, and with
the depth of Striedter's aesthetics, that one could begin to view Heinrich von
Ofterdingen not only, as has been recently done, 37 as a response to Goethe's
Lehrjahre, but as a work perhaps more akin, at a natural philosophical level, to
Goethe's Wahlverwandtschaften. It is, as mentioned, Novalis's reception and
adaption of Werner's form of mineralogical classification which Schmid links up to
Novalis's symbolism in Heinrich von Ofierdingen, and no analysis is made by
Schmid of the probable structural significance of Werner's geognosy in Novalis's
literature. Given the broad natural philosophical implications of Werner's
geognosy, which are comparable to the encompassing virtues of Ritter's notions of
galvanism, it would be fruitful to analyze Novalis's employment of geognostical
forces and principles to structural and symbolic ends, with the aim in mind to show
how poetry and the sciences can be usefully linked.
Schmid's and Striedter's attainments and fmdings are of particular value when
one considers that they came about before the arrival of the historical critical
edition, which in itself was a milestone in Novalis scholarship. Indeed, the critical
edition of Novalis, with its invaluable apparatus, for the first time fully opens up
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the whole field of Novalis's scientific studies and philosophical writings. Full
credit must go to the editors Kluckhohn, Samuel, Mali! and Schulz.
As the critical edition arrived in the sixties and seventies, several Novalis scholars
began to reassess his thought on the sciences. A considerable portion of this work
has centred around Novalis's views on medicine. Neubauer's much needed and
pioneering work of 1971, Bifocal Vision. Novalis' Philosophy of Nature and
Disease (337), showed perceptively and in detail just how knowledgeable Novalis
was of the contemporary debate on medicine, pathology and excitability theory
(issues revolving around Neubauer's work are discussed in the course of this
work). Schipperges argues how health and medicine play a major role in Novalis's
thought. Schipperges shows how Novalis viewed medicine in a highly practical
way as a "konkrete Philosophie" (347, 242) and as a "Konkretisierung" of
knowledge (347, 237). Schipperges indeed places medicine at the centre of
Novalis ' s thought as "die Elementarwissenschaft eines jeden gebildeten Menschen"
(347, 242). Sohni's work Die Medizin der Fruhro,nantik (350) goes into more
detail than Schipperges's into the medical theory of Novalis's time. Sohni argues
for Novalis's notion of therapy, and explains it as "eine freie Harmonie zwischen
Korper und Seele" (350, 124). Sohni shows how this was realized in Novalis's
notion of the interchange of asthenic and sthenic states (350, 124), and, in the
sense of organization, man had the power to unite these forces (350, 124), and,
further, that this power had to be trained (350, 129). Sobni emphasizes the broad
intent of Novalis's thought and refers to his notions of medicine as
"Lebenskunstlehre", that is, therapy and medicine were "arts" that involved man in
his entirety, accounting for his capabilities to bring about change in the state of his
whole constitution. Interestingly, Sohni views Ritter's physiological and galvanic
experiments (although he does not analyze Ritter's work in any detail or elaborate
on Ritter's work) as essentially carrying out Novalis's "Lebenskunstlehre", since,
in Sohni's view, Ritter was searching for the "Willkfihr" or organization in Nature
and man (350, 128). Sohni is also one of the few critics who argues for the strong
practice orientation of Novalis's thought, and the highly experiential nature of
Novalis's view of knowledge. Sohni refers to Novalis's way of thinking in general
as "ein empirisch gedachtes Realisierungsprogramm" (350, 190). Sohni does much
to show how concretely Novalis shaped his philosophy with contemporary
scientific thought, and his work is arguably the best on Novalis's views on
medicine.
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Since the arrival of the historical critical edition several critics have treated
sciences other than medicine, such as Kapitza, Neubauer, Mahoney, Burwick and
Hansen. 38 Kapitza's work, Die fruhromantisc/ze Theorie der Mischung (322),
explores the meaning of "Mischung" in the Romantic era. In contrast with the
modern pejorative meaning of "Mischung", both in chemistry, where it denotes
"einen bloB äuBeren Zusammenhang verschiedener Stoffe", and in its non-scientific
use as "das Sekundäre ... das weniger Originale" (322, 11), Kapitza shows how
the term "Mischung", in the context of chemistry in the eighteenth century, had a
highly defmed and loaded meaning. For scientists in the eighteenth century, in the
process of defining new chemical laws, viewed "Mischung" in terms of chemical
affinity and physical forces (322, 12). Since chemistry was evolving into the most
important science of matter in that period in its investigation of fundamental forces
and the invisible actions within matter, the term "Mischung" acted as an exemplary
and powerful tool for inquiry, and, as Kapitza shows, the term became a tool not
just for scientific inquiry, but also, for thinkers such as Novalis, Schlegel and
Schelling, for inquiry and philosophy in general.39
In his second major work, Syntholismus und symbolische Logik (1978), Neubauer
approaches Novalis predominantly from an epistemological view-point, and, in
doing so, gives his interpretation of the history of "Combinatorik". Although the
work is valuable for understanding how Novalis came to terms with this part of
contemporary science, Neubauer takes the view that Novalis sees language as
autonomous (339, 163). Neubauer further views Novalis's thought in terms of a
split between mind and matter, since Neubauer believes in the influence of what he
refers to as Leibnitz's "radikale Trennung zwischen Geist und Materie" (339, 70)
on Novalis. While the link to Leibnitz is useful for tracing back fundamental
notions of organization such as are evident in Leibnitz's monads, it does make it
difficult to explain the union of mind and matter as an organization in Novalis's
philosophy. There are, however, good reasons for Neubauer's stance since Novalis
cannot plainly be seen in terms of an ontological success. Neubauer reminds the
critic that Novalis's stance over the attainability of the "noumena" is not so clear
cut or unrelinquishingly utopian as is sometimes supposed. Neubauer's analysis of
calculus and "Combinatorik" also hits upon a key part of Novalis's thought and it
is his work above all that has brought these issues to light. Problematic, as will be
discussed, is a stance such as Neubauer's where Novalis's calculus is understood in
Kantian terms, since it is through Herder that Novalis seeks to define more closely
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the concept of the a priori. Neubauer's discussion of Novalis's literature as a
calculus is, of course, central to Novalis's works, but this cannot, I think, be
viewed in Neubauer's terms of autonomous language (339, 134-18 1). Instead, as
has been mentioned, one should do justice to the Romantic use of the subject in
their notion of language. Neubauer's work also has the ability to see Novalis in a
greater perspective, for he links Novalis to the poetry of the French symbolists
such as Ma1larm and their sucessors, such as Valery, and poses questions about
the nature of the autonomy of modern art (339, 162-18 1). Neubauer's recent work
on Novalis, even given the great time gap since his previous work, shows that he is
still reassessing and reflecting upon Novalis and, importantly, making Novalis
relevant to intellectual thought today.
Mahoney's work of 1980 takes substantial steps in illuminating the way Novalis
makes use of the sciences in his literature. Unlike Kapitza, who discusses the
relationships of chemical and aesthetic concepts, Mahoney goes on to show just
how Novalis realized his views of chemistry in his literature. Mahoney's main
achievement is his delineation of Novalis's reception and adaption of Kant's views
on dynamism. Mahoney argues that it is Kant's dynamism that stimulates Novalis's
idea of a poetic "AuflosungsprozeB" (332, 29): the notion of dynamic matter, and,
in particular, the fluidity of chemical "Mischungen" are seen as analogous to the
fluid and creative powers of poetry (332, 27). Mahoney takes the reader through a
series of scenes in Die Lehrlinge zu Sais and Heinrich von Ofterdingen and
illuminates them in terms of dynamic chemistry and Novalis's notion of love.
Mahoney's work, although not concerned with the links of scientific and aesthetic
methodology, goes a long way in showing just how elements of Novalis's natural
philosophy are found in his literature, and for this reason, deserves to be placed
next to the works of Schmid and Neubauer. However, Mahoney's emphasis on
Novalis's aestheticizing of nature ("Die Poetisierung der Natur") does Novalis less
service, since, as the present work argues, there is more at stake than aethereal
aesthetics and relativising irony alone.
Burwick's work (306) clearly reveals (as does Wetzels's essay too, 'Klingsohrs
Märchen als Science Fiction' (356)) the significance of Ritter's notions of
galvanism for Novalis, and their use in the "MArchen" in Heinrich von
Ofterdingen. Burwick also, in a more distinct fashion than most other critics,
shows with some poignant examples the complex interplay of Novalis's interests.
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For Burwick underlines how Novalis uses contemporary scientific knowledge and
experiments as a direct source, and applies them to his literary works. For
example, Burwick explains a scene from the "Märchen" in Heinrich von
Ofterdingen, where Novalis describes negative light, through his reading of Mrs
Fulhame's essay on the effects of light on substances in the Ailgemeines Journal
der Chemie (93). Burwick goes on further to explain how in the "Marchen", the
mind, in its imperfect perception, is compared to a camera obscura (3C, 113-4).
Here Burwick brings out the philosophical and practical depth of Novalis's
thought. Concerning the relationship of science and literature, Burwick also makes
the further point that the "Märchen" was part of Novalis's scientific programme,
since literature had the role of bringing people to see science in a new magical
way:
Because the Märchen celebrates the primal wonder, it provides the perfect setting for the reunion of
science and magic (306, 109).
Uerlings's work of 1991 (354) is a major event in Novalis scholarship. It
provides the most comprehensive and reflective overview of Novalis reception to
date. It will undoubtedly be the standard reference work for many years to come.
Furthermore, Uerlings has arrived at a highly stimulating view of Novalis's notion
of knowledge which, as discussed, is of relevance to intellectual history. A key
feature of Uerlings's work is his reassessment of the works of Manfred Frank,
which have been greatly neglected by Novalis scholarship, and when his work has
been referred to it has been misappropriated. 4° Frank's premises call into question
a whole line of Novalis scholarship embodied in Haering (1954), Dick (1967), von
Molnár (1970), and Neubauer (1972) (317; 309; 334; 338). In a series of works
(312, 313; 314; 315) Frank differentiates himself from these earlier critics in
proposing the notion of the transcendent absolute in Novalis's thought, which is a
thesis that stands in direct opposition to the claims of the critics above for the role
of the immanent absolute in Novalis's work. Frank correctly states that Novalis
does not argue for the attainment of the absolute, but that his thought is concerned
with the process of approaching the absolute, and indeed in marking out empirical
symbols of the absolute:
Das Ich hat nun allerdings Wissen vom Absoluten, aber nur em abstraktes". D.h., das reine
Absolute 1st dem endlichen Ich gar nicht zugänglich . . . Es wird sich zeigen, daB Novalis darum im
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Geiste das Moment der Zeitlichkeit, der Endlichkeit des Daseins sucht. Solange das Ich von etwas
(Stoff) aus und zu etwas hin (Form) geht, ist es noch nicht das Absolute, sondem Geist, relatives
Subject, empirisches Ich (312, 93);
Das philosophierende Ich steigt also nur bis zur negativen, abstrakien Anschauung des Absoluten.
Die in den zu erklärenden Dingen vorgefundene dialektische Struktur ist nur empirisches Symbol
der absoluten Einheit aller Gegensatze im absoluten Grunde, den ich bloB als heuristisches Prinzip
der Philosophie gebrauchen kann, solange ich ihn nicht selber deduzieren konnte (312, 94).
Here, in the notion "empirical symbol", the link to this work's concern for
scientific productivity can be obviously made: for in this notion lies the
philosophical status of what Novalis's terms "wircksame Begriffe" or the symbols
of his notion of science.
Frank's interpretation of Novalis's magical idealism shows that Novalis cannot be
viewed in an idealized, aethereal, second rate mystical way, as he has been for a
long time, nor can his magic idealism be seen as idealistic in an absolute sense, for
his notion of magic is grounded in the need to confront the world: Novalis is
concerned with "einer magischen Umschaffung der Welt" (312, 116). Central to
Novalis's project is the role of the "Einbildungskraft", for it is there in the
"intellektuale Anschauung" that the absolute is transcendent. This, as Frank points
out, is also the key to Schelling's philosophy, it is thus that the absolute can be
approached at all (170, 88).
Frank also comes close to relating scientific productivity to aesthetics when he,
for example, neatly links Novalis's artistic and philosophical stances by seeing
them both as part of the same knowledge process:
Kunst und Philosophie sind Ausdruck eines und desselben Erlebnisses. In beiden kommt das
Universum zum BewuBtsein seiner selbst, in der Kunst durch reelle, im Denken durch ideelle
Reflexion. Dem Wesen nach in Kunst die Praxis der Einbildungskraft selbst, welche von der
Philosophie reflektiert wird (313, 227).
Frank's thesis here provides the grounds for the attempt in this dissertation to fmd
the prior basis of both art and science in Novalis's thought. While raising the
above issue, Frank also points to Novalis's affinity to Goethe, for Novalis sees in
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Goethe precisely the ability to employ knowledge concretely and, at the same time,
the ability to reflect abstractly:
Goethe verdient grofites Lob, weil in seiner poetischen Praxis die 'genaueste Abstraction' stets mit
einer gleichzeitigen 'Construction des Objectes' einhergeht, 'dem die Abstraction entspricht.'
Mit anderen Worten, Philosoph und Poet schopfen die Verbindlichkeit ihrer Praxis aus der
konkreten (objektivierenden und abstrahierenden) Anschauung der Wirklichkeit, die sie gestalten
und reflektieren (313, 227-228).
Novalis's comments here, as will be discussed later, refer also to Goethe's form of
scientific productivity - and this again points to ways in which Frank's fundamental
notions are congenial to this work's approach to Novalis. Frank's concern for the
notion of time in Novalis's thought is directly echoed in this present work by its
concern for practice and the process of knowledge formation. Time, process and
experiential knowledge are the key to understanding Novalis's eschatology and his
notion of the Golden Age since man is working towards this absolute, be it through
poetry or through science. Thus it is that Frank argues that Novalis steers beyond
the polarities such as mind and matter to encapsulate them in a higher pair, that of
transcendence and finite time:
In dem MaBe also, in dem das Absolute, Gott, Uber das empirische Ich hinausgehoben ist, wird
dieses selbst verendlicht. Die Polaritãt Geist-Materie, Ich-Welt, ist einem höherem Gegensatzpaar
gewichen, dem von Transzendenz und zeitlich-endlicher Wirkiichkeit (312, 98).
Where Frank poses more strictly philosophical problems this work searches for
instances in the sciences both to illustrate and to seek the origins of such problems.
Uerlings's work has in many ways begun to tackle this key aspect of Novalis's
thought - transcendent temporality - in his literature. 4 ' In the context of Frank's
work, Uerlings also raises the crucial question of Romantic pantheism. Although
pantheism and transcendental immanence will be dealt with later in the sections on
Plotinos, some comments are called for now. Frank shows how the notion of
transcendental immanence links "Natur" and "Geist" at various levels of
consciousness (170, 105; 354, 162-163). The interpenetration or transreflexivity of
levels of knowledge in Novalis's and Schelling's notions shows how matter,
thought and purposiveness are linked in terms of knowledge formation. One could
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also say knowledge as a whole includes Nature, where the absolute is also
transcendent. It is then not just the transcendent immanence of man's knowledge,
but also the transcendent immanence of Nature's purposiveness that informs
Novalis's and Schelling's notion of knowledge. One can take Frank's views
further: this understanding of Novalis's pantheism as transreflexivity or
interpenetration also opens up the grounds for scientific productivity. Something
akin to the notion of a microcosm within man, or the Plotinian God-in-us, is
expressed in Novalis's notion of pantheism. The natural inquirer is capable of
fmding nature within himself in the figures of the imagination which correlate at a
transreflexive level to the phenomena (the "figures") of nature herself. As Novalis
expresses this idea, two of the four points of transreflexivity are the outer world's
own external self and the outer world within us (N, 3, 429). Uerlings is probably
correct in pointing to the problems of Neubauer's notion of Romantic Spinozistic
pantheism as absolute immanence (354, 136-139). None the less, Neubauer's views
are important for stressing the passivity and open-ended nature of Novalis ideas.
This, as has been discussed above, is significant in the light of pluralistic elements
within Novalis's thought. What one sees in Novalis are aspects of Leibnitz's notion
of monads, but without the radical split of mind and matter which Neubauer
supposes. Novalis brings the critical philosophy of German Idealism to bear upon
Leibnitz. Critical philosophy's reflective element and its use of the subject are
applied to the notion of monads to steer, in turn, beyond Kant, Fichte and Leibnitz
himself to refer to a reflexive, organic and purposive relationship between man and
phenomena. As will be shown, however, it is to Plotinos whom Novalis essentially
turns for his notion of pantheism and epistemology, as Mähl has already
pioneeringly argued as early as 1963.42
To return to Uerlings's interpretation of Novalis's aesthetically based notion of
knowledge formation, it can be seen how Uerlings's reception of Frank's notion of
pantheism as immanent transcendence not only effects ideas of epistemology and
ontology, but also Novalis's view of literature as well. 43
 Uerlings portrays
Novalis's notion of gaining knowledge as "die narrative Konstruktion immanenter
Transzendenz". "Konstruktion" refers to "bewu1te Setzung" and "narrative" to the
fact that such constructions are only possible in terms of "Darstellung" to Novalis
(354, 230). The relation of the present work to Uerlings's is clear: "bewuBte
Setzung" correlates with this dissertations's concern for the activity - understood as
consciousness - of knowledge formation; "narrative" correlates closely to the
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present work's concern for the aesthetics of productivity. Uerlings's use of the
term "immanenter Transzendenz" reveals how the relevance of his notion of
Novalis's thought to intellectual history lies explicitly in the role of German
Idealism. Uerlings's term "narrativ" points not only to elements of German
Idealism - as mentioned above, Novalis's idea of "Darstellung" can also be seen as
Idealist aesthetics- but also to the relevance of Novalis's aesthetics to current
intellectual history. "Konstruktion" also arguably picks up on Uerlings's
understanding of the utopian element in Novalis's work, and, in the broadest sense,
implies that a progression in knowledge is possible.
Finally, it remains to be seen to what extent critics have concerned themselves
with Novalis's idea of "experiment". In his work of 1970, Krumme Regel. Novalis'
"Konstruktionslehre des schaffenden Geistes" und ihre Tradition (316), Gaier binds
in Novalis's use of the term "experiment" within his overall interpretation of
Novalis's "Konstruktion" of knowledge. Gaier emphasizes those key remarks
which are, too, a major concern of this present work (N, 3, 123-124). Gaier
interprets Novalis's "Experimentalmethode" and "Beobachtungsmethode" as the
two parts of the "Hin und Her" of Novalis's construction of knowledge.
Importantly, Gaier here also sees Novalis's notion of the poeticizing of knowledge
in general and of the sciences, for in the two above methods of construction the
inquirer moves continually between the aesthetic "Figur" and the conceptual
"Wort" (316, 199). It is a pity that Gaier makes no detailed references to the
sciences themselves - apart from some to mathematics - to further illustrate
Novalis's thoughts on this matter. 44
 However, one of Gaier's references, Lambert,
is of particular use in defining Novalis's notion of "experiment". Gaier points out
how the notion of experiment in Lambert's 1764 work, Neues Organon (67), is
central to his idea of mathesis. For Lambert, as Gaier remarks, the construction of
"Wissenschaft und Leben ailgemein" are viewed as an experiment (316, 183).
Lambert's significance for Novalis would appear to reach beyond the idea of
"Konstruktion", however useful this term is for explaining Lambert's and
Novalis's view of mathematical construction in calculus. It is particuarly the
manner in which Lambert treats knowledge in a critical and experimental way that
would have attracted Novalis. 45
 One of the first lines Novalis jots down from
Lambert runs:
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Lehrsatze und ErfahrungsSät.ze lassen sich in einander verwandein, wenn man zu leztem den Beweis
sucht und Erstere auf die Probe steilt (N, 3, 130; 67, 1, § 148).
This type of questioning, that can be seen as an "ordo inversus" of primary
statements and principles, has great affinities with Novalis's spirit of inquiry. Here
statements are relativized (i.e. in the sense of "aufgehoben") and referred to other
ones transreflexively in order to be put to the test.46
Löffler is another critic who discusses the importance of experiment to Novalis -
this time with the emphasis on Fichte - in a brief but perceptive forray in 1978 in
his essay, 'Berufserfahrung und Theoriebildung bei Friedrich von Hardenberg
(Novalis)' (326). Löffler argues that it is through Fichte that Novalis comes to fmd
the central importance of "experiment" to his own thought. Löffler argues it is
Novalis's understanding of "experiment", as espoused in the tenets of Fichte's
practical philosophy, that allows the inquirer to arrive at genuine experience:
Nur im Experiment entsteht "echte Erfabrung", d.h. eine vom Willen des Menschen diktierte
Realitãt. Allein im Experiment öffnet sich der Weg zur realen, praktischen Tathandlung, in der das
Ich das Nicht-Ich seW. Es ist im Sinne Fichtes eine wissenschaftlich begründete Handlung.
Zugleich ist es auch eine in der Praxis erprobte Methode, neue RealitAt zu schaffen.(326, 54; N, 3,
391).
Löffier further argues that Novalis takes on Fichte's dialetic method as an
empirical-experimental method (326, 55; N, 3, 391). Whether Löffler's
interpretation is to be understood as Marxist is not important: dialectics are
undeniably present in Novalis's interpretation of Fichte. Equally present in
Novalis's method, which Löffier does not point out, is the notion of a
"phenomenal" calculus and the notion of the row. In the introduction ample room
has been given to the discussion of the "row" or "series" in early Romantic natural
philosophy. In Goethe, Novalis and Ritter one finds, in fact, a blend of dialectics,
calculus and ideal empiricism, for out of the row of phenomena or experiments
there rises a synthesis or "higher experience" as Goethe puts it. The "Formel" of
the row is at the same time synthesis, enhancement, function and "higher
experience" (see also below, chapter two, sections 1.4 and 1.8).
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A further point Löffler makes concerns the ethics of inquiry. Löffler sees in
Novalis's notion of "experiment" an attempt to do justice to nature. For by
respecting not only the inquirer's subjectivity, but also the subjectivity of nature in
her purposiveness, Novalis, like other Romantic natural philosophers, pays respect
to nature:
Es gibt noch einen zweiten Grund, weshaib gerade das Experiment irn Zentrum der
Hardenbergschen Philosophie steht. Im Experiment glaubte Hardenberg jene Form der Veranderung
der natürlichen (und gesellschaftlichen) Umwelt gefunden zu haben, die der eigenen, inneren
Gesetzlichkeit der Natur am ehesten gerecht wird. Die Anerkennung der Natur als einer
eigenstandigen in sich organisierten Welt bedingt eine vom Menschen unterschiedene
GesetzmäBigkeit, die respektiert werden mufi (326, 57).
One can extrapolate these thoughts of Löffler to argue that the early Romantic
notions of "higher" empiricism and the whole of experience, as espoused in its
attempt to remain close to the phenomena under investigation, and in its interest in
productivity, experiential knowledge and purposiveness, have definite ethical
elements.
As a conclusion to Gaier's and Löffler's work47 on "experiment" one can observe
that Lambert's and Fichte's generally philosophical approach to "experiment" are
complemented by further thinkers who influenced Novalis. Lambert and Fichte is
thus two of the many sources Novalis draws upon in his search for a reliable
method. The introduction has shown the relevance of Werner, Goethe and
Schelling to Novalis's notions of natural philosophy, productivity and
"experiment". Chapter Two recapitulates these sources and others, who all deal
with the philosophy of "experiment" with differing emphases, and shows in more
detail the context of Novalis's thought here.
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Z Plan of the work.
The major themes and patterns of thought approached in this dissertation, the
issues of practice, have been prefigured in the introduction. In the following
chapters, early Romantic notions of practice and the productivity of knowledge are
illustrated in Novalis's scientific and philosophical writings. The dissertation
attempts to show how Novalis was a great early Romantic methodologist of
practice, on par with Goethe and Schelling at this level of knowledge.
Chapter one positions Novalis's notion of "experiment" within the tradition of the
theory of experiment. The chapter starts with a brief account of the swing in
natural philosophy towards experience. I then go on to consider epistemological
and methodological issues surrounding the term experimentum crucis, and how this
term was employed by Newton. The fmal section of the chapter explores the key
part of Novalis's notion of "experiment", its aesthetics. Certain parallels are drawn
between Novalis's idea of concrete, experiential thought and the type of knowledge
espoused in the tradition of memory systems. This leads to one of the chief
characteristics of Novalis's notion and rhetoric of "experiment", namely the re-
experiencing of experience in the imagination. I then move on to conclude with
remarks on the encompassing nature of Novalis's idea of "experiment", and give
examples to show how this is part of a fundamental attitude of his, as expressed in
his idea of "Experimentaiphilosophie".
Chapter two considers the breadth of intellectual thought channelled into
Novalis's idea of "experiment". It is discussed how, for a variety of reasons -
ontological, methodological and natural philosophical -, that Novalis's reception of
Plotinos is a major point of reflection in his life, and, consequently, for his notion
of "experiment". Other major players considered who take up a central role in
Novalis's thought are Werner, Herder, Goethe and Fichte.
Chapters three and four step out of the immanent discussion of Novalis's thought
in terms of the thinkers of his time to reflect over key patterns and strategies in his
notion of knowledge. I explore two central strands of his thought: the first lies in
his desire to unify theory by means of a classification system of knowledge; the
second lies in his arguably more attainable aim of unifying practice. Novalis's wish
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to classify the sciences can be sketched briefly as a project setting out to provide a
system of symbols in the sciences for further employment in inquiry. The
unification of practice is, arguably, an epistemologically more complex affair, but,
I maintain, more realizable. In this programme for inquiry, Novalis seeks the
unification of practical theory with methodology, and - as illustrated by Ritter's
work - the individual inquirer has a central role to play in this programme. Both
programmes put forward proposals, to varying degrees, for the attainment of
consensuality and consensus in inquiry. It is Ritter's form of individual natural
philosophical productivity that provides an instance of the probability of the more
powerful form of consensuality that Novalis intimates in his writings. In the course
of these reflections, a detailed path is taken back into the sciences of the time, into
the pneumatics debate, and into Ritter's work on galvanism. Further examples,
too, of Novalis's reflection over the sciences of his time are given.
Chapter three considers Novalis's view of paradigmatic symbols for inquiry in the
light of the pneumatics debate and Novalis's own speculations on "Physik".
Novalis's understanding of phosphorus as a paradigmatic symbol is analyzed in
detail.
Chapter four explores the immense variety of ways in which Ritter's thought and
work connects with Novalis's own thought. Here, Novalis's idea of "experiment"
is realized in Ritter's methodology. Ritter's work finely illustrates a breadth of
issues concerning the use of aesthetics in inquiry. Practical knowledge, aesthetics,
and case studies all form a coherent whole in Ritter's work, and, also, in the
manner in which Novalis interprets Rifler.
In the conclusion, the concerns of this dissertation are subjected to further
reflexive assessment. Possible values of this dissertation for intellectual history as a
whole, with respect to the history and philosophy of science, and with respect to
the realm of studies carved out under the title of literature and science, will be put
under examination. In this manner, an attempt will be made to put the notion of
unifying practice into an appropriate perspective. Initially, questions involving the
practicability of the early Romantic notion of inquiry will be raised. I will then
move on tentatively to propose possible spheres - primarily within the realm of the
history of the practice of ideas - where literature and science studies could,
perhaps, be enhanced.
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Chapter One
Novalis and the tradition of "experiment"
1. Experiential contra a priori knowledge.
2. The role of the experimentum crucis in natural philosophy.
3. "Experiment" as aesthetic and natural philosophical productivity.
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1. Experiential contra a priori knowledge.
As mentioned in the introduction, a study of the work recorded for late 1798 and
early 1799 in the Freiberger naturwissensc/zafthiche Studien and Das aligemeine
Brouillon affords the reader an insight into Novalis's interests after his arrival at
the Freiberger Bergakademie. Most importantly, one should not be misled by the
variety of subjects, disciplines and thoughts that Novalis attempts to combine and
unite in his encylopaedic project, and then assume that his undertaking had no real
base, and that he was merely forcing notions together in conceptual play. For
behind his apparently idealistic and difficult remarks lies a decidedly empirical
orientation and a wish to test and clarify knowledge. The more purely conceptual
interests of the Fichie Stud/eu are replaced by a genuine attempt to encounter the
outside world through a philosophy that seeks to blend the sophistication of
German Idealism in Kantian and Fichtian epistemology, and the Neoplatonic
tradition, with contemporary scientific thought; and, further, to analyze and
theorize about inquiry itself in a highly historical sense. Both Die Christenheit oder
Europa and the Hymnen an die Naclu illuminate Novalis's highly historical attitude
to knowledge. One can say that, as in his eschatological work he views religion as
a movement and continuum of thought throughout the ages which culminates in a
vision of how man, at the end of the eighteenth century, should act and practice,
continuing a quest conducted throughout the ages, so, too, in Das ailgemeine
Brouillon, Novalis puts forward a programme for knowledge that takes account of
the development of knowledge and places man within this process. The history of
science or discoveries is never, to Novalis, a plain accumulation of facts, but rather
a whole process of the very acts of discovering and the procedures used. In this
philosophy, Novalis's concept of "experiment" plays a key role. His use' it implies
that he did see the advancement of knowledge in terms of the empirical tradition.
Knowledge for researchers in the late eighteenth century was, in general, bound up
with the great development of the sciences, yet Novalis's understanding of
"experiment" is broader than that met in traditional natural philosophy, and
includes more than strict and quantitative science alone. Moreover, Novalis's
attitude to "experiment" is quite different from today's belief that to "experiment"
is to put a theory to the test, which was a view often held in the eighteenth century
too. In fact, Novalis attempts a thorough re-evaluation of the meaning of
"experiment".
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Particularly since Francis Bacon's (1561-1626) works, "experiment" had meant a
dismissal of scholastic argumentation and a return to experience itself as the source
for knowledge. It goes without saying that the concept of "Experimental
philosophy", based on Bacon and which so imbued the attitudes of the Royal
Society and Newton's works, was a radical turn around in thought. Its enormous
significance for the development of science in particular and for society in general
is well documented. After Bacon, a major new development of ideas on experiment
came, of course, with Newton. Newton's science created a shift away from a
priori principles to what has been referred to by Lakatos as the less strict
"psychologism" of induction.' Lakatos's interpretation brings out Newton's
empirical stance to knowledge and its fundamental opposition to the formalism of
the Cartesians. As Lakatos says, Newtonianism struggled against the restrictions of
the essentialist, a priori metaphysics of the Cartesians, which was, as Newton
exclaims, making him a "slave to defend" his theories (76):
This is why they [the Newtoniansl were forced, almost against their will to oppose the tyranny of
self-evident, a priori first principles and thus to change the standards of scientific proof and
criticism and indeed, the very concept of knowledge (227, 207).
Lakatos explains just how Newton's form of empiricism set out a quite different
agenda of what counted as valid science, by holding up a strong belief in the
faculties of the scientist. In this sense it is justificationist or dogmatic; 2 it argues
against infallible a priori metaphysics:
The inherent psychologism of Newton's concept of experimental proof puts him into the category of
justificatiomst fallibilism: Newtonian standards are those of justificationist fallibilism. They are not
third-world standards but psychologistic standards. The proof of the phenomena is guaranteed by
the "lack of speculative basis", "carefulness", and "experimental skill"; the proof of the inductive
generalization is guaranteed by the "caution" and "sagacity" of the theoretician: one could well call
them "proofs by pedigree". Kepler's laws were proved by Kepler's "reliability" as an observer;
Newton's laws by Newton's "sagacity" at making inductive inferences (227, 209).
Thus Newton's inclusion of the famous Rule IV in the second edition of his
Principia in effect, as Lakatos observes, through its demand that metaphysical
criticism should not force the inquirer to reject inductive proofs, "amounts to a
truncation of the Cartesian model of explanation" (227, 205). Science could now,
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in Newton's view, concentrate on the region below first principles. It may not be
possible to deduce the causes of phenomena from the first principles at the top of
the Cartesian model, but the lower regions may yet be scientific, and could extend
man's knowledge within what was now an open-ended model of scientific
knowledge (227, 205).
Newton's particular form of induction is made apparent in his desire for proven
propositions, but the proofs he was seeking in his experimental philosophy were
patently different from those of the Cartesians. Newton was aware of this, and this
in turn explains his ambivalent stance to proof, as Lakatos argues, because Newton
wished to establish his own "psychologistic" standards of proof (227, 209). Thus
he could say, as Lakatos points out (227, 208), that "arguing from Experiments
and Observations by Induction be no Demonstration of general Conclusions" (74,
404) although experimental-inductive proof "is the highest evidence that a
Proposition can have in [my] philosophy" (77, 155).
This Newtonian position also seems to represent one of the pillars of Novalis's
method. It is expressed in the remark (above, p.l8), concerning the limitations of
logic: when logic is used, it should not be used alone; beyond analytical-logical
proof, one also needs experimental proof ("daB wir mit der Logik allein nicht viel
ausrichten könnten ..." (N, 3, 402)). Novalis thus suggests a method that should
combine logic with those faculties that fall into the realm of psychology. Both tools
are limited on their own, and only prove fruitful together ("daB wir noch em
andres Vermogen und seine Theorie aufsuchen müfiten, die als dem Denkvermögen
und d[erj Logik entgegengesezt und allein eben so nutzlos, als diese, in
Verbindung mit diesen gesezt werden mUBten, urn daraus em zusamrnengeseztes
Vermogen - und zusammengesezte, sich gegenseitig complettirende Theoneen und
Handl[ungen] und Resultate zu erlangen und so fort"). Importantly, both aspects
consist of, and have to be proven through, "experimentation" ("Am Ende scheint
alles Nachdenken auf ächtes Experimentiren zu führen - und die sog[enanntej
Vernunfflehre - die Nothwendigkeit, Methode, etc. des Expenmentirens und
Lebens, als eines beständigen Experimentirens zu enthalten und beweisen" (N, 3,
402)). The ultimate arbiter here appears to be a form of experimentation, which
subsumes both logic, other faculties, and practical experiments, in a higher order
experimental method. Clearly Novalis's own notion of induction opposes dogmatic
a priori metaphysics. In arguing for experiential knowledge, his view is hound up
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with the empirical tradition in the history of the sciences. Yet at the same time, by
connecting "Experimentiren" and "Leben", he goes far beyond the framework of
empirical science and returns to the earlier notion of "experiment" as "experience";
in so doing, he enters the debate on the issues of individual and practical
knowledge involved in processes of knowledge formation.
The metaphysical concepts Novalis wishes for in inquiry should firstly be few,
and secondly be experiential or concrete, as opposed to a priori analytical
concepts, as a remark of his in 1799 shows:
Aligemeine Behauptungen geiten in der Naturiehre nicht. Ihr Vortrag mufi praciisch, technisch, real
seyn ... Unsre Physik spricht nur von den aligemeinen Eiementen der Natur - von den ailgemeinen
wircksamen Begriffen - oder den Naturkrafte[nJ ... Alles ist beschränkt, auch des Menschen
Wissenschaft soil nach Zeit, und Ort etc. bestimmt seyn ... (N, 3, 600).
Part of the necessary limitations on inquiry are found, in Novalis's view, in the
inquirer's own physical and mental limitations. What Novalis grants the status of
"wircksame Begriffe" will be discussed in the following chapters, particularly
where the sciences are treated in detail. Here it is necessary to note that Novalis's
fundamental opposition to dogma or a priori systems explains his recourse to the
notion of "experiment", and his use of "experimental" proof in his notion of
induction.
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2. The role of the experimentum crucis in natural philosophy.
A key methodological instance in the history of science, Newton's use of the term
experimentum crucis, further appropriately illustrates the development of the notion
of induction and the switch to experience and to experiments in the sciences. The
concept makes clear the complexities of the issues Novalis was dealing with. For
however much of a paradigm for hypothetico-deductivism Newton's experimentum
crucis later came to be, and this is a key reason, for example, why Goethe
polemicizes so much against him, Newton's own method itself was fundamentally
empirical-inductive. Confusion often arises over the role of experimentation after a
theory has gone down in history as being the correct one, as Laymon argues, for at
this stage an "experiment" such as Newton's is described as if all other theories
were quite wrong, and in the description of the experiment the original inductive
procedures are omitted. Indeed, from the perspective of a thinker such as Novalis,
the whole notion of a continuum of inquiry is overlooked:
Once a competition between theories has been decided (for whatever reasons) and a winner chosen,
the history of this competition very often is restricted to only the early stages of explicit deduction
where very idealized experimental descriptions are used. Ordered pairs of initial conditions and
predictions are selected so as to make it appear that the rejected theories were refuted by a simple
incompatibility with the facts (234, 76).
As Sepper has shown so clearly for the situation that Goethe (and Novalis) lived in,
Newton's views were in fact simplified so much as to be presented in a
meaningless and fallacious way in eighteenth century texthooks (276, 27-38). This
is indeed a natural retrospective reaction to knowledge and discoveries: the actual
process of discovery is forgotten, since the new theory has now become embedded
in the minds of scientists as the "facts" themselves. Yet from Novalis's perspective
of "zusammengesezte, sich gegenseitig complettirende Theorieen" (N, 3, 402) this
whole tendency would seem to represent an impoverishment of science in
particular and of "Leben" in general.
One may, perhaps, say that in his optical writings Newton was really trying to
espouse the old Aristotelian ideal of methodology, directly constructing theory
through sensual impressions. As Nickles remarks, in Newton's Opticks, his
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theories on the nature of light are conveyed as "deductions from the phenomena"
(248, 314), for Newton was keen to present his theories without having to go into
purely formal reasoning. Sepper, too, comments upon this aspect of Newton's
thought when discussing Newton's optical works:
Despite the brilliance of Newton's optics, then, despite the apparently immediate self-evidence of
his experimental theory, one might reasonably wonder whether it would not have been better had
he, like Goethe, come to realize and admit the problematic nature of experimental proof rather than
conceal and ossify it ever more completely with masses of experiments, improperly qualified
claims, and a veneer of mathematics. For in Newton's case we are talking about a scientific success
that decisively influenced the natural sciences for generations. Insofar as these shortcomings and this
dogmatism went unnoticed and uncriticized, we have to deal with a significant failure of early
modern science itself (276, 142).
Even excepting such methodological shortcomings, it is well known that Newton
certainly cannot be labeled in straightforward positivist terms. As well as Koyrë
himself, post-Koyréan intellectualist approaches to Newton, as in the works of
Dobbs (163), Heimann and McGuire (192), Rattansi (240), McMullin (241) and
Kubrin (222), have shown the links of Neoplatonism, alchemy, religion and
philosophy to Newton's natural philosophy. Heimann and McGuire have argued,
for example, that in the Newtonian notion of force and Locke's notion of power
common themes can be found "which were fundamental to the problems of
scientific explanation" (192, 305). The sociological influences on, and effects of,
Newton's thought have also been traced. Manuel, as well as pointing to the effects
of religion on Newton's thought has also shown how Newton manipulated people
and institutions to forward his natural philosophy (239, 264-291). Margaret and
James Jacob have written on the social uses of Newtonian natural philosophy
during Civil War, Interregnum and Restoration (205; 204). Indeed, historians have
shown that there were a variety of types of Newtonianism - ranging from
pantheistic materialism (206, 552) to transcendent Newtonianism (293).
Of particular interest here in Newtonian historiography are not so much questions
concerning religion or cosmologies as the ones concerning experimental method,
and are treated in Sepper's work, and also in Schaffer's account of the role of the
experimentum crucis in Newtonianism. When discussing the term experimentum
crucis in Newton's natural philosophy, Schaffer refers to the problem of the
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"Experimenter's Regress" (270, 68-71), a notion elaborated on by Collins (155,
79-100, 129-30). The term "Experimenter's Regress" refers to the difficulty of
justifying an experimental method and the essential circularity of the relationship
between practice and theory. Collins describes the problem thus: to settle a
theoretical question over phenomena, "experimenters needed to know whether or
not" the subject of their inquiry existed, "and to find this out they needed to do
some well-performed experiments. But to know whether their experiments were
well performed they needed to see if their experiments produced the 'correct'
results, and to determine this they needed to know whether" the subject of their
inquiry "existed - and so on. This is the Experimenter's Regress" (156, 88).
Schaffer views some solution to the "Experimenter's Regress" in Newton's
experimenrum crucis in the role instruments played in consensus over Newton's
optical theory. It was the "superior quality" of the English prism that played a
major role in consensus (270, 94). Taking a different line, Cantor raises the
question of rhetoric surrounding the term experimenrum crucis. Cantor points to
how "philosophers of science now generally downplay the significance of" crucial
experiments, "partly because they fail to recognize them as rhetorical, dramatic
devices" (150, 176). Novalis's notion of experiment refers to another aspect
commonly overlooked by philosophers of science, for he is not essentially
concerned with the rhetorical appeal of experiments, but with the essential role of
experiment in knowledge formation, and with the need for a tight link between
experience and theory. If one wished to interpret Novalis's view of "experiment"
in terms of rhetoric, then it cannot be in the plain sense of "argumentative value",
whether linguistic or visual; instead, the interpretation should be undertaken in the
broader terms of aesthetics and the practical appraisal of knowledge. As argued in
the introduction, the early Romantics emphasize the notion of experience to argue
for the phenomenal, the natural and the practical aspects of knowledge. The role of
experiment in early Romantic styles of inquiry is part of a total approach to
inquiry. Novalis's stance here can be seen as a point of reflection on the nature of
experiment, positioned between its Baconian meaning as "crucial instances", the
Newtonian notion of experimenrum crucis, and, for example, the abundant use of
the term experimentwn crucis "during the optical revolution of the early nineteenth
century" (150, 176).
Novalis's notion of experiment is bound up with the themes revolving around the
Baconian notion of induction. An overview of the context of Bacon's and Newton's
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thoughts will elucidate this. Newton himself saw his &xperimentum crucis as being
firmly placed in the Baconianism of the Royal Society, and the history of the
notion experimentum crucis readily supports this. However, as much Newton may
have wished to give the impression that his theories themselves were the correct
ones, and this was in fact how they also came to be understood later, namely as
examples of hypothetico-deductivism, i.e. his "experiment" was proof of his
theory, his own actual method reveals that his experimenrum crucis was the
outcome of careful empirical work, a gradual process of selection that did not
merely directly induce or "deduce" from the phenomena. His actual working-
method cannot be unequivocally identified with his concepts of scientific method.
Newton's adoption of the term experimenrum crucis is part method, part strategy.
Koyré and Lohne have pointed out how Newton's use of this term arose from his
reading of Hooke, who actually coined it (220, 42; 236, 173-4, 179). 3 Hooke first
used it in his Micrographia referring to what "our thrice excellent Verulam calls
Experimenrum Crucis" (53, 54).4 However, Hooke actually arrived at the term by
confusing Bacon's "Experimenta Lucifera" with his "Instantiae Crucis". From the
start, therefore, the concept has the status of a phantom, attached to Bacon's name
in order to lend authority to an argument. Newton himself echoes the original
meaning of the term "Experimenta Lucifera" when remarks on "ye most luciferous
& many times luciferous experiments too in Philosophy" (75, 1, 10). But the
source in Bacon is slightly different. In his Novum Organum, Bacon demands
inquirers "to judge about natural causes by means of crucial instances and
luciferous experiments and not solely by probable reasons" (7, xxxvi).
Subsequently, the epithets became transposed, and the new second term began its
independent existence. Lohne gives two quotations from Bacon which show what
he meant by crucial instances:
For instance, if we are inquiring into the nature of Colours, prisms, crystals, which show colours
not only in themselves but externally on a wall, dew, etc., are Solitary instances ... From which we
easily gather that colour is nothing more than a modification of the image of light received upon the
object, resulting ... from different degrees of incidence (7, XXII);
When in the investigation of any natuie the understanding is so balanced as to be uncertain to which
of two or more natures the cause of the nature in question should be assigned, on account of the
frequent and ordinary concurrence of many natures, instances of the Fingerpost (Ins:antiae Crucis)
show the union of one of these natures with the nature in question to be sure and indissoluble, of the
other to be varied and separable; and thus the question is decided, and the former nature is admitted
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as the cause, while the latter is dismissed and rejected. Such instances afford very great light, and
are of high authority, the course of interpretation sometimes ending in them and being completed
(7, XXXVI).
Bacon's "instances of the Fingerpost" were thus particular cases which decided
between one theory and another; the image of sign-posts at a crossroads seems to
have suggested to Bacon the word "crux" (236, 174). His idea is crucial to modern
methodology. For here, theory is to be decided upon through a particular instance
of experience and not by strict argumentation at a theoretical level. This was the
method which was passed on to Newton, and which Novalis draws on to form part
of his notion of experiential knowledge, and part of what he calls "Experi-
mentalphilosophie" or "thatiger Empirismus". Sepper points to a further aspect of
the experimentwn crucis: the fact that the it was perhaps even more concerned with
refutation than with experimental confirmation. The experimentum crucis can be
used to leave theory open for further inquiry:
By its nature an erperimentum crucis is meant to perform two functions: It should place the
experimenter at the intersection of two or more possible ways of accounting for phenomena, and it
should exclude some of the possibilities from further consideration while perhaps also pointing to
one or more alternatives as the most promising paths. An experiment that fulfills this office must be
designed so that it yields unequivocal information. Even if it does not clearly identify a single path,
it must at least point away from one or several alternatives. The nature of the experimeniwn crucis,
then, is to refute, even more than it is to confirm (276, 134).
Sepper's reading of the experimenrum crucis, as he argues himself, applies to
Goethe's notion of experiment. For in his own work on optics, Goethe was
concerned with the "many-sidedness" of light and not its mathematization in the
Newtonian sense (276, 156). Goethe was concerned with keeping inquiry open and
exhausting as many aspects of the phenomena of light as possible as opposed to
reducing light to Newton's "mathematicophysical certainty" (276, 141). Where
Newton sees light in terms of his mathematical concept of the ray, Goethe wished
to view light in a far more comprehensive way, interpreting light, for example in
terms of a phenomenon with chemical and physical qualities, and also in terms of
physiology and aesthetics. By virtue of his encompassing attitude to light theory,
Goethe is clearly more concerned with refutation in experimentation and seeking
further approaches to the study of light, whereas Newton can be viewed as being
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keen to close the debate on optics as soon as possible, i.e. primarily to confirm his
theory through experimentation (276, 134-156). This aspect of the experimentum
crucis involving refutation also corresponds with Novalis's emphasis on the need to
seek a reliable method of inquiry, which is arguably the key concern of his natural
philosophical writings.
Putting Newton's particular stance to the experimenrum crucis aside, it can be
seen that Novalis dwells upon the Baconian meaning of experiment as a
fundamental recall to experience. The Baconian sense of experiment, and the
subsequent swing in the sciences towards experimental proof, provides a key
starting-point for Novalis's wider view that all knowledge was itself experience and
that any valid knowledge had to be experiential or concrete itself.
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3. "Experiment" as aesthetic and natural philosophical productivity.
Although Novalis may often be appearing to use the term experiment in the sense
of a test, and naturally his interests do lie in inquiring into Nature, 5 his meaning of
the term is not strictly in accordance with the Baconian rigorous interrogation of
nature. Whilst advocating the intervention of experimentation, as will be shown in
the coming chapters, his attitude entailed that Nature should be allowed to speak
herself. By "experiment" he tends to mean an "experiential activity" and not so
much a forcing of Nature to speak; his idea of a scientist as a person who has
"Gefühl" (N, 3, 179) lies far closer, for example, to a figure such as Goethe's
Faust, a figure of the magus tradition deeply at one with Nature, and who disdains
knowledge gained by "torturing" Nature ("Und was sie [Nature] deinem Geist
nicht offenbaren mag, / Das zwingst du ihr nicht ab mit Hebein und mit
Schrauben" (38, 3, 28)).
Within experiential activity, Novalis naturally envisaged a direct confrontation
with Nature in laboratory experimentation, but also, as a necessary part of inquiry
and "experiment", and bound up in the "direct" confrontation, he envisaged what
can be called an "indirect" confrontation with Nature. In the indirect confrontation
Novalis demands that the scientist should sharpen his mental tools, and approach
inquiry with his own "Gefithi" for Nature. As mentioned, Simon Schaffer
underlines precisely this part of Novalis's attitude to scientific inquiry, when
speaking of Novalis's meaning of "Genie" in relation to the era (271, 91). "Genie"
is another term used by Novalis, and is comparable to "GefUhl". In approaching
inquiry with "Genie" or "Geflihi", the scientist approaches Nature with both
analytical and empathetic skills: clearly, for Novalis, "experimentation" with
Nature is more than a "test". The experimenter has above all to have a genuine feel
for, and experience of, Nature ("Der ächte Experimentator mufi em dun/des Gefi4hl
der Narur in sich haben ... Die Natur inspirirt gleichsam den ächten Liebhaber und
offenbart sich urn so vollkommner durch ihn - je harmonischer seine Constitution
mit thr ist" (N, 3, 256)). Importantly, this closer knowledge or commune with
Nature allows, in Novalis's view, a greater precision in dealing with natural
phenomena: it enables the performance of a more comprehensive experimental
method ("vervielfältigen ... vereinfachen ... combiniren"). The closer experience
of natural phenomena also assists in the presentation and explanation of Nature. It
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helps to order experimental observation ("Auswahl und Anordung"), and allows
for a broader and more versatile presentation of Nature ("artistische, sowohi
zusammengefafite, als ausfiihrliche Beschreibung") (N, 3, 256). As already
discussed, Goethe and Ritter were exemplary for this experimental approach for
Novalis, both in their experimental method and in their presentation of their
findings.
Thus, too, when in the following remark Novalis refers to the Baconian method,
he emphasizes how the knowledge gaining process in experimentation has to pass
through man's "Organ", i.e. man's critical and moral tools:
Die vollendele Speculation fldzn' zur Nazur zurück.
Das ganze Geheimnifi des Philosophirens iiegt in der generalisirten Baconischen Sentenz -
Philos[ophia] abducit el reducit - die Abduktion ist der Reduktion wegen. Die Natur ist aber weit
mehr, wenn sie durch das PhiI[osophische] Organ gegangen ist (N, 3, 402).
Although Novalis is clearly asserting the importance of the Baconian return to
experience, and a careful process of inductive exclusion and rejection, he is, at the
same time, underlining how the very process of gaining knowledge in
experimentation is itself "experimental". As Novalis then continues, since, in his
view knowledge is a phenomenon itself, it also has to be treated as any other
phenomenon in Nature, and has to undergo experimentation:
Philosophism ist em höheres Analogon des Organism. Der Organ[ism] wird durch den
Philosophism complettirt und umg[ekehrtl (N, 3, 402).
As the term "Organism" implies, the process of gaining knowledge is itself part of
the greater organism of Nature; philosophy is an analogical entity of the natural
world itself, and as such Nature can be "completed" by philosophy, and, vice-
versa, philosophy by Nature. Moreover, philosophy aims not just to test Nature,
hut also to test itself, and also, as the remark on "Genie" shows, philosophy was
not only to test, but also to conduct inquiry into Nature with a feeling and
understanding for her.
The following remark made by Novalis on Fichte's method of philosophy further
reveals how Novalis held the process of gaining knowledge to be an essential part
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of a broader view of experimentation. Indeed, Fichte's notion of experimentation
in the working method of his philosophy is, along with the Baconian notion of
experimentation, another key starting-point for Novalis's concept of inquiry.
Novalis's following remark on Fichte's working method shows how, since
knowledge is part of experience itself, it has to be permanently tested in a process
that mediates between making statements on Nature and the phenomena
themselves. Again, the very experiential nature of gaining knowledge itself is
brought to the forefront:
Alles kann zum Experiment - alles zum Organ werden. Achte Erfahrung entsteht aus ãchten
Expeiimenten. (Versuche sind Experimente.) Fichte Iehrt das Geheimnifi des Experimentirens - er
lehrt Thatsachen und Thathandlungen, oder wirckliche Sachen und Handl[ungen] - in Experimente
und Begriffe verwandlen. Sachen in entgegenges[etzte] Handl[ungen], in Begriffe - Handl[ungenj in
entg[egengesetztel Sachen - auch in Begriffe. Diese Begriffe hangen zusarnmen - die Handl[ungen]
und Sachen hangen zusammen - und alle 4 hangen gleichzeitig zusanunen (N, 3, 391).
The highly psychological Fichtian approach to arguing with and working with
concepts appealed to Novalis for its highlighting of the activity ("Handlung") of
the knowledge gaining process. A genuine experiential approach to knowledge, as
Novalis perceived in Fichte's method, provides a fuller and more comprehensive
account of the matter under investigation ("Achte Erfahrung entsteht aus ächten
Experimenten"). Here also, in Novalis's account of the Fichtian philosophical
method, the "test" is not only carried out on external phenomena, but on
knowledge itself, knowledge as an activity tested; this allows for greater
methodological complexity: concepts for processes and objects, and the processes
and objects themselves, are all viewed in their interaction with one another ("alle 4
hängen gleichzeitig zusammen").
It should be made clear that Fichte himself does not concern himself with the
sciences, and intentionally remained in the realm of the philosophy. This explains
those remarks of Novalis's where he distances himself from Fichte, for Novalis
was seeking a less strictly philosophical methodology that would cover his
scientific-empirical interests as well. Yet, none the less, in the following remark of
Fichte's in his Wissenschafislehre, his view of "experiment" and his dismissal of
formal thought (which he likens to "em todter Begriff") is, clearly, in its
rudiments, similar to Novalis's stance to knowledge:
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Ganz anders verhãlt es sich mit der WissenschaftsLehre. Dasjenige, was sie zum Gegenstande ihres
Denkens macht, ist nicht em todter Begnff, der sich gegen ihre Untersuchung nur leidend verhalte,
und aus weichem sie erst durch ihr Denken etwas mache, sondern es ist em Lebendiges und
Thätiges, das aus sich selbst und durch sich selbst Erkenntnisse erzeugt, und weichem der Philosoph
bloB zusieht. Scm Geschäft in der Sache ist nichts weiter, als daB er jenes Lebendige in
zweckmaBige Thätigkeit versetze, dieser Thatigkeit desselben zusehe, sie auffasse, und als Ens
begreife. Er steilt em Experiment an. [!] Das zu untersuchende in die Lage zu versetzen, in des
bestimmt diejenige Beobachtung gemacht werden kann, weiche beabsichtiget wird, ist seine Sache,
es ist seine Sache, auf die Erscheinungen aufzumerken, sic richtig zu verfolgen, und zu verknüpfen,
aber wie das Object sich äuBere, ist nicht seine Sache, sondern die des Objects selbst, und er würde
seinem eigenen Zwecke gerade entgegen arbeiten, wenn Cr dasselbe nicht sich selbst überlieBe,
sondern in die Entwickelung der Erscheinung Eingriffe thäte. Der Philosoph von der ersten Gattung
hingegen [i.e. those who see the processes of knowledge as dead conceplsj verfertigt em
KunstProdukt. Er rechnet im Objecte seiner Bearbeitung nur auf die Matene, nicht auf eine innere
selbstthatige Kraft desselben. Ehe er an die Arbeit geht, muB diese innere Kraft schon getodtet seyn,
auBerdem wUrde sie seiner Bearbeitung widerstehen. Aus dieser todten Masse verfertigt er Etwas
lediglich durch seine eigene Kraft, und bloB nach seinein eigenen schon vorher entworfenen Begnffe
(28, 1, 4, 209-210).
Fichte's own use of the term "experiment" primarily underlines the need to view
the observed as an activity itself, and to see thought as an activity, and, further,
actively to conceive both processes as "Ems". As later with Novalis, philosophy
and the objects of investigation are united in the act of the "experimentation" itself,
although it is clear that Novalis adds an organic dimension, which is not present in
Fichte's approach ("Alles kann zum Experiment - alles zum Organ werden" (N, 3,
391); "Der Organ[isml wird durch den Philosophism complettirt und umg[ekehrt]"
(N, 3, 403)).
Importantly, however, Fichte views the object under investigation as an activity
or entity itself which cannot merely be compelled to give the answers the inquirer
wishes, and in fact, "er wUrde seinem eigenen Zwecke gerade entgegen arbeiten,
wenn er dasselbe [the object] nicht sich selbst Uberliefie". This is remarkably
similar to an inductivist's argument against a hypothetico-deductivist, for the
inductivist would also say that the inquirer should not merely test his theory out on
phenomena ("bloB nach seinem eigenen schon vorher entworfenen Begriffe"), but
instead observe what the phenomena express. Thus, Fichte's notion of
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"experiment" which disparages both "dead" concepts and the notion of treating
phenomena as if they were simply "dead" concepts, could be said to anticipate
Novalis's view of the scientist's role in inquiry.
As has been discussed, Novalis's notion of "experiment" is not solely based on
the particular sense of the term in the Baconian empirical tradition: it will now be
shown that Novalis's use of the term entails a return to the original and ancient
meaning of "experiment". It also relies much on some aspects of Neoplatonic
thought. Importantly, the original meaning of "experiment", and Novalis's
knowledge of Neoplatonic thought, add a further dimension to Novalis's notions of
"Gellihi" or "Genie".
The traditional view of the Baconian meaning of empiricism, that of testing
through "instances" and the return to experience in opposition to formal thought,
overshadows the original meaning of "experiment", which always stressed
experiential activity. The etymology of "experiment" goes back to the Romans, to
the law courts and, indeed, to the arts in general. Frances Yates, when discussing
the memory notions of the ancients, cites Quintilian, who observes that memory,
like all arts, stems from "experiment". Quintilian's meaning of "experiment" is
clearly that of a concrete form of knowledge, for he is referring to the use of
images in the mind in the art of memory. The "experiment" itself is thus,
importantly, a conscious recall to experience, and the arts use the method of
"experiment" to carry out their business. Quintilian is here speaking of Simonides,
the renowned inventor of the art of memory:6
This achievement of Simonides appears to have given rise to the observation that it is an assistance
to the memory if places are stamped upon the mind, which anyone can believe from experiment
[idque crede: suo quisque experimenso]. For when we return to a place after a considerable absence,
we not merely recognize the place itself, but remember things that we did there, and recall the
persons whom we met and even the unuttered thoughts which passed through our minds when we
were there before. Thus, as in most cases, art originates from experiment [Nata esi igilur. Ut in
plerisque, ars ab experimento] (88, 2, 645 (11, 2, 17); 299, 22).
It is clear here that "experiment" involves re-experiencing past experience, and
putting the past experience into practice. Furthermore, it seems to be an activity
involving the whole person, taking in memory, observation, mental acts and
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judgement. The ability to picture an event in the mind is a crucial part of this sense
of "experiment". Moreover, in the Roman law courts, for instance, an
"experimentum" was an attempt to make the jury think back to some past
experience of their own which had similarities to the case at hand in the court.
"Experiment" is, then, in this original sense, a conscious recall of experience;
furthermore, it is similar in its rudiments to what one would now call "generative
induction", a process of knowledge-gaining that builds on previous knowledge to
construct new knowledge. The importance of this whole process for the
development of science is now being recognized. Thus, to take one example,
Nickles, a main campaigner for the concept of generative justification, in his essay
'Justification and experiment', explains the process of generative induction and its
importance for the history of the sciences. He argues for the importance of
practical knowledge and "know-how" in the making of claims about nature (248).
Although Nickles does not deal with the etymology of "experiment", his own
views on experimentation and its broad meaning go back to this original meaning
of "experiment", which is quite the opposite of any hypothetico-deductive notion
of experimentation or discovery. Nickles's idea of "know-how" can be compared
to the ancients' use of previous experience, and concrete images, which are then
employed in an art. "Know-how" refers to non-verbal forms of knowledge and
extensions of verbal knowledge, which accords with the meaning of "experiment"
for the ancients, since the arts were not conceptual, rather they were concrete,
practical knowledge.
Novalis, in line with his natural philosophical interests, has a particularly organic
view of the notions of "know-how" and experiential knowledge. He views
experimentation and inquiry as a continual process and as part of life and
organization itself. When Novalis speaks of philosophy and the organism mutually
fulfilling one another ("Philosophism ist em höheres Analogon des Organism") he
sees them both as analogical and reciprocating entities. He thus continues to
remark, underlining the essential "process" of knowledge:
Wer weis, was philosophiren ist, weis auch was Leben ist - und uzngek[ehrtj (N, 3, 403).
His envisaged notion of inquiry, in its practice-orientation, is moreover highly
piecemeal; he sees inquiry as a process "Schritt vor Schritt entwickelnd" (N, 3,
600). This same process of "limited" steps he sees, too, in Nature herself; Novalis
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draws similarities between structures and processes in Nature and man; both, in his
view, operate in accordance with the same fundamental experiential processes:
Die Natur ist eine Kirche unendlicher Naturen. Ailes ist beschrankt, auch des Menschen
Wissenschaft soil nach Zeit, und Ort etc. bestimmt seyn (N, 3, 600).
Nature is composed of endless, but distinct, entities. In this sense inquiry,
experimentation and philosophy, as a process of successive steps, are indeed the
key to life, and vice-versa, "Leben" and our awareness of the need for strictly
practice-oriented forms of knowing are the key to philosophy. In this way
knowledge is part of the greater organized process of Nature. Nature is, too, as an
endless organization, a creative, "experimental" process. In the first lines of Die
Lehrlinge zu SQIS Novalis speaks of Nature as a "knowing" organized process, a
process which man's activities are part of:
Mannichfache Wege gehen die Menschen. Wer sie verfolgt und vergleicht, wird wunderliche
Figuren entstehen sehn; Figuren, die zu jener grofien Chiffernschrift zu gehoren scheinen, die man
überall, auf Fiugein, Eierschalen, in Wolken, im Schnee, in Krystallen und in Steinbildungen
erblickt (N, 1, 79).
In the "Chiffernschrift" of objects, processes and activities, Nature is equated with
an "experiential", active notion of knowledge, since, in her various forms, Nature
is revealing her organization.
Moving away from what one would consider to be the usual "scientific" realms of
"experiment", i.e. the analysis and observation of phenomena, and continuing the
line from Quintilian, it is to an "experimentation" of the imagination that Novalis
often refers. A variety of views concerning the genre or rhetoric of experiment
within the context of natural philosophy have been discussed. As remarked,
Gooding's work (176) on Faraday's use of diagrams as non-verbal concepts comes
close to Novalis's view of "experiments" in the imagination. Toulmin's notion of
practical knowledge is of great relevance since he stresses the epistemology of
experiential knowledge. Toulmin's work can also be applied to make the important
distinction between the more formal-conceptual "thought experiments" of
physicists and Novalis's stress on the experiential in "experiment", a notion
illustrated in Toulmin's term of the paradigmatic type. This is a key difference and
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one overlooked, for example, by Moser in a recent article (245). Moser's article
on the history of "Gedankenexperiment" and the link between the fictive
experiments of literature and scientific experiments is both useful and illuminating.
None the less, Moser fails to treat the epistemological factors of experiment and
does not make reference to experiential knowledge. In so doing, Moser makes the
differences between science and literature more apparent than they are by not doing
justice to practical knowledge, which tends to point more to reality and experience
than fiction or hypothesis. 7 What Novalis means by "experiments in the
imagination" refers essentially to aesthetic productivity and its role in natural
philosophical productivity itself. While Novalis does refer to the theatrical-
rhetorical aspect of laboratory experiments, he would view this as part of his
greater notion of the aesthetics of "experimentation" in the sciences and in
philosophy. The latter, due to Novalis's concern for practical knowledge, is bound
up in his interest in the epistemology of "experiment".
Novalis's notion of "experiment" is not restricted to individual actions, but to a
particular kind of "experimental philosophy". Any thorough discussion of the term
"experiment" must account for the whole process of experimentation, that is, all
the possible influences on the experimental process itself. For Novalis this means
we perceive and interact with the world around ourselves, and a major part of
man's interaction with Nature in the process of inquiry for Novalis are the use of
concrete notions and symbols. In his view not only are thought and external
phenomena linked in the sense that they are both organizations, they are also bound
together in their symbolization of one another:
Der Organ[ismj wird durch den Philosophism complettirt mid umg[ekehrtj. Beyde Symbolisiren
sich einander (N, 3, 403).
For Novalis, at the level of perception, a phenomenon can be elevated to a symbol,
just as a particularly pregnant notion can be symbolic of a phenomenon or set of
phenomena.
The sciences, and their object of investigation, the physical world, provided
Novalis with the other half of his philosophy , which was not present in his earlier
studies before his time at Freiberg. The study of matter makes the reciprocal
symbolization of thought and external phenomena more fully possible. When
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Novalis speaks of an "Experimentaiphysik des Geistes" (N, 3, 387) he is referring
to notions in the imagination which reciprocate symbolically with external
phenomena. For the "Experimentaiphysik" of the imagination would be "eine
Algeber der Physik und Technologie" (N, 3, 387). To Novalis then, the notions of
the imagination are symbolic formulas which mediate between theory and
phenomena.
This other meaning Novalis attaches to "experimentation", distinct from the
common meaning of "experimentation" oriented around the values of a
hypothetico-deductive stance to inquiry, lies fully in the tradition of Neoplatonism
and the use of symbols of the imagination as part of a method for gaining
knowledge. In fact, this sensual-imaginative tradition also fmds an ardent adherent
in Bacon, for this is an important side to his notion of knowledge; according to
Frances Yates, it is his "most notable contribution to science", as she argues when
speaking of his style:
And the intensive concentration on images in the literary style is related to that search for "real
characters", for a notation which should make direct contact with reality, which was perhaps
Bacon's most notable contribution to science, leading, as it did, to the search for universal
languages, and thence, eventually, to Leibniz (3(X), 69).
Yates comments further, when speaking of Bacon's use of myth to come closer to
reality than discursive reasoning:
This again ties up with Bacon's advocacy of "real characters", the use of signs having a direct
contact with reality, which he regards as one of the basic necessities for the advancement of science.
This idea has an obvious connection with magic signs, but, again, Bacon's treament of it is detached
and rational.
This brings us to Bacon's belief in the importance of the art of memory - a reformed art of memory,
not used with pretentiousness and pride (perhaps he was thinking of Bruno's and Fludd's magic arts
of memory), but humbly, as an instrument of scientific classification and method ... It may be that
it is on these lines - in the search for a "real" notation, for a universal language using "real
characters", and for a method incorporating Lullism, Ramism, and the art of memory - that Bacon's
greatest importance will be seen to lie in the scholarship of the future, as it traces these strands from
the Renaissance to Leibniz ... On the problem of the mental image and changing attitudes to it - an
absolutely central one for the history of our civilization - Bacon again stands between two worlds.
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On the one hand he knows, still at first hand to speak, of the Renaissance imaginative magic; on the
other he begins to detach himself from it. When events like these, occurring within the psyche, are
better understood, we may come at last to a better understanding of the great turning points in
history, such as the modulation of Renaissance into seventeenth century (3(X), 6566).8
Novalis was aware of this side of Bacon's thought, and refers to the concrete
notation that Bacon was seeking for the furtherance of inquiry as "die indirecte
Erfindungskunst" (N, 3, 128). Novalis thereby links this part of Bacon's thought to
his own notion of discovery and his notion of the use of symbols in inquiry (see
also below, chapter 2, section 1.4).
Moreover, the Baconian inductive method itself, in the way it moves towards
greater generalizations, is also to an extent symbolic, since the generalizations are
symbolic of many phenomena. They may have been gained inductively, but as
generalizations they are symbolic idealizations of phenomena.
The inner logic of the mind and its symbolic notation as espoused, for example,
in Bruno's method or the making of Leibnitz's calculus has, naturally, considerable
relevance to scientific method itself. Had Novalis known of Bruno's endless
systemizing and combinations of his wheels he would surely have called him an
"experimenter" of the highest order. Novalis does indeed think very highly of what
he refers to as Leibnitz's "herrlicher Versuch" at the "heiligen Weg zur Physik"
(N, 3, 469), undoubtedly a reference to Leibnitz's vast "Combinatorik"
programme, where a universal notation was sought. The importance of this whole
tradition, as it leads to Leibnitz, for Novalis, further emerges when Yates cites
Couturat on the significance of Leibnitz's concrete notation for the sciences:
"And indeed", says Couturat, "there is no doubt that his [Leibnizj most famous invention, that of
the infinitesimal calculus, arose from his continual search for new and more general symbolisms,
and that, inversely, this invention confirmed him in his opinion of the capital importance for the
deductive sciences of a good characteristic." Leibniz's profound originality, continues Couturat,
consisted in representing by appropriate signs, notions and operations for which no notation had
hitherto existed. In short, it was through his invention of new "characters" that he was able to
operate the infinitesimal calculus, which was but a fragment, or a specimen, of the never completed
"universal characteristic" (299, 384; 157, 84, 85).
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This whole tradition of "experimentation" with signs or images in the imagination
is, too, in other Neoplatonic forms, directly bound up with empirical
experimentation in the laboratory; it can be seen, for example, in the use of
symbols to assist alchemical inquiry; and these notions survived into Novalis's
time, as can be seen by the development of alchemical signs into chemical affinity
tables.9
Novalis's own notion of "die Experimentalmethode" (N, 3, 123) refers to the
employment of a concrete a priori form of knowing and is applicable as a general
method of inquiry. One can rightly use the term "concrete a priori" since Novalis
is well versed in the language of German Idealists, and is well aware of the
difference between, for example, a Kantian synthetic a priori judgement and a
Cartesian analytical concept. In particular, Novalis's intellectual development
shows an attempt at unifying the German Idealism of Kant and Fichte with a
broader concept of knowledge that has Neoplatonic orientations. In Hemsterhuis
and Plotinos Novalis found the notion of "Sympathie", and in Hemsterhuis, too,
the idea of a "Combinatorik". It was on this Neoplatonic idea of "Sympathie" that
Novalis to a some extent based his own method involving the concrete notation of
the imagination. When Novalis speaks of "Geflihi" or "Genie" he is referring to
the power of "Sympathie" in man, and man's innate ideas, and the employment of
concrete notation as part of a working method of inquiry, a type of concrete
"Calciil". Through "Sympathie" a bond was formed between the observer and
external phenomena, literally, in Novalis's view, allowing the inquirer to work in
"sympathy" with Nature.'°
This shift in Novalis's development is of interest for a model of scientific inquiry
itself, for the use of a concrete a priori assists in building a model for inquiry that
can take account of how theory is developed. For Novalis's adaption of Kant and
Fichte to the thoughts of Hemsterhuis and Plotinos brought about his notions of
scientific and natural philosophical productivity. Fichte did not treat the sciences in
any detail, and Kant was not prepared to stretch his own views of aesthetics so
categorically as Novalis does to scientific and natural philosophical productivity. In
the light of Novalis's view of the role of aesthetics in inquiry, the scientific
"experiment" itself gains a particular status: firstly, as a showpiece of theory; and
secondly, as the very concrete link between man's thoughts and the phenomena.
The "experiment" (as also for Goethe in his Der Versuch als Vermittler zwisc/zen
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Objekt und Subjeki (41)) effects the relationship between subject and object: thus
the "experiment" itself is a form of concrete knowledge. Here, for Novalis,
aesthetics and science meet in natural philosophical productivity. Regarding
scientific procedure, Novalis's use of the term "experiment" implies a process of
"ideal" induction where knowledge is accumulated from what we know already as
experience, both in a strictly empirical sense of practical "know-how", and in the
extended sense of our innate ideas of Nature. In this way, the subject is employed
in inquiry to mediate between phenomena and theory in the act of experimentation.
(Historians of science such as Gooding or Nickles would refer to "know-how" in
its broader sense as all non-verbal forms of knowledge (176, 192; 248, 329).)
Further what makes the term "experiment" so useful, and not only with regard
strictly to science, is that it is a constant reminder of the very nature of inquiry and
knowledge; to Novalis, it underlines his belief that knowledge is a process and a
phenomenon itself, for the "experiment" is an event or activity. In this manner, the
"experiment" is a constant symbol of what knowledge is and how it is created, the
"experiment" itself draws conceptual views of knowledge, formal theory and
indeed speculation back into experience itself. Thus one can say that Novalis's idea
of "experimental" knowledge is not only a experiential method for knowledge
formation, but also part of a particular attitude. A famous example of a similar
attitude is Samuel Johnson's refuting of Berkeley's idealism by kicking a stone.
Perhaps for Johnson his action was a call for a return to common sense, but for
Novalis such an instance would also be symptomatic of an attitude that demands
continual mediation between theory and phenomena: knowledge, in Novalis's
view, should always be drawn back into life and experience. With specific
reference to his own views on inquiry Novalis remarks:
Diogenes Gehn - war Erperimeivalphil[osophieJ - achtsynth[etischel Phil[osophiej (N, 3, 439).
This remark refers to the occasion when Diogenes "proved" an opponent's denial
of motion wrong by simply walking (23, 1, 313; 24, 2, 263-4 (6, 39)).!! This
example is, interestingly enough, used by Fichte (for a practical notion of
knowledge, although at a different level to Novalis), and this is undoubtedly
Novalis's source.' 2
 The "steps" taken by Diogenes throw light on several aspects of
Novalis's experimental stance: firstly, on his view of the very nature of an
"experiment", namely that it is an instance of a phenomenal proof or statement on
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Nature, and can be used in inquiry as a point where theories can be decided upon.
The "steps" also demonstrate Novalis's belief that knowledge is, in essence,
experience itself, here simply the "steps" taken by Diogenes. Significantly, Novalis
refers to Diogenes's steps as "achtsynth[etische] Phillosophie]". This is a clear
allusion to, and extension of Kant's notion of knowledge. The "steps" espouse a
notion of the a priori going beyond the Kantian "synthetic a priori judgement" and
refer to natural philosophical productivity and also a broad notion of experiential
"know-how". In the scientific context of the idea of "motion", Novalis refers here
to Diogenes's form of philosophizing as genuine "Expthmentalphilosophie", a
reference to the empirical tradition, for what Diogenes does is to remain close to
the phenomena, and not try in hypothetico-deductive manner to prove a theory.
Diogenes's walking is indeed the epitome of Novalis's notion of experiential
knowledge, for the "steps" can be seen as the realization of an innate idea, and the
"steps" were the visible employment of "know-how". For Diogenes instinctively
must have felt that the idea that motion did not exist was wrong, and his "know-
how" must have told him that motion was continuous. What Novalis sees as an
"experiment" of the imagination, that is, the bringing forth of an innate idea or the
employment of "know-how", has actually been realized in the steps Diogenes took;
the "proof" of Diogenes's notion of motion was communicated non-verbally as an
activity itself. In his steps, theory and phenomena were succinctly bound together,
his "theory" of continuous motion was thus put to the test, and his "experiment"
was a highly visible showpiece of his "theory". The rhetoric of Diogenes's
"experiment" does not lie alone in its dramatic qualities. Diogenes "experiment" is
also a small scale demonstration of the aesthetic elements in Novalis's notion of
natural philosophical productivity. Diogenes's "know-how" or practical knowledge
are a type of aesthetic knowledge since they are forms of concrete thought. Here
we can also see the relevance of Toulmin's notion of paradigmatic types and his
reference to Aristotle's "phronesis": Diogenes's "steps" are a form of knowing that
links morality, the aesthetics of the imagination, and scientific knowledge. By
taking his steps Diogenes "hits the mark".
It is clear that Novalis's reference to Diogenes's "steps" as genuine "Experi-
mentaiphilosophie" is a major point of reflection. Essentially, Novalis is remarking
that there are many forms of "theorizing", be they aesthetic, moral or scientific. In
his notion of experiential knowledge he is referring to the many and varied forms
of experiential knowledge, the many ways of drawing knowledge back into life and
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experience, and the many forms of "experiment", in all of man's activities. To
conclude, Novalis's notion of "experiment" goes beyond the standard scientific
viewpoint to mean, firstly, the dismissal of hypothetico-deductivism in favour of a
piecemeal ideal induction using concrete notation. This meaning of "experiment" is
essentially concerned with the aesthetics of natural philosophical productivity. The
second strand in Novalis's meaning of "experiment" points to his fundamental
attitude to knowledge: inquiry, "Leben", and Nature as a whole organization, all
operate "experimentally". Knowledge, for Novalis, is always drawn back into
experience. "Experimentiren", to Novalis, is the key to life itself: to both
understanding life, and the key to the processes of life. These two strands in his
notion of "experiment" accord in general with the epistemological and pluralist,
active or passive patterns in his thought.
165
Chapter Two
The emergence of Novalis's notion of "experiment".
1. The "experiment".
1.1. Hemsterhuis: "Sympathie" and "Combinatorik".
1.2. Kant: practical knowledge and philosophy as an "experiment". Nova/is 's shift
to the aesthetics of scient/ic productivity as natural philosophical productivity.
1.3. Herder's Plastik and the aesthetics of knowledge formation.
1.4. Goethe 's "activer Empirismus". Aesthetics of "experiment" and "Formel".
1.5. Schelling: natural philosophical productivity.
1.6. Ficlue 's "Thathandlung" and Nova/is 's shy? to transrefiexivizy.
1.7. Plotinos: "thatiger Empirismus" and pantheistic transrefiexivity.
1.8. "Plotins Physik" and "phenomenal" calculus.
1.9. Condorcet 's general "Kalkul".
1.10. Socrates: social and practical knowledge.
1.11. Summary of Nova/is's notion of "experiment".
2. The experimenter.
2.1. Novalis 's extension of the excitability debate to knowledge forinati on: a note
on Ficlue.
2.2. "Sensibilität" and the constitution.
2.3. "Freyes Nachdenken ". generating knowledge within the bounds of the
constitution.
2.4. Werner's encyclopaedic methodology: the constitutive rules of general and
persona/inquiry.
2.5. "Freyes Nachdenken" in practice: mechanics, excitability and Ritter.
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1. The "experiment".
1.1. Hemsrerhuis: Sympathie and Conthinatorik.
Having provided some introduction to what "experiment" and experimental
philosophy meant to Novalis it is now time to study his reaction to other thinkers in
his works. Noticeable in Novalis's intellectual development is above all his
understanding of contemporary thought, both in the sense of German Idealism and
contemporary science, and his assimilation of contemporary thought into the
Neoplatonic tradition. This is a clear sign of his highly historical and reflective
approach to knowledge.
A major contemporary influence was Hemsterhuis. As Mähl has shown,
Hemsterhuis provides Novalis with insights into the Neoplatonic tradition,
particularly concerning the notions of the Golden Age and "Sympathie". Mähl
writes on Novalis's interest in the Dutch philosopher:
Was jim [Novalis] vor allem anzog, war wohi die Idee der Liebe, wie sie bei Hemsterhuis, in der
ihm eigentUmlichen Verbindung neuplatoniseher Gedankengänge mit den Erkenntnissen der
modernen Naturwissenschaft, zur metaphysischen Weltmacht erhoben worden war (331, 267).
Hemsterhuis himself remarked:
Ce principe que vous sentez si bien, mon cher Aristée, cet amour, cette pente vers une union
d'essence avec des êtres ou des choses quelconques, est une facu1t qui lie en quelque facon les êtres
ensemble, et qui agit en raison de I'homogéneité (50, 2, 58).
Love and, as it is otherwise known, "Sympathie", was further a universal law to
Hemsterhuis; he conceived of this ancient force in a modern way, by analogy with
the law of attraction operating in matter, namely as a specific power, God-given,
and inherent in human "essence":
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[...] une Ioi qui derive de notre essence, que Dieu a donnee aux êtres libres et actifs, pour s'aimer,
pour s'unir ensemble; comme ii a donné a Ia matière Ia loi d'intertie ou d'attraciion, d'oü derive Ia
reaction contre toute action contraire a cette loi [... 1 (50, 2, 98).
Hemsterhuis's formulation of the idea of "Sympathie" was particularly appropriate
for Novalis. For here was a law that most ideally drew Novalis's scientific and
spiritual interests together, since essentially the same force was at work in man and
in Nature. A further aspect of Hemsterhuis 'S concept of "Sympathie" was also
crucial for Novalis. This was Hemsterhuis's notion of man's "moral organ", which
operates in accordance with the universal "sympathy". The force within all being
cannot, in Hemsterhuis's view, be apprehended directly by the senses, but only by
this human ("moral") organ:
[...J cet organe, qui est tourné vers les choses divines, comme l'oeil est tourné vers Ia lumière (50,
2, 100).
This concept became a standard part of Novalis's conceptual framework, and is
often mentioned in his writings.' In contrast to the sense-organs, the path to
knowledge through this organ was inwards:
fl faut entrer dans nous-mémes (50, 2, 95).
There is an obvious echo of this idea in Novalis's famous fragment in BlUtenstaub,
"Nach Innen geht der geheimni8volle Weg" (N, 2, 419). Closely connected to this
concept is Hemsterhuis's ranking of poetry as the highest form of knowledge,
another element attractive to Novalis; for Hemsterhuis, the workings of the "moral
organ" were most apparent in the creative imagination. Here lies the root of
Novalis's notions that knowledge has to be "poeticized" or "romanticized", and
indeed his notion of "Genie" has its roots here as well, as Mähl argues (N, 2, 315-
316).
Most important for Novalis's knowledge programme is the "sympathy" between
man's ideas and natural phenomena as expounded in Hemsterhuis's work Lertre sur
I 'homme er ses rapporrs. Here Hemsterhuis explicitly refers to the possibility of
overcoming the split of mind and matter:
168
Si I'homme avoit les idées de tous les rapports, et de toutes les combinaisons de ces objets, ii
ressembleroit a Dieu, pour ce qui regarde Ia science, et pour cc qui regarde I'état de I'univers,
autant que nous le connoissons, et sa science seroit parfaite (50, 1, 228).
Here one may find one source for the beginnings of Novalis's notion of a
"Combinatorik". During his scientific studies at Freiberg, Novalis then develops a
progressive method of inquiry based on this very "sympathy" between ideas and
phenomena. Novalis wrote down in response to Hemsterhuis:
Die Wissenschaften sind nur aus Mange! an Genie und Scharfsinn getrennt - die Verhältnisse
zwischen ihnen sind dem Verstand und Stumpfsinn zu verwickelt und entfemt von einander.
Die gröBesten Wahrheiten unsrer Tage verdanken wir soichen Combinationen der Lange getrennten
G!ieder der Totalwissenschaft (N, 2, 368).
The many "separate" forms of knowledge are to be reunited through the use of the
innate ideas of the genius or poet, operating by "Sympathie". It is important to
understand that the "Combinatorik" does not just mean a comparison of the
disciplines or various types of knowledge; "Combinatorik" primarily means, as in
the rudiments of calculus, its mathematical form, the use of symbols and notation
that correspond to phenomena, or, as Hemsterhuis puts it, "les rapports". This
remark of 1797 was clearly of such importance that Novalis inserted it into Das
aligemeine Brouillon in 1798, along with other remarks on Hemsterhuis (N, 3,
275). What Novalis sketches in 1797 after reading Hemsterhuis is developed later
in his notion of scientific and natural philosophical productivity, where concrete
notions, models and idealizations are used to discuss the sciences and discovery
processes themselves.
Novalis's references to the Golden Age also seem inspired by Hemsterhuis, who
speaks of a past and the possibility of a new Golden Age through the power of love
or "Sympathie" in man, as Mähl has shown (331, 272). This idea adds an
important dimension to Novalis's notion of inquiry, too, and covers him again
against those who are too quick to interpret his ideas of knowledge absolutely, as
being purely idealistic. For the final goal of Novalis's inquiry was indeed the
Golden Age of total "Sympathie", when knowledge would be all experience, when
man would be in perfect accordance with Nature; but inquiry to Novalis was
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always seen in the light of the Golden Age, as something as yet unobtained, but
which inquiry had the potential to move gradually towards.2
Critics have pointed out how Novalis's views do, however, conflict with
Hemsterhuis's determinism, for Novalis, unlike Hemsterhuis, did not see man's
role in the universe as passive, although as discussed there are passive elements in
his thought. However, Novalis, in keeping with his notion of progressive inquiry
and the "experiment" of life itself, believed that man had the potential to change
Nature (339, 81; 331, 269-270).
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1.2. Kant: practical knowledge and philosophy as an experiment". Novalis 's shift
to the aesthetics of scientific productivity as natural philosophical productivity.
Hemsterhuis was, then, the person who upheld that man could gain knowledge
innately from within, and is a major marking post for Novalis's development.
Indeed, as Mähl argues, Hemsterhuis was for Novalis the prophet of the coming
German Idealism, which then came into existence in the figure of Kant, and was
completed and expanded by Fichte (N, 2, 335). This is an important point to bear
in mind when considering Novalis's development, for Novalis, although steeped in
the German Idealism of Kant and Fichte and their terminology, works extensively
to assimilate this modern form of Idealism with Neoplatonic viewpoints.
It would seem appropriate to discuss Novalis's relationship to Fichte before
approaching Kant, since this is more the order in which Novalis himself made in-
depth studies of German Idealism. Novalis studied Fichte in 1795 and 1796, came
to Hemsterhuis in 1797, and the studies of Hemsterhuis led him, as mentioned, to
turn to Kant in the same year. These Kant-Studien are an important point of
reflection in Novalis's intellectual development. Mali! comments on the chronology
and development of Novalis's interests:
Dennoch hat bei Hardenbergs Kant-Studien offenbar em besonderer Anlafi mitgewirkt. Die
BeschAftigung mit Hemsterhuis haue jim in der Uberzeugung eines von Fichte unabhangigen
Standpunktes bestãrkt. Eben dieser Augenblick mufite ihm, der zwischen Fichte und Hemsterhuis
seine eigene Position zu ergrunden hãtte einen emeuten Ruckgang auf Kants "Kritik der reinen
Vernunft" reizvoll erscheinen lassen - einen RUckgang auf den Boden und Ursprung der
Transzendentalphilosophie, von dem aus Hemsterhuis als "Prophet des transcendentalen Idealismus"
und Fichte als sein kUhnster und einseitiger Vollender begriffen werden, zugleich aber auch der
eigene Ansatz selbststandig weiter verfolgt werden konnte (N, 2, 335).
Elsewhere Mähl further shows that Novalis's renewed interest in Kant lay
specifically in his interest in fmding links between Kant's "theoretischen" and
"praktischen Vernunft". Novalis found the link in "Poesie" - in the imagination -
and Mähl views these reflections in the Kant-Studien as the "Geburtstunde des
Romantikers Novalis" (329, 68).
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One can also say that the reason for Novalis's renewed interest in Kant lay in his
urgent need to find out how Kant linked philosophy to natural philosophy. 3 Of
course, the dynamism of Kant's own natural philosophy would have attracted
Novalis, but Novalis was essentially searching for something else: what I would
call his own notion of natural philosophical productivity. The latter ought,
arguably, also to be understood as Novalis's poetics; and these need to be seen, for
their part, in terms of his overall project to link man's consciousness with Nature's
purposiveness. This search had been stimulated in the broad terms of
Hemsterhuis's ideas - which can themselves be interpreted as a type of a natural
philosophy. Ironically, but also understandably enough, Novalis found answers to
his questions not in Kant's Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der Naturwissenschaft,
but instead, as has been seen, in Kant's critical works. In the Kritik der reinen
Vernunfi Kant speaks of his undertaking as an "experiment" and Novalis jots down
"Expenmentalmethode der reinen Vernunft" (N, 2, 386). This idea of conducting
an "experiment" on the object of knowledge and of treating knowledge as an
activity causes Novalis to remark further:
Wir erkennen es nur, insofern wir es realisiren (N, 2, 386).
This experiential approach to philosophizing causes Novalis to reflect upon
philosophical style, and he reacts to Kant's call for a "Wissenschaft" (i.e. a
methodology) for philosophy in the following way:
[.. J philosophiren ist soviel, als wissenschaflen, Gedanken durchdenken, Erkenntnisse erkennen -
die Wissenschaflen wissenschaftlich und poelisch behandein. Soilte practisch und poetisch ems seyn
- und Iezteres nur absolut practisch in specie bedeuten? (N, 2, 390).
For Novalis, philosophy is its own activity, and is both theoretical and poetic at the
same time. Novalis here further poses the fundamental question as to whether
practical philosophy and, indeed, it would appear to be intimated, the sciences, are
not actually a form of aesthetics themselves. In this way, Novalis suggests that
poetry, too, is perhaps but one form of practical philosophy. Here we can see
Novalis circling around the links between theoretical, practical and aesthetic
knowledge. Kant was not willing to apply practical reason to theoretical reason,
but Novalis's comments suggest that he saw just that evinced in the "experiment"
of the Kritik der reinen Vernunfi. We can now see that it was not so much Kant's
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notions of epistemology in his Kririk der reinen Vernufi that effected Novalis, but
his philosophical style itself. As ever, Novalis is concerned with notions of
productivity, and his circulation around the terms "praktisch" and "poetisch" point
further to the fact that he is concerned with the broadest form of productivity, that
of his notion of natural philosophy.
Thus, in the Kant-Studien, it is in terms of Hemsterhuis's "Sympathie", the
universal force of the physical and metaphysical realms, that Novalis asks if there
are forms of experiential knowledge other than those stipulated by Kant in his
notion of theoretical reason. Having questioned Kant's "Begriff von Sinn" and the
meaning of Kant's "inneren" and "äu1eren Sinnlichkeit", Novalis then poses the
question:
Giebt es noch aufiersinnliche ErkenntniB? 1st noch em anderer Weg offen, aus sich selbst
herauszugehn und zu andern Wesen zu gelangen, oder von ihnen afficirt zu werden? (N, 2, 390).
What Kant only allows for aesthetics and morality - attributes which do themselves
admittedly point to the notion of an experiential whole - Novalis wishes to apply to
the sciences. 4 The sort of experiential whole Novalis is referring to is, naturally,
the magic bond between man's inner thoughts and the world outside as entailed by
Hemsterhuis's universal force of "Sympathie". This is a theme which Novalis
incorporates into his thought, and is the key to his notion of "Combinatorik" which
he later develops in 1798, where innate ideas and empirical work are linked in a
single inquiry.
After the Kant-Studien of 1797, Novalis once again returns to Kant in 1798, in
the Freiberger naturwissenscizafihiche Studien, with "experiment" and natural
philosophical productivity in mind. On this occasion, however, Novalis is more
precise in his views and gives clear indications about the aesthetic elements in
scientific productivity when he speaks of "die Beobachtungsmethode" and "die
Experimentalmethode" (N, 3, 123). Before elaborating on these terms, it is
worthwhile discussing some of the issues surrounding philosophy and the sciences
in Die Kririk der reinen Vernunfi, which is the work that Novalis primarily directs
his comments at.
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Kant's reassertion of man's intellectual abilities through the founding of a theory
of knowledge based on the subject in his proof of a priori knowledge would, of
course, have appealed to Novalis's own recourse to the subject and his view that
the key to truth lies within man. Important, too, for Novalis's idea of knowledge
and experience is that Kant constructed a philosophy which steered between
empiricism and Rationalism. Kant castigates the Rationalists for only seeing
knowledge in pure logic or thought, and uncovers the empiricist's fallacy that there
is no knowledge outside of experience.
Kant tackles empiricism and Rationalism from the point of view of objective and
general knowledge, and it is his new concept of what can be considered as
"aligemein und notwendig" that blends the two schools of thought. For Kant,
objective knowledge is not just made up of experience (empiricism), nor does it
only consist of thought (Rationalism). Kant shows that knowledge is comprised of
sensual experience ("die Anschauung") and experience-free concepts (a priori
ideas).5
Within his critical metaphysics Kant searches for all knowledge that is
"transzendental", that is all knowledge which is a prerequisite for our
understanding of the world. In the introduction to Die Krizik der reinen Vernunfi he
calls "alle Erkenntnifi transzendental, die sich nicht sowohi mit Gegenstanden,
sondern mit unserer ErkenntniBart von GegenstAnden, sofem diese a priori moglich
sein soil, Uberhaupt beschaftigt" (62, 3, 43). In his theory of a priori knowledge
Kant seeks to define a deeper, objective layer of inner experience. Höffe explains,
"Untersucht werden die erfahrungsunabhangigen Bedingungen objektiver
Erkenntnis, die in der vor-empirischen Verfassung des Subjekts liegen" (199, 54).
Kant's new form of metaphysics does not serve to increase our knowledge of
metaphysics nor of the sciences, he intends only to add a critical dimension to our
knowledge, although, in doing so, he is necessarily providing the metaphysical
basis of all knowledge. His notion of metaphysics does not mean to further
speculation or the accumulation of knowledge; as he says, it serves "nicht zur
Erweiterung, sondern zur Erläuterung unserer Vernunft" (62, 3, 43). Kant calls his
metaphysics "eine Logik der Wahrheit" (62, 3, 87), and this implies that he is not
searching for the meaning of truth, nor is he assessing which other aspects of
man's knowledge are true, as for example in the sciences. Höffe comments on
Kant's Krink, "Sie sucht weder - semantisch - nach der Bedeutung von "Wahrheit"
174
noch - pragmatisch - nach einem Mafistab, urn entscheiden zu können, weiche
Aussagen(systeme) wahr sind" (199, 68). Kant is, rather, searching for the
conditions of objective statements.
Moreover, looking at Kant's notion of knowledge in more detail and his
demarcation of the rest of knowledge, Kant did not see truly objective knowledge
in general lying in the sciences or in mathematics. He saw this only in the
principles of the a priori as expounded in the "transzendentale Kritik", and these
he understands as "die reinen Anschauungsformen, die reinen Begriffe und
Grundsätze" (199, 69). Kant does not include the individual sciences in his notion
of knowledge, apart from mathematics and physics, because they are not, in his
view, a priori proven, as HOffe endorses, citing Kant, "Zur 'eigentlichen
Wissenschaft' gehort, daB ihre GewiBheit apodiktisch (notwendig) ist; 'Erkenntnifi,
die bbs empirische GewiBheit enthalten kann, ist ein nur uneigentlich so genanntes
Wissen'" (62, 4, 468; 199, 60). To be precise, above all, a priori knowledge must
have synthetic character, and this refers to a form knowledge that is not conceived
by analysis and logic. Analysis operates under semantic rules using the statement
of contradiction in order to form logical laws. Analytical judgements, in Kant's
opinion, only elucidate our knowledge of the subject, and do not add anything new
to the subject:
Z.B.wenn ich sage: alle Körper sind ausgedehnt, so ist dies em analytisch Urtheil. Denn ich darf
nicht uber den Begriff, den ich mit dern Wort Korper verbinde, hinausgehen, urn die Ausdehnung
als mit demselben verknupft zu finden, sondern jenen Begriff nur zergliedern, d.i. des
Mannigfaltigen, weiches ich jederzeit in ihm denke, mir nur bewuBt werden, urn dieses Pradicat
darin anzutreffen; es ist also em analytisches Urtheil (62, 3, 34).
Distinct from analytical judgements, synthetic judgements do increase our
knowledge of the subject, for the predicate brings something new into relation with
the subject:
Dagegen, wenn ich sage: alle Korper sjnd schwer, so ist das Pradicat etwas ganz anderes, als das,
was ich in dem bloBen Begnff eines Körpers uberhaupt denke. Die HinzufUgung eines solchen
Prädicats giebt also em synthetisch Urtheil (62, 3, 34).
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The principles of mathematics, or particularly of geometry, are composed of
synthetic a priori knowledge. In fact Kant sees all mathematical judgements as
"synthetisch" because they operate using synthetic principles as their base, even
though the mathematical method appears to take an analytical form. For the
sciences, and here Kant implies physics, only the principles are considered as
synthetic a priori knowledge, and in Die Kritik der reinen Vernunft he gives
Newton's third Law as an example, "Ich will nur em paar Sätze zum Beispiel
anführen, als den Satz, daB in allen Veranderungen der korperlichen Welt die
Quantität dci Materie unverändert bleibe, oder daB in aller Mittheilung der
Bewegung Wirkung und Gegenwirkung jederzeit einander gleich sein müssen" (62,
3, 38). However, although Kant rated mathematics and physics so highly, in the
sense of his philosophy they do not exemplify the essence of experiential
knowledge. What the sciences were in need of, he thought, was a base for their
objectivity. The "lranszendentale Kritik" is not trying to compete with the sciences
or argue for any particular scientific method: it aims to discover an objective
relationship to possible experience. Since his a priori knowledge relates knowledge
to real objects, in his undertaking Kant has greater interest in objective statements
than in the objects themselves because they lie deeper in experience, and so he
tackles the layer of experience behind the sciences.
Thus, for example, the a priori "Anschauungen" in geometry serve only to assist
in the search but are no basis for an objective knowledge of experience, as Cassirer
confirms: "Indessen bildet auch für die Geometrie, wie man sieht, die
'Anschauung' hier nur ein technisches Hilfsmittel, dessen sic sich bedient, nicht
aber den Rechtsgrund, auf dem ihre Wahrheiten beruhen" (152, 591).
Kant does, naturally, have a special place for mathematics and physics in the
sense that he sees external nature governed by the Newtonian laws, and further,
that he bases the possibility of his transcendental a priori knowledge on the fact
that a priori knowledge was already firmly grounded in mathematics as part of a
long established tradition. However, his final stance to mathematics and physics is
that they form the premises for objectivity, but are not the goal of objectivity.
Transcendental forms of knowledge, as Höffe concludes, "heiBen jene
Voraussetzungen, die weder mathematischen noch physikalischen Charakter haben
und doch immer 'am Werk' sind, wenn wir Mathematik oder Physik betreiben"
(199, 67).
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Turning now to Novalis's comments in 1798 on Kant's epistemology, in the
Marhenarische Studien zu Bossut und Muhrhard in the Freiberger natur-
wissenschafthiche Srudien, Novalis notes down the following from a remark of
Muhrhard's concerning Kant's epistemological differentiation between philosophy
and mathematics:
Kant bestimmt, als wesenzl[ichenJ individ[uellenJ Karacter der math[ematischenj
Methode - daB dEer] Mathem[atiker] nicht discursiv, wie der Phil[osophj - sondern intuitiv verfährt
- nicht aus Begr[jffen] sch!iefit, sondern seine Begr[iffe] construirt - sinnlich darsteilt - abet activ
sinnlich - oder reine Ansch[auungj bildet (N, 3, 122-123).
This comment refers to the synthetic and experiential nature of the mathematical
method. Novalis reacts to the idea by arguing that mathematics is not the only
discipline where such experiential and, in the Kantian sense, synthetic notions are
formed:
Auch hier ist das Verfahren d[es] Mathem[atikersj wie mich dunkt, nicht individuell ... Warum soil
dies der Phil[osoph] nicht auch thun - oder überhaupt jeder einzelne wissenschaftliche Meister - In
alien W[issenschaftenj soil selbstthatig plastisirt werden (N, 3, 123).
Besides extending the entire framework, Novalis importantly introduces a term
which is decidedly non-Kantian, that of "Plastisirung". The concept undoubtedly
comes from his reading of Herder's Plasnk at this time (N, 2, 650; see below). In
this combination of Kantian and Herderian ideas, one sees Novalis's own
"Combinatorik" at work in his absorption of Kant. The remark has significant
consequences. The notion of "Plastisirung" also provides a bridge to Goethe. A
remark of Novalis's from his essay Uber Goethe written at the same time serves to
show that when Novalis was, at this time, thinking of abstracting from phenomena
in the remark on Kant, he probably also had Goethe's (as well as Herder's) notions
of concrete knowledge in mind:
An jhm [Goeihej kann man die Gabe zu abstrahiren in einem neuen Lichte kennen lernen. Er
abstrahirt mit einer seitnen Genauigkeit, aber me ohne das Object zugleich zu construiren, dem die
Abstraction entspricht (N, 2, 641).
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In both the comment on Kant and that on Goethe, Novalis is speaking of concrete
forms of knowledge that imply a much broader notion of scientific productivity
than did Kant. Indeed, this breadth, and the parallel notions of "plastisiren" and
"construiren", actually calls Kant's notion of science into question, for Novalis is
clearly demanding a more encompassing and concrete notion of synthetic
experiential knowledge. Novalis wishes to bring aesthetics into the sciences on a
far broader scale and use aesthetics centrally at a constitutive level, as opposed to
Kant's regulative level. As already mentioned, Kant's notions of aesthetic and
teleological appraisal in his Krink der Urteilskraft do treat the ordering of nature in
terms of perception, the imagination and understanding. This stance has many
affinities with, and is a forerunner of, Romantic natural philosophical endeavours.
Romantics such as Novalis and Schelling were thus both extending Kant's
programme and questioning Kant's strict notion of science. Novalis defines the
boundaries between himself and Kant by calling the use of concrete notions, in
distinction to what Kant refers to as the synthetic knowledge of mathematics, the
"experimental method":
Die Plastisirungsmethode ist die ächte Experimentalmethode (the N, 3, 123).
This remark is of fundamental importance for Novalis, and illustrates his position
vis-à-vis Kant. Indeed, in my view, this remark lies at the heart of Novalis's notion
of natural philosophy. Novalis is saying three things. Firstly he argues that
aesthetics is a part of scientific productivity, as the term "Plastisirung" implies.
Secondly, he is asserting his notion of "experiment". Both elements of Novalis's
idea of "experiment" feature here: "Plastisirung" points to the use of concrete
thought and notation in a process of inquiry based upon ideal induction. This is
Novalis's rhetoric of "experiment" which is concerned with the aesthetics of
natural philosophical productivity. The other element of Novalis's meaning of
"experiment", that inquiry, life and Nature are all "experimental", i.e. that
knowledge is always drawn back into experience, is illustrated here in the fact that
Novalis's wishes all the disciplines to employ aesthetics ("uberhaupt jeder einzelne
wissenschaftliche Meister"). Thirdly, he emphasizes that mathematics, the science
that Kant rated above all, is not the only science which is capable of producing
synthetic a priori knowledge. Indeed, Novalis goes further to suggest that the
mathematical method is, in the sense of a stance to inquiry, more deductive and
conceptual, more akin to the distanced observing of phenomena. Novalis by no
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means negated mathematics, for it, too, at a higher level operated according to
"Sympathie" using concrete notation; it is, rather, that here, when he uses the term
of the "mathematical method", he is referring to the more discursive, conceptual
part of man's thought:
Die Umgekehrte, mathematische Methode bestãnde in Construclion der Anschauungen, im
Gegensatz der Begriffe - ... in Bildung reiner Gedanken - in Fixirung des Anschauens (Sinnens)
durch Gedanken ... Die Begreifungs, oder Erkenntnifimeth[odej ist nichts, als die ãchte
Beobachlungsmeihode (N. 3, 123).
Novalis's notion of a "Beobachtungsmethode" is a process moving from concrete
thought to formal forms of thought. Concrete thought ("Anschauuung") is
converted into "reine Gedanken". This process is more the deductive and analytical
method in distinction to the inductive and synthetic "Experimentalmethode".
Novalis further comments that the "Experimentalmethode" produces "Figuren",
i.e. the symbols of concrete thought, whereas the "Beobachtungsmethode"
produces "Worte", i.e. the more discursive forms of knowing (N, 3, 123).
In these remarks Novalis is clearly alluding to his grander notion of natural
philosophical productivity, for he goes on to speak of the Golden Age to come,
when man will be "plasticizing", that is, making his thoughts real by
"experiment", for then his ideas will be in harmony with Nature, his concrete
notions will be direct correlatives of natural phenomena. Not only will man be
"plasticizing", but also have such a direct contact to phenomena, that he will
directly perceive Nature as a "language", and convert the language of her "figures"
into words:
Das wird die goidne Zeit seyn, wenn alle Worte - Figurenworte - ... und alle Figuren -
Sprachfiguren ... seyn werden - wenn man Figuren sprechen und schreiben - und Worle
voilkommen plastisiren ... Iernt (N, 3, 123-124).
In short, knowledge will become experience itself, and man would be carrying out
the empirical ideal of directly apprehending Nature.
Important to note is that Novalis is not so absolute in his stance as the ideal of the
Golden Age may make him appear, since he suggests a process of induction and
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deduction ("Plastisirungsmethode" and "Beobachtungsmethode"), whose "goal" is
the Golden Age of direct experiential knowledge. He is speaking here of a method
and process of knowledge that transcendentally approaches the absolute ideal of the
Golden Age. In his open method, the final goal is indeed total experiential
knowledge, but the method of attaining this goal is a process of modifying and
improving experiential forms of knowledge. Inquiry is carried out in the continual
process and interaction of the "Experimentalmethode" and the
"Beobachtungsmethode". As part of a form of inquiry, i.e. a process, both the
"Experimentalmethode" and the "Beobachtungsmethode" are tools for the inquirer,
enabling him a "sichern Progressus und Regressus" (N, 3, 123) during his
investigations. The process of inquiry should be, as Novalis says, implying that the
process should be conducted in the spirit of a piecemeal, but, none the less,
progressive approach, "Schritt für Schritt entwickelnd (N, 3, 600). Novalis's open
form of inquiry emphasizes above all the experiential processes of knowledge, and
his concerns are with a practice-oriented concept of knowledge. This means not
only that Novalis elevates broad areas of knowledge into a method using concrete
induction (because of his broad definition of what can be considered to be
experiential knowledge), but also that, because he is practice-oriented, the actual
processes of discovery, as mentioned, are seen as a valid part of knowledge.
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1.3. Herder's Plastik and the aesthetics of knowledge formation.
An important influence on Novalis's experiential notion of knowledge was
Herder. The source for Novalis's concept of the "Plastisirungsmethode" is
Herder's essay Plastik (52), which Novalis directly comments upon at the end of
September or beginning of October in 1798 (at the same time as his essay on
Goethe). The relevance of Herder's Plasrik is important as an example of a
contemporary thinker who afforded a sensual-imaginative approach to knowledge.
As already mentioned, Wilkinson and Willoughby have shown how Herder argues
for the primacy of "Gefühl" over sight, and in doing so plays upon the two
meanings of "Gefühl", that (literally) of "the senses", and that of an "inner sense"
(294, 34). This distinction is crucial to Novalis, who very like Herder, believed in
the primacy of the inner sense of the imagination as the tool through which man
acquired knowledge. In the remark directly preceding a jotting from Herder's
Plosrik, Novalis notes how the senses are linked together by the creative
imagination, and how that affords the primary sense of perception:
ARes Sichtbare haftet am Unsichtbaren - Das Hörbare am Unhörbaren - Das FUhlbare am
Unfühlbaren. Vielleicht das Denkbare am Undenckbaren -.
Das Fernrohr 1st em künszliches, unsichibares Organ. /Gefafl. /
Die Einbildungskraft 1st des wunderbare Sinn, des uris alle Sinne ersezzen kann - und der so schon in
unsrer Willkühr steht. Wenn die ãu8em Sinne ganz unter mechanischen Gesetzen zu stehn scheinen
- so ist die Einbildungskraft offenbar mcht an die Gegenwart und Beruhrung ãuBrer Reitze gebunden
(N, 2, 650).
The sense of the "imagination" clearly owes much to Hemsterhuis's Neoplatonic
stance to knowledge. The "imagination" here is not just a form of "fantasy", but a
virtue (i.e. a power) which can cross the boundary between the visible and the
invisible, and mediate between the two; because of its dual aspect, it is intimately
connected to the ability to "plasticize". The notion of "Plastisirung" itself implies a
"feeling" for "ideas", i.e. a non-conceptual approach to the understanding of ideas,
and this is how man comes to understand the world, for the other senses are really
mechanical like the telescope. In the annotation from Herder's Plastik, which
directly follows the remark above on the imagination, Novalis notes down the
passage on the blind mathematician Saunderson who, on regaining his sight, had to
181
relearn to "see" the world again, translating his previous perception of the world
through touch into the "language" of sight:
Herders Plastik. pag. 7. Man Iehrte den Blindgebohrnen und Sehendgewordenen scm Gefühl
sichtlich erkennen - Er vergafi oft die Bedeutungen der Symbole des Gefühls - bis scm Auge
Fertigkeit erhielt Figuren des Rawns und Farbenbilder , als Buchszaben voriger Korpergefithle
anzusehen, sie mit diesen schnell zusarnmenzuhalten und die Gegenstande urn sich zu lesen (N, 2,
650).
This example, amongst others, meant to many and to Novalis as well, that man did
not simply "see" the world, but first had to interpret the world through the creative
imagination. As Wilkinson and Willoughby have shown, Goethe, too, learnt this
important lesson from Herder: it had a huge influence on Goethe's aesthetics and
his whole notion of knowledge. Crucial for this approach is Herder's claim
towards the end of his Plastik: it is a "Metaphysisch- und Physisch erwiesener
Satz, daft nur korperlic/zes Geflehi uns Formen gebe" (52, 71). Herder views all
forms of mental activities in terms of sense perception, aesthetics and practical
knowledge. Herder states here how knowledge has to be treated in a phenomenal
sense, and indeed in an organic sense as an entity, or rather entities, since each
sphere of knowledge has its own particular phenomenal form. The painter works
with different experiential material or mediums to the writer, although they may
indeed be trying to convey the same thing or experience. The point being made is
that in every area of knowledge, before one executes an idea, a strong practical
awareness of one's tools has to be attained. The implications for the writer are that
the poet is not dealing with plain referential words; instead the poet learns to treat
words as phenomena in their own right - this implies, for instance, that a whole
group of words may contribute to the meaning of a text just as much as the
individual semantics of the words. In this sense, the tenet of Plastik is the literal
shaping of language en masse, as a sculptor does his stone.
The use of "die Plastisirungsmethode" for a general programme of knowledge is
just this way of treating knowledge concretely. Inquiry is an open-ended entity for
Novalis, and Nature, like the sculptor's raw stone, is the vast, open-ended mass of
material man has to acquire a practical knowledge of in order to build up
knowledge and further inquiry. In his "Plastisirungsmethode" Novalis argues that a
concrete use of ideas and experiential, practice-oriented forms of knowing have to
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be maintained and upheld, to balance the analytical processes of the
"Beobachtungsmethode". One is reminded here that Novalis's notion that the
inquirer should have a "Gefuhl" (N, 3, 256) for, or love of, Nature (N, 3, 179),
does not necessarily imply rapture; rather "Gefühl" and "Liebe" are part of a
carefully balanced procedure of inquiry that attempts to keep the scientist as close
to the phenomena as possible. "Geflihi" and "Liebe" are part of Novalis's broad
notion of experiential knowledge; in Herder's meaning of the "inner sense" they
are closely connected to the concrete notions arising out of man's practical
knowledge of Nature, connected to what man has experienced within himself and
to what he has experienced of the outside world.
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1.4. Goethe's "acriver Empirismus". Aesthetics of "experiment" and Fonnel".
It is of interest to note that in 1792, after the "lesson" he had learnt from Herder
in the preceding years, Goethe wrote his essay Der Versuch a/s Vermirtler von
Objekt und Subjekz (41), where something of the views from Herder's Plastik most
probably remain. Goethe's empirical stance naturally leads him to argue for
inductive experimentation in the sciences, and the accumulation and use of
experiments in building theories, as opposed to pinning down a theory to a
particular experiment or using the hypothetico-deductive method. As Goethe
remarks, a particular experiment is the outcome of many other experiments, and,
in fact, more often than not belongs to a group of experiments. In short, the
experimenter has to work his way into a field, and have experienced many cases,
before postulating a theory:
So schätzbar aber auch em jeder Versuch einzeln betrachtet scm mag, so erhält er doch nur semen
Wert durch Vereinigung und Verbindung mit andern. Aber eben zwei Versuche, die miteinander
einige Ahnlichkeit haben, zu vereinigen und zu verbinden, gehort mehr strenge und
Aufmerksamkeit, als selbst scharfe Beobachter oft von sich gefordert haben. Es können zwei
Phänomene miteinander verwandt scm, aber doch lange nicht so nah, als wir glauben. Zwei
Versuche können scheinen, auseinander zu folgen, wenn zwischen ihnen noch eine grofie Reihe
stehen mUfite, urn sie in eine recht natürliche Verbindung zu bnngen (41, 9).
This recalls Herder's thesis in his Pkisrik, where he argues against the too swift
gaining of knowledge by the eye, and instead for the gradual feel and inner
knowledge of an object. There are similarities between Herder's notion of
perception and the issues surrounding practical knowledge and scientific
productivity. The use of the inner senses and the tactile senses does not in any way
mean leaving inquiry to "feeling" alone, for, as Goethe's remarks suggest, the
procedure of acquiring an intimate knowledge of a particular topic requires strict
controls and alertness to the procedures being undertaken and a thorough
experience of the field.
The link between Herder, Goethe and Novalis is, in terms of their general
attitude towards knowledge formation, particularly strong. The tenets of Herder's
Plasrik may not account for all the similarities, but the notions of productivity
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arising from his Plasrik do find significant reverberations in Novalis's essay Uber
Goethe written around the same time as his notes on Herder and his Kant-Studien,
that is nine months after his arrival at the Freiberger Bergakademie. 6 In this essay
Novalis speaks of Goethe's stance to knowledge in general, and treats both
scientific and literary issues. It is especially the issues concerning the aesthetics of
scientific productivity and the rhetoric of "experiment" that will be discussed, since
that is what is at stake here. Novalis had knowledge of much of Goethe's scientific
works, specifically Beitrage zur Optik, Die Metamorphose der Pflanzen and Die
Metamorphose der lnsekten, and clearly held them in great esteem, particularly for
the reason that Goethe was an artist setting a paradigm for inquiry itself:
Seine Betrachtungen des Lichts, der Verwandlung der Pflanzen und der Insecten sind Bestätigungen
und zugleich die uberzeugendsten Beweise, daB auch der vollkommne Lehrvortrag in das Gebiet des
Künstlers gehOrt (N ,2, 640).
The imaginative quality here praised by Novalis would appear to be a form of
"Plastisirung". Goethe's method of (re)-creating a "concrete idea" of the
phenomena in his work provides a model for what Novalis also demands. He
remarks later on, sometime between December 1798 and March 1799 in Das
ailgemeine Brow/Ion, that Goethe should be the new high priest of the ancient
tradition of "holy" physics:
Göthe soil der Liturg dieser Physik werden (N, 3, 469).
What Novalis means by "holy" physics and by Goethe's role as an artist
contributing to science is soon made apparent. To Novalis, Goethe was not an
idealist, nor an empiricist per Se; instead, in his works he espoused an "activen
Empirismus" (N, 2, 641). It is due to this form of knowledge, where Goethe
attempts to unite the processes of the natural world and human thought, that he is
likened to a "holy physicist". Novalis had observed that Goethe was not merely
listing statements about nature in his scientific works, or in his literary works
merely recounting experience, but instead, in re-experiencing the world for
himself, and translating these experiences into the appropriate scientific or literary
mediums, he had created forms of writing that mediated between experience and
theory, that were examples of concrete thought. The tradition of "holy" physics to
which Novalis refers, and in which he sees Goethe acting a major role, is indeed
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the tradition into which his own programme of experiential-oriented knowledge
fits, for Novalis's programme, in its various forms of "phenomenal" calculus or
"Combinatorik", i.e. in its mediation between theory and phenomena in concrete
theorizing, is very similar to Goethe's ideal empiricism which accounts for
aesthetics in scientific productivity.7
To describe Goethe's works, Novalis recalls the Fichtian notion of the
fundamental phenomenon or activity of knowledge:
Bey ihni ist alles That - wie bey andren alles Tendenz nur ist. Er macht wircklich etwas, wãhrend
andre nur etwas moglich - oder nothwendig machen. Nothwendige und mogliche Schöpfer sind wir
alle - aber wie wenig Wirckliche. Der Philosoph der Schule würde dies vielleicht activen
Empirismus nennen (N, 2, 641).
With acute precision, Novalis focuses on "die Tat" as the central category of
Goethe's thought, 8
 and finds a term for Goethe's method, "active empiricism",
which is no less astute than the celebrated one found by Siedenroth and praised by
Goethe himself, that his "Denkvermögen gegenständlich tätig sei" (38, 13, 37).
Both Novalis's and Siedenroth's terms remind one of the tenets of Herder's
Plastik, and a further comment of Novalis's confirms this parallel. For Novalis
says how Goethe's scientific method is comparable to that of the artist when
contemplating the classical world: that is, the classical world or Nature first has to
be re-experienced, or in Novalis's terms, "plastisirt" into concrete notions, in order
to be understood and, importantly, also to be conveyed, so that others too can have
a "Geflihi" for the subject:
Hier kommt es darauf an, ob man die Natur, wie em KUnstler die Antike, betrachtet - denn 1st die
Natur etwas anders, als eine lebende Antike. Natur und Natureinsicht entstehn zugleich, wie Antike
und Antikenkenntrnfi; denn man irrt sehr, wenn man glaubt, daB es Antiken giebt. Erst jezt fungi
die Antike an zu entstehen. Sie wird unter den Augen und der Seele des Künstlers. Die Reste des
Aiterthums sind nur die specifischen Reitze zur Bildung der Antike. Nicht mit Hãnden wird die
Antike gemacht. Der Geist bringt sie durch das Auge hervor - und der gehaune Stein ist nur der
Korper, der erst durch sie Bedeutung erhält, und zur Erscheinung derselben wird (N, 2, 640).
This notion of re-experiencing an object, as an example of "Plastisirung" and the
"Experimentalmethode" is the key meaning of what, in postmodernist terminology,
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would perhaps he called Novalis's "rhetoric of experiment", and also the key sense
of his notion of experiential knowledge since it points to experiential reflectivity.
Central to Goethe's form of scientific productivity is what Novalis describes as
Goethe's particular form of abstraction, for Goethe always manages to keep hold
of the phenomena:
Er abstrahirt mit einer seitnen Genauigkeit, abet me ohne das Object zugleich zu construiren, dem
die Abstraction entspricht (N, 2, 641).
Clearly, in Novalis's view, Goethe always provided theory with a concrete form.
Novalis goes on, too, to speak of Goethe as a practical philosopher. This is helpful
in defining the term "active empiricism", since the distinction is made between
conceptual thought and a practice-oriented concrete form of theory, which is
"angewandt", not just idealism, but theory put to use, and into action:
Dies [Goethe's abstracting] ist mchts als angewandte Philosophie - und so fánden wir ihn am Ende
zu unserm nicht geringen Erstaunen auch als anwendenden, practischen Philosophen, wie denn jeder
ãchte KUnstler von jeher nichts anders war (N, 2, 641).
Although Novalis would not have read Goethe's Der Versuch aLs Vermittler von
Objekt und Subjekt, since it was first published in 1823, there are several parallels
to Novalis's notion of experiential knowledge and scientific productivity. Firstly,
Goethe stresses the need to return to experience as far as is possible. Knowledge is
approached above all from experience and not by the testing of a favoured theory:
Da alles in der Natur, besonders abet die ailgemeinern Kräfte und Elemente in einer ewigen
Wirkung und Gegenwirkung sind, so kann man von einem jeden Phãnomene sagen, daB es mit
unzahligen andern in Verbindung stehe, wie wir von einem frei schwebenden Ieuchtenden Punkte
sagen, daB er seine Strahien nach alien Seiten aussende. Haben wit also einen soichen Versuch
gefaBt, eine soiche Erfahrung gemacht, so können wir nicht sorgfhltig genug untersuchen, was
unmittelbar an jim grenzt, was zunachst auf jim folgt. Dieses ist's, worauf wir mehr zu sehen haben
als auf das, was sich auf ihn beziehi. Die Vermannichfaliigung einesjeden einzelnen Versuches ist
also die eigentliche Pflicht eines Naturforschers (41, 12-13).
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This theory is very similar to Novalis's requirement that the scientist works from
experience outwards, from a particular phenomenon, in a form of "calculus". The
gradual steps envisaged by Goethe correspond to Novalis's progressive "calculus",
and his form of "Combinatorik". Just as Goethe proceeds from phenomena,
Novalis believes that experiments and the experiences themselves could improve a
starting-point for a more encyclopaedic "Combinatorik". The broader the base of
data in a "CalcUl", the more comprehensive the theory will be. Goethe stresses the
need for clear connexions, Novalis emphasizes the experiential base:
Man geht mit den Erfahrungen und Experimenten noch viel zu sorgios urn - Man versteht sie nicht
zu benutzen - Man betrachtet zu wenig die Erfahrungen - ais Data zur Auflösung and
rnannichfaitigen Combinationen zum CaicUl - Man uberiegt die Erfahrungen, in Beziehung auf
Schlusse, mcht sorgfitig genug - Man nimmt nicht jede Erfahrung, als Function und Glied einer
Reihe an - man ordnet - vergleicht - und simplificirt die Erfahrungen nicht genug - man pruft einen
Gegenstand nicht mit alien Reagenhien - man vergieicht ihn nicht fleiBig - und mannichfach genug
(N, 3, 427).
Interestingly, both Goethe and Novalis stress the "manifold" character of the
necessary phenomena, and the need for "Vermannichfaltigung"; the essential
difference between them here lies, however, in Novalis's use of the mathematical
term "CalcUl" and the Neoplatonic and Lullian idea of "Combinatorik"; both of
which are more abstract than Goethe's terms. Yet, with that important distinction,
Novalis is exceedingly close to Goethe.
Moreover, Goethe's method of induction, so apparent in the way he describes and
lays down his scientific findings, and in the way he moves from one phenomenon
to another, is precisely the sort of method Novalis refers to himself in the
following remark of 1799:
Em Phaenomèn mufi nothwendig zu andern Phaenomènen führen, wie Em Experiment zu mehreren
Experimenten. Die Natur ist em Ganzes - worinn jeder Theil an sich me ganz verstanden werden
kann. Der ächte Naturforscher geht von irgend einem Puncte aus und verfolgt semen Weg Schritt
vor Schritt in die Unermefihichkeit hinein mit sorgfaltiger VerknUpfung und Aneinanderreihung der
einzelnen Thatsachen (N, 3, 603).
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This remark of Novalis's ought to be read both in view of his notion of a
"phenomenal" calculus and in the light of Goethe's notion of induction, which, as
has been discussed in the introduction, contains many aspects of Novalis's idea of
calculus. Novalis's "experiment" is not exactly the same as Goethe's in his
Versuch, partly because Novalis stresses the notion of calculus. The idea of
"experiment" takes on the meaning of testing, and relies on concrete thought or
notation (as desired by Goethe); however, it also refers more to the art of
inventing, as found in the tradition of Combinatorik. In the passage under
discussion, Novalis advocates a form of "active" empiricism, and imbues it with
the notion of a "phenomenal" calculus. The activity of experimentation itself and
the actual handling of phenomena, where one experience naturally leads to another,
should imitate Nature and lead to a more cohesive picture of Nature. The sort of
calculus Novalis refers to, and also what he would have seen in Goethe's scientific
works, is a calculus of activity and of literal experimentation, where the inquirer is
so close to the phenomena both literally and in his mind, that he theorizes
concretely, and in this sense "calculates", using "Gefuhl" and combinations of
images in the mind. If this is not the same as Goethe's method, Novalis yet, like
Goethe, stresses how little man can conceive of the complexities and combinations
within Nature herself ("die Natur ist em Gz2nzes"): hence inquiry must be
progressive in an inductive manner, and avoid the pitfalls of over hasty-
hypothesizing.
Novalis's important remark shows him moving towards Goethe's stance on
inquiry; but equally, Goethe himself tends towards Novalis's idea of a
"phenomenal" calculus in some comments he makes in his Versuch regarding the
link between experimental method and the mathematical method. Although Goethe
avoids the term "calculus", he seems, like Novalis, to be alluding to that part of
mathematics. Probably more emphatically than Novalis, however, Goethe discusses
mathematics more strictly within the realm of induction. A key part of Goethe's
notion of scientific productivity is the idea of an analogy between a higher
inductive statement and the statements, experiments and experiential knowledge it
is made up of. In his Der Versuch aL Vermistler von Objekt und Subjekt, when
describing his method in relation to his optical works, Goethe observes:
Ich habe in den zwei ersten Stücken meiner optischen Beitrãge eine soiche Reihe von Versuchen
aufzustellen gesucht, die zunachst aneinander grenzen und sich unmittelbar berUhren, ja, wenn man
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sie alle genau kennt und übersieht, gleichsam nur einen Versuch ausmachen, nur eine Erfahrung
unter den niannichfaltigsten Ansichten darstellen.
Eine soiche Erfahrung, die aus mehreren andern besteht, ist offenbar von einer hohern Art. Sie stellt
die Formel vor, unter weicher unzahlige einzelne Rechnungsexempel ausgedruckt werden. Auf
soiche Erfahrungen der höhern Art loszuarbeiten halt ich fir höchste Pflicht des Naturforschers, und
dahin weist uns das Exempel der vorzüglichsten Manner, die in diesem Fache gearbeitet haben (41,
13).
This passage fully reveals the reflectivity of Goethe's approach to scientific
methodology; far removed from simple empiricism, this "symbolic empiricism"
leads directly from the phenomena to higher-order statements by what might be
called inductive construction. This approach may be compared to that offered by
Novalis when the latter says that the explanation must form an analogy with the
phenomena, just as much as the individual experiments themselves must do so:
Wenn der Satz, oder die Verhãltnisse - der Gegenst[and] oder der Begriff - richtig gewählt sind -
wircklich Ens sind - so muB auch die Demonstration und Auflösung - das Experiment und die
Erklarung - durchaus übereinkommen.
Wie das Experiment die blofie Erweiterung - Zertheilung - Vennannichfalrigung - Verstarckung des
Gegenstandes ist, so ist die Erklãrung dasselbe vom Satze - Hier gilt also der Sat.z:
Was vom niedern Grade gilt, mufi auch vom hohern Grade gelten. Was im medern Grade durchaus
ems ist, mu auch im hohern Grade durchaus Ems seyn (N, 3, 353).
Novalis, like Goethe, sees the use of constructive analogizing as a key to inquiry:
the closer the inquirer is to the phenomena the greater his "GefUhi", and hence the
greater his ability to form analogies between theory and phenomena. Consequently,
the closer the inquirer will be to forming theory that is intertwined with
phenomena, where he can then maintain that "das Experiment und die Erklarung -
durchaus übereinkommen".
Goethe's dictum that the search for such higher experiences is the task of the
scientist also relates to what Novalis believed was part of the Baconian method,
namely the need to find an inner logic or concrete notation that would serve as an
experiential tool with which one could carry out further research. Higher
experiences, which encompass many other experiences, are a form of theory which
has got so close to the phenomena that it is symbolic of certain natural processes.
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Inductive generalizations can be seen as idealizations of phenomena. In his
comment on Bacon, Novalis refers to the calculus of mathematics:
Die combinatlorischej Analysis der Physik ware die indirecte Erfindungskunst, die Baco gesucht hat
(N, 3, 128).
Clearly, Bacon could not have been thinking towards a mathematical calculus in
particular, but was dwelling upon a general "Erfindungskunst" or symbolic logic,
and similarly, Novalis, although here referring to mathematics, usually speaks of
his own broader notion of "calculus", which is analogous to Bacon's search for a
concrete notation of "real characters". In scientific productivity, and in its greater
sense of natural philosophical productivity, which is to Novalis a form of "Calcül",
good generalizations become part of an inner logic that is close to phenomena, and
can be of predictive value ("die indirecte Erfindungskunst"). Here the meaning of
Novalis's calculus again becomes clear: he argues for a form of "phenomenal"
calculus, consisting not of strict mathematical formulas, but of experiential
formulas. It is at this point that Goethe's and Novalis's references to mathematical
method cross over. In his Versuch Goethe speaks of the higher experience of his
inductive procedure as a "Formel" ("Eine soiche Erfahrung, die aus mehreren
andern besteht, ist offenbar von einer hOhern Art. Sie stellt die Formel vor, unter
welcher unzahlige einzelne Rechnungsexempel ausgedrUckt werden" (41, 13)).
Goethe is referring to a symbolic phenomenal whole that unifies the series of
experiments and the phenomena under investigation. The experiential and symbolic
"Formel" can be interpreted as acting as the higher function for the series of
experiments. In this blend of aesthetics and science, Goethe is himself undertaking
a "phenomenal calculus". This is the meaning of what today, in postmodernist
terminology, would perhaps be called Novalis's and Goethe's "rhetoric of
experiment". Aesthetics and scientific method are so intimately linked that this
"rhetoric of experiment" is best called natural philosophical productivity. 9 One can
call this concrete notation a variety of symbolic logic, or one can more
pragmatically say that this notion of "experimentation" implies the use of what we
would now call models of phenomena, which, for Novalis and Goethe, in the
experimental process of inquiry itself, mediate between phenomena and theory.
Following up on this point of the experimental process of scientific productivity,
also implied in Goethe's method are the hidden implications of good inductive
191
descriptions: they are not just statements but part of a discovery process, or what
Novalis calls the "history of discoveries". The actual processes of creative
discovery are visible in the description of the experiments. This means that the
scientist does not start off with a theory he wants to prove in hypothetico-deductive
fashion, instead, in terms of the aesthetics of scientific productivity, the inquirer
works towards a theory, speaking as it were the language of the phenomena and the
experimental apparatus. This is also part of the meaning of "Gefl.ihl" for the
scientist in Novalis's view. The actual process means taking particular phenomena
("gutgeordnete Beschreibungsreihe") as concrete theory, as models with which one
can work:
Geschichte der Versuche Versuche zu stande zu bringen. Die Idee eines Versuchs zu realisiren -
gutgeordnete Beschreibungsreihe der Experimentalversuche sind wohi ebenfalls Synonymen d[erj
phil[osophischenj Geschichte (N, 3, 439).
Here, as well, Novalis is speaking not of theory, but instead elevates discovery
processes to the status of philosophy, and not just "scientific" discovery processes
per se, but above all forms of productivity.' 0 Productivity in general, i.e. the
formation of knowledge, is an "experimental" discovery processes, in which an
inductive "calculus" takes place. Novalis's starting point for all inquiry is never
theory, but a larger view of experience itself. This corresponds essentially with the
breadth in which Goethe himself approached inquiry: one only has to think, for
example, of the manifold ways in which Goethe inquired into the phenomenon of
light in his Farbenlehre. Further, as with Novalis, for Goethe the notion of
"experiment" expresses both a strong epistemological element in his thought and
also a fundamental attitude to knowledge, that takes accounts of the essential
experiential and experimental nature of life and inquiry.
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1.5. Schelling: natural philosophicalproduczivity.
Ample space has been given in the introduction to the Schelling's thought. Novalis
and Schelling were in many ways concerned with the same issues: the notions of
productivity in the light of natural philosophy. Novalis does, however, at times
take issue with Schelling, as for example over what Novalis sees as the latter's
dualism in his Von der Weitseele. This emerges in the following remark:
Die Wissenschaft fangt nicht mit emem Antinom - Binom - sondern mit einem Infinitom an (N, 3,
432).
This comment can be seen to attack concepts like Schelling's mediation of "Geist"
and "Natur".
At the same time, however, Novalis recognizes that Schelling does account for
individual, generative organic form: "Schellings Individualisierungs, besser
Vermannichfaltigungstrieb der Natur" (N, 3, 430). These two comments of
Novalis's highlight the fact that Schelling and Novalis were working on the same
project, that of natural philosophy, but in different ways. Novalis never attempted
to write systematic works such as Schelling's, and in this sense he had greater
freedom of thought. Novalis could thus criticize Schelling's presentation of
dualistic forces, while also observing that Schelling was, in other aspects of his
work, arguing quite in his own sense, and indeed that he was in general on what
Novalis saw as the correct path: Schelling was a thinker "der das Höchste ahndet"
(N, 4, 261). However, the major difference, as has been pointed out in the
introduction, is that Novalis is far more concerned with scientific productivity than
Schelling. Clearly, Schelling's notions of dynamic natural forces, just as Ritter's
notions of galvanism, would have found Novalis's approval. Most important is the
fact that at the most fundamental level of their thought, at the level of natural
philosophical productivity, Novalis and Schelling are in accord. It is the aesthetic
element in natural philosophical productivity which leads them both to speak of the
term "intellektuale Anschauung" (N, 3, 440). Schelling ' s postulated natural forces
are, as remarked, products of natural philosophical productivity and are akin to
Novalis's notion of "wircksame Begriffe".
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1.6. Fichte 's "Thathandlung" and Novalis 's shift to transreflexivizy.
Novalis had studied Fichte closely. Most important to Novalis was Fichte's
notion that knowledge was an activity. Fichte's concept of "Tathandlung" refers to
the initial free act of self-positing that precedes all thought. Any form of
consciousness is preceded by this primary act of the self, and our knowledge of
objects outside ourselves is dependant upon this. Thus, too, subject and object are
always bonded together in Fichte's "Ich", as an act of the consciousness, or in
Fichte's words:
Das Ich sezt ursprUnglich schlechthin sein eigenes Seyn (28, I, 2, 261).
This is crucial to Novalis's own views on knowledge, since Fichte's "Tathandlung"
implied that the primary act of the "Ich" was free. This accorded with Novalis's
notion of the creative imagination. Novalis readily wrote down:
Warum die erste Handlung eine freye Handlung seyn mufi - weil sie keine andre voraussezt - Sie ist,
weil sie ist, nicht weil eine andre ist. Foiglich ist die Bestimmung des Ich, als Ich, frey (N, 2, 105).
Fichte's law of the sentence of identity, A = A, thus gave to Novalis a sense that
knowledge was not formal or conceptual, but an activity, part of Being itself.
Frank has shown the fundamental difference between Novalis and Fichte at the
level of their philosophies of consciousness. Fichte argues that the "Ich" posits a
"Nicht-Ich" against itself and that the absolute is present in the intellectual
intuition. Novalis, on the other hand, sees the absolute represented indirectly
(transcendentally) in the "intellektuale Anschauung" (N, 2, 119). Instead of
positing a "Nicht-Ich" against the "Ich", Novalis sees subject and object both in the
"Ich" as a process of consciousness where "Gefühl" and "Reflexion" or
"Urhandlung" and "intellektuale Anschauung" interact (N, 2, 125; 315, 76; 354,
116-117). This fundamental pattern of Novalis's thought - the transreflexivity of
the subject - is described in Frank's article on Novalis's notion of "Ordo inversus".
This figure of thought in the idea of "Ordo inversus" has many parallels in
Novalis's thought, such as his notion of "Hin und Her", or, indeed the interaction
of the "Beobachtungsmethode" and the "Experimentalmethode" (N, 3, 123) (see
below, p374).
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In other aspects, as already discussed, Fichte's general direction of thought
appealed to Novalis greatly. Fichte's disparagement of formal thought in his notion
of "experiment" bears considerable similarity to Novalis's notion of induction and
"experiment".
However, although Fichte by no means negates the outside world, he did not
attempt to account for Nature in terms of empirical detail, and this, when Novalis
arrived at Freiberg, was soon to become a major factor in his emancipation from
Fichte. Lauth describes how Fichte had, throughout his writings, made references
to a "general" natural philosophy ("allgemeine Naturphilosophie"), but that Fichte
never bound in the empirical sciences to any great extent into his thought. The sort
of material Novalis was interested in, such as excitability, galvanism or the
pneumatic debate, found almost no resonance in Fichte's works (232, xiv-xv).
Novalis never gives up Fichte entirely, and the Das aligemeine Broullion has many
references to Fichte, but by now Novalis was clearly searching for a less purely
philosophical model of knowledge, and instead for a model that would account
more for his empirical interests.
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1.7. Plonnos: rhatiger Empirismus" and pantheistic transreflexivity.
A remark towards the end of Das aligemeine Brouillon points to Novalis's
differences with Fichte and at the same time to the model he had found:
Die Hypostase versteht Fichte mcht - und darum fehit ihm die andre Hälfte des schaffenden Geistes.
Ohne Eksiase - fesseindes, alles ersetzendes B[ewuBtjS[eynj - ist es mit der ganzen PhiJosophie
nicht weit her (N, 3, 465).
Novalis here criticizes the aridity of excessively sober philosophical thought, and
emphasizes both the need for an ecstatic attitude to knowledge, such as he would
have been aware of in Pietism, and also the necessity to view knowledge
phenomenally; that is, not just concretely, but also as a phenomenon within
Nature, as one of the hypostases in the hierarchy of Being. This marks the limit of
his proximity to Fichte, and points to a more fundamental influence on his later
thought.
Specifically, the terms "Hypostase" and "Ekstase" explicitly refer to Plotinos, and
it is to Plotinos that one must turn for a full understanding of Novalis's mature
thought on knowledge (as, incidentally, for an appreciation of Goethe's, too).
Plotinos holds that knowledge is phenomenal and part of the Chain of Being.
Plotinos's hypostases allow for ideas as a particular realm of Nature, and this was
the sort of model of knowledge that Novalis was seeking, where both the subject
and the object were accounted for in the whole organism of Nature. From his
reading of Dieterich Tiedemann's Geist der spekulativen Philosophie (117) between
December 1798 and January 22 1799, Novalis learnt of Plotinos's notion that the
world soul was made up of light, and in this way that the ideal or knowledge had
physical form, as Tiedemann comments:
Dennoch behauptet Plotin, der Weitseele Substanz sey Licht, wie die der Materie, Schatten und
FinsterniB (117, 3, 309).
Novalis takes this notion on and applies it to philosophy in general. Using
Plotinos's notion of the physical nature of knowledge, Novalis refers to "Ekstase"
as a phenomenon:
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Ekstase - Innres Lichtphaenomèn = intellectualer Anschauung (N, 3, 440).
Novalis's pulls Plotinos into heart of the debate over German Idealism. His notion
that the "intellectuale Anschauung" is light itself shows how Novalis's views on
aesthetics and practical knowledge are, quite literally, concerned with natural
philosophical productivity: light is linked directly to man's consciousness of
nature. The alleged concreteness of ecstatic knowledge provides Novalis, in
Plotinos's sense, with a model for a hierarchy of Being that accounts for thought.
Indeed, Tiedemann stresses Plotinos's ecstatic path to knowledge of the Godhead,
and that, in Plotinos's view, knowledge and God are light:
Man erblickt nichts als dan herrlichste Licht, well in Gott nichts ist als Licht (117, 3, 281).
Although Novalis learnt of Plotinos through Tiedemann, who was very much an
enlightenment thinker and "kritisch-rational", as Mall describes him (N, 3, 981),
this had little filtering effect on Novalis. Novalis read through Tiedemann's
censures of Plotinos, to come to his own highly positive view of him." Indeed, his
reading of Plotinos seemed to congeal and bring to a head much of his thought in
Das aligemeine Brouillon. This is undoubtedly a major threshold of Novalis's
development. As with his Kant-Studien, it is a key point of reflection. Plotinos put
modern thinkers into perspective for Novalis, in that he provides a general model
into which they could be assimilated as part of a continuum of inquiry. This is
revealed in some key remarks of Novalis's which will now be dealt with.
Plotinos, importantly, provided Novalis with a physical and metaphysical base for
knowledge, that of "Sympathie". Even though Novalis only read of Plotinos
through Tiedemann, his reading substantiated the ideas he had already obtained
from Hemsterhuis, and lead him to develop further his Neoplatonic ideas. With
"Sympathie" in mind, Novalis refers to Plotinos's concept of emanations when
describing the processes of thought:
Sonderbares Accompagnement der Verstandesfantasieen - des abstracten Spiels - mit innern
SinnenFantasieen und Bilderspiel - BegJeitende Symbolisation, oder Schemazism.
Emanat[ionsl Lehre etc. (N, 3, 441).
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This remark assumes the various forms and stages of the Plotinian emanations or
hypostases, how there is an analogy between them, and how this phenomenon of
analogy is the driving force behind them all.' 2 Novalis here envisages a parallelism
between various inner processes ("Verstandesfantasieen" and "SinnenFantasieen")
and subsumes them both under representation in general ("Schematism"), which
itself belongs to a wider process ("Emanat[ion]").
In another remark, Novalis links the notion of the creative force of "Sympathie"
directly to Plotinos and "experimentation":
Noun war schon in Betreff der meisten Resultate - kritischer Idealist und Realist./Fichtes und Kants
Methode ist noch nicht vollst[andig] und genau genug dargesteilt. Beyde wissen noch nicht mit
Leichtigkeit und Mannichfaltigkeit zu experimentiren - Uberhaupt nicht poeiisch - Alles ist so steif,
so angstlich noch.
Die freye Generationsmethode d[erj Wahrheit kann noch sehr erweitert und simplificirt - Uberhaupt
verbessert werden. Da ist nun diese ächte Experimentirkunst - Die Wissenschafi des ihazigen
Empirismus (N, 3,445).
This is a fundamental statement of Plotinos's importance for Novalis, which leads
to the centre of his project. It clearly confirms the way in which his reading of the
Neoplatonist relativized his understanding of modem philosophy. The emphasis on
"thatigen Empirismus" naturally links back to his comments on Goethe's "activen
Empirismus". It refers to a form of empiricism and "experimentation" with
concrete notions, and to the mediation of subject and object. Through his reading
of Tiedemann, Novalis perceived Plotinos's philosophical method as a type of
"active empiricism"; for Plotinos argued from the abstract to the concrete,
providing abstractions with concrete metaphors and images. Tiedemann comments
on Plotinos's form of philosophy:
Er hilft sich hier, wie überall, mit Erschleichung, daB er nemlich dem Intellektuellen sinnliche
Bilder und Begriffe heimlich unterlegt, und so mit semen Lesem etwas vorgaukelt ... (117, 3, 321)
Although Tiedemann speaks critically of Plotinos's method, Novalis sees Plotinos's
strength precisely in this disparaged philosophical method. What makes Plotinos's
philosophical style even more attractive for Novalis is his pantheistic ontology. The
link between Plotinos, Schelling and Novalis in terms of their notions of pantheism
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is strong. As already discussed, both Frank and Uerlings show how "Natur" and
"Geist" for Novalis and Schelling are linked at various levels of consciousness
(170, 105; 354, 162-163). The interpenetration or transreflexivity of levels of
knowledge and being in Novalis's and Schelling's notions has similarities with
what Tiedemann calls the particular mixture in Plotinos's thought of "groben" and
"feinen Spinozismus". "Grober Spinozismus" refers to the idea that matter evolves
from and is part of God (117, 429). As mentioned, both Novalis and Schelling
move away from the notion of the immanent absolute to the idea of the absolute's
transcendence. "Feiner Spinozismus" refers to God as the starting point for all
thought and to the use of the "inner sense":
Er [PlotinosJ lehrt feinen Spinozismus, wenn er Gott zum logischen Subjekie aller in der Erfahrung
vorkommenden Mannigfaltigkeiten macht, und aus Verstandesbgriffen alles sinnliche herleiten will
Aus diesen feinen Spinozismus führt unausweichlich die Bemühung, aus bloBen
Verstandesoperationen, und nach bloBen Begriffen des inneren Sinnes, alles zu erklären (117, 430).
In this way man employs the inner, sense of the God in himself to come to know
the world (117, 429). What annoys Tiedemann so greatly is what could be termed
Plotinos's form of natural philosophical productivity, i.e. the "sinnliche Bilder und
Begriffe" of the productive imagination which attempt to explain nature. This
aspect of Plotinos's thought gives a further perspective to Novalis's idea of
"experiment" and phenomenal calculus, as will be seen in the next section.
Plotinos's particular form of pantheism would have struck an immediate chord with
Novalis, for shortly before he began reading Plotinos, he had himself come to
similar conclusions about the relationships between the soul of nature and its outer,
man's soul and his outer, and how man can understand and sense nature:
DaB wir nur durch Gedanken das Innre und d[iej Seele der Natur vernehmen können, wie wir nur
dlurchi Sensationen das Aufire und d[enj Korper der Natur (N, 3, 429).
Like Plotinos, Novalis sees external nature with its own body and soul, humans
with their body and soul, and the outer world in us in our thought ("daB es auch
eine AuBenwelt in uns giebt" (N, 3, 429). Here, in this transreflexivity, lies a
pantheism which profoundly links the thought of Plotinos, Schelling and Novalis.
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In calling Plotinos "kritischer Idealist und Realist", Novalis also uses Plotinos to
view the philosophies of Kant and Fichte in a new perspective. Kant and Fichte
both treat the experientiality of knowledge, but to Novalis both had not gone far
enough. Within the bounds of their more sober philosophy they were not as
poetical as Novalis would have wished, they were still "angstlich". For Novalis,
genuine critical philosophy lies in calling the specific areas of theoretical, aesthetic
and practical knowledge into question and subsuming them all under natural
philosophical productivity. In this sense, Novalis speaks for the need of treating
knowledge in terms of an experiential whole ("Mannichfaltigkeit"), and for the
need of an ease in moving between subjects ("Leichtigkeit"). In Plotinos's
transreflexive model of knowledge the inquirer can move with ease between the
inner and outer worlds, between subject and object. Novalis advocates a freer form
of argumentation and knowledge formation than that of Kant and Fichte in his
concept of concrete notation, which is symbolic ("poetisch") in nature and feeds on
a broad experiential base. As mentioned, Plotinos's freer form of philosophizing
was most certainly made apparent in Tiedemann's commentaries, who often
rebukes Plotinos as speculative and for his lack of formal philosophical style.'3
Further, "Sympathie" is the driving force behind "die freye Generationsmethode
der Wahrheit", for the concrete images used in Novalis's "Plastisirungsmethode"
operate on the "Sympathie" between man's thought and phenomena. Through
"Sympathie", knowledge can be "generated" as concrete thought in a method of
discovery. The notion of "Generation" is also an allusion to contemporary
excitability theory and the "Reproduktionskraft, and shows the way that Novalis
views knowledge, like the organism, as an active, physical process. For Novalis,
Plotinos has a deeper notion of concrete knowledge than Fichte, since he brings
organization into play in the "generation" of knowledge through what Novalis
interprets as the organizing force of "Sympathie". Through "Sympathie", Novalis
is able to interpret knowledge in a concrete, phenomenal way, not just at one level
such as espoused in Fichte's notion of "active" thought, but also at another level,
as a phenomenon in the Chain of Being. In this way, Novalis's notion of
"kritischer Idealist und Realist" implies an ontological link between the subject and
the object, not just at the level of perception, but also at a material level.
Further remarks of Novalis substantiate this view of his relationship to Plotinos in
terms of ontology and a transreflexive model of knowledge; they also show how
200
Novalis worked hard at assimilating Fichte into Plotinos's scheme of thought.
Novalis places Plotinos at the top of his list of "holy physicists":
Fichte wird hiernach seine Freunde beschamen, und Hemsterhuis ahndete diesen heiligen Weg zur
Physik deutlich genug. Auch im Spinotza iebt schon dieser gottliche Funken des Naturverstandes.
Plotin betrat, vielleicht durch Piaton erregi, zuerst mit ächtem Geiste das Heiligthum - und noch ist
keiner nach thin wieder so weit in demselben vorgedrungen.
In manchen altern Schriften klopft em geheimni8voiler Pulsschlag und bezeichnet die
BerUhrungsstelie mit der unsichtbaren Welt - em Lebendigwerden. Göthe soil der Liturg dieser
Physik werden - er versteht vollkommen den Dienst im Tempel. Leibnitzens Theodicee 1st immer
em herrlicher Versuch in diesem Felde gewesen. Etwas ähnliches wird die künftlge Physik, aber
freylich in einem höhern Style. Wenn man bisher in der sog[enanntenj Physikotheologie nur statt
Bewunderung em ander Wort gesezt hätte (N, 3, 469).
In Novalis's view, Plotinos was the initiator of a long tradition that takes account
of the physical nature of knowledge, as an activity and as part of Being, and thus
of the link between man's consciousness and Nature. Characteristically, Novalis
views Plotinos as a part of a tradition, each member of which has a contribution to
make. Thus, for example, he links Fichte and Goethe to the Neoplatonist. Fichte,
for his study of the subject, is also seen as a "holy physicist", and is drawn
together with Plotinos. Elsewhere in Das ailgemeine Brouillon, Novalis compares
Fichte's philosophy (his "logisches Schema") to Plotinos's thought; what he calls
Fichte's "Combinationen" (i.e. his method of working with terms and ideas,
constantly moving around the same concepts) he sees as physically productive.
They produce a "flame" within man, which may be compared to Plotinos's "inner
light":
Fichte thut durch geschriebene Worte und Wortformein - Combinationen - innere Wunder -
Gegenseitig Bezognes simuitanes Sprechen und Denken (thätiges Betrachten) thut Wunder - erzeugt
eine Substanz (Flamme), die beydes, Sprechen und Denken harmonisch erregt - und bildet (N, 3,
443).
Novalis pursues the very concrete way in which Fichte's thought takes effect on
the reader - what Novalis calls "holy physics" would today fall to psychology - and
bases his argument partially on excitability theory ("erregt"); Neoplatonically, he
envisages an active process dependent on "Sympathie", operating with
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"Combinationen", which "physically" generates knowledge (as a "Flamme").
Through language, both speech and thought are shaped and advanced ("bildet").
In another remark, Novalis inserts the Fichtian notion of the "Ich" into a
Neoplatonic scheme and exploits excitability theory, in a "pathology" of the
formation of knowledge. In this case, he attempts to unite contemporary chemistry
and pathology with both critical philosophy and Neoplatonism. The soul is related
to oxygen; knowledge and metaphysics are thereby linked to matter, within what is
presented as a pathological assessment of the Chain of Being. This technique is a
form of "Combinatorik":
Uber unset Ich - als der Flanune des Korpers in der Seele. Aehnlichkeit der Seele mit Oxigène.
(Oxigene als Irritabilitaetspr[ocessJ.) (N, 3, 440).
Beginning with a modern, Fichtian "Ich", Novalis imbues it with a Neoplatonic
"light"; he interprets the flame in terms of the modern French chemistry of
Lavoisier, but goes beyond this by interpreting the chemistry in terms of
excitability. By this active "Combinatorik" Novalis gives a more modern, concrete
meaning to Plotinos.
There is, further, a possible allusion to Plotinos's concept of the "Einen", God,
as the physical catalyst for thought:
Solite Gott d[asj Element der Synthesis seyn - gleichsain das Oxigène dieser Operation.
(Experimentiren in Gott - Theosophistereyen) Spinotzism - Emanationsystem (N, 3, 443).
This remark takes the argument one major step forward, to the Final Cause. God is
subjected to a scientific interpretation as that which will feed combustion (oxygen).
In brackets, Novalis names the whole nature of the enterprise: "Experimentiren in
Gott". The comparison to Spinoza refers, as has been seen, to Plotinos's
transreflexivity, whilst the fmal term places the whole procedure into the
overarching structure of Plotinos's philosophy.
Novalis also draws further comparisons between Fichte and Plotinos: in his view
there was as much occult "Sympathie" in Fichte's essential tenets as in Plotinos's,
for Fichte's "Tathandlung" was itself based upon a fundamental "sympathy".
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Accordingly, Novalis draws the two thinkers together in their concrete, experience-
oriented methods: both operate symbolically using "Muster" to build models of the
world (Plotinos employs his hypostases and emanations; Fichte uses his "logisches
Schema"):
Das logische Schema der Wissenschaft hat Fichte gleichsam zum Muster einer realen
Menschenkonstruction und Weltkonstruction gewãhlt. Seine Aehnlichkeit mit Plotin (N, 3, 443).
Novalis presumably recognized the similarities between Fichte's construction of the
"Ich" and Plotinos's view that the actual creation of the world caine about through
"sympathy". For Plotinos's world began when the "One" reflected upon itself, and
did this through "sympathy"; it thereby became aware of the "sympathy" between
itself and its reflection on itself. So too did Fichte's "Ich" simply posit itself in a
fundamental reflection, and become aware of itself. In reading Tiedemann, Novalis
would have recognized these similarities, as Mähl points out. Mähl cites the
following remark of Tiedemann's on Plotinos's thought:
Immaterielle Dinge, so bald sie gedacht werden, existiren sie auch, denn was der Verstand denkt,
sezt er, und was er sezt, ist ... So bald der Verstand sich selbst denkt, denkt er sich existirend, und
sieht dadurch das wahre Wesen. Er denkt sich aber auch als stets existirend, stets denkend, und sieht
dadurch die Unverãnderlichkeit. Er denkt sich endlich als von einem Gedanken zum andem gehend,
und erblickt dadurch die Veranderung. Diese drey Dinge unterscheidet der Verstand von einander,
sieht ihrer Verschiedenheit im wahren Wesen, und denkt dadurch die Verschiedenheit. Er denkt sie
endlich als in Einem, als Ems, und erblickt dadurch die Einerleyheit ... (117, 3, 403-4; N, 3, 984).
Mähl adds:
Ahnlich hat Fichte in seiner Wissenschaftslehre von 1794/95 die drei logischen GrUndsätze der
Identitãt, des Gegensetzens und des Grundes aus den reinen Denkhandlungen des Ich entwickelt (N,
3, 984; 28, 1, 2, 255-282).
Although this is true, it is no less relevant from Novalis's viewpoint to speak of the
similarities between Fichte and what Tiedemann says of Plotinos in terms of
"Sympathie". For this process of creation envisaged in Fichte, and what
Tiedemann remarks on Plotinos, is indeed the same as what Plotinos and Novalis
regarded as a process of "Sympathie". It is also reasonable to assume that the idea
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of creation described to the hero in Heinrich von Ofierdingen, that is, how "durch
wundervolle Sympathie die Welt entstanden sey" (N, 1, 220), was a view held by
Novalis himself. This somewhat cryptic comment could equally be interpreted both
in Fichtian terms of an action of the "Ich", or, less technically, in the sense that
"love created the world". However, the informed reader will recognize how the
statement is coloured and shaped by Novalis's mature philosophy as a whole. It
needs to be interpreted in terms of his reading of Plotinos through Tiedemann, as
well as in terms of his absorption of Hemsterhuis and Fichte. The statement thus
embodies a quintessence of Novalis's reading, and, simultaneously, of his own
thought.
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1.8. Plorins Physik, "experiment" and "phenomenal" calculus.
Within the context of the remarks revolving around Plotinos, Novalis comments
on the Schoolmen and how they differed in their formal approach to knowledge
from Plotinos. They were, according to him, too abstract, and failed to turn their
knowledge back into experience, or as Novalis puts it, to turn knowledge into a
"System, oder Reihengewebe". Plotinos's philosophizing and Fichte's
Wissenschaftsle/zre were, by contrast, to be read as the practical consequences of
thought; hence they entailed an experiencing or phenomenalization of knowledge:
Die Scholastiker verwandelte[n] aile Dinge in abstracta - Schade, daB sie nicht, zugl[eich] in
&ziehung auf diese Operation - die Entgegengesetze versuchten - und über dieses Verfahren
nachdachten, oder Sch!usse daraus zogen.
(Das Nachdenken verwandelt alles in System, oder Reihengewebe.) (N, 3, 442).
The term "Reihengewebe" probably refers to the grand galvanic circuits of Nature.
It is an idea taken from Ritter's notions of galvanism and organization (which so
inspired Novalis) and lends a concrete, overarching context to the reflection.
Another remark on the Schoolmen in the same section of Das allgemeine
Broullion puts them in a different light. Indeed, Novalis sees them as being close
to Plotinos. Novalis makes clear that he is talking of the Schoolmen in a general
and positive sense this time, and talking of others who, in this positive sense, bear
some similarities to the Schoolmen. This comment picks up on some key issues in
the Neoplatonic tradition and particularly on the part which is of great import for
Novalis's notion of "experiment". The affmity or "Verwandtschaft" (i.e.
"sympathy"), of numbers, concepts, and their combinations, in thinkers such as
Lull, Bruno, the Cabalists or Leibnitz lead, so Novalis thinks, to the possibility of
another world. Here one is reminded of the art of "Combinatorik" as a tool of
scientific discovery:
Die allg[emeinenJ Ausdrucke der scholastischen Phil[osophiej haben sehr viel Aehnlichkeit mit den
Zahien - daher ihr mystischer Gebrauch - ihre Personification - ihr musicoiischer GenuJJ - ihre
unendlichfache Combination.
Alles aus Nichis erschaffne Reale, wie z.B. die Zahien und die abstracten AusdrUcke - hat eine
wunderbare Verwandtschaft nut Dingen einer andern Welt - mit unendlichen Reihen sonderbaren
Combinationen und Verhältrnssen - gleichsam mit einer mathem[atischenj und abstracten Welt an
sich - mit einer poëtischen ,naihem(atischenJ und abstracten Welt (N, 3, 440-441).
Both abstract "Ausdrücke" and "Zahien" display an "affinity" to an "abstract
world" or "Welt an sich", and "Sympathie" provides this bridge.
Among these many remarks formulated around his reading of Plotinos, the
meaning of Novalis's "Combinatorik", and, in general of his encyclopaedic
programme, becomes apparent. He most certainly was not carrying out any
empiricist encyclopaedic programme such as that of D'Alembert. Instead, he is
turning consciously to the Neoplatonic tradition and its notion of a "Combinatorik"
of signs and concepts or ideas. The meaning of "thätiger Empirismus" is the notion
that ideas are elevated to a form of experience in a highly "physical" construction
of knowledge. The actual generation of ideas is linked up to the Neoplatonic
tradition of experimenting with ideas and figures.
In this context Novalis speaks of "Plotins Physik". He is speaking of an
empiricism that uses ideas in a Neoplatonic way; overtly "Plotins Physik" refers
most probably to the way Plotinos constructed his hierarchy of Being, and the way
he made the metaphysical "real" in constructing a hierarchy from the "One"
downwards, which again is something Novalis later refers to as the base of his
notion of science ("Unsre Physik ... ist eine reale Metaphysik oder Logik" (N, 3,
600)). Indeed, in the following remark on Plotinos, Novalis is speaking of the need
for the sciences to use concepts which have "real metaphysical" value:
Des Begriff Materie, Phlogiston, Oxigène, Gas, Kraft etc. gehoren in eine logische Physik - die
nichts von concreten Stoffen weis - sondern mit kühner Hand eigensinnig in das Weltchaos
hineingreift - und eigne Ordnungen macht.
Plotins Physik (N, 3, 179).
Novalis attacks here the conventional scientific wisdom that terms like "matter"
can be used in a naïvely empirical way, by asserting that they actually belong to a
higher category of being, they are not plainly empirical, but part of a "logic".
These sorts of concepts are what Novalis also later refers to as "wircksame
Begriffe" (N, 3, 600), they are concrete notions or models which the inquirer uses.
The inquirer does not need to know of "concreten Stoffen" in a plain empirical
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sense since he is carrying out a higher form of empiricism that mediates between
sheer experience and theory through the use of concrete notions, as is also and
supremely the case, for example, with Goethe's "Urpflanze", with Schelling's
forces, and with Rifler's incorporation of a model of the nerve into his
electrochemical and physiological experiments. The "concepts" have metaphysical
value since they are generalizations; they are abstractions from nature and part of
an inner logic of the mind, and, like Neoplatonic magic numbers, these concepts
are, in Novalis's view, perhaps in contact with another world. They are "real"
because they are the product of a close association with Nature and are part of a
"reale Metaphysik". Following this remark on "Plotins Physik", Novalis refers to
the "Gefuhl" that the scientist should have, and this again implies a concrete
approach to knowledge, an intimacy with phenomena, a reliance on the inner
sense, as has been seen in relation to Herder. Novalis envisages the "physical"
nature of the process of discovery itseff:
Zum Experimentiren gehort Naturgenie, d.ist, wunderartige Fahigeit den Sinn der Natur zu treffen
- und in ihrem Geiste zu handein. Der ãchte Beobachter ist Küns:ler - er ahndei das Bedeuzende und
weifi aus dem seitsamen, vorUberstreichenden Genusch von Erscheinungen die Wichtigen
herauszufilhlen (N, 3, 179).
The demand for "genius" in the experimenter entails a parallel between him and
Nature ("Naturgenie", "Sinn der Natur"). The use of innate ideas or concrete
notions is to Novalis part of inquiry, complementing and assisting strict empirical
inquiry. Novalis's meaning of "experiment" is not only that of a test, but also a
drawing forth of knowledge and a placing back of it into experience. This is, as I
have said, a practical form of knowledge, and literally has to be put into action. In
this way Novalis's "magischer Idealismus" (N, 3, 385, 430) or his idea of treating
the sciences "symbolically" 14
 entails the use of models or concrete notions as aids
in inquiry. Hence Novalis sees Plotinos as the first "generator" or "experimenter",
using concrete notions operating on "Sympathie".' 5 To use other terms: one can
describe phenomenal calculus or the "Generationsmethode" as natural philosophical
productivity or as pantheistic transreflexivity at work.
The whole Neoplatonic notion of continuity in the Chain of Being gives Novalis's
idea of "phenomenal" calculus added meaning. The latter, too, is a continuous
row, not of entities, but of thoughts, language, or experiments. Thus, although
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Novalis's "phenomenal" calculus is related to its mathematical counterpart, as
evinced in Leibnitz's notions of continuity and notation in his infinitesimal
calculus, it represents a phenomenal form of the principle of continuity. Similarly,
it grounds the unity of thought and matter at both methodological and ontological
levels. As mentioned, Nisbet sees in Goethe's experimental method the principle of
continuity reflected in the notion of a series of experiments with gradually visible
distinctions, a form of methodology related in its structure to Leibmtz's gradual
quantitative distinctions in his infinitesimal calculus. In the light of Novalis's
transreflexive methodology, as evinced in his idea of the continual "Hin und Her"
of thought, or in the progressive interchange of the "Experimentalmethode" and the
"Beobachtungsmethode", Novalis appears to argue for the employment of the
notion of continuity as fundamental basis for all thought. In laboratory work, one
can speak of the progressive use of experiments and of the language of diagrams in
discovery processes. For literature one can refer to the progressive use of
symbolic, concrete language. Novalis's notion of phenomenal calculus, when seen
in the light of the Neoplatonic notion of continuity, loses some its mathematical
connotations, to become a more organic notion, both in the sense that the forms of
knowing based around the principle of continuity are seen as phenomenal, and in
the sense that knowledge so formed is driven on and organically "generated".
However, the principle of continuity does not offer the fmal theme in early
Romantic ideas of knowledge formation and natural philosophical productivity. In
Goethe, Novalis and Schelling there is, equally, what could be termed a dialectics
of argumentation. Novalis's "Hin und Her", Schethng's polarities and Goethe's
own use of polarities point to this. Novalis would have found a similar pattern of
thought in Plotinos, for, as already mentioned, Plotinos's method of argumentation
moved between the opposites of sensual and conceptual thought. Thus, what one
sees in the works of Goethe, Novalis and Schelling links dialectics with the
principle of continuity. A dialectical pattern of thought is employed within a
greater pattern, the idea of continuity. Thus, for example, Goethe's "higher
experience" is both the "dialectical" synthesis of all the experiments undertaken, as
well as the "Formel", i.e. phenomenal "function" for all the series of experiments.
Here the principle of continuity can be interpreted as the "phenomenal
mathematics" of phenomena (i.e. plants operate according to the "function" of the
leaf). Bound up within this process of thought is the further process of moving
between opposites to attain progression in knowledge. Reference was made in the
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introduction to Schelling's analogous pattern of thought in his notion of the infinite
series of Nature, which also operates according to a "function" and makes use of
polar thought structures. In Novalis, too, within the series of experiments or
thoughts, there is the further dialectic pattern of thought which moves between the
conceptual and the sensual: both processes are united in his notion of knowledge
formation.
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1.9. Condorcet 's general Kalkul ".
It should here be mentioned, in the context of Plotinos's importance for Novalis's
thought, that Novalis found a contemporary, mathematically and empirically based
confirmation of his belief in concrete notation as a tool for discovery processes in
Condorcet's work of 1796, Entwurf eines historischen Gemahldes der Fortschrirte
des menschlichen Geistes (20). It is worthwhile considering Condorcet, not in the
light of the crucial philosophical issues arising from Novalis's reception of
Plotinos, nor in the light of Novalis's broad notion of "experiment", but instead in
view of Condorcet's role as a more "sober" protagonist of "Combinatorik".
Condorcet's work was, for Novalis, more a lower level substantiation of the notion
of "Combinatorik", than a key influence on his own concept of "Combinatorik",
since Condorcet did not speak of "Combinatorik" explicitly in a Neoplatonic sense,
but instead, in sober terms, treats the invention of mathematical calculus in
empirical terms. However, since Novalis's remarks on Condorcet were written at
the same time as his remarks on Plotinos, it is fair to assume that Condorcet
further stimulated Novalis's interest in notation. Indeed, Novalis's remarks relating
to Condorcet lead away from the strictly empirical and mathematical notion of
"Combinatorik", to more general philosophical considerations. Novalis
concentrates on two factors of mathematical calculus, its ability to predict (i.e. in
the sense of discovering) and the fact that it was based upon the affinity (the
"Verwandtschaft" or "Sympathie") of things:
Kalcill = Kunst, Bestiinmungen zu verbinden oder Kunsi zu bestimmen uberhaupi z. B. aus
gegebenen Bestimmungen nicht gegebene Best[irnmungenj zu finden.
Rechnungs1[ehre = Bestimnzungsverwandzschaflslehre (N, 3, 424).
Condorcet, although asserting how infmitesimal calculus operates on the
relationships of things to another ("die Verhältnisse der Sachen" (20, 234)), never
speaks of "Verwandtschaft" or "Sympathie". Condorcet does, however, hope for
an elaboration of calculus and "eine ailgemeinere, philosophischere Anwendung
des Kalkuls auf alle menschliche Kenntnisse" (20, 297). Further, Condorcet saw
scientific method itself as a calculus of experimentation. I quote the German
version known to Novalis:
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Die Naturlehre, die sich nach und nach von den durch Des Cartes eingeführten vagen Erklärungen
reinigt, gleichwie sie sich der scholastischen Ungereirnheiten entledigt hatte, ist nun nichts anders
mehr, als die Kunst, die Natur durch Versuche zu befragen, urn sodann durch den Kalkul
ailgemeinere Thatsachen daraus herleiten zu suchen (20, 240).
Condorcet underlines the precision of the empirical tradition and its truthfulness to
experience and Nature: importantly for Novalis, he speaks of the possibilities of
viewing experimentation as a process involving "Combinatonk" (although it must
be emphasized that Condorcet's meaning of experimentation cannot be equated
with Novalis's broader meaning). For Condorcet believed that the method of
infinitesimal calculus could be used for all objects under investigation, provided
that their "Elemente" were known, and the method would use their relationships
with one another to determine their laws. Novalis recited, almost word for word,
the following remark of Condorcet's in Das ailgemeine Brow/ion:
Nach Condorcet lehrt der Inflinitesimal] CalcUI ... eine Methode, die da sie sich auf alle
Combinationen verãnderlicher Gr[öBen] und auf alle Hypothesen ihrer Veranderungen erstreckt, auf
gleicher Weise fir alle Dinge, deren Veranderungen eines bestimmten Maafies fhig sind,
ent[weder] die Verhältnisse ihrer Elemente, aus der Kenntnifi der Verh[altnisse], weiche die Sachen
gegeneinander haben, oder die Verhaltn[issej der Sachen, wenn nur die ihrer Elemente bekannt
sind, bestimmen lehrt (N, 3, 425; 20, 234-235).
To Novalis this meant that by studying the affinities ("Bestimmungsverwandt-
schaftslehre" (N, 3, 424)) of things for one another, and their combinations,
discovery could take place. Novalis naturally had a broader notion of what actually
constituted the relationship of things with one another, and this is apparent alone in
his use of the term "Verwandtschaft", as opposed to the more neutral term used by
Condorcet, "Verhältnis".
Condorcet, too, remains vague in the practical application of his notion of an
empirical method, and Novalis's found his sources for a detailed method, or
"experimentation" in action, elsewhere. Although Condorcet's line of thought
readily appealed to Novalis, it is clear that he could not provide him with the sort
of far reaching philosophical and metaphysical base or method he found in
Plotinos, who far more profoundly affected Novalis's notion of "experiment" and
"Combinatorik".
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1.10. Socrates. social and practical knowledge.
If it is Plotinos to whom Novalis is particularly drawn for a broad method of
inquiry, then it is Socrates who affords Novalis another aspect of ancient thought
important for establishing a model for inquiry, this time not of a "Combinatorik"
of innate ideas and phenomena, but of a socially oriented use of innate ideas. The
remarks following those on "Plotins Physik" conjure up the potential of grand open
inquiry and debate in the Socratic sense. Novalis seems to look at the project of
modern science through the lens of the Renaissance, and ultimately, Greek
philosophy:
Eine ganz eigne Liebe und Kindlichkeit gehört, nebst dem deutlichsten Verstande und dem ruhigsten
Sinn, zum Studium der Natur. Wenn erst eine ganze Nation Leidenschaft für die Natur empfaht,
und hier em neues Band unter den BUrgern geknupft wird, jeder Ort seine Naturfot-scher und
Laboratorien hat, dann wird man erst Fortschritie auf dieser colossalischen Bahn machen, die mit
ihr in VerhãltniB stehn (N, 3, 179).
Here it is suggested that if the whole nation was aware of the scientific issues, and
was impassioned by them, great progress would be made. The remark points to the
role of social institutions in science. The observation once again employs
Neoplatonic notions ("Liebe", "Band"), but places them into a contemporary
context ("Burger", "Laboratorien"). The insight links up to a remark Novalis
makes close to his comments on Plotinos in Das allgemeine Brouillon, where he
speaks of Socrates's ability to bring out the innate in man, i.e. his moral sense, if
knowledge is supplied with a practical, experiential base of the kind Socrates
always invoked. In this process a closer bond will then be formed between what
man knows and what man does. Essentially, Socrates was trying to ensure that all
knowledge was practical and "know-how", and this is also Novalis's understanding
of the scientific community. Novalis's "Kindlichkeit" and the "moral organ" refer
to experiential knowledge, be it innate or scientific experience:
Ansicht der ganzen Welt durch den Moralsinn - Deduktion des Universums aus der Moral - alle
wahre Verbess[erungen] sind moralische Verbesserungen, alle wahre Erfindungen - moralische
Erfindungen - Fortschritte. (Verdienste des Socrates.) (N, 3, 424). 16
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Socrates, thus, adds a further vital element to the tradition which Novalis
constructs for his notion of "experiment", by virtue of his emphasis on "Moral" or
practical knowledge, and, further, by his method of inquiry. The emphasis of the
above remark is that all knowledge or true discoveries should be experiential, the
outcome of an innate (moral), intimate bond with Nature. Thus Novalis's recourse
to Socrates expresses part of the social aspect of his concept of "experiment",
which will be discussed in the following chapters, as well as his fundamental
attitude to knowledge. In heated open debate when Socrates went into the "agora"
he was trying among the public to bring out into the open what people held
innately within themselves. Through argument he sought to bring them to an
understanding (i.e. a conception) of the purpose of their beliefs in their very
justification of these beliefs (287). This means that it is not enough that people
have innate knowledge; most important to Socrates, and to Novalis, is the fact that
these ideas have to be "born", created, brought into action.' 7
 This birth would
further enhance the desire for inquiry, for one would be in the best sense
"physically" arguing for one's case.
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1.11. Summwy of Nova/is's notion of "experiment".
Socrates's method brings us back to Novalis's meaning of "experiment": the
"experiment" lies primarily in making knowledge an activity or an experience, the
emphasis is not on proving something, but on the fundamental action of actually
discovering something. "Experiment", then, to Novalis above all points to the
process of inquiry and productivity in general. In all his remarks on his philosophy
of experiential knowledge, whether Novalis is referring to a "Combinatorik", or
the interplay of the "Plastisirungsmethode" and the "Beobachtungsmethode", or to
the epitome of "Experimentaiphilosophie" in Diogenes's steps, Novalis's notion of
experiential knowledge implies the making of knowledge itself, and the varied
ways of "knowing". Novalis's rhetoric of "experiment" in his phenomenal calculus
is the key to his idea of natural philosophical productivity, and imbues
"experiment" with strong elements of practical knowledge and aesthetics.
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2. The experimenter.
2.1. Novalis 's extension of the excitability debate to knowledge formation: a note
on Fichte.
Before illustrating Novalis's idea of the healthy experimenter, a brief survey of
his stance on the excitability debate is required, since his concept of the inquirer's
healthy mind is based on notions employed in this debate. Novalis was attracted to
excitability theory as it came to mean the self-receptivity and self-activity of
organisms, as proposed by the leaders of the German Brunonian movement,
Andreas Röschlaub (1768-1835) and Schelling. Novalis wished to use and adapt
some of the key Brunonian notions to approach ideas on knowledge formation
itself. In a greater perspective, he further interprets the theory of "Erregbarkeit" as
a "moral" pathology for Nature itself, viewing Brunonianism in terms of natural
philosophical productivity. The Brunonian concept of sensibility, as will be seen,
gives Novalis's natural philosophy another type of ethical edge, closely related to
the ethical elements dlready discussed in early Romantic natural philosophy, but
none the less adding a new perspective.
Novalis was well versed in excitability theory, although, as Neubauer has shown
(337, 105-106), he had not read Brown's Elementa Medicinae. Instead, Novalis
gained his knowledge of Brunonianism from Andreas Röschlaub, the renowned
physician, who worked at the hospital in Bamberg and collaborated with its
director Adalbert Marcus (1753-18 16) in expounding a new system of excitability,
the "Erregbarkeitstheorie". Novalis had read the first two volumes of Röschlaub's
Untersuchungen (101) which came out in 1798: this work transformed what the
Germans thought to be Brown's mechanical premises into a theory of excitability
that accounted for the active role of organisms. Excitability was not viewed as a
passive action and reaction by Röschlaub, but as a self-reproducing activity
commanded by organisms which allowed them to respond to stimuli. According to
Röschlaub, excitability accounted for reception to stimuli in a mechanist sense but
also for the organism's own inherent activity ("Selbstwirksamkeit") in an idealist
sense (101, §287; 337, 106-7; 288, 67). Novalis had also most probably read
Schelling's Erster Entwu,feines Systems der Naturphilosophie (108) where
Röschlaub's notions were taken up and developed. Indeed, Schelling developed and
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deepened his close links to Röschlaub, going to Bamberg in 1800 to collaborate
successfully with him and to lecture there at the university (288, 65).
In the medical context at the end of the eighteenth century in Germany,
excitability came to mean an active state of the body. The philosophy of Kant and
Fichte played some role in establishing this view. According to Risse, it was
Kant's notion of what a science should be that made physicians deem it necessary
to give medicine an authoritative status through philosophical means (288, 69; 262;
263). Excitability could not be used as an a priori principle of true science in
Kant's sense if it still had occult connotations. It was possibly Fichte's
Wissenschafislehre of 1794 and 1795, according to Tsouyopoulos, which, by its
use of dialectics, gave excitability theory philosophical authority (288, 70-71). In
the same way that Fichte established a relationship between subject and object at
the level of consciousness, thereby giving philosophical status to the subject, so too
could a relationship between organism (subject) and environment (object) be found
in the notion of excitability. Thus, in accordance with Kant's demands, excitability
was turned into a principle which eschewed the occult yet still gave significance to
excitability, as Schelling argues:
Das dritte System setzt den Organismus als Subjekt und Objekt, Thatigkeit und Receptivitãt
zugleich, und eben diese Wechselbestinunung der Receptivitat und der Thätigkeit in Einen Begriff
gefafit, ist nichts anderes als was Brown Erregbarkeit genannt hat (108, 90).
Novalis makes use of Fichte's thought in a different manner to come to his own
conclusions about the relationship of excitability theory to the activities of the
mind. It is in this way that Novalis employs Fichte's idea of knowledge to arrive at
suggestions for the pathology of knowledge formation. What Novalis saw in
Fichte's thought was the ultimate phenomenon of the self-generation of thought.
Thought was an organizing force, part of Nature's greater generative and creative
powers:
Fichtes Phil[osophiej ist em Denkerzeugungsprocefi oder Orgarnsationsproc[eBi - em Phaenomèn
selbst, oder em Factum (N, 3,477).
Novalis wished to apply Fichtian "active", self-reflexive thought to the forces of
excitability, for he further notes down: "Begriff der thatigen Reitzbarkeit und
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Sensibilitaer" (N, 3, 477). However, Novalis goes beyond Fichte's notion of
thought to employ his own notion of transreflexivity: he would appear to be
suggesting that through self-conscious thought, some control can be had over the
forces of excitability, and also that through the transreflexivity of these thought
processes, a further enhancement or improvement in one's pathology can be
attained. Before coming to the thought processes that Novalls is speaking of here,
we have first to introduce in more detail their counterparts at the level of strict
pathology, namely irritability and sensibility.'8
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2.2. "Sensibilität" and the constitution.
Both Novalis and Schelling believed that "Sensibilität" was a deoxidation process
of the nerve which led to irritability (oxidation of the muscles). Novalis remarks,
"Das Oxigene nimmt an Masse im Verhältni.B der Zunahme der Sensib[ilitaetj ab"
(N, 3, 659). Schelling interprets these physiological processes in the light of the
thesis of S.T.Sommering (1755-1830) that high mental development was revealed
in a paucity of nerves (107, 562; 337, 98). Schelling regards an organism's
"capacity", which is the amount of oxygen an organism can take in, that is, its
irritability, as a sign of instability, and views "Sensibilität" as the highest, most
stable organic force. Schelling further puts down an organism's freedom from
mechanical causes to its sensibility, and views this as a movement of the organism
away from the mechanical actions of irritability:
So hat also die Natur, indem sie die Bewegung der WillkUr ganz zu Uberantworten schien, sic durch
Erhohung der Sensibilitat der Willkür wieder emzogen; denn die Bewegungen der empfindlichsten
Thiere sind auch am wenigsten willkürlich, und uingekehrt, die grofite Willkur der Bewegungen ist
in den tragen Geschöpfen. So nimmt mit steigender Sensibilität des Nervensystems das WillkUrliche
(Abgemessene) der Bewegungen durch die ganze Reihe der Organisationen, und sogar in Individuen
derselben Gattung (nach Verschiedenheit des Geschlechts, Klimas, Temperaments u.s.w.)
regelmãBig ab (107, 563).
As has been seen with Novalis's views of the relationship of Fichte's thought to
excitability, Novalis wishes to extend the excitability debate into the realm of
thought, and, ultimately, he wishes to apply excitability theory to cultural
development itself. Novalis sees the dangers of what he views as his too sensible,
"asthenic" age and wishes to counteract this trend. For Novalis viewed an
organism's "capacity", that is, its irritability, as playing an important role in the
stability of the constitution (337, 97-100). This view of the importance of
irritability to the pathological constitution is reflected in his notion of a possible
form of irritable thought. Novalis comments on the fragile state of knowledge in
his age:
Wir sahen vorhin, daB Bildung und Vermehrung der Seele das wichtigste und erste Untemehmen
ist. AuBere Reitze haben wir schon in unsrer Hand - und mit ihnen die Reitzbarkeit - es kommt nur
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vorzuglich auf Vermehrung und Bildung der Sensibilitaet und zwar auf die Weise an, daB die
Reitzbarkeit und der äuBre Reitz nicht dabey leiden, nicht dabey vernachlassigt werden - denn sonst
webt man em sehr zerreifibares Gewebe, und em Gewebe der Penelope ... (N, 3, 318).
Although Novalis here emphasizes the fact that man must concentrate on the
"Bildung der Seele" and its sensibility, he proposes a method that takes account of
irritability ("die Reitzbarkeit und der äuflere Reitz"). Furthermore, "Sensibilitaet"
here refers to sensibility in its cultural context. With "Sensibilität", Novalis is
referring to all of man's forms of knowing, and not to the pathological force of
sensibility alone. Novalis also refers to irritability as an external condition, and in
this sense he is speaking literally of the effect of the environment or medicaments
or other such possible "external" factors on man's constitution. Yet the general gist
of the comment, as other remarks of Novalis show, points to the possibility of
"internal" irritable "sthenic" factors, that is, of the "physical", "phenomenal"
nature of knowing. "Irritable" forms of knowledge are those such as "Gefuhl",
"Reflexion" and "Plastisirung". These particular "sthenic" activities of the mind
are used with the "asthenic" activities of the mind, reason, speculation and
abstraction, to keep the constitution stable and healthy. A constitution which was
too asthemc should use sthenic means to obtain a healthy balance, and a sthenic
constitution should employ asthenic means. Novalis remarked about his own
asthenic, over-excitable state:
Durch Abstraction wird die Reitzbarkeit vennehrt. Zuviel Abstraction erzeugt Asthenie - zuviel
Reflexion Sthenie. Ich mufi viel reflectiren und nicht viel abstrahiren. Ich bin schon reitzbar genug
(N, 3, 289).
However, these irritable forms of thought are not only an important factor (in
conjunction with the sensible ones) in the healthy balance of the constitution, but
they are also crucial for the attainment of truth. They indeed play a major role in
inquiry itself, for they are those concrete forms of thought which mediate between
theory and phenomena, and which play so key a role in natural philosophical
productivity.
It should be noted that Novalis's notion of sensibility has to be viewed in the light
of his knowledge programme, where the final goal is the union of the conceptual
and the concrete (in "Figurworte" and "Wortflguren"). Here, sensibility is a grand
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process, it is the process of knowledge attainment, and the analogous "creative",
organized processes in Nature. Novalis places particular emphasis on "irritable"
activities, since the creator of "Figurworte", in the process of "plastisiren" in the
"Experimentalmethode" is the "Genie" (N, 3, 123-4). Nature, too, in her
"Chiffernschrift" is essentially "plasticizing". Thus, the danger of the fragile web
("em sehr zerreifibares Gewebe"), i.e. the process of sensibility, which does, in the
process of attaining knowledge, necessarily contain abstracter asthenic activities,
can be avoided and made "robust" through analogous concrete forms of knowledge
("Plastisiren"). In the terms of Novalis's knowledge programme, the asthenic
forms of knowledge, have, in a progressive unification with concrete sthenic
activities ("Hin und Her"), to move towards a higher, concrete way of "knowing"
and concrete theorizing, where, like Nature, they would be permanently
"plasticizing", and knowledge would be both experience and activity. Here, in the
genius's "Experimentalmethode", "experiment" is the epitome of experiential
knowledge.'9
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2.3. Freyes Nachdenken": generating knowledge within the bounds of the
constitution.
In the sense of the "constitution" of knowledge itself, those entities at the higher
end of the Chain of Being, the "Ideen", are kept in a healthy state by the irritable
forms of knowledge, since "Gefühl" and "Begeisterung" help maintain the
generative drive in knowledge itself, the "Wissenstrieb":
Durch unaufhörliches freyes Nachdenken muB man sich begeistern. Hat man gar keine Zeit zum
Liberschauen, zum freyen Meditiren, zum ruhigen Durchlaufen und Betrachten in verschiednen
Stimmungen, so schlaft selbst die fruchtbarste Fantasie em, und die innre Manrnchfaltigkeit hört
auf. Für die Dichter ist nichts nüzlicher als eine fluchtige Betrachtung der vielen Weltgegenstãnde
und ihrer Eigenschaften, so wie der mancherley Wissenschaften.
Ich lese jezt zu wemg und meditire zu wenig.
Wieder etwas Chymie - Physik - Geographie - Geschichte[.1 - Alte Kroniken etc. Don Qu[ichote.]
Shaksp[eare.1 Göthe. Tiek. Boccaz (N, 3, 655).
This observation can be understood as a series of practical hints as to how to
reactivate the "Wissenstrieb". The suggestions are a useful aid for any inquirer,
including the scientist, perhaps, stagnating in excessive laboratory work. "Freyes
Nachdenken" opens up new possibilities. In accordance with Novalis's notion of a
"Combinatorik", the free play of thought allows man to operate using the grand
"Sympathie" of things and to move between various modes of knowing. Elsewhere
Novalis speaks in a similar manner of the need for viewing knowledge in terms of
the balance of one's constitution:
Höher kanns der Mensch nicht bringen, als daB er einsieht, weiches Wissen sich just für seine Stufe
pafit - für die Dauer und Constitution seines Lebens - und den Wissenstrieb nicht krankhaft
begUnstigt - ihn in Harmonie mit semen ubrigen Krãften und Anlagen läBt (N, 3, 600-601).
The process of knowledge demands to be conducted with self-awareness, so that it
advantages and does not harm the investigator. "Freyes Nachdenken" can both
afford a welcome break from inquiry as well as provide the material, perhaps, for
innovations and breakthroughs.
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2.4. Werner's encyclopaedic methodology: the consiirurive rules of general and
personal inquiry.
As already remarked, a full study of the relationship between Novalis and Werner
cannot be undertaken here. I wish instead briefly to recapitulate the points made in
the introduction, and, further, to consider an important part of Werner's thought,
namely his teaching methods, which are reflected in his idea of an encyclopaedic
methodology. It will be suggested that a highly significant aspect of Werner's
influence on Novalis (and, one can conclude, on his other students) lay not only
within the realm of general methodology, but also specifically within the area of
personal knowledge.
Werner's theory itself ought to be understood as practical theory, as Novalis
himself points out:
Werner hat die Theorie eines speciellen Beobachtungsprocesses geliefert - Auf diesem Grunde kann
man weiter bauen -
AIlg[emeineJ Theorie des Beobachtens und Experimentirens - und Einzelne, specielle Processe, als
Beyspiele.
Prac:ische Theorie d[es] B[eobachtensj und Exp[erimentirensj (N, 3, 437).
One can say that Werner's mineralogical classification system, his "theory", is
actually more concerned with the practice of inquiry than "theory" itself. In the
above remark, Novalis wishes to extend Werner's more tacit remarks on
methodology in his classification system to an explicit theory of practice. As will
be discussed below, Werner approaches the issues of practice explicitly in his
teaching method. Part of Werner's "Beobachtungsprocess" is concerned with
directly theorizing with phenomena, and this is how Werner approaches the task of
classifying rocks. This aspect of Werner's thought involves issues of tacit
knowledge, since it implies the necessity of having a "feel" for phenomena, and,
also, for the reason that observation of phenomena is undertaken within a
theoretical framework of open-ended concepts or paradigmatic types. Thus, his
theory both offers a method for investigating phenomena and provides
mineralogical or geognostical schemes with which the individual inquirer can carry
out his research. It isrthis sense that one can argue that Werner was concerned with
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setting constitutive rules and providing some form of a presuppositional framework
for inquiry.
As has been seen, Novalis extrapolates from Werner's practical theory to suggest
that in a "phenomenal" calculus Werner's types could be combined to further
inquiry. Following this train of thought, Novalis also refers to Werner's
classification system as a sign language: "die Zeicbenlehre der äufiern
Kennzeichen" (N, 3, 141). Clearly, in Werner's working method, and in his
classification system itself, Novalis saw a form of his own idea of concrete
notation that he later developed. This is, arguably, a major influence on Novalis's
own idea of consensuality in the sciences, as will be further illustrated in Novalis's
reception of Ritter's work.
To complete the picture of the importance of Werner's thought for Novalis in
terms of setting constitutive rules for inquiry, one must also consider the
methodological part of Werner's notion of encyclopaedism. The "Methodologie" of
Werner's encyclopaedic programme acts in parallel with the "theoretical" part:
importantly, both parts form the whole picture of Werner's idea of encyclopaedic
inquiry. His encyclopaedic theory aims to provide interdisciplinarity; to
complement this, the encyclopaedic methodology is concerned with the equally
important part of inquiry for Werner, the all-round education of the individual. In
this part of Werner's encyclopaedism particular emphasis is laid upon the manner
in which the individual comes to terms with theory ("die Regein des subjectiv
zweckmäfiigen Studiums und Exercitiums"). According to Novalis, Werner's
methodology further suggests that theory has to accommodate the individual's
needs ("Karacter des Kopfs"), and that the individual has to practice and inquire
beyond his own discipline ("Neben und HUlfsstudien"). Part of Werner's
methodology also involves the organization of studies themselves; here it is implied
that the individual's ordered use of his time is, too, a necessary part of any
approach to inquiry ("Ordnung und Folge der BeschAftigungen") (N, 3, 394-395).
This is a broad programme of education that is aimed at helping the individual get
the most out of theory, and, more importantly, himself, in his studies. In this way,
"theory" as such is relegated, and the manner in which the individual comes to
terms with knowledge is placed at the forefront. This activity is, it would seem,
indispensable to theory itself. Not only does Werner stress the practical skills
needed for inquiry, but also, significantly, the manner in which the inquirer comes
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at all to attain knowledge. Consequently, it can be perhaps be suggested that the
methodological part of Werner's encyclopaedism treats the essential basis of all
inquiry, namely the way the individual comes to terms with knowledge and the
world. This is an essential aspect of Werner's constitutive rules for inquiry, and, in
its programmatic nature as part of a notion of encyclopaedism, must have
influenced Novalis's own broad views on practical knowledge and the healthy
experimenter.
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2.5. Freyes Nachdenken" in practice: mechanics, excitability and Ritter.
To conclude this section on Novalis's idea of the experimenter, it is appropriate to
give an illustration of just what "freyes Nachdenken" looked like in practice. An
example of this can be found in Dos aligemeine Brouillon - itself a mass of "freyes
Nachdenken" - in a remark of Novalis's where he approaches some fundamental
physical statements in terms of excitability theory. He carries this act of thought
out with his "phenomenaF' calculus, and thereby relativizes notions of excitability
and physics in a process of concrete theorizing. In this remark, Novalis speaks in
one breath of uniting excitability theory and Newtonian mechanics: mechanics and
excitability are, in Novalis's view, only relative schemes employed by scientists.
Indeed, Novalis would prefer to approach these forces in a way analogous to
Ritter's stance on galvanism. Rifler, as will be seen, relativized the current
schemes in the galvanic debate (briefly stated: Volta's notion of contact electricity
and Humboldt's idea of a specific life force), to arrive at a more fundamental
notion of galvanism, the purposive constant galvanic life force. This force
expresses a deeper level of theory which effects both notions of contact electricity
and an animal life force. In this style Novalis wished to approach excitability and
mechanics:
Umsiofiung der Gr[und]gesetze d[er] Mechanik - und Erregungstheorie.
Keine Bewegung ohne Sollicitation etc.
Meine Sätze:
Alle Bewegung und Erregung entsteht nur d[urch] Bewegung und Erregung.
Reitz und Beweglichkeit sind nur Verhãltnisse von Bewegungen.
Alles was erscheint z.B. Bew[egung] und Erreg[ung], war schon vorher da.
Aller sog[enannterl Reitz stört die Bewegung und Erregung vielmehr - polarisirt sie - und nun wird
sie, als gestorte Bewegung und Erregung sichtbar.
So unordentlich und confus diese Sätze auch sind so reichen sie doch zu - die Substantialitaet - und
UrsprUnglichkeit dEer] Bew[egung] und Erreglung] und die Verkehrtheit des bisherigen Sãtze, die
nur relative Gultigkeit behalten, darzuthun. (vid. Ritters galv[anische] Versuche.) (N, 3, 387-388).
Although Novalis calls his propositions "confus", they are more or less quite
coherent, and constitute a stance in many ways typical of early Romantic science.
Characteristically, they aim to discover final causes in new ways. Novalis's
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comments appear to be aimed at unreflective scientific views, that of common
Newtonianism and that of crude Brunonianism. Firstly, Novalis posits the
overturning of conventional mechanics: "Umstoflung der Gr[und]gesetze d[er]
Mechanik ...". This "UmstoIung" effectively entails a denial of Newtonianism and
its physics, as it was commonly received in Novalis's time (276, 27-38), and of its
primary role as a paradigm and basis of modern science. By the same token, he
denies "Erregungstheorie", representative of the human sphere, but - like
mechanics - so Novalis appears to think, based on laws of cause and effect. Both
mechanics and the German Brunonian notion of excitability are based, in his view,
on action and reaction: "Keine Bewegung ohne Sollicitation". In contrast to the
model of thinking established from Galileo to Newton, which interprets the actions
of matter in terms of mechanical causes and effects (or in terms of mechanically
conceived forces like "gravity"), Novalis proposes seemingly circular "Sätze", in
which "Alle Bewegung und Erregung entsteht nur d[urch} Bewegung und
Erregung". He thinks not in terms of the laws of motion, which describe states,
actions, and reactions of bodies, but - in a non-Newtonian way - seeks the cause of
motion, which he finds in motion itself, i.e. in the autogenesis of movement. It is a
perspective developed out of the philosophy of Kant and Fichte, and applied with
startling results to science. On Newton's theory, the cause of gravity notoriously
originated outside of matter, e.g. "in the breast of God" 20; thus, on the traditional
reading, Newtonian physics rests on a framework of theology which lies beyond
physics, and outside of the sphere of scientific inquiry; Novalis's quasi-tautological
laws, by contrast, in fitting with his pantheism, seek to ground a physics in terms
of a transcendent force throughout Nature. Whereas Newton's laws deal in matter,
motion, rest, and so on (which can be interpreted together in terms of "force"),
Novalis seeks a single first principle, a "motion" itself, from which further
consequences arise; the phenomena of "Reitz" and "Beweglichkeit" are simply
manifestations of this first principle, and in this sense they are "relations"
("Verhältnisse"), which previously existed in the original "motion" ("Alles was
erscheint ... war schon vorher da"). This leads to a reinterpretation of action or
"Reitz" as a disturbance of "Bewegung" and "Erregung". On this theory,
"polarity" does not appear to be a primary phenomena, but, rather, the product of
a disturbance in the original process of "movement". In the same manner, to
Novalis, the polar forces of the German Brunonians, "Irritibilität" and
"Sensibilität", and their notions of polar physiological states, "Reizbarkeit" and
"Erregbarkeit", are secondary phenomena. It follows that Ritter's notion of a
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constant galvanic force was, for Novalis, a major step towards an understanding of
a fundamental process, and indeed towards a "proor of the fallacy
("Verkehrtheit") of traditional views of physics and organization. Schelling, too,
was well aware of this point, for he expressly welcomed Ritter's work on
galvanism, and viewed it as an important extension to the excitability debate (see
chapter four). As can be seen from this example, Novalis's form of "freyes
Nachdenken" is highly productive, and illustrates clearly how the experimenter or
inquirer can have recourse to creative sources within himself, which also,
importantly, help maintain the balance of his constitution.
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Chapter Three
Unifying theory
The possibility of natural philosophical productivity as a programme for classifying
the sciences.
1. Introduction. "Symbolische Physik", "Muster" and "Calcül". Intimations of a
progranune for natural philosophical productivity to unify theory.
2. Phosphorus and the pneumatic debate in the 1 7) 's: consensualizy,
"phenomenal" calculus, practical social knowledge and the dramatic aesthetics of
scientific productivity.
2.1. Phosphorus's role for consensualizy and for "phenomenal" calculus: "Muster
des Experimenrirens" and "Experimentencalcul".
2.2. Phosphorus 's role in practical social knowledge and in the dramatic aesthetics
of scientific productivity.
3. Phosphorus and matter theory: the breadth of the possible programme for
natural philosophical productivity.
3.1. The ramifications of the pneumatic debate for matter theory: the possible
extension of Novalis 's programme.
3.2. The possible extension of Novalis 's programme in deflagration experiments.
3.3. Novalis 's own extension of his programme in his ideas on the use of
phosphorus for matter theory: cosmological modelling.
4. Excursus: aspects of a/chemical texts on one of Nova/is 's book lists and their
sign jficance for his idea of science.
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1. Introduction. "Symbolische Physik", "Muster" and "CalcQl". Intimations of a
progranvne for natural philosophical producuvily to unify theory.
The subject of this chapter, Novalis's "symbolische Physik", will lead us to
consider the possibility of natural philosophical productivity as a programme for
unifying theory, and immediately raises the question of the social orientation of
Novalis's work. To what extent did Novalis see his views on the sciences as
practicable for a community? To what extent does Novalis's thought deal with
knowledge as a social construct? The next chapter also raises these questions, but
approaches the issues in terms of the consensual implications of the unification of
practice.' However, this chapter is tentative in its views about the practicability of
Novalis's notion of a "symbolische Physik" for a community of inquirers, but this
chapter is quite clear in its view that Novalis's notion of knowledge is not a social
construct.
The social elements of Novalis's thought have to be seen as a form of practical
knowledge. The intellectual determinents are so embedded in the sociological
aspects that one cannot speak of social construction alone. 2 Novalis takes up a
stance that allows for a breadth of intellectualism - in his notions of practical
knowledge and in his views on the links of the purposiveness of nature and man's
consciousness - and also accounts for social elements of knowledge. Through his
emphasis on productivity this is a stance that mediates between social and
epistemological elements of knowledge. Taking the case of phosphorus, he argues,
like Goethe, for the epistemological value of "phenomenal bases" for research
programmes, as well as the clear sociological aspects of such bases - since they are
supposed to be used by a community. 3
 It will be shown how phosphorus was the
phenomenal base for many a question posed by the inquirer in the pneumatic
debate. Thus, in Novalis's emphasis on knowledge formation or productivity,
social and intellectual elements of knowledge fall together, yet with a clear
emphasis, in a non-relativist manner, on epistemology and cognitive gain.
Taking a closer look at possible points where knowledge could be deemed a social
construct, we can see that Novalis's notions of knowledge cannot be profitably
interpreted in terms of the effects of institutions and power alone. If anything, if
these sort of sociological elements are there, Novalis makes the suggestion that
such institutional differences should be overcome in open debate in the lecture
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theatre. Secondly, he argues that such differences are to be overcome through a
consensuality based upon the topic of inquiry, and not upon aspects of an
institution. This may sound like a more utopian form of sociology, but, none the
less, the goals are not set as high as, for example, in von Molnár's interpretation of
a communicative social construct. In the social aspects of Novalis's programme of
knowledge for unifying theory we have a lower level form of consensuality,
suggested in a symbol such as phosphorus; further, this is coupled with the quite
legitimate and sensible suggestion that scientists should defend their views in
debate. Moreover, related to the idea of debate, as Novalis comments, is the use of
the dramatic value of a good experiment in a lecture hall. This is again a socially
oriented form of knowledge, but the epistemological issues thoroughly outweigh
any notion of the social construction of knowledge. The use of a good experiment -
such as a dramatically convincing one - is, of course, more then drama alone.
Firstly, such an experiment is bound up with the theoretical scientific issues it is
dealing with, and has the potential to communicate these issues. Secondly, such an
experiment has to be viewed in terms of its epistemological element as experiential
knowledge for its spectators: cognitive gain is available through the experiment for
each individual.
Novalis's idea of socially oriented practical knowledge in his programme
designed to unify theory is expressed in terms such as "symbolische Physik" or
"die Formularwissenschaft oder Kunst der Natur" (N, 3, 175). These more socially
oriented terms - which suggest a usable system of symbols - are, to a certain
extent, also used by Novalis in the sense of his perhaps less socially oriented
notion, "Plotins Physik". As with "Plotins Physik", it is the task of a symbolic
physics to find out the key elements to be used in a "phenomenal" calculus of
inquiry, and Novalis calls such a key element for symbolic physics "das Formular"
or "Muster" (N, 3, 175) - Novalis sees just such a "Muster" or key element of
inquiry in phosphorus.4
Importantly, the construction of a symbolic system for the sciences and its
development in the "phenomenal" calculus of inquiry, itself indeed a large claim,
fits into Novalis's expectations of this time. He was thinking of such grand
systems, such as the related encyclopaedic programme in Das ailgemeine
Brouillon. In his later thoughts there is, arguably, a move away from such large
projects towards the individual attainments of an inquirer such as Ritter. None the
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less, even if the massive undertaking of such a symbolic science was not realized
by Novalis - in the present state of Novalis scholarship more symbols for such a
programme still have to be found -, there is evidence that phosphorus did act as a
consensual metaphor for the pneumatic debate. Thus, there are grounds for saying
that Novalis saw in phosphorus the sort of "Muster" he desired for his symbolic
physics. However, even given these undoubtable social orientations, the manner in
which Novalis refers to phosphorus as a "Muster des Experimentirens" would
appear to point more to its general use as a paradigm for inquiry and to the
epistemological aspects of inquiry. Novalis, it seems, is more concerned with the
application of the symbols of inquiry than nominating members of such a system of
symbols required for a large scale programme. Thus, his ideas on a programme for
natural philosophical productivity remain more at the level of methodology - and
this will become particularly apparent in the next chapter. Characteristically,
Novalis's remark on the "Muster" of phosphorus is almost inundated with
reference to "experiment":
Vervie fal:igung - Wiederholung - Zertheilung - (Addition - Multiplication - Exponenziation etc.)
von Experunenten. Zusammensetzung von Ecperimenten.
(Experimentencalcul.)
Erperimennren ist gewissermaafien mchts, als calculiren.
(Aller Calcül ist Analytisch - inventorisch)
Muster des Experimentirens.(Phosphor - Kampfer) (N, 3, 435).
In this observation Novalis, in line with his experiential notion of knowledge, is
stating above all the precedent of experiment over theory itself. Consistent with his
concept of practical knowledge Novalis is implying that more fundamental to
knowledge and the sciences are not the formulation of theoretical statements or the
testing of hypotheses, but how one obtains the theory in the first place, and also as
the notion of "experimental calculus" suggests, a constant recall to experience, a
calculus forever turning to "experiment". He is referring to calculus of literal series
of experiments in the laboratory, and to the calculus of images in the mind.
Novalis's notion of "experimental calculus" is "Analytisch" in the sense of having
predictive ability ("inventorisch"), analogous to the mathematical "analytical
calculus", and is a method of speeding up the process of knowledge gaining, which
is also of use, in Novalis's eyes, for the open chemical debate.
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In his notions of "Experimentencalcul" and "Muster" Novalis is speaking of a
calculus where a constant factor is selected, as part of the notation. Novalis
chooses phosphorus and camphor as particularly significant chemical phenomena
("Muster") to be used in this manner. In this context, he wished to sees them as a
phenomenal base for a calculus around which theory in the pneumatic debate could
orientate itself. "Expenmentencalcul" does not imply random experiments or the
attempt to calculate "infinite" rows of experiments. Novalis wishes to supply
inquiry with a phenomenal base that always directs the scientist's attention to the
key phenomena. The consensuality of such symbols carry both sociological and
epistemological implications, in their use by inquirers and in their cognitive
elements for the individual or group of scientists, respectively.
As will be seen, the reason why phosphorus and camphor were paradigms
("Muster") of experimentation lay also in their usefulness for Novalis's own
notions of chemistry and matter theory. Phosphorus was, however, outside
Novalis's thoughts, a commonly used substance in experimentation, and can thus
be seen as a common paradigm for chemical inquiry. The very usefulness of the
substances phosphorus and camphor for inquiry suggests to Novalis that the
substances are in a way analogous to theory itself. To Novalis they are so
exemplary of physical and chemical action that they can provide a concrete link
between phenomena and theory. In this way, the substances have proven
themselves as worthy enough to be elevated to principles for natural philosophical
productivity, and, as Novalis implies, they can be employed as the basis of a
"phenomenal" calculus for chemical inquiry. It should be added that it was
common chemical practice to make use of analogies between substances, and
Novalis's idea attempts to give this natural philosophical justification. Of course,
the scope of natural philosophical productivity's goals go beyond unreflective
empirical inquiry. Yet, in another sense, and as for example in this case of the
common use of analogy in chemistry, Novalis's ideas here can be seen as an
attempt to express the tacit practices of the empirical inquirer. One can speak of
tacit practice, or at a more reflective level, one sees again the meaning of Novalis's
rhetoric of experiment. Here, one can note how experiment is based upon the
variation around the constant notation of phosphorus, i.e. re-experiencing a key
phenomenon in a productive way. The rhetoric lies in these aesthetic and practical
elements of natural philosophical productivity.
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Further, necessarily implicit in Novalis's reference to "Experimentencalcul" is
also the idea that chemistry itself is a paradigm for knowledge, since the two
substances are used in the context of chemical experimentation. But it is a
particular form of "Chemie" which Novalis is referring to, that of a general
"Physik". Like Schelling, he argues, for instance, in the Freiberger
naturwissenschafthic/ze Siudien, that "Chemie" is more important than traditional
mechanics for an understanding of matter, since mechanics only deals with
"Gewicht" and "Ortsveränderung":
Ortsveranderung ist der Bewegung mcht wesentlich ... Die Mechanik hat nicht mit Korpern sondern
nur mit Gewichten zu thun (N, 3, 77).
More essential to matter theory are the internal processes in matter, which is what
chemistry concerns itself with. Importantly, the sort of chemisiry that Novalis is
working on is the chemistry which overlaps with physics. This goes beyond
Lavoisier's (1743-1794) chemistry, for although Lavoisier also incorporated
physics into his chemistry through the notion of "caloric", he refused to broach the
broader physics of a deeper level of matter theory. The sort of "physics" that
Novalis espouses is the "physics" which goes beyond mechanics to account for
dynamism and forces such as affinity. Novalis - in common with many
contemporaries - perhaps viewed Lavoisier's chemistry as akin to the French
revolution, which he saw negatively as a triumph of reason, as opposed to of
spirit. 5 Similarly, for Novalis, Lavoisier's chemistry evaded important issues. One
could say it avoided the theoretical problems of the "spirit" of inquiry, being more
concerned with rapidly setting up a "state" for chemistry. This view of Novalis's
will be further substantiated in the course of this chapter. Further, a variety of
views held by Novalis will be discussed in the context of his broad understanding
of chemistry. Novalis does not hold back from introducing subjects such as
excitability or digestion to enhance his notion of matter theory. An occult notion
such as "Sympathie" is also, understandably, given its ontological importance for
Novalis, drawn into his thoughts in this area. In Das ailgemeine Brouillon Novalis
speaks, for example, of how the world and man are driven by "Lust und Unlust"
(N, 3, 423). There are also a variety of remarks made by Novalis which are not so
speculative. As mentioned, these types of remarks orientate themselves around the
justifiable concerns of the Romantics, and other strictly empirical inquirers, over
the need for a discussion of forces going beyond Lavoisier's notion of chemistry.
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2. Phosphorus and the pneumatic debate in the 1 7) 's.
2.1. Phosphorus's role for consensualizy and for phenomenal calculus: "Muster des
Experimentirens" and "Experimentencalcul".
Phosphorus was the substance most replete with implications for Novalis's
thought; camphor is also of significance but not to so great an extent and will be
dealt with more briefly. Looking into the history of phosphorus, it becomes evident
why Novalis should have selected it as a tool for inquiry and as a paradigm for
experimentation. Ever since its discovery by the alchemist Hennig Brand around
1674 (252, 62) phosphorus combusted its way through the latter part of the
seventeenth century and throughout the eighteenth century, igniting chemical
theory.
Most obviously, phosphorus was used in many fundamental experiments on
combustion and the constitution of air. Robert Boyle (1626-1691), for example,
having been given some notion of how to prepare phosphorus in 1677 by Kraffi
(who had bought the secret off Brand) (252, 62), went on to produce and use
phosphorus in his work on combustion in 168 1/82, recorded in his New
Experiments, and Observations, made upon the Icy Nocriluca (14). Here he
remarks, after reporting on closing phosphorus in a glass tube, that "the air bad
some vital substance preyed upon or else tamed by the fumes of the phosphorus" 6
Boyle also undertook substantial work on the properties of phosphorus itself.7
Stephen Hales (1677-1761) employs phosphorus in his experiments on combustion
in his celebrated work of 1727 Vegetable Staticks (48). 8 Carl Wilhelm Scheele
(1742-1786), the discoverer of oxygen, experimented with phosphorus in his work
of 1777 on combustion, Chemische Abhandlung von der Lufi und dem Feuer
(103). 9 Further, in the pneumatics debate of the 1790's, phosphorus was again
used, as in the above cases, to serve as a major tool in the inquiry into combustion.
The mysterious properties of phosphorus, such as its glowing in the dark and its
spontaneous combustion, presumably also stimulated interest amongst the
alchemists, since they concerned themselves above all with the effect of heat on
substances in general (252, 65). Phosphorus is, too, of significance in the light of
the alchemical sulphur-mercury theory. This was a tradition based upon the ideas
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of the Arabian alchemist, Jabir ibn Hayyan (720-813), who maintained that all
metals were composed of sulphur and mercury, and his theory was taken up by
most alchemists in their quest to bring about the transmutation of metals. It
survived until the arrival of the phlogiston theory late in the seventeenth century
(201, 75). The theory also lived on, although modified, in Paracelsus' (1493-1541)
spagyric alchemy. Paracelsus's three primary principles, the tria prima, also known
as the "hypostatical principles", were salt, sulphur and mercury (201, 174). These
particular substances were however not taken literally by alchemists, they were
rather understood in a symbolic or hypothetical sense. For example, sulphur, as an
alchemical principle, signified combustible substances in general (201, 75, 174-
175).'° It is as a symbol of combustion that phosphorus, like sulphur, might have
taken up a position at the heart of alchemical thought." Indeed, in the alchemical
work Quadratum aichymisticum (87), which is on Novalis's book list early on in
the Freiberger naturwissenschafihiche Studien (N, 3, 34-35), there is a very
probable reference to sulphur' 2 in the above sense, as a hypothetical substance, in a
symbolic diagram and scheme for the proposed path to attain the "Lapis
Philosophorum" (87, 78) (see below, fig.3).
Fig. 3. Aichemical symbolism in Quadratum alchymisticum, (1705).
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The symbol of the eagle represents "die Weise und Röthe Is" (87, 73), i.e. the
hypothetical "sulphur", which was indeed common in aichemical usage. The
aichemical symbolism in the diagram also throws light on the concrete nature of
Novalis's idea of a notation of the imagination and on the symbolic, paradigmatic
significance Novalis attached to phosphorus. Aichemical symbolism does indeed
bear considerable similarities to the type of concrete theorizing which Novalis
argues for.'3
Furthermore the term "phosphorus" was always symbolic of all carriers of light,
since it literally means "light-bearing", its roots lying in "4ws" (phos) = "light",
and "4)Opos" (phorus) = "bearing". It also had direct associations in an
etymological and occult sense with Lucifer (lux = "light", and ferre = "to
carry"), and hence also with Venus, the morning star. So phosphorus was a loaded
concept and substance, always redolent of something more than its strict chemical
meamng.
Thus, even before the pneumatic debate in the 1790's, phosphorus was, to use
Novalis's expression, exemplary ("Muster") amongst chemical substances. The
historical meaning and the use of phosphorus both supported Novalis's view that
the sciences had to be understood in the broadest sense of "knowledge". Science
had to take account of productivity in discovery processes (the sense behind such
an alchemical recipe as the one illustrated above), and, further, science had in a
variety of ways to approach matter theory with an eye to forces and purposiveness.
Novalis's view was, however, a forward-looking approach, for he did not wish
phosphorus to be viewed as exemplary in the sense of the particular symbolic
associations it had for alchemists. Instead, he strove in his remarks to identify
phosphorus as a symbol of the emerging science of modern chemistry. This did not
exclude older views. He wished the modern scientist to maintain an imaginative
state of mind such as an alchemist's, while relinquishing aichemical theory, and
instead to insert a symbol such as phosphorus into the newest chemical theory.
Further implied in the notion of a "Muster" is the fact that phosphorus was the
symbol of all pneumatic theory in the 1790's. Like an alchemical principle, it was
an approximation of the theory; or, in an epistemological sense, phosphorus was
the concretization of theory. This is no speculative leap of Novalis's. Rather, it can
be understood as an attempt to keep the complexity of the as yet unresolved
pneumatics debate under a single denominator. In terms of Novalis's
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"Experimentaiphilosophie", the use of phosphorus as a symbol afforded the
scientist the possibility of linking the various theories to experience, and, indeed,
back to the experiments in the laboratories themselves, where the phosphorus was
vividly burning, physically and in the imagination. Just how much phosphorus was
used in the phenomenal calculus of the pneumatic debate remains now to be
shown.
Phosphorus's role in the pneumatics debate ought not to be underplayed. For
example in Gren's Neues Journal der Physik (73), in the years 1795-1797,
phosphorus is the subject matter of no less than thirteen articles, twelve of those
alone in the volumes published in 1795 and 1796. In Scherer's Ailgemeines Journal
der Chemie (5) phosphorus is the subject of two letters and six articles in 1798, of
one article in 1799, and of five in 1800. There is, in this experimental context,
considerable variation in the theories on pneumatics and combustion. Moreover,
given the sheer amount of work carried out in this area, it is not difficult to
apprehend just how important pneumatics were for the chemistry of the time.
Pneumatics were important alone for Lavoisier's elemental chemistry, but
pneumatics and its broader implications were also highly significant for 'Physik'
when attempts were made to go further than Lavoisier's chemistry to defme deeper
levels of matter theory, as in the area of affinity, and, as with notions which were
precursors to some idea of energy. Eighteenth century "Physik" clearly had broad
parameters, and included chemistry, as can be seen, for example, from Gehier's
Physikalisches WOrterbuch (37), to which Peter Kapitza has drawn attention (322,
22):
Physik, Naturlehre, Naturkunde, Naturwissenschaft. Diesen Namen führt die gesanfle Lehre von
der Natur oder Körperwelt, oder von den Eigenschaften, Krãften und Wirkungen der Korper. Im
weitlaufigsten Sinne des Wortes gehört zur Naturwissenschaft alles, was jemals Uber die Körper
erfabren oder gedacht worden ist (37, 3, 488). 14
The overlap between physics and chemistry goes back at least as far as Newton.
For instance, it is now widely agreed that the study of affinity, so important for
"Chemie", finds an important precedent, in fact nothing less than a programme, in
the 31st Query of Newton's Optic/cs (74; 129, 5 1-57; 154, 5). Here, Newton
suggests that the study of affinity would complement his physics and would
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provide a full picture of Nature, based on the traditional notion of the analogy
between all things, the analogia entis:
We must learn from the Phaenomena of Nature what Bodies attract one another, and what are the
Laws and Properties of the Attraction (74, 376);
And thus Nature will be very conformable to her self and very simple, performing all the great
Motions of the heavenly Bodies by the Attraction of Gravity which intercedes those Bodies, and
almost all the small ones of their Particles by some other attractive and repelling Powers which
intercede the particles (74, 397).
In the way chemistry overlapped with physics, in an attempt to account for
imponderable substances and forces, it became one of the leading sciences, both in
Lavoisier's chemistry with his incorporation of "caloric" (215, 78-83; 151, 27),
and in the works of others who were critical of his new chemistry. This helps
explain the fundamental importance of pneumatics for physics as a whole.
Some background to pneumatics is required before tackling Novalis's views.
When the sprawling nature of the combustion debate is made apparent, Novalis's
notion of an "experimental calculus" will be seen to be a considered response to the
real problems of the science of his time. For his notion of "Experimentencalcul"
arises in a scientific context where debate advances through innumerable slight and
subtle changes, as much as by reversals and contradictions. An "experimental
calculus" was, then, in Novalis's view, particularly appropriate for the pneumatics
debate, and would speed up discovery. The summary of the phlogiston debate,
which is now to be given, will show how the participants often entrenched
themselves, and how Novalis's proposal that phosphorus should be used as a
symbolic substance at the same time brings some order to the debate, and also
assists in keeping the debate open. Further, as mentioned, the full implications of
Novalis's notion of "experimental calculus" for chemistry go beyond the strict
pneumatics debate to deal with chemical and physical factors, pointing towards an
extension of pneumatics, and an emerging, more complex view of matter. This is
discussed in the next section.
In the pneumatics debate of the 1790's, phlogiston still plays a role as an
explanatory notion. While it is true that the antiphiogistians had more or less won
the struggle in 1790, the debate still carried on into the nineteenth century with
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alternatives to the oxygen theory, such as nitrogen, water and phlogiston itself
(167, 49). 15 In the eighteenth century, which was its true age, phlogiston
eventually came to mean many things: a substance with negative weight, light,
electricity, soot, a fatty principle, the matter of fire and hydrogen (252, 87-89;
167, 53). It was Georg Ernst Stahl (1660-1734) who first evolved the theory of
phlogiston.' 6 Stahl had in his Fundamenta Chymiae (115) of 1723 set out to
improve the notions of Johann Joachim Becher (1635-1682). Becher held that
matter was composed of air, water and three earths, the first inflammable (terra
pinguis), the second mercurial, the third fusible or vitreous, and it was Becher's
terra pinguis that Stahl renamed phlogiston. Stahl's emphasis on phlogiston and its
use as the base of a theory of combustion initiated a turn away from the three
aichemical principles of salt, sulphur and mercury (252, 88). This is important for
the entire pneumatics debate since a "principle" of combustibility was subsequently
to haunt all experimentation in this field. It was only with the acceptance of the
concept of energy in the mid-nineteenth century that the need to explain
combustion or heat in terms of a substance was no longer felt to be necessary (252,
89). Pneumatic theory then both implicitly and sometimes explicitly linked up to
deep level matter theory.
Indeed, when Lavoisier put forward his theory of combustion it did not involve
oxygen alone. He had to employ some sort of imponderable substance in his
theory, but he did not attempt to explain it. He did explain that the increase in the
metal's weight was caused by its calcination through oxygen, but he explains
oxygen in its natural state as a gas made up of a mixture of an oxygen base with
heat and light (167, 48; 142, 131). Lavoisier himself was not the true discoverer of
oxygen, for Scheele had discoveredfire air in the early 1770's (252, 107, 105),
and Priestley (1733-1804) had already discovered dephiogisticated air in 1774
(252, 117-121; 185, 144-145). Lavoisier's experiments on combustion were
primarily directed against Priestley's experiment of 1774 and his use of phlogiston
in a theory of combustion, for Priestley saw air as an elementary substance (185,
145) and his notion of dephiogisticated air was based on his belief that the
phlogiston had been taken out of the air, and hence to him air was either
"phlogisticated" or "dephlogisticated" (252, 117-118; 86). Lavoisier showed that
air must be made up of two gases and that the notion of phlogiston was superfluous
to combustion, for in his theory it is the oxygen which combines with the metals,
in distinction to the phlogistic notion where the metals lose their phlogiston in
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order to become calcinated. Thus in his experiments of 1777 (69, 35; 252, 128) to
prove the role of oxygen in combustion, Lavoisier set out to demonstrate that it
was not the phlogiston which had been taken out of the air during combustion, but
rather that the oxygen had been withdrawn, and that by extracting the oxygen from
the calcinated metal in the second stage of his experiment, he could then in the
third step restore the oxygen to the so called dephiogisri cared air to produce the
original atmospheric air (252, 128-129; 185, 145-148). Nevertheless, Lavoisier is
in essence arguing against one notion of a principle of combustibility where the
matter of fire happens to be called phlogiston and is located in the combustible;
while in his own theory the principle of combustibility is bound up with the pure
air (oxygen), so that this gas exists, as mentioned, as a base with the heat and light
of "caloric".
The antiphiogistic notion of "caloric" or "Wärmestoff" naturally did not escape
criticism. The phlogistian Jeremias Benjamin Richter (1762-1807), for example,
argued that Lavoisier's heat substance was just as much a fanciful idea ("eine
ebenso ungereimte Grille") as phlogiston itself:
denn memand hat den Wärmestoff abgesondert darstellen und ebensowenig em Gewicht an ihm
bemerken können (91, 1, xiv; 167, 56).
These were strong words from someone who was going even further than Lavoisier
in quantifying chemistry, for Richter had undertaken to "mathematize" chemistry
in his Anfangsgrunde der Stochyomerrie oder Meflkunst chemischer Elemente.'7
Strong opposition to the antiphiogistians came from Richard Kirwan (1733-1812)
who believed that phlogiston was hydrogen. This view was held by many
scientists, such as Cavendish (the first to suggest this idea), Priestley, Bergman,
Delamëtherie, Crell, Wiegleb and Hermbstädt (167, 57). Priestley, although a
phlogistian, did not become as involved as Kirwan in the polemics of the
pneumatics debate (167, 61). Kirwan quite properly pointed out some of the
anomalies of the antiphlogistians, but did however recant in 1791 and took the
French side. Kirwan attacked the antiphlogistians on the subjects of affinity, the
composition of acids, and the composition of water. Kirwan believed that
combustion involved not only oxygen but also hydrogen (i.e. phlogiston).
According to Kirwan, in combustion the metal lost its phlogiston/hydrogen, with
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which the oxygen formed "fixed air", and the calcinated metal was a mixture of
metal, oxygen and phlogiston/hydrogen:
Meiner Meynung nach verlieren die metallischen Substanzen durch ihre Calcination ihr Phlogiston,
weiches weiter mchts ist, als reine brennbare Luft im verdichteten Zustande; und zugleich verbinden
sie sich gemeiniglich mit der fixen Luft, die während der Oxydation erzeugt worden ist (65, 335;
167, 59).
He also maintained that water was an element and used strong arguments based on
chemical affinity to discount the antiphlogistic view that water was a compound.
The composition of water was important to the antiphiogistians since it fitted into
the oxygen based theory of combustion; it explained to them why when metal
oxides were heated with hydrogen, metal and water were produced, and why when
iron was heated with water, hydrogen was produced, and why when metals were
dissolved in acids hydrogen was produced (167, 58). Since Kirwan believed that
water was an element, the hydrogen had to come from the iron when iron was
heated with water (as mentioned, metals existed as a base with hydrogen/
phlogistan in Kirwan's view). He argued that, if as Lavoisier maintained, carbon
had a greater affinity for oxygen than iron, then no hydrogen should be produced
when iron and water were brought together at normal temperatures, since even
over glowing coals no hydrogen arises from water (167, 58; 65, 261). Kirwan
further saw hydrogenlphlogiston playing an important role in the theory of acids,
in distinction to Lavoisier's notion that all acids contained oxygen. Indeed oxygen
stems from the Greek for "generator of acids" (252, 132; 215, 85). Whereas
Lavoisier saw all acids as a compound of substances with the base of oxygen, and
that metal precipitations in acids were caused by the metal forming a compound
with the oxygen of the acid (167, 50, 59), Kirwan argued that metal precipitation
in acids was due to the metal base's affinity for hydrogen/phlogiston. Thus when
metals were dissolved in acids the hydrogen/phlogiston came from the metal and
not from the acid (167, 59; 64). Here as von Engelhardt remarks "liegt die Grenze
der antiphlogistischen und zugleich auch der phlogistischen Chenue, der
Sauerstoff- und Wasserstoffchemie" (167, 59), for the antiphiogistian notion that
all acids were oxygen based meant that metals could only be seen in the light of
oxygen, and the phlogistian notions that water was an element, and that
combustion had always to involve hydrogen/phlogiston and oxygen, were also not
wholly explanatory.
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Even before the arrival of the antiphiogistic theory, attempts were made to
explain the increase in weight during combustion. H.Th. Scheller (in 1757) and
J.P.Chardenon (in 1763) explained phlogiston as a negative weight (252, 55).
Fnedrich Albrecht Carl Gren (1760-1798) took up a similar stance. He equated
phlogiston with heat and light and explained the increase in weight through the
imponderability of heat and light:
Denn da der Stoff der Wärme und des Lichtes keine Schwerkraft, in Vergleichung der Ubrigen
Körper, hat ..., so mufi auch das Phlogiston, weiches aus beyden zusainmengesetzt ist, sie nicht
besitzen. Es mufi also auch das Phlogiston, wenn es mit einem schweren Stoff in Verbindung ti-itt,
das absolute Gewicht desselben vermindern, und umgekehrt, es mufi dies absolute Gewicht eines
Körpers wieder zunehmen, wenn das Phlogiston abgeschieden wird (44, 1, 219; 167, 55-56).
Gren did, however, accept the antiphiogistian theory but still sought to combine
the two schools of thought, using the ideas of Richter and Leonhardi (167, 56; 45;
46). Richter combined the notions of phlogiston and "caloric", explaining
combustion as an attraction of the two material bases (i.e. metal and oxygen) and a
corresponding attraction of phlogiston with the "caloric" of the oxygen, which
united causing the light and fire (252, 89).
The theoretical complexity of the phlogiston debate, one could say, could have
benefited from a methodological form of mediation, such as Novalis's, to prevent
the participators entrenching in camps and blocking themselves off from open
inquiry. A form of chemical inquiry was needed with broader parameters and also
with a methodology that allowed for theoretical variance, so that the chemical
debate would not just be reduced to the cases of phlogiston versus oxygen.
Now Novalis's notion of concrete theory and calculus will be examined with
reference to the strict pneumatics debate in the 1790's, which, for the most part, is
a debate over which gas causes combustion. Later the possibilities of a broader
pneumatic and chemical debate will be considered. To begin with, though, we will
now see how phosphorus could be understood as an image of the pneumatic debate:
Novalis chose it, because, in his view, it offered the chance of improving
pneumatic theory by offering up an open position. The implications of his remarks
on phosphorus are that it should be seen as the commonly used substance it was,
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and, as such, it should be seen as the consensual base of a phenomenal calculus for
open debate.
Novalis was well versed in "the jungle of the Theory of Phlogiston" (252, 84).
Picking one's way through his natural philosophical notes the reasons for his
suggestion of an "experimental calculus" for the pneumatics debate can be pieced
together. Examples of works he made notes on will also show some further
developments in the pneumatics debate in the 1790's.18
Novalis knew of Mrs. Fuihame's view of combustion. She argued against both
camps in the debate, as is manifest in the title of her work of 1774: 'An essay on
Combustion, with a view to new art of dying and painting. Wherein the phlogistic
and antiphiogistic hypotheses are proved erroneous' (34). Novalis, however, had as
sources the extract of her work in J.C.Delamëtherie's (1743-1817) Journal de
physique (33; 61) of 1798 which he made notes on (N, 3, 76), and Ritter's review
of her work in 1798 in Scherer's Ailgemeines Journal der C/zemie (5; 93), which
Novalis also refers to (N, 3, 183, 185). Mrs. Fuihame explains combustion as the
decomposition of water through double elective affinities: combustion was thus
linked not to hydrogen or oxygen alone but to water, and phlogiston is rejected.
Ritter sums up her work:
Das ailgemeine Resuitat aller vongen Untersuchungen ist demnach, urn das Ganze zulezt mit Einem
Blick zu übersehen, folgendes: Wasser ist sowohi zur Wiederhersteliung (Desoxydation), als zur
Oxydation der Körper nothwendig, und wird immer bey diesen Operationen zersezi. Alle in dem
angezeigten Werk enthaitene Versuche zeigen es, daB die Weise, auf weiche entzilndbare Körper die
Wiederherstellung bewirken (desoxydiren), in alien gleich ist. Kein Körper wird oxydirt, ohne daB
gieichzeitig em anderer desoxydirt werde, und umgekehrt. Auf diese Weise erhãit die Natur em
Gleichgewicht von Kraft, zwischen enthindbaren und oxydirten Körpern, und verhütet die
Rückkehr des ursprunglichen Chaos. Beyjedem Verbrennungsprocefi ist zu unterscheiden:
Oxydation d.i. Vereinigung des Sauerstoffs mit entzündbaren Körpern und - Desoxydation d.i.
Wiederherstellung oxydirter Körper zu ihrem entzundbaren Zustand. Und da bey jedem Faile der
Verbrennung Wasser zersezi wird, und em Körper durch den Sauerstoff des Wassers oxydirt wird,
indefi der andere zu seinem natUrlichen Zustand durch den Wasserstoff der nämlichen FlUssigkeit
wieder hergestellt wird, so folgt, daB der Wasserszoffdes Wassers die einzige Substanz ist, weiche
Körper zu ihrem entzündbaren Zustande hersteilt; daB der Sauersioffdes Wassers der einzige ist,
durch weichen, und deinnach das Wasser die einzige Queue ist, aus weicher enzzündbare KOrper
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oiydin werden; daB also in keinem Falle die Verbrennung durch einfache, sondern in jedem durch
doppelte Wahlanziehung bewirki wird (93, 441-442).
Novalis was further aware of J.F.A.Gottling's (1755-1809) notion that
combustion was caused by nitrogen. He made notes on the sections of the article
where the antiphiogistians Fourcroy (1755-1809) and Vauquelin (1763-1829)
damningly criticized Gotthng in Scherer's Aligemeines Journal der Chenüe of
1798, 'Prilfung der Uber das vorgebliche Leuchten des Phosphors in Stickstoffgas
angesteliten Untersuchungen':
Es schien seit einigen Jahren, daB die Antagonisten der französischen Chemie von allen Seiten
besiegt waren, und daB es weiter keinen Zweifel mehr an der Wahrheit dieser Lehre gãbe, der
schwachen Angriffe ungeachtet, die noch von Zeit zur Zeit gegen sie gerichtet wurden, als Herr
Gottling, Professor der Chemie zu Jena, in Jahr 1794 eine Schrift unter dem Titel: Beytrag zur
Berichtigung der antiphlogisiischen Chemie auf Versuche gegrundet, herausgab, wodurch er die
Grundlage dieser Lehre zu untergraben und eiue beynahe vollig entgegengeset.zte an ihre Stelle zu
setzen hoffte. Daraus, daB der Phosphor, wenigstens in einer niedern Temperatur, im Sauerstoffgas
nicht Ieuchtete und nicht merklich brannte; daraus, daB besonders derselbe verbrennliche Körper
ihm Licht in dem Stickstoffgas darbot; daraus schlofi er, daB dieses leizere zur Verbrennung
geschickter als das andere sey (31, 494).
Claude Louis Berthollet (1748-1827) also believed that nitrogen caused
combustion, but he too, as Fourcroy and Vauquelin write in the same article, came
round to the antiphiogistic theory:
Demungeachtet hielten wir es für nothwendig, die Versuche des Herm Gottling zu wiederholen, und
die Fehier, die er mis begangen zu haben schien, in ihrein Ursprunge aufzusuchen. Dem Institut ist
bereits die Arbeit des Burgers Berthollet Uber denselben Gegenstand mitgetheilt worden. Unser
College hat geglaubt, daB der Phosphor sich im Stickstoffgas, und nicht im Sauerstoffgas auflose;
daB er in diesein sich entzfinde, nachdem er sich in jenem aufgelöst babe; daB auf diese Art die
langsame Verbrennung in atmospharischer Luft bewirkt werde; er hat am semen Beobachtungen
zwey sinnreiche Ansichten gezogen, die eine uber Eudiometne, durch die langsame Verbrennung
des Phosphors, die andere über die Zusammensetzung thierischer Stoffe. Ob er gleich bekannt
gemacht hat, daB er Phosphor im Stickstoffgas leuchtend gesehen habe, wie Herr Gottling, so hat er
doch seitdem eingesehen, und zwar nach den ihm gezeigten Beobachtungen, daB dies von einer
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kleinen im Stickstoffgas enthaltenen Quantitat Sauerstoff herrilhre; dieses Stickstoffgas war aus
Anunoniak durch SalzsaUre gezogen worden (31, 498).
Given that staunch figures such as Berthollet and Priestley had argued against the
antiphiogistians, and the concomitant variations on combustion theory, Novalis's
wish for a "Muster des Experimentirens" indeed seems not unreasonable. For
taking a key substance such as phosphorus as a phenomenal base about which the
differing theories could operate using analogies or a "phenomenal" calculus, and in
viewing phosphorus as a symbol per se of pneumatic theory, acting as the analogy
or notation linking theory and phenomena, implied leaving the pneumatic debate
open until a broader more explanatory theory was obtained. A characteristic
example of his open views on the debate and his interest in phosphorus is found in
a comment Novalis jots down after his notings from Foucroy and Vauquelin. After
reading their comments on Berthollet, he immediately remarked upon the very
work on eudiometry by Berthollet that they referred to (a detailed account of
eudiometry and the use of phosphorus is given below):
Die langsame Verbrennung des Phosphors nach Berthollet, der beste eudiometrische Process (N, 3,
188; 12).
Novalis does not, however, give up the notion of phlogiston. Almost two years
later, in 1800, he speculates over phlogiston in the context of excitability and the
structure of a natural hierarchy:
Oxyd[ation] Verminderung der Personalitaet.
Phlogiston = Geist.
Dem Geiste ist Ruhe eigenthumlich.
Das Schwere rUhrt vom Geiste her.
Gott ist von unendlich gediegenen Metall - das Körperlichste und Schwerste aller Wesen.
Die Oxyd[ationj kommt vom Teufel
Luftvernichtung ist Herstellung des Reichs Gottes ... (N, 3, 659).
Here the driving force behind the universe, God, is equated with an infmite mass
of enormous energy potential (phlogiston).' 9
 In Novalis's pathological and
combusting world there is a struggle between energy/phlogiston and oxidation. The
process of combustion is part of a moral process, hence substances such as
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phosphorus or phlogiston were elevated to symbols of a spiritual quest. In this
manner Novalis views the chemistry of his time as an essential part of his whole
project of natural philosophical productivity, whose goal is to unite man's
consciousness with the purposiveness of the natural world. Thus, in an extended
sense, his programme of phenomenal calculus for the sciences is one of the paths
which will lead to the Golden Age, a path upon which the moral scientist will ever
better to "plasticize". This is the upper aim of Novalis's project, but, as will be
shown, Novalis offers a wealth of comments dealing with lower level issues, which
are closer to the activities of the sciences of the time.
The examples above show that Novalis was generally well informed on the
combustion debate; some further examples given now will reveal just how much of
a central role phosphorus itself played in the debate. It will be shown that the
scientific context itself gives grounds for Novalis's "experimental calculus", and
his meaning of a "Combinatorik".
A study of the works Novalis read shows that there were many reasons for the
use of phosphorus as an analogical tool and as a consensual term in the pneumatics
debate of the 1790's. Firstly, in the experimental context the important theoretical
issues often depended upon whether or not phosphorus burnt under certain
circumstances. Since it was used so frequently, it must have appeared as a touch-
stone for the verification of the various pneumatic theories, i.e. acting as a
powerful analogy of the link between theory and nature, between man's beliefs and
the outside world. A direct reference to the particular significance of phosphorus
for pneumatic experimentation occurs in Ritter's review of Mrs. Fulhame's work.
Ritter draws a parallel between the combustion theory of Mrs. Fulhame, evinced in
her experiments on the varied solutions of metals and phosphorus and their
precipitants, and the combusting rod ("Stange") of phosphorus:
Die Versuche mit Phosphor- und Meta!lauflosungen in Aether, Weingeist und Wasser beweisen die
Wahrheit dieser Erklarung, und zeigen, daB, wenn em Metal! das andere niederschlagt, es wie eine
Stange Phosphor wirkt, nãmlich das Wasser zersezt (93, 440).
For Ritter, phosphorus is the image of Mrs. Fuihame's "water" chemistry, and, it
would appear, an almost symbolic analogical key to her science. For Rifler's
remark does not just touch on her experiments with phosphorus, but on all her
experiments and views: notably, her ideas on fermentation (93, 435-6), on light
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(93, 433), on meteorology (93, 436-437), on the combustion of metals through fire
and electricity (93, 434), and on the combustion of carbon ("Kohie") (93, 432).
Thus it can be seen how Novalis bases his view of phosphorus on the way the
substance was understood in his day in scientific practice.
There are also more examples in what Novalis read of the way phosphorus was
understood as a phenomenon which could act as an analogy and thus give grounds
to his idea of phosphorus as key element of notation. It could be taken to argue for
quite different notions of combustion. Thus, Mrs. Futhame, to support her view of
combustion, maintained that phosphorus only burned in damp air. In his review
Rifler also cites Bergman (1735-1784) and Spallanzani (1729-1799) to support this
view of phosphorus:
So verbrennt nach ihr [Mrs. Fuihame] auch der Phosphor in der Lebensluft nur, in sofern sie feucht
ist, und eine Beobachtung von Bergmann [sici spricht abermals für diese Meinung ... (93, 435).
To this Rifler adds in a footnote the remark that Mrs. Fuihame cited from
Bergman, and himself cites Spallanzani:
"Der Phosphor verzehret sich sehr langsani mit der Lebensluft ohne HUlfe einer aufiern Warme;
wenig oder mchts wird aber verzehret, wenn kein Wasser vorhanden, so durch eine doppelte
Attraction die Zerlegung befördert." Auch Spallanzani sagt: "Wenn die gemeine Luft sehr trocken
und von Quecksilber eingeschlossen ist, so geht die Verbrennung des Phosphors in gewohnlicher
Temperatur sehr langsam von statten. Licht und Wãrme sind dabey fast unmerklich" (93, 435-
436).20
Here, water is seen as the fundament of combustion, and phosphorus as the proof
of this; the next examples will show how phosphorus is used to support entirely
different theories of pneumatics.
Adam Wilhelm von Hauch used phosphorus in an essay which Novalis may have
read since it was published in Gren's Neues Journal der Physik of 1795. It was
entitled 'Beschreibung einiger mit Phosphor angesteilten Versuche in Hinsicht auf
die Wahrscheinlichkeit der Lehre von den Bestandtheilen des Wassers, nehmlich
Sauerstoff und Wasserstoff', and in it von Hauch argues for the antiphiogistians
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and their view of water. Von Hauch comments on what he thinks is the
significance of his work:
Die Lehre vom Wasser ist ... der Hauptgrundstein, auf weichem die ganze neue französische Lehre
der Chemie bet-uht und wodurch ihre Beybehaltung oder Verwerfung bestimmt wird (49, 29).
Again phosphorus plays the role of "arguing phenomenally" for their theoiy.
Fourcroy and Vauquelin, arguing against a nitrogen theory of combustion,
demonstrate both that phosphorus combusts in atmospheric air (as opposed to pure
oxygen), and that oxygen is a more powerful combustant than nitrogen:
es ist klar, daB die langsame Verbrennung des Phosphors in dem Sauerstoffgas erst bey 22 ihren
Anfang nimmt; man weifi Ubngens, daB seine schnelle Verbrennung nur bey 32, und wenn er
schmeLzt, statt finde (31, 500),
and further,
DaB die gleichzeitige Gegenwart dieser beyden Gasarten [oxygen and nilrogen] zur langsamen
Verbrennung des Phosphors, mid zu seiner Verwandlung in phosphorigte Satire bey Temperaturen
unter 2O unentbehrlich ist, und daB dies der Grund ist, warum er in atmosphärischer Luft,
ungeachtet seiner niedern Temperatuur, und bis zu einigen Graden unter Null langsam brennt, indefi
er sich miter 20 in Sauerstoffgas bbs auflöst (31, 505).
Using alternate mixtures of phosphorus with gases, and introducing the gases into
a bell jar with phosphorus and another gas, Fourcroy and Vauquelin demonstrated
that oxygen and its mixtures above all caused the strongest combustive effects. The
combustion in the experiments and their theory hinged around the touchstone of
phosphorus. For they remarked on:
der sonderbare Unterschied, weichen die Flainme des Phosphors zeigt, wenn Phosphor-Stickstoffgas
in Sauerstoffgas, oder Sauerstoffgas in Phosphor-Stickstoffgas gebracht wird (31, 512).
This comment refers to their fourth experiment, where they describe the more
spectacular effect of the combustion of the phosphorus-gas mixtures in oxygen as
opposed to nitrogen:
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aber das Licht war welt starker, da wir em Bläschen nach dem andern von dem Stickstoffgas,
worm der Phosphor gewesen war, in Glocken you Sauerstoffgas gehen lieBen. In diesern leztern
Falle war der ganze Recipient you von einem bläulichen Lichte, indefi in dem ersteren derselbe [i.e.
'Sauerstoff' in Phosphor-Stickszoffgas ] weit schwãchere Schimmer gleichsam in dem einzigen
Punite der hinzugesezten Bläschen von Sauerstoffgas concentrirt war (31, 501).
The varying reactions of phosphorus (or as in the above experiment of the
phosphorus-gas mixtures) are the "phenomenal" arguments for the proof that
oxygen is a more powerful combustant than nitrogen. A further example from
Fourcroy and Vauquelin again shows the analogical use of phosphorus. Novalis
noted how Fourcroy and Vauquelin applied the properties of phosphorus
analogically to other substances:
Fourcroy schliefit analogisch vom Phosphor auf ähnliche Auflosungen des Schwefels, der Kohie etc.
in den genannten Luftarten bey niedriger Temperatur (N, 3, 188; 31, 513).
All these examples show a "CalcUl" in Novalis's sense of a fundamental
"experiment" of the mind which fixes phosphorus as a symbol in an inner logic of
the imagination, and the consequent development of theory based around
experimentation with phosphorus. It can be seen that Novalis, through his idea of a
"phenomenal" calculus, attempts to provide a methodological basis for this
sometimes conscious, and other times tacit use of analogy by the scientists of his
time.
Phosphorus was further employed as an analogical tool in eudiometers for
measuring the composition of air. Here, phosphorus is used in the quantitative
sense of "Calcül", providing the base for a "mathematization" of the air. Here,
too, lie grounds for Novalis's interpretation of the pneumatics debate, for the
quantification can also be viewed as being based upon a phenomenal calculus
which employs phosphorus as the key to its notation. Novalis was well informed in
the area of eudiometry and pursued its development keenly, as he wrote:
Priestley - Erfinder des Eudiometers. Er hat durch Salpelerlufi - Scheele durch geschwefel:es Eisen -
andre (Reboul) durch Phosphor - Humboldt durch Schwefe!leber den Oxigènegehalt der
atm[ospharischen l Luft zu erforschen gesucht (N, 3, 39).
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Novalis refers here to Reboul's eudiometer which he could have read about in
Gren's Neues Journal der Physik of 1795 (89). Novalis could also have known of
Gren's article on a phosphorus eudiometer where Gren writes:
So haben wir an der allmahligen und langsamen Verbrennung des Phosphors, oder seinem
Zerfliessen, bey der miulern Temperatur, das voilkommenste eudiometrische Mittel, und sind im
Stande in der zu prufenden Luft auch den kleinsen Rest des darin befindlichen Sauerstoffgas
wegzuschaffen (47, 364).
Here, clearly, Novalis could have found further substance for his notion that
phosphorus was a paradigmatic and consensual term for inquiry.
Phosphorus, however, did not go uncriticized as an eudometric substance, since it
did not entirely combust all the oxygen in the apparatus, as for example Humboldt
(1769-1859) points out in a work on which Novalis also made notes (N, 3, 198):
Bey meiner mehrjahrigen Beschaftigung mit der genauen Analyse der Atmosphäre und mit den
verschiedenen Eudiometern, von denen ich die Grenzen zu bestimmen suche, bis zu weichen sie irre
führen können, fand ich, daB das Stickstoffgas, weiches man bey der Zerlegung der Atmosphäre
durch den Phosphor erhält, sehr oft einen Antheil Sauerstoff enthält, den man ihm durch keine
Verwandtschaft der saUrefâhigen Basen entziehen kann (55, 577).
Notwithstanding such reservations, it can be seen that phosphorus is once again at
the forefront of the pneumatic debate, this time literally as an instrument for
"calculating" the air.
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2.2. Phosphorus 's role in practical social knowledge and in the dramatic aesthetics
of scientfic productivity.
Undoubtedly important to Novalis's notion of "Experimentencalcul" is also the
fact that phosphorus was a spectacular substance. It was an analogical tool that
most easily attracted attention, and so quite naturally became a symbol in an inner
language or logic of the imagination. Consequently, for Novalis, phosphorus
would have joined the scientific stage as a figure to become part of the spectacle in
a symbolic theatre of "experimentation":
Uber das Theatralische des Jahrmarclas und des Experimenhire,s - Jede Glastafel 1st eine BUhne -
em Laboratorium - eine Kunstkammer ist em Theater ... (N, 3, 452).
The symbolic theatre of "experimentation" is an important social aspect of
Novalis's rhetoric of experiment. In broad terms, such a stance to experimentation
conflates "Art and Life", "Appearance and Reality", and provides a profound
social comment on science. The dramatic rhetoric of experiment enhances those
notions already bound up in Novalis's idea of experiment: consensuality and
cognitive gain. The consensuality of experiment is clearly expressed in the
involvement of the audience in a lecture hail. The epistemology of experiment is
manifest in the experiential and symbolic transfer of knowledge in performance.
Both of these aspects of the dramatic aesthetics of scientific productivity come
together in the open, public performance and demonstration of scientific theory.
The stage performance is transferred to the mind. In the way Novalis's notion of
experiment harks back to the use of experience in memory systems, there is an
element of this dramatic rhetoric of experiment that may perhaps recall something
of the Renaissance memory theatres of Giulio Camillo and Robert Fludd. 2 ' At a
broad epistemological level there is a link in their ideas of theatre in terms of a
combination of images and symbolic knowledge. However, I cannot find a genuine
link between Novalis and Renaissance theatre of memory, although Novalis does
mention Fludd in a letter to Caroline Schlegel where he asks August Wilhelm
Schiegel for copies of the works of Helmont and Fludd (N, 3, 86; N, 4, 261).22
Whether this empirical link exists or not, Novalis none the less continues the
Renaissance tradition when he suggests that his idea of concrete notation can be
used in a social way in the lecture hall.
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Novalis's sensual-imaginative approach to theory could further be likened to a
Socratic model of inquiry. The theatre or lecture hail would provide the modern
place for a broad audience and the possibility for a debate at many levels. The
notion of as broad a debate as possible is suggested by the linking of
"experimentation" with the market ("Jahrmarkt"). There are obvious connotations
of open discussion and argument, and perhaps a radical Socratic "experimental"
theatre is invoked where the audience participates, and the demonstrators have to
haggle for theory. They would have to give answers to their theories through
discussions, recalling their deep "innate" beliefs. Attention would be focussed
around a phenomenon and different theories would be put to test through direct
debate. If scientific debate was as hectic as at the market, and if people were
thrashing out theories in heated debate, some life or genuine feeling for the
sciences would be brought about on a large scale. The spectacle of the theatre
affords a demonstration of a Socratic moral concretization of knowledge. The
entertainment of the spectacle literally raises the audience's attention for a
questioning of knowledge, forcing the audience to a practical awareness and,
importantly, to come, in a Socratic sense, to a better understanding of why they
hold a particular theory. By answering the "why", they would arrive at a
purposeful, moral understanding of their beliefs and knowledge. Indeed, Novalis's
modern Socratic model of inquiry, instead of reducing science to statements about
nature, offers a model of inquiry as a whole, including man, his institutions, and
Nature. Such a model does justice to how ideas and discoveries come into being:
theory evolves from tireless discussion, from the return to experience, and from
the debate revolving around certain phenomena.
Novalis's notion of an "experimental" theatre fmds some anticipations, although
not in his full sense, in the science of his day. Consider the remarks that Fourcroy
and Vauquelin make on the entertaining and pedagogic qualities of one of the
experiments involving phosphorus. Here, the stage is a lecture hail, and the players
are nitrogen, phosphorus and oxygen. Phosphorus and oxygen take the lead roles
in the stunning display of a blue flame in the darkened lecture hail. The show is
not pure entertainment, for it is also meaningful for Fourcroy and Vauquelin, since
behind the "experiment" lies the entire antiphlogistic theory. In Novalis's terms,
naturally, we see here a form of concrete dialectics that mediate between theory
and phenomena, sparking off an inner language or logic. Fourcroy and Vauquelin
write:
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Bey jedern Blaschen vom Stickstoffgas, weiches in das mit Phosphor gemischte Sauerstoffgas
übergieng, erschien eine bläuliche Flamme, weiche den ganzen Raurn der Flasche flute. Dieser
Versuch bot im Dunkein em Schauspiel dar, das sehr schön und beynahe den zarten und dUnnen
Funken ähnlich war, weiche man aus dem elektrischen im leeren Raum verbreiteten Fluidum erhãlt;
man könnte en dem an die Seite stellen, weiches man in den physikalischen und chemischen
Vorlesungen zeigt, urn die WiBbegierde und Aufmerksamkeit der Zuhörer zu reizen. Er beweiBt,
wie die vorhergehenden, daB die Gegenwart des Sauerstoffs nothig ist, urn den Phosphor leuchtend
zu machen (31, 502).
Explicit, here, is the notion that a concrete experiment raises the attention and
interest of an audience. A lucid demonstration will always assist a theory, and in
the light of the warring scientific factions this may well have been important.
However, from Novalis's point of view, the demonstration is not only a test or a
proof of a particular theory in the pneumatics debate. Since the field in his opinion
was open, he preferred a recall to the very essence of demonstration or show, that
of captivating the audience and impressing a phenomenon upon their minds, and to
use this impressed symbol in further "experimentation" as the basis of an
"experimental" calculus.
A further example of the theatricality of phosphorus should, perhaps, be given to
show the contemporary awareness and interest in "entertainment" chemistry.
P.J.Macquer (1718-1784) comments on phosphorus in this light in his Chemisches
WOrterbuch. Macquer's remarks on "eine unzahlige Menge belustigender
Versuche" with phosphorus show that he clearly envisages a form of experiment as
entertainment. Naturally, Novalis's view, unlike Macquer's, carries both social and
theoretical implications. Macquer further comments on the potential of phosphorus
for "surprise" entertainment, were it only less well known; Novalis, with his
different interests, sees it an exemplary substance precisely because it was
commonly known, and therefore had potential for open debate. Here, then, are the
experiments which Macquer describes:
Wenn er [phosphorus I ubrigens bloB in der Anzahl dererjenigen Sachen bleiben mUBte, die nur das
Auge belustigen, so wUrde er allezeit in dieser Kiasse den ersten Rang mit behaupten. Man macht
mit dem Phosphor eine unzahlige Menge belustigender Versuche, weiche das grofieste Erstaunen
erregen würden, wenn diese Substanz weniger bekannt ware. Mann schreibt z.B. an die Mauer eines
dunkeln Ortes mit einem StAngelchen Phosphor, und die Schrift läBt sich sogleich als feurige
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Buchstaben lesen . . Man löschet einen Wachsstock aus, und zündet ihm augenblicklich dadurch
wieder an, daB man an die noch warrne Schnupfe die Spitze eines Messers halt, an weiche man em
kleines Stuck Phosphor mit etwas Unschlitt angeklebt hat. Hierher gehoren auch die selbstzUndenen
oder phosphorisirten Kerzen ... Es sind dünne in zugeschmolzenen Glasröhren enthaltene
Wachsstöckchen, deren mit Zimmt- Nelken- oder Wachsöl oder mit geschmolzenem Wachse oder
mit geschmolzenem Benzoe und Schwefel benetzte, sodann in Kampher- und Schwefelpulver, oder
in feinem Salpeterstaub, oder Schwefelpulver allein herumgedrehte Schnuppen in etwas
geschmolzenem Phosphorus, weicher in dem einen Ende der zugeschinolzenen Glasröhre enthalten
ist, getaucht worden, und nachdem die Glasröhre an einem angeschliffenen Orte zerbrochen
worden, einigemal in dem Phosphor schneil hin und her bewegt wird, da sodann die
hervorzuziehende Kerze sich sogleich entzündet (71, 4, 561).
Macquer provides an insight into the fascinating effects created with phosphorus,
but gives his "theatre" no theoretical underpinning. That the entertaining qualities
of phosphorus which he refers to were indeed common knowledge can be seen
again in Novalis's own reference to what can best be described as phosphorus
"fife-crackers":
Feu portatif - Phosphorauflosung in Nelkenol. Turinerkerzen -
Wachs und Phosphor - Baumwolle hineingetaucht - und diese in luftleeren - oder verschlofinen
Gläschen authewahrt (N, 3,45).
Even this shorthand description of the phosphorus concoction, "Feu portatif", is
quite different from Macquer's, in that it sounds emblematic. In these early forms
of "fire-crackers", Novalis was already searching for a way to harness
entertainment to deeper theoretical ends. The burning image of phosphorus
juxtaposed with the emblematic name, "Feu portatif", can be seen as part of the
process whereby, for Novalis, phosphorus could become a symbol for combustion,
in accordance with his notion of a method of open inquiry which uses symbols
within an "Experimentencalcul".
In conclusion, a reminder of the value of social issues in Novalis's notion of
inquiry is called for. In general, the social aspects of Novalis's views on inquiry,
such as the dramatic rhetoric of scientific productivity, the Socratic method, or the
idea of a "symbolische Physik", significant as they are, do not take up the central
role in his view of knowledge. Arguably more central, as mentioned, are the
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epistemological factors concerning the individual and inquiry. These are, of
course, also present in Novalis's idea of social knowledge, but are in many ways a
prerequisite for his notion of social knowledge, and are thus more the primary
determinants of his notion of knowledge and inquiry.
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3. Phosphorus and matter theory: the breadth of the possible programme for
natural philosophical productivity.
3.1. The ramWcations of the pneumatic debate for matter theory: the possible
extension of Novalis 's programme.
The previous section has attempted to look at phosphorus primarily within the
strictly pneumatic sphere, the study of gases; but, naturally, pneumatics meant
more than, for example, the discovery of oxygen as the cause of combustion. It
now needs to be considered why Novalis wished to keep the pneumatic debate
open, why he wished to extend pneumatics into deeper physical theory, and why he
preferred, for this reason, a "Muster des Experimentirens" to a fully fledged
pneumatic theory. The initial remarks on "Chemie" in this chapter indicate how
important chemistry was, and how important pneumatics were, for the sciences of
the time. Widely divergent views of chemistry depended upon pneumatic theory.
Before turning our attention to phosphorus in this context, an overview of
Novalis's stance to the chemistry of his time should he given.
Novalis took a highly historical view of the 1790's pneumatics debate. He saw
the new chemistry as important, not so much for the discovery of oxygen and its
role, and, as mentioned, certainly not because of Lavoisier's programme for an
elemental chemistry, but because of the very factors which played so great a role in
the background to Lavoisier's discovery itself, such as the gain of weight in
combustion and heat (Lavoisier's "caloric"). The chemical revolution came about,
in Novalis's view, because of a fundamental change in chemistry's programme of
inquiry, which entailed a shift away from the traditional chemical agenda to the
study of forces, and to that of the "invisible" matter of air. One could surmise
from the following remark of Novalis's that, in his opinion, the real chemical
revolution had taken place before Lavoisier. Further, the seemingly unconnected
items of Novalis's examples make it appear that Novalis saw the cause of the
advancements made in chemistry in a kind of "calculus" or "Combinatorik"
between chemistry and other areas of inquiry:
Die Chymie hat Fortschritte gemacht sobald sie angefangen hat Rücksicht auf die mit den
chymischen Phaenoménen verwandte und verbundene Phaenoméne andrer Naturkräfte zu nehmen -
z.B. auf Schwererwerdung - Luft - Electricitaet - etc. (N, 3, 86).
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Clearly, even before Lavoisier, investigators had been observing those phenomena
which were related to strictly chemical changes and the forces of these related
phenomena. As an example, Novalis explicitly mentions the increase in weight
during combustion ("Schwererwerdung"). This was, as already discussed, the very
crux of Lavoisier's discovery, but before Lavoisier it was a main issue for
phlogiston chemistry. Novalis also cites "Luft", which was, historically, an area of
inquiry that goes back a long time, namely to Van Helmont (1579-1644) (252,
48), but perhaps Novalis is here referring to the experiments of Cavendish (173 1-
1810) or, more likely, Priestley. "Electricitaet" could refer to a number of things
which were common knowledge at the time, but in the context might most likely
be related to Cavendish's analysis of air through electricity and his eudiometer, a
"firing globe", which "fixed air by electricity" (252, 138-9; 18, 119), by sending
sparks. Thus, Novalis's shorthand remark epitomizes certain key issues,
encapsulating historical developments in chemistry by concrete symbols. Analysis
of the symbols effectively relativizes the importance of the new chemistry.
Progress in chemistry is itself also seen as a symbolic procedure by Novalis, in
which a "Combinatorik" of various spheres of knowledge was employed.
Another remark of Novalis's makes his stance to French chemistry clearer. Here,
Novalis moves away from the antiphiogistic "caloric" to speak of affinity and of
electricity or electrochemistry:
AuBerst merckwUrdig ist das Bestreben der neuern Chemie alle Stoffe auf wenig unsichibare, luftige
Stoffe zurUckzuführen - in der Luft die Mutter aller Dinge zu suchen. Wie die Wärme alles in Luft
verwandelt und em luftiger Körper, vielleicht durch Anziehungskraft zur Wärme - positive
Erwarmung, die benachbarten Korper negativ erwarmt, odes erkaltet, freylich nur im Moment des
Ubergangs - indem er nachher wieder wärmt, so verwandelt die Kãlte alles in feste Korper und
bnngt entgegengesezte Verhaltmsse hervor (N, 3, 184).
Novalis appears to use the term "new chemistry" to refer to Lavoisier' s revolution,
and also to point beyond the latter to the open pneumatic debate. Thus, from
Novalis's point of view, even Lavoisier's chemistry occupied a place in a wider
historical programme: a programme that was not engaged in searching for a system
based upon the gas oxygen, but was inquiring into more general issues of a matter
theory.
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Indeed, Novalis traces the new chemistry's interest in air to point to
developments in pneumatics that went beyond Lavoisier's chemistry, and led to
early attempts at defming energy. The central concept Novalis exploits is that of
affinity:
Sehr bedeutend ist die Frage - ob es mcht Stoffe giebt - die so grofie Empfindlichkeit fur die Wärme
- cine so grofie Anziehungskraft gegen sie haben - daB sie mcht einmal in Luftformiger Gestalt
beharren, sondern eine noch fühigere, bindendere Form in Beziehung auf Wãrme für immer haben -
jedoch tausendfache Verbindungen eingehn - Verbindungen, in denen wir die vorzUglichste QueUe
der Warme, so wie in ihren Entstehungen die Hauptquelle der Kiiite suchen mUssen. (Licht,
El[ektricitatl, Nervenaether etc.) (N, 3, 185).
In 1798 Novalis had to speak of "Stoffe" and "Anziehung", but if one considers
the dynamics of the process he envisages it is apparent that he is referring to
"Stoffe" which do not correspond to traditional elements or to the antiphlogistic
substance "caloric". His view of substance is, rather, philosophical, and
approximates to what would today be called matter and energy. Although Novalis
still breaks these "Stoffe" down in terms of "Anziehungskraft" and
"Verbindungen", he is essentially referring to a form of matter which is perpetually
engaged in attracting and is a constant source of heat ("eine noch fáhigere
bindendere Form in Beziehung auf Wärme fir immer haben ...", "die
vorzüglichste Quelle der Wärme . .. "). Thus "energy" plays a more fundamental
role in Novalis's view of science than do, say, Lavoisier's elements.
Novalis's source for these notions comes, as is revealed by the surrounding
comments, from Ritter's review of Mrs. Fuihame's experiments and Rifler's own
galvanic experiments. In a preceding remark he observes:
Sonderbar und bedeutend sind ferner die neulich von Ritter bemerckten quantitativen
VerwandtschaftsverhAltnisse des Oxigèns. Aehnliche Reihen soilte man von jedem Stoffe haben -
die Verbesserung der specifischen Wärmeskalen gehört auch hierher ... Die Galvanischen
Erscheinungen eröffnen eine unermeffliche Aussicht im Gebiete der Physik.
Der Fuihame Versuche gehoren ebenfalls zu den Wichtigen (N, 3, 184-185).
The phrase "die Galvanischen Erscheinungen" refers to Rifler's discovery of the
parallel between galvanism and oxidation, which was supported by his reading of
258
the link between galvanic processes and affinity. Consequently, it further alludes to
the way Ritter interpreted nerve action, or the imponderable "Nervenaether" itself,
in terms of electrochemistry and affinity. Ritter's work on galvanism can be
viewed as an early attempt at defming "energy", or, as Novalis expresses this, the
search for substances where the "vorzüglichste Quelle der Wärme" is to be found.
Also in the above remark, following on from Ritter's observations in his review of
Mrs. Fulhame's experiments, Novalis suggests the need for a close inspection and
quantification of affmities, and an ordering of the effects of heat on different
substances. Such a procedure, in his view, could assist in explaining imponderables
such as "Licht, E1[ektricitätl, Nervenaether", and in doing so would not analyze
substances "elementally", but rather in terms of their relationship, in the more
abstract sense of proportionality, to other substances and effects such as heat. In
making this point on the erection of chemical "scales" Novalis is affirming, and
responding to, Mrs.Fulhame's notion from her "water" chemistry that hydrogen is
the basis for a body's ability to be oxidized. In his review Ritter summarizes this:
daB der Wasserszoffdes Wassers die einzige Substanz ist, weiche Körper zu ihrem entzündbaren
Zustande hersteilt ... (93, 441-442).
Indeed, Ritter goes far to stress that this principle of combustibility, hydrogen, is a
universal and a more important one than Lavoisier's oxygen. It enables all
combustion, and is the lightest substance. Of all substances, it has the greatest
capacity, i.e. attraction, for oxygen. Moreover, in arguing for the importance of
hydrogen, Ritter's method of analysis exemplifies Novalis's notion of setting up
chemical "scales":
Der Wasserstoff nur also ist es, des wirklich auch aus andern Quellen als dem Wasser, aus jeder
andern (sauerstoffhaltigen) oxydirt werden kann. MerkwUrdig genug, daB dieser Stoff in der
einfachsten sinnlich darzustellenden Verbindung desselben als Wasserstoffgas, unter alien uns
bekannten, unsere Waagen mit endlichem Moment in unendlich kleiner Masse, d.i. Flãche
sollicitirenden, von uns im praktischen Leben insgemein schwer genannten, oxydirbaren
Raumerfuilungen, bey gleichen Umfangen mit den ubrigen unter alien gerade derjenige ist, der
dieselben mit dem geringsten endlichen Moment sollicitiret, d.i. das geringste specifische Gewicht
hat; daB er aber unter diesen oxydirbaren Raumerfullungen auch diejenige ist, weiche bey der
Verbindung mit Sauerstoff die groBte Menge desselben zur Sättigung erfordert, oder, wie man
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diesen Begriff bestimmier ausdrücken könnte, die gröfite endliche Capacizat fur Sauerstoff hat (93,
441-442).
Even though Ritter is using oxygen as the measuring post for the properties of
hydrogen, it is still hydrogen which comes away as the more potent principle of
combustion, and not Lavoisier's oxygen. Further, and importantly, as Novalis
emphasizes, Ritter's technique of querying Lavoisier's dominating oxygen
chemistry, is to tackle the question of a principle of combustibility by treating the
oxidation of substances proportionally, and by comparing the ability of substances
to oxidize. This, as mentioned, is precisely what Novalis meant by erecting various
chemical "scales", and, in doing so, oxygen's "elemental" dominance would be
relativized.
Ritter then continues, extending the notion of a combustible principle beyond
hydrogen to light; he takes up contemporary ideas about light as a substance
capable of affinities, a notion which Goethe, for instance, had already speculated
on. 24 Goethe had remarked already in 1793 that light is "der reinste, feinste
Körper" to have affinity "mit allen ubrigen Korpern" (40, I, 3, 130; 129, 82).
Ritter himself speculates, that light, in comparison to other substances, has an
enormously large capacity for oxygen. Although Novalis and Rifler use differing
terminology, they are both referring to chemical affinity. Rifler uses the term
"Capacitat" which, in the way Rifler uses it, means affinity. He further places the
notion of chemical affinity within the wider sphere of attractions and affinity,
specifically relating it (after the manner of the age) to gravity:
Aber merkwUrdiger noch, (urn den Grundsãtzen der Verf. getreu zu bleiben,) 1st jene
RaumerfUllung, oder bestimrnter vielleicht: jener gewisse intensive Antheil bestimmter, wo nicht
aller Raurnerfuilungen, der selbst den Wasserstoff des Sauerstoffs zu berauben, und damit
Lebensluft zu bilden im Stande ist, - das Lichi. Dieser unsere Waagen mit unendlich kleinem
Moment sollicitirende, und darum irn ailgemeinen Gravitationssystem einen Rang höherer Ordnung
bekleidende Wirklichkeitsgrund der Licht genannten Erscheinung, dieser, urn gleich den andern em
mit endlicher Gröfie sollicitirendes Produkt herstellen zu können, mufite es seyn, dessen Moment
der Capacität für Sauerstoff irn VerhãltniB zu den ubngen unendlich grofi war, urn so über das
Gebiet aller Oxy- und Desoxydation zu herrschen, und darnit durch Verknupfung an einander
grenzender Ordnungen im ailgemeinen System der Gravitation, em Glied in der groBen Kette des
dynamischen Welterscheinung zu bilden! (93, 442).
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Indeed, in linking light to affinity, Rifler is not only seeking to explain gravity in
terms of chemical affinity, but also bringing another substance, light, into his own
notion that Nature was a vast purposive electrochemical circuit ("em Glied in der
grofien Kette der dynamischen Welterschemnung").
Behind Novalis's and Rifler's comments lies, as mentioned, the wish to go
beyond the confines of the French chemistry, and as the references here to
"Wärmeskalen" and "VerwandtschaftsverhAltnisse" imply, both Rifler and Novalis
were seeking a science of matter based upon proportions, arrangements and
quantification. But this was to be a quite different notion of quantified chemistry
from that set up by Lavoisier. To Rifler and Novalis it is not so much a question of
the weight of a substance, but rather of how substances, in a more philosophical
sense, stand in proportion to one another. At points like this, elemental chemistry
merges directly with the chemistry of deeper physical theory, and Lavoisier's
strictly elemental chemistry is left behind.
It is important to note how useful the notion of affinity was for discussing the
imponderables of a deep level matter theory. For affinity positively did supply the
inquirer with alternative methods of relating substances to one another, and, as
Rifler's and Novalis's comments show, it was possible to explore this difficult area
of physics. Their comments reveal the beginnings of an analysis and explanation of
imponderables. By contrast, the materialist notion of "caloric" or "Wärmestoff"
did not further inquiry in this area. All it did was to replace an older imponderable
("phlogiston") with a new one.
Moreover, although Novalis refers here explicitly to two forms of chemical
"scales", those of "Verwandtschaftsverhältnisse" and "Wärme", throughout his
writings he alludes to several more. The further "scales" he suggests are part of his
programme of constructing a science based upon "wircksame Begriffe", and the
nomenclature of the individual "scales" makes up part of his array of "real
metaphysical" notions. He lists the following properties and characteristics of
substances, with which, in his view, the inquirer should construct "scales":
Härte. Geruch. Festigkeit. Biegsamkeit. Elasticitaet. Cohaerenz. Adhaesion. Schwere.
Electricit[aetl. Magnetism. Chemische Eigenschaflen. Auilösbarkeit. Verbrennlichkeit.
Erwarmbarkeit. Opacitaet. Galvanism.
261
Acustische Eigensch[aften] (N, 3, 596).
The note preceding this one once again reveals the importance of affinity for
Novalis. It is a crucial force, and possesses methodological significance as a
paradigm for the erection of chemical "scales":
Morveaus Buch von den Affinitaeten - seine Tabelten (N, 3, 596).
The common method of setting up affmity tables is indeed decisive to his notion of
chemical "scales". Moreover, Novalis did not learn of the importance of affinity
from Morveau alone, for "Chemie", and its fundamental aspects, pneumatics and
affinity, were among the major subjects of interest in his time. Adler, for instance,
points out that in 1799 Scherer held lectures aimed at the general public in
Weimar, amongst which was his Kurze Darstellung der chemischen
Untersuchungen der Gasarten (113), where affinity was dealt with (129, 81).
Adler then remarks how, after these lectures, the whole town was overtaken by
chemistry, and how a contemporary was led to comment:
Alle Weimaraner und Weimaranerinnen scheinen Chemiker und Weimar em groBer Schinelzofen
werden zu wollen (223, 269; 129, 81).
Moreover, Berthollet's complex affmity programme would have been known to
those at home in contemporary chemical debate, even though his ideas were first
fully published in 1801 (29), since he had earlier published several essays on the
subject (253, 4, 576). Given this social context, and Novalis's knowledge of
Scherer, and also of Ritter, who indeed worked for Scherer, assisting in the
publication of the Ailgemeines Journal der Chemie, it is not surprising that Novalis
had a particular predilection for affinity theory. The social context, coupled with
his Neoplatonic interests in "Sympathie", explains how a "CalcUl", in his view,
could be erected as the base of a new chemistry, using "real metaphysical" notions
such as affinity. The various chemical "scales" he suggests could then be combined
to determine the deeper relationships between substances, whereby the concrete
notions (such as affmity, "Elasticitaet" etc.) are used to defme the key areas of
inquiry. This approach to chemistry and the establishment of particular and broader
criteria for the analysis of substances bears indeed resemblance to Berthollet's
programme. For Berthollet demanded that chemical processes should be
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investigated bearing a broad range of factors in mind. In 1801 E.G.Fischer
summarized Berthollet's range under "Verwandtschaft", "Quantitat",
"Unauflosligkeit", "Cohäsionskräfte", "ElasticitAt", "Wärme", "Efflorescenz", and
the "Auflösungsmittel" (29, 51 if.; 129, 72). Another list of Novalis drew up
reveals how he wished to erect "scales", using his notion of "Combinatorik", in a
further aspect of his programme of natural philosophical productivity, which would
take account of physiological and psychological factors as well, so as to encompass
the whole "real metaphysics" of Nature:
Krystallisat[ions]kr[aft.] Bildungskr[aft] Generat[ions]kr[aft] Irntabilit[aet. I Sensibilitaet.
Vorstellungskraft. Deutk[raft]. Intuitionskraft.
Wie verhalt sich die Elektr[izität,1 Der Magnet[ism,J Die Wännekr[aft,] Cohaes[ionslkr[aftj, die
Bewegungskr[aft], die Schwerkr[aftl, Die Elasticität, der Galvanism, die chemische
Verwandtschaftkr[aft] (N, 3,662).
Clearly, Novalis's list of factors can be seen as an extension of investigative
methods such as those of Berthollet: the chemist's list of factors in the realm of
matter is extended to include organic matter and the mind. Thus Novalis's
programme can be understood as a reflection of the unity of the Great Chain of
Being.
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3.2. The possible extension of Nova/is 's programme in deflagration experiments.
Phosphorus occupied a pivotal place in Novalis's understanding of this innovative
field of deeper physical theory and the employment of broader chemical criteria.
But what grounds did Novalis have for using phosphorus in an "Experimenten-
calcul" as part of an extended pneumatic debate? What grounds did he have for
calling phosphorus a "Muster" for a deep level matter theory? In the scientific
handbooks of the time, and disregarding Mrs. Fuihame's experiments on double
elective affinity, one finds less material on phosphorus as an agent of inquiry for
deep level matter theory than as a participator in the antiphiogiston debate.
However, there was an interest in deflagration ("Verpuffungen"), that is,
detonation experiments, in which phosphorus played a role. Novalis directly refers
to detonation when he made notes on Delamëtherie's (1743-18 17) Journal der
Physique (22; 61). He writes:
Plaizende Mischungen.
Potasche mit ubergesauerter Salzsäure - Schwefel und Kohie. Plazt schon bey leisem Druck (N, 3,
74).
Here, no mention of phosphorus is made, but this is the kind of experiment where
it might be used. Explicit use of phosphorus in deflagration experiments is found in
Scherer's Ailgemeines Journal der Chemie in an essay entitled 'Neue
Beobachtungen Uber die Verpuffungen der salzsauren und salpetersauren Salze mit
verschiedenen Körpern' (17; 5, 1, 604- 624). The contributors, Brugnatelli, van
Mons (1765-1842) and Hoyle, all use phosphorus in their experiments. 25 Novalis
makes no direct reference to this article, but since he made notes on other essays in
Scherer's first volume, he probably read the article, and was certainly aware of the
issues it raises, as his remarks on deflagration, which will now be discussed,
reveal.
Brugnatelli's opening words in the article convey the significance of these new
deflagration experiments, and will help convey how Novalis's ideas fit into their
contemporary context:
Ich wufite, daB salzsaures Kali stärkere Wirkungen, als Salpeter mit Kohie und Schwefel gemischt,
hervorbringt; daB es durch Stoflen oder Zerreiben mit einer groflen Menge oxydirbarer
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(verbrenrdicher) Suhstanzen verpufft; allein ich hätte die weit stärkem Wirkungen von bloBen
salpetersauren Saizen, und sogar von Metalikalken mit Phosphor gemischt und mit einem Hammer
geschlagen, mcht erwartet (17, 604).
From this opening it is apparent that a shift has occurred from believing that
detonation was a property of particular substances to the awareness that
deflagration was a far broader issue concerning, perhaps, all of matter. For
Brugnatelli, the great surprise is that metal caics mixed with phosphorus explode.
Phosphorus was therefore one of the substances which alerted him to the broader
implications of detonation. In Novalis's sense, it performed the function of a
symbolic image for Brugnatelli. Moreover, these lines from Brugnatelli offer some
further vindication of Novalis's method of inquiry: Brugnatelli does not stop at
detonation theory with "Salzsaures Kali". In effect, he uses a procedure akin to
Novalis's "Experimentencalcul"; for he expands research into detonation by
considering many substances. He does not search for a single substance that
detonates, but rather looks for the laws lying behind deflagration.
Brugnatelli's method is indeed symptomatic of an attitude of inquiry that looks
not for the properties of particular substances, but rather for general aspects of
matter theory. Indeed, all the contributors to the article on "Verpuffungen"
experiment with a large variety of substances in what could be seen as an informal
"Experimentencalcul" based not around a particular substance, but around the
concrete detonation. There is little doubting the vividness for the imagination of a
notion such as detonation. Further, because the contributors to the article line up
experiment after experiment on the chosen subject of deflagration, in a
"calculating" manner, their entire enterprise gives the impression of an
"experimental calculus". Their method was of course common practice at the time,
and the method creates an ordered effect, and usually took the form, as in this
article, of a numeric labelling of each experiment, followed by a description of the
experiment itself, i.e. "Erster Versuch ... Zweyter Versuch ... Dritter Versuch
Vierter Versuch . . .". To Novalis this numerical order based around some notion or
substance would presumably have appeared as a form of "phenomenal" calculus.
Novalis would have seen this as a pattern of thought, already employed by
practicing scientists, that could be worked into his idea of a general programme of
natural philosophical productivity. As regards phosphorus's status in these
experiments, one can observe in contrast to the pneumatic experiments that
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phosphorus is not the main substance used here, but one of many. To be just, then,
one cannot regard phosphorus as the one great analogy for deflagration.
Phosphorus is, however, one of the important substances in detonation
experiments, and so it belonged with other substances and notions in a broad,
imaginative inquiry based openly around the notion of deflagration: a phenomenal
calculus that seeks to extend chemical theory into regions of physics and that brings
together empirical laboratory work and concrete images in the mind. His concept
of inquiry alerts one to the notion that the chemical analogy is based upon the
assumption that there is a genuine link between theory and phenomena. The
process of drawing analogies, and as in this essay on deflagration, the process of
compiling and "experimenting" with different explosive substances, is as much
sheer laboratory work, as a mediation between the imagination and matter. Here,
the concrete notions would include the particularly significant substances used in
the experiments, such as phosphorus, and the relevant factors determining the
chemical processes.
Regarding the detonation experiments themselves, they treat the broader factors
in chemical processes, and, if one examines the article in detail, one can again see
how precisely Novalis's explanatory ideas fit his contemporary scientific situation,
for the detonation experiments do attempt to explain chemical activity at a deeper
level, investigating substances with what Novalis would deem "real metaphysical"
notions, such as "Affinität", "Elasticität", "Druck" and "Wärme". In the
deflagration experiments here, inquiry essentially focuses itself not on a full
combustion process, as has been considered hitherto for the pneumatics debate, but
on a partial combustion process, in which the substances are not given the time to
combust fully. Instead of completely reacting, the combustible partly combines
with the combustant, while the rest of the oxygen of the combustant, to speak in
the terminology of the time, becomes "elastic", causing the forceful effects of
detonation. Novalis describes the process himself:
Plazzung ist UberwaltigungsPhaenomen der VolumsCapacitaet./ Die Warme dehnt wohi nicht aus -
sondern der Korper dehnt sich aus - urn die frernde Masse Warmesioffauf dci Oberflãche haiten und
fassen zu können - Ubergewiclu der Atmossfare über den Kern bewirckt die mechanische
VergrOerung der Oberflache - die Zerkleinung - Platzung (N, 3, 82).
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In the article in Scherer the contributors use a hammer on various substances to
cause a diminishment of the surface area of the substances. In full combustion, as
Novalis explains, the substance expands in order to take up the heat; but if the
body does not expand, yet is in the process of combusting, and it is not given the
chance to combust fully because of the diminishment of its surface area, it explodes
("die Zerkleinung - Platzung").
Brugnatelli concludes that the strike of the hammer sets the particles in motion,
thus allowing their natural affinities to operate:
Der Schiag des Hammers ist nöthig urn die Bestandtheile der Korper in jene Bewegung zu versetzen,
in weicher sich die Affinitãten thatig beweisen (17, 609).
Van Mons, in the first of his contributions to the article, explains that the hammer
stroke perhaps causes heat, which is followed by partial combustion; the remaining
oxygen, having been made free from its oxide, forcefully causes the noise:
Der kalte Schiag, indem er den Stoff stark zu sarnmen drückt, und vielleicht elnige Wärme erregt,
bewirkt eine unvolikommene Verbrennung (Oxydation) des Phosphors, und foiglich eine bios
partielle Bindung des Oxygen, wovon der Theil, weicher durch den brennbaren Stoff nicht fixirt
wird, das Gerausch hervorbrrngt, in dern er Elasticitãt erhält (17, 614).
In his second contribution to the article van Mons describes in more detail his
notion that the hammer stroke forces the oxygen and heat out of the oxide, and that
the rest of the oxide contains enough heat to become elastic:
Je mehr ich die Erfahrungen Uber die Detonation wiederhohie, desto gewisser scheint mir die
Muthmafiung zu werden, daB durch den Schiag oder Druck das Oxygen und der Wärmestoff
zugleich aus der oxydirten Substanz gedruckt werden. Die Wirkung ist gewissermafien mecharnsch
und der verbrenniiche Körper tragt bios durch die Figirung eines Antheils Oxygens zu dieser
Erscheinung bey, wodurch der ubrige Antheil dieses Grundstoffs die nothige Menge Warmestoff
erhait, urn in den elastischen Zustand uberzugehen. Dies scheint urn so viel wahrscheinlicher, weil
durch die Erhitzung und Entziehung des Sauerstoffs dasselbe bewirkt wird (17, 618).
Thomas Hoyle sums up the reactions in his experiments, and, as the others,
explains detonation through the sudden release of gases:
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Obgleich die vorhergehenden Versuche nicht so angestelit wurden, daB alle Erfolge derselben hãtten
genauer untersucht werden können, so wird doch folgende auf dieselben gegrUndete Muthmaflung
erlaubt seyn. Wahrscheinlich verbindet sich der Sauerstoff nach MaaBgabe der Heftigkeit der
Verbrennung mit dem Phosphor zum phosphorigtsauren Gas oder zur Phosphorsäure; mit dem
Schwefel zum schwefligtsauren Gas, oder zur Schwefelsäure; mit der Kohie und andern
Pflanzensubstanzen zur Kohlenstoffsäure; vielleicht zersetzt dersetbe das Operment in
schwefligtsaures Gas und Arseniksäure.
Die Ursache der Detonation beruht höchstwahrscheinlich auf der ElasticitAt und der Heftigkeit, mit
weicher die schnelle Entwickelung der Gasarten auf die umgebende Luft wirkt und sie comprimirt.
Die salzigte SAtire vereinigt sich sehr wahrscheinlich mit den ubrigbleibenden Kali und etwas von
dem angewandten oxydirbaren Stoffe; bey Anwendungen der Schwefel- oder SalpetersAure scheint
die salzigte SAure in Freyheit gesezt zu werden (17, 624).
Of all the contributors Hoyle is the least explanatory. Brugnatelli actually mentions
affmity, and van Mons has the most detailed and sophisticated approach since he
does attempt to trace the problem of heat through the experiments. But all the
contributors show how the pneumatics debate could be extended into areas of
physics through the examination of combustion in conjunction with the behaviour
of particles under pressure or in expansion.
Although phosphorus was not the analogy for the deflagration experiments, it is,
in this article in Scherer, used in two experiments by Brugnatelli and van Mons
which stand out from the other experiments using different substances, for
descriptive, anecdotal, and hence perhaps even, in the light of Novalis's views on
phosphorus, for pedagogic and symbolic purposes. Brugnatelli describes in his first
experiment how the use of phosphorus caused the most terrible explosion he had
ever experienced. Admittedly, one must add that he was not expecting the
phosphorus to cause such dramatic effects, and that he may have been somewhat
generous in the amount he was using; but, this, importantly, is part of the novelty
of phosphorus in these deflagration experiments:
Erster Versuch. Ich nahm em Quentchen krystallisirtes salpetersaures Silber, und Iegte es auf einen
grofien Ambos, mitten unter die Krystallen eine sehr dUnne Lamelle Phosphor: die Temperatur der
AtmosphAre während dieser Versuche, stieg nicht Uher 6 über das Zero des Reaumürschen
Thermometers; nachdem alles so eingerichtet war, schlug ich mit einem Hammer em wenig stark
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auf die Mischung; worauf eine der fUrchterlichsten Detonationen erfolgte, die ich jemals erlebt
habe. Der Ambos und sein hölzerner Träger wurden dadurch erschUttert. Man bemerkte auf dem
Ambos 5 bis 6 Linien lange Spuren von Silber; einer von den Rãndern des Hammers ward
zuruckgebogen und aufwärts gekehrt; ich war ganz davon betAubt, und meine Kleider waren an
verschiedenen Stellen durchlöchert.
Ich wiederholte denselben Versuch zu verschiedenen Malen, und selbst in meinen Vorlesungen,
und ob ich gleich nur mit eimgen Gran Salz den Versuch anstelite, so war doch der Knall niemals
schwächer, als der von einem Flintenschusse (17, 605).
In a pedagogic sense, here, phosphorus must have made an impression on the
audience, and Novalis could have seen the dramatic symbolic uses of phosphorus,
as a strong image for the imagination in his notion of concrete theory.
Van Mons describes how his phosphorus experiments set terror into his audience.
Again, Novalis could have seen phosphorus's symbolic use here. Further, as with
Brugnatelli, it appears that phosphorus was perhaps at the forefront of the
deflagration experimentation that was moving away from the notion that particular
substances were explosive to the notion that deflagration should be on the agenda
for a general inquiry into matter. For Van Mons expresses sorrow that the novel
results obtained with phosphorus could not be tested with sulphur and carbon
because he had run out of "salzsaures Ammoniak". This, or "salzsaures Kali" as
Brugnatelli calls it, was the substance chemists usually thought of when dealing
with deflagration, and it interestingly appears that it was in this context that the
unexpected results obtained from phosphorus led them to broaden their inquiry.
Van Mons writes:
Ich hatte noch ungefhr 5 Grane salzsaures Anmoniak, wovon ich die Hãlfte mit ungefahr 4 Gran
Phosphor anwendete; da ich die beyden Substanzen mit aller Vorsicht zerrieb, urn sie zu mischen,
so entstand em so entsezliches Verpuffen, daB das ganze Haus in Schrecken gesezt wurde. Der
Phosphor war gröBtenteils auf meinen Hut geschleudert worden und dieser brannte lange, bevor ich
es gewahr wurde. Die Heftigkeit des Schiags hatte mir den Hammer aus den Händen gerissen; ich
hatte sehr deutlich bemerkt, daB er von den expandirten Gasarten empor gehoben worden war. Die
andere Hãlfte des salzsauren Ammoniaks wurde ganz allein auf einen umgestUrzten eisernen Mörser
gethan, und etwas derb mit dem kalten Hammer geschlagen; schon der erste Schiag verursachte em
Verpuffen desselben; allein es wurde kein Licht entbunden. Es that mir leid. daB ich nichis von
diesem Saize mehr ubrig hatte, urn es mit Schwefel und Kohie zu versuchen (17, 612-613).
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Further suggestion of the novelty of the phosphorus for these deflagration
experiments comes out two pages later in the article, where van Mons warns
experimenters who are new to this area of inquiry to be cautious, above all with
their use of phosphorus:
Denen, die mit dergleichen Versuchen nicht genau bekannt sind, mufi ich anzeigen, daB, wenn man
mehr als anderthaib oder höchstens zwey Gran Phosphor nimmt, man Gefahr lãuft, sich die Hände
oder Kleider zu verbrennen, da die ubrigen StUckchen Phosphor brennend umherfliegen (17, 614-
615).
Such amusing anecdotes are highly instructive when it comes to understanding
Novalis. Thus, although phosphorus was only one of the many substances used in
the detonation experiments, and although it was not the analogy or symbol for
deflagration for these experimenters, it further illuminates Novalis's notion of
phosphorus as a "Muster des Experimentirens": both anecdotally and scientifically,
phosphorus in the above experiments perhaps "sparked off" the wider notions of
deflagration. Furthermore, the very surprising effects of phosphorus, which make
it the stuff of anecdote, implant it in the memory, where it can serve a function
very close to Novalis's idea of symbolic substances. Interestingly, the experimental
context of the lecture hall itself could have suited Novalis 's idea of a chemical
theatre - as mentioned, perhaps as a modernization of the idea of a memory theatre
- where phosphorus could contribute to a form of "phenomenal" calculus in the
dramatic aesthetics of scientific productivity. It is important to emphasize, once
again, that entails a practical form of social knowledge with a strong
epistemo logical underpinning.
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3.3. Novalis 's own extension of his progrwnme in his ideas on the use of
phosphorus for matter theory: cosmological modelling.
The uses and limits of phosphorus in contemporary science as regards its role in
chemistry, where it has with broad physical implications, have been traced in the
previous sections. However, Novalis himself entertained experimental uses of
phosphorus that went further into physics. His thoughts are contained in a section
of the Freiberger narurwissenschafiliche Studien entitled Gravitarionslehre (N, 3,
69-72). Here, Novalis puts forward his own model of the universe, and he suggests
some experiments designed to illustrate his ideas. In these experiments, phosphorus
plays a major role. The notes explain planetary motion in terms of excitability,
organization, and affinity. The views stand in direct opposition to the traditional
picture of Newton and modern science, by relativising the role of Newton's laws.
More fundamental than the inverse square law to Novalis is the heterogeneity of,
and are differences in, mass. Novalis is speaking of a dynamic process of gravity
in distinction to a mechanical model:
Uberall ist Masse - nur durch die Ungleichheiten der Masse enzs:ehz die Schwere (N, 3, 69).
Instead of treating mass in terms of quantity, Novalis suggests that the law of
gravity should be based upon the dynamic relationships of all mass.
Updating the organic view of Nature with inventive precision, Novalis compares
the planets to muscles. Behind this image stand Renaissance ideas of the earth as a
living body with grass as its hair, for instance, and the much more recent
cosmology of the Kant-Laplace system. For Novalis, the planets are organized
wholes which, excited by affinity, move externally and change internally. Primary
to this system of planetary motion is thus not mechanics, but pathology and
chemistry. That Novalis does not speak directly of affinity or "Sympathie" in these
remarks can be explained by the fact that he uses "Reitz" or "Schwere" as their
synonyms; particularly, he is trying to distance himself from the work of Pierre
Simon de Laplace (1749-1827), on whom he was here making notes in a highly
independent and creative fashion. He takes up Laplace's belief in the universality
of affinity for large and small bodies, but attempts to go further by redefining
affinity; he expands the common concept rooted in mechanics and chemistry,
which Laplace was also using, and, incorporates into it the notion of "Reitz", with
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all its connotations of organization. Indeed, as mentioned, Novalis even
accommodates gravity ("Schwere") to this scheme, using the term in the same
sense as "Reitz". 26 He observes:
Elastisch schwere Korper - die pos[itiv] und neg[ativj Schwer zugleich sind, die eine Zeirlang fallen
bis zu einem terminus, wo sie wieder steigen - Muskein - und soiche Muskeln sind unsre
Weltkorper. Der voilikommenel Muskel fuilit sich wohi mcht nut Speise urn von dern Maximo zurn
Mimmo zunickzukehren, oder verwandelt gar seine Gestalt, wie z.B. alle Verkalkbare, Schmelzbare
und verdarnpfbare K[orper], die eben deswegen wohi unvolikomne Muskeln sind (N, 3, 69-70).
Novalis envisages planetary motion as a process of relative polarity and as a
process of relative combustion or chemical activity. He is viewing matter neither
statically nor elementally, but as an organized dynamic whole. The purposiveness
of matter itself, not so apparent in laboratory experiments with "Verkalkbare,
Schmelzbare und verdampfbare K[orper]", and to many scientists without natural
philosophical inclinations not apparent at all, is, for Novalis, readily appreciable
when observed on the grand scale of heavenly movement. As this and other
fragments indicate, for Novalis, the greater the body, the more scope there is for
organization. Consequently, too, Novalis explains gravity as an evolutionary,
generative process which forms heavy bodies. Clearly, he takes a bold step here in
his remarks, from viewing gravity in terms of traditional mechanics, to a view
based upon chemical organization and its primary force, affinity. Although this
stance is, in its rudiments, derived from combining Renaissance anthropomorphism
with the Kant-Laplace system, Novalis's views, as mentioned, do incorporate a
novel extension. For Novalis transforms the mechanist centre of gravity into the
chemical burning point of the soul, which resides in the purposive entity of
gravity:
Em Gravitationsprocess erzeugt schwere Körper. Der Brennpunkt ist nichts, als das Leben der
Schwere - der Sit.z der Schwerseele - die d[as] Gleichgewicht bestimmt (N, 3, 69).
Affinity (denoted by "Reitz") is understood as the general force in all bodies, large
and small - a common interpretation in the sciences -, but Novalis further
emphasizes the purposiveness in matter, and calls this early speculation on energy
the "soul" of matter. Furthermore, boldly tackling the fundamental question of the
relation between chemical affinity and Newtonian attraction which preoccupied
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chemists after Newton, Novalis suggests that all the affinities of all bodies collect
together in the universal phenomenon of gravity, and that they do so in an
organized process within a "fluid" state:
Vei-wandeln sich nicht alle Reitze in diesen Univers(aljReitz der Schwere, wenn beyde KOrper in
Einem Fluido sind (N, 3 , 71).
Novalis's introduction of the term "fluid" gives a decidedly substantial meaning to
the Newtonian concept of a celestial ether. He then lends concreteness to his
speculation by proposing experiments with substances placed in the "fluids" of
water and air. By "fluid", he essentially means a general medium in which bodies
move, but the concept for him has strong chemical connotations. Novalis's
proposed experiments serve as cosmological models based fundamentally on a
chemical view of nature as an organization, and are an attempt specifically to
answer the following question he sets:
Würde nicht jeder gereizie Karper sich dem Körper der ihn reizte, in einem gewissen Verhältnisse
nã1ern - bis zu einem Puncte, und dann sich wieder entfemen - z.B. bey der Wãrme - wenn beyde
K[OrperJ im weiten Weltraume schwönvnen? (N, 3, 71).
Novalis is here touching on the origins of celestial attraction and repulsion; his
experiments are designed to address this breathtakingly speculative issue in a
highly practical way.
He first suggests a cosmological experiment which involves placing combusting
balls of substances together in order to observe whether the chemical stimulation
("Reitz") of affinity causes particular movements:
Aller Reitz zieht an - dehni aus - und stöfit auch wieder ab. (Physiologie.)
(Statt der cartesischen Teufel - (GIas)kugeln mit Selbstentzündlicher Masse inwendig - z.B. eine
Glaskugel und eine Metailkugel beyde mit entzündlicher Masse gemischt - oder PhosphorKugel -
und eine von innen sich erhitzende Metalikugel - hier würde die Phosphorkugel urn die andre
herumtanzen.-) (N, 3, 72).
Novalis appears to be setting up his model above all in contrast to that in
Descartes's (1596-1650) PrincipiaPhilosophiae(1644), as much as in opposition to
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the whole "billiard-ball" model of the universe, commonly believed to be espoused
by the Newtonians. The reference to "der cartesischen Teufel" could allude to an
apparatus Descartes, or his followers, devised to demonstrate their notions of
celestial movement and the behaviour of particles. Or it could perhaps refer to
Cartesian models of matter in a more general sense, as theories of matter. It could
also even be interpreted as the "devil" Descartes had let loose by his splitting of
mind and matter, and his belief solely in matter in the world of Nature. This made
it extremely difficult to explain the causes of motion of bodies, or notions of
organization at all, for the Cartesian "immaterial" soul was quite simply a different
category of existence from matter. French has pointed to a major aspect of this
problem:
but on the Continent, so completely had Descartes banished the lower activities of the soul that
"soul" was equated with "mind" or consciousness: It cannot be the soul that constructs the body or
controls its every action, for we are not conscious of it doing so. Yet again the question arises: If
the body is the machine, what moves the parts? (171, 125).
Further, there were indeed considerable differences between Cartesian and
Newtonian corpuscularity, which Novalis seems to be explicitly stressing in his
dismissal of the Cartesian "Teufel". As French remarks, Newtonianism was not so
radically mechanical as Cartesianism. For Newtonianism did not entirely reject the
notion of organization or a life force in matter itself, and "retained some
suggestion of innate mobility and nonparticulate subtlety" (171, 113). Thus, in the
experiment he proposes, instead of passive, mechanical entities (e.g. Descartes's
particles), Novalis elects combustible examples to account for "animate", organized
matter; and, once again, he chooses phosphorus as a paradigm.
He also develops experiments (such as placing drops of oil on water) which
expand the traditional demonstrations associated with affinity by introducing the
burning process:
Em brennender Oeltropfen neben einem Andem auf dem Wasser - em sehr heifles Rohr im Wasser -
urn das sich nachher der planetarische Körper herum bewegle. En Stuck Phosphor laB ich in einer
Nufischale voll Wasser schwimmen, oder em wemg Schwefel und nähere ihrn eine gluhende
Metallspitze (N, 3 , 72).
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In all these experiments Novalis wishes to observe and connect the phenomena of
cohesion, elasticity, chemical affinity, and heat, to observe their effects on the
motion of substances. His experiments thus indicate that his notion of planetary
motion is one of large-scale organized heat transfer:
Die Bahn der Weltkorper wird durch ihre Elasticität bestimmt - durch die Sfäre ihrer Erregbarkeit
(N, 3, 71).
Affinity causes both elasticity and heat; on a large scale, this affmity (manifesting
as elasticity) determines planetary excitability. Thus Novalis interconnects affinity,
elasticity, excitability and planetary motion, harnessing chemical, physiological
and pathological ideas to an understanding of celestial motion.
Novalis's interest in camphor also most probably lies in the type of cosmological
speculation that he associates with phosphorus. Novalis seems to have singled out
camphor specifically for this reason, since camphor does not appear to play a
significant role in the pneumatic debate in the areas of combustion or detonation.
However, once again, contemporary studies illuminate the importance of the
substance. There is in Scherer's Aligemeines Journal der Chemie a summary by
Fourcroy of Benedict Prevost's work on the effluences of odorous substances (84;
5, 1, 143-166). 27 In his experiments, Prevost studies the movements and effects of
substances on one another on a metal sheet covered by a fine surface of water. As
Fourcroy states, the most striking effects were achieved with camphor. He draws
attention to the neglected results of C.A. von Bergen, who had already
experimented with camphor on water in 1754; he then cites a passage from Bergen,
which defines the curious property of camphor:
Mit Verwunderung sahe ich aus der Peripherie eines jeden Theilchens vie! pinselfornuge Ströme
einer sehr feinen Materie ausflieBen (84, 166) •28
This curious phenomenon is hardly less striking, though it may be less glamorous,
than the behaviour of phosphorus. One can see how, for Novalis, camphor would
presumably have had similar physical implications as phosphorus did for his own
cosmological model. Indeed, among the experiments Fourcroy calls most striking,
there are clear parallels to Novalis's suggested experiments with the balls of
phosphorus. In Prevost's experiments, camphor and lead are placed opposite each
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other on a leaf of zinc ("Scheibe"). The leaf of zinc then begins to move in circular
fashion. The type of action in the following experiment described by Prevost is
closely analogous to that subsequently proposed by Novalis as a model for studying
the effect of chemical processes on planetary motion:
Das Ausstromen dieser FlUssigkeit geschieht mit einer Reguiaritãt, die im folgenden Versuche
frappant wird. Man bringe em rundes Stickchen Campher von emer Lime im Durchrnesser, auf den
Rand einer Scheibe von vier Linien, weiche in einem mcht sehr hohen cylindrischen Gerafi von 6
bis 7 Zoll im Durchniesser auf dem Wasser schwinunt - gerade gegen Uber lege man em Stückchen
Bley von derseiben Schwere; wean alien ganz ruhig ist, wird sich die Scheibe kreisformig urn den
Cylinder drehen, so daB die Tangente des Umkreises durch den Campher und das Bley gehen wird;
anfangs dreht sie sich bis zu 5 Malen in emer Minute (84, 161).
Clearly, this description cannot be adduced as a direct source of Novalis's ideas,
but in that it is representative of contemporary thinking, it does show how he might
have seen camphor as a cosmological model.
However, there were also quite different influences on Novalis's cosmological
modelling unconnected to phosphorus and camphor. On the same page where
Novalis puts forward his suggestions for cosmological models, he remarks:
Rumfords Versuch - die Wãrmeleitung Anschaulich zu machen (N, 3, 72).
Novalis is referring to the experiments that Count Rumford (1743-18 14) undertook
by observing dust particles in heated "Weingeist" (102). In his way, Rumford
attempted successfully to provide a model for heat at a deep level theory of matter.
This, presumably, influenced Novalis's own concrete approach to deep level matter
theory through models in laboratory experimentation. Importantly for Novalis,
Rumford argues that heat was a motion of particles and not a chemical element that
expanded through substances (215, 85-86). Rumford concludes his experiments
feeling that his observed motion of dust particles was proof enough of this:
Da die Resultate dieser Versuche auf die entscheidenste Art beweisen, daB die Fortpfianzung der
Wãrme im Wasser, nicht nur durch solche Dinge aufgehaiten wird, weiche seine Flüssigkeit
vermindern, sondern auch dutch soiche, weiche auf mechanische Weise, und ohne eine Verbindung
damit einzugehen, die innern Bewegungen heminen, so scheint es mir, daB dadurch fast bis zur
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Demonstration erwiesen wird, dali die Wärme im Wasser nur zu Folge der innern Bewegungen
desselben fortgepflanzt, - oder, dali sie von den Teilchen dieses Liquidiums transportirt oder
fortgefuhrt (carried) wird, und sich nicht, wie man gewohnlich glaubt, darin ausbreitet und
expandirt (102, 441).
The view of matter and heat developed here is close to Novalis's own (but
naturally Novalis differs from Rumford in his notions of organization). Indeed,
after referring to Rumford's model of heat, Novalis speaks of the "immanent"
elliptical motions in "fluids": he refers to "fluids" in a chemical sense as in
Rumford's experiments with "Weingeist", but also to other possible models of
"fluids" which can illuminate electricity, magnetism and light:
Uber die Ellyptischen, immanenten Bewegungen von Heterogenëisirten Flüssigkeiten.
(Lateralwirckungen der SzrOme.) E1[ektricitaet], Magnet[ismusj. Licht (N, 3, 72).
A sense of Novalis's notion of "immanent" elliptical motions can be seen in
Rumford's experiments where Rumford rotates the tube containing the
"Weingeist", thus altering the current of the dust particles:
Da ich die Bewegung des Weingeistes mit emem Linsenglas näher betrachtete, so fand ich, dali der
aufszeigende Strom die Achse der Röhre einnahm; der heruniergehende aber Iangsz der Wand war.
Als ich die Rôhre etwas neigte, bewegte sich der aufszeigende Strom auller der Achse und gieng
lãngst der obem Wand der Röhre, indefi der herabsteigende Strom die ganze untere Seite der Röhre
einnahm (102, 424).
Novalis remarks after his reference to Rumford's experiment on "fluid" models
show his wish to build up some analogy between laboratory models of matter on a
small scale with natural forces and the greater planetary movements. Moreover,
they reveal to us the very wide "hinterland" of ideas which Novalis channeled into
his views.
Contrasting phosphorus with the substances used by Rumford, it further seems
likely that Novalis singled out phosphorus because it lent credence to his view that
the inorganic world was "alive". Phosphorus supported the view that the whole of
nature was a living organism, since it "naturally" (i.e. spontaneously) combusted.
Camphor, too, was an exemplary substance since it also quite "naturally" produced
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chemical and physical effects. Without human intervention phosphorus glowed in
the dark: this self-active glowing was paradigmatic of Novalis's view that the
universe was driven by affinity, "Lust" and "Unlust" (N, 3, 423), fulfilling his
belief in the force of "Sympathie". Accordingly, it illustrated his view that the
"world soul" was a fundamental physical organizing force, although transcendent,
or as Novalis puts it here, transitory:
Uberall wird eine Kraft, oder Action (quod idem est.) transitorisch sichtbar - die durchaus
verbreitet, unter gewissen einzretenden Bedingungen (Beruhrungen) sich zu offenbaren, wircksam zu
werden scheint. Diese mystische Kraft scheint die Kraft der Lust und Unlust zu sein - deren
begeisiernde Wirckungen wir so ausgezeichnet in den wollustigen Empfindungen zu bemercken
glauben.
(Alle Wirckungen sind nichts, als Wirckungen Einer Kraft, der Weitseele - die sich nur unter
verschiednen Bedingungen, Verhältnissen und Umständen, offenbart - die überall und nirgends ist
...) (N, 3, 423).
Novalis sets forth his view with considerable caution, both emphasizing its
hypothetical character (repeatedly using the word "scheinen"), and qualifying it by
phrases like "unter gewissen ... Bedingungen". By such means, he integrates his
scientific with his religious approach, mediating the two by constant reference to
human factors. The human mean constantly recurs, typifying Novalis's
pathological-vitalist view of nature. The latter further comes to light in the remarks
he makes on the similarities between combustion and nutrition:
Alle Wircksamkeit ist Folge eines Repulsivprocesses - oder des mechanischen Secretions und
Gahningsprocesses - Man kann aber auch umgekehrt sagen - der Grund aller Verändening ist
Frefibegierde - Combustionstendenz - Nutritionstrieb - durch diesen entsteht erst, als nothwendige
Folge, Secretion.
Hauptfrage - 1st das Ernãhren des Absonderns oder das Absondern des Ernãhrens wegen?
Diese Frage führt zur Auflosung - daB beydes Accidenzen sind - deren Action die eigentliche
Substanz ist - die Generationsaction (N, 3, 100).
Here, Novalis juxtaposes basic animal drives with combustion. Again, he points
out that the initial or final states in combustion (or nutrition) are not the real centre
of any matter theory: the real cause of nature's activity lies in the original
generative force itself.
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Novalis goes so far as to speculate on a natural hierarchy of combustion. This
remark reveals the fundamental importance of combustion, flames, and fire in his
thought. For he considers fire as a higher realm within the kingdoms of Nature and
also as a characteristic of all phenomena; far from envisaging a separate substance
like "caloric", all chemical activity has a "Flammennatur", since substances react
with one another, and hence, analogically, "eat" one another as a flame would
"eat" them. The importance of the remark is indicated by its heading, which
connects "philosophy" and "experiment":
Philosophische Instruction fir den Experimentator.
Solite die Flam,ne, der Funken, etc. in em neues Reich gehoren, das von Pflanzen, Thier, und
Menschenreich verschieden ware. Lebendige Processe.
4 Arten von Flammen - 1. diejemge, deren Excremente - die anorgischen Naturen sind. 2. deren
Excremente - Pflanzen - 3. deren Excremente - Thiere. 4. deren Excremente - Menschen sind. Je
höher die Flamme - Je kun.ctlicher - desto complicirter gebildeter das Excrement.
Alles Fressen ist em Assimilationsprocess - Verbindungs - Generationsprocess (N, 3, 84-85).
Fire appears to occupy the highest point in this view of Nature. It was not without
precedent historically to view fire in such a deeper sense. For Heracitus (circa 500
BC) fire was supreme; and, more recently, Hermann Boerhaave (1668-1738) held
it in high esteem (203, 15-16; 151, 24-26). The importance that fire has in this
remark, and by extension, in Novalis's thought (see for example, the references
already made to Fichte's "Flamme" and Plotinos's light), further helps us to
understand his choice of the very combustible phosphorus, as a substance
paradigmatic of natural processes •29
To conclude, it has now been seen what Novalis's programme for natural
philosophical productivity, which aimed at unifying theory, may have looked like.
Epistemological aspects, such as key symbols and the method of "phenomenal"
calculus, tend to outweigh the social factors in Novalis's programme. This is in
accord with Novalis's notion of "experiment", which itself primarily underlines the
need to check and reflect upon cognitive gain. Of course the elements of these
social aspects of Novalis's thought are significant. They are also of value for
reflection on the history of science. However, it has again to be stressed that
epistemology is Novalis's prime concern.
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This chapter has been concerned with the adequacy of Novalis's programme of
natural philosophical productivity for unifying theory: Novalis had made the
beginnings of such an undertaking, but, naturally, given the demands and nature of
such a project, it remains at the level of a possibility. Yet perhaps the most
important part of the project, his idea of "phenomenal" calculus, was sufficiently
developed and illustrated by Novalis himself. However, this still leaves the
symbols of his system wanting. Even though a wealth of support for Novalis's
programme for unifying theory arises Out of his treatment of phosphorus, this is
still only one key substance, found in only one, albeit significant, fragment. None
the less, the contextualization of phosphorus, in the sciences of the time and in
Novalis's thought itself, has shown ample evidence for this side of Novalis's
programme for productivity, and has therefore given an indication of the direction
of Novalis's thoughts on this topic.
The next chapter will illustrate how Novalis's later thought moves away from
such a large endeavour to fmd respite and, most probably consensus, in natural
philosophical productivity for the individual inquirer. This programme for natural
philosophical productivity is concerned with the unification of practice through a
consensuality based upon the realization of the individual's methodology and his
interdisciplinary theory.
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4. Excursus: aspects of aichemical texts on one of Novalis 's book lists and their
signfi cance for his idea of science.
This excursus only wishes to illustrate some aspects of aichemical texts in one of
Novalis's book lists and to relate them to his stance to the sciences of his time.
Clearly, no work on Novalis's ideas on chemistry should fail to take account of
alchemy. While it is true that Novalis's views on chemistry have to be seen in the
light of eighteenth-century chemistry and natural philosophy, there are also
considerable methodological issues and notions of matter theory which arise out of
alchemy. On the book list mentioned by Novalis early on in the Freiberger
naturwissenschafihiche Studien 3° one of the texts, Georg Wolffgang Wedel's
Einleitung zurAichernie (1724), is of particular relevance (123). This is a text that
sets out to provide the apprentice alchemist with an insight into the tradition, aims,
method and pitfalls of alchemy. Wedel openly discusses several major questions:
notably the fundamental outlook of the alchemists, and their Neoplatonic, Hermetic
and Cabalist way of thinking. The importance of Hermes Trismegistus, the notion
of the chemical marriage, and also the general mystical notion of "Sympathie", so
important to Novalis, are readily apparent in Wedel's work. Thus Wedel's
introduction to the subject provides a useful key to the interests of alchemists
which are so often obfuscated in the other texts on Novalis's book list. The value
of the text in relation to Novalis's science lies, not least, in the fact that Wedel
appears to adapt alchemy to a more modern scientific perspective.
It has been established that major sources of Neoplatonic thought for Novalis
were Hemsterhuis and Plotinos. However, Wedel's work is naturally symptomatic
of this tradition too, and gains added interest for its "scientific" content, which
provides an invaluable backdrop to Novalis's thought. Wedel's book both
illuminates Novalis's thoughts on alchemy, and throws light on how Novalis
reinterpreted the Neoplatonic agenda for the sciences of his time.
Wedel's views show just how much alchemists were concerned with experience
and their experimental procedures, however much their works are couched in the
metaphysical:
Es ist em ganz gerneines Axioma: Em einzig Experiment mehr werth, als hundert rationes; Also gilt
dasselbe auch billig von der Aichemie; Und soiches urn so viel mehr, je leichter der Verstand damit
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Uberein stimmet, warm er durch die Raisons dazu verleitet wird, daB dieselben nicht darwider sind,
sondez-n der Experienz nachgeben und sich unterwerffen (123, 19) ... Sondern er [the aichemisll soil
indifferent seyn, der so vie! auf Theoriam halt, als auff Praxin, auch diese ohne jene nicht anfangen,
dergleichen nicht aberglaublich, wie soiches vie!e mit Schaden erfahren (123, 35).
In a similar manner, concerning alchemical practice itself, Wedel suggests that
the alchemist should work carefully, and concentrate on the "Particularen" and not
on the "Universalen" (123, 92). Those who jump immediately to the "universals"
are obsessed by equating some substance with the "Tinctur" or stone itself. He
remarks that some overhastily deem it simpler to claim that they have found the
stone itself than to spend hard work studying the "particulars" ("den Lapidem
selbst zu machen, als em Particulare" (123, 92)).
Moreover, Novalis's "Glaube" or "Kindlichkeit" (N, 3, 179), the fundament
required for his notion of "Plotins Physik", can be understood as a direct parallel
to the alchemical belief in magical signs and figures, since both of these attitudes in
fact argue for a great intimacy with Nature. To Wedel, a better understanding of
natural processes is afforded through concrete signs and symbols:
Dieses [the alchemist's use of symbols and hieroglyphicsl gilt auch von den Figuren, womit sie offt
besser, als durch den Text se!bst, die Wissenschaft der Ingredientien und des Processus haben zu
verstehen geben wo!len (123, 43).
The closeness of Wedel's practical alchemical procedure and the use of symbols to
Novalis's notion of an a priori "Physik" can readily be seen: both Wedel, as
natural for an alchemist, and Novalis envisage a concrete approach to theorizing
that employs symbols of things in an inner language of the mind. In a similar
manner Cabalist number permutations are forms of concrete theorizing: for
example, the work of Jabir Ibn Hayyan (720-813) is an early attempt at actually
ordering substances through the use of a magic square of numbers (201, 75-78).
The alchemical use of symbols is also naturally a precursor to affinity tables and
chemical formulae. 3 ' Modifying the alchemical use of symbolism with, for
example, a stance such as is evinced by Wedel, one arrives at a base for such
eighteenth-century products as the affinity tables; in such conceptual tools, a
concrete methodology survives, as do the alchemists's visual symbols, but the
understanding of the chemical substances is enhanced by modern knowledge.
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Novalis seems highly aware of just such a continuity (from aichemical inquiry) into
the "Physik" of his time. He remarks:
Die Physik der Alten und des Mittelalters ist äuBerst merckwurdig - bes[ondersl als Versuche a
priori zu physiciren. lunge Physik der Alten - Antike Physik der Modernen (N, 3, 86).
Novalis may here refer to the concrete a priori of pre-Socratic philosophy and
Aristotelian physics, as well as to the various aspects of medieval cosmology and
alchemical inquiry. Furthermore, his remark implies the hope for a reconciliation
of these supposedly superseded methodological attitudes with those of his
contemporary sciences. He felt, as has already been examined in his Socratic
programme, that concrete debate, compelling participators to use "innate"
knowledge and symbols, would keep the sciences alive and bring about great
advancements. Importantly Novalis's Socratic programme, although, like alchemy,
a concrete procedure, paves a way beyond the secrecy and elitism of alchemy to
the modem lecture hail and the possibilities of open debate and inquiry in the
"market" of science.
The idea that the ancient and the modern chemistry could somehow be reconciled
within the realm of open debate was indeed a source of great concern to Novalis.
Thus, for instance, he suggests how the modem French chemistry, although now,
unlike alchemy, public, was dogmatic. In criticizing the new French chemistry, he
asserts that the French had turned oxygen - which had such a pivotal role in the
new science - into a new philosopher's stone of inquiry:
Die Antiphiogistiker machen das Oxigene zum Stein dEer] Weisen (N, 3, 317).
The provocative form of his remark itself stimulates openness. It may also recall
the open method of alchemy. For as Novalis remarks elsewhere, the stone was
always an ideal or aim: the unattainability of this goal guaranteed openness. The
stone was not a materialist "concrete" fetish, like oxygen:
Es giebt keine PhilEosophie] in Concreto. PhilEosophie] ist, wie der Stein dEerl Weisen ... eine
bloBe nothw[endigej Aufgabe der Szientifiker - das Ideal der Wissensch[afl/ überhaupt (N, 3, 385).
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Indeed, Novalis thought of the stone in its most profound sense, as a natural force,
as part of the purposive whole of Nature. He equates the stone with the conscious
continuum of Nature. As such, it is comparable to the "Genie" of man, and, is
itself, in his view, the organized ether of matter:
Soilte es nicht em Vermogen in uns geben, was dieselbe Rolle hier spielte, wie die Veste auBer uns -
der Aet her - jene unsichtbar sichtbare Materie, der Stein der Weisen - der überall, und mrgends,
alles und nichts ist - Instinki oder Genie heifien wir sie - Sie ist überall vorher. Sie ist die Fulle der
Zukunfi - die Zeiienfiulle überhaupt - in der Zeit, was der Stein der Weisen im Raum ist ... (N, 3,
462).
Clearly, the "Stein der Weisen" is one of those several symbolic images around
which Novalis's key ideas crystallize, each one seeming to contain the whole of his
thought, yet only deriving its full power through contact with the others. Among
the several facets of the stone which become apparent here, the one I wish to
emphasize now is its spatial futuricity, which ensures (like human "Genie") an
open inventiveness of inquiry. To Novalis, the antiphiogistic concept of oxygen
was opposed to the "stone", being an example of a debated substance, in the
discussion of which theory had taken over, and which now hindered any further
debate. The new French chemistry was, from Novalis's point of view, in every
sense a closed system, which allowed no reevaluation of first principles. On the
contrary, its fixation on oxygen made it backward looking ("Antike Physik").
Novalis's interpretation of the use of phosphorus, on the other hand, was intended
to look forward to new theory and discovery. The important point for Novalis,
however, is that all areas of inquiry need some ideal in the future; as he
figuratively puts it, they should all search for the "stone". This ideal must remain a
goal, and should not be allowed to become dogma or formal theory. Moreover, as
Novalis's paradoxical formulations in the preceding quotation imply, and in the
Plotinian sense, the ideal goal is not conceivable for man. Hence, it cannot be
found "in Concreto".
Wedel 's fmal reference to Hermes Trismegistus as the example and source of all
alchemical wisdom also raises the whole issue of open inquiry, and, importantly,
Novalis's idea of the scientist. Wedel recounts the well-known formula that
Hermes was master of three things (123, 99). As Frances Yates observes, the
Hermetic tradition is of fundamental importance for Renaissance science, and led
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to "the best-known manual of Renaissance magic" (3(X), 262), Agrippa's (1486-
1535) De occultaphilosophia (4), where the triadic idea reccurs. For Yates,
Agrippa's book epitomizes the Renaissance:
The Renaissance ideal of the magus, the "divine" man with powers of operating on the cosmos and
achieving universal knowledge and power - adumbrated in Pico's famous Oration on the Dignity of
Man - found its theorist in Agrippa ... (3(X), 262; 82).
Agrippa imbibed Marsilio Ficino and Pico della Mirandola, who both (in
Renaissance fashion) held the Egyptian Hermes Trismegistus in reverence (3(k),
229; 299, 150-151). It is Agrippa who gives a paradigm for the Hermetic magus,
as master of three spheres: "the elemental world, the celestial world, and the
supercelestial world" (3(X), 266). Indeed, Novalis reverts explicitly to the
Renaissance ideal of the magus on several occasions, and adapts the figure to his
age and into his own thought. He uses the idea of the magus both to support his
ideal of the scientist and his own method of knowledge.
In an important fragment, Novalis rehearses the Renaissance ideal of the magus,
but implants it into his own notion of the "moral" inquirer. The source here of
Novalis's notions is, of course, Hemsterhuis, and Novalis is drawing on the
Neoplatonic idea of "Sympathie". It is man's "moral" sense, his ability to perceive
the "wunderbare Sympathie" in Nature, and his ability to act accordingly, that
explains to Novalis man's potential and his place within the cosmos:
Wir müssen Magier zu werden suchen, urn recht moralisch seyn zu können. Je moralischer, desto
harmonischer mit Got: - desto gottlicher - desto verbunde:er mit Gott. Nur durch den Moralischen
Sinn wird uns Gott vernehmlich - der moralische Sinn ist der Sinn für Daseyn, ohne aufire Affection
-derSinnfUrBund-derSinnfUrdasHochste-derSinnfurHannonie-derSjnnfujr
freygewahltes, und erfundenes und dennoch gemeiaschafthiches Leben - und Seyn - der Sinn firs
Ding an sich - der ächte Divinationssinn./ diviniren, etwas ohne Veranlassung, Beruhrung,
vernehmen. I ... (N, 3, 250).
Man's "moral sense", as understood by Hemsterhuis, provides the basis for the
universal "Sympathie", on which Novalis grounds his notion of knowledge, the
"Combinatorik" or calculus of an inner logic of the imagination. Through
"Sympathie", the individual magus relates to the divine, opening up the cosmos to
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man. It is through "Sympathie" that Novalis's inquirer senses objects using a
language of the imagination, and not by employing the strict empirical senses
("diviniren, etwas ohne ... Berührung ... vernehmen").
Significantly enough, Novalis spoke in this way of Werner, one of the people
whom he most respected, when he refers to the latter's "divinatorischen Sum" (N,
4, 299): Werner, to Novalis, espoused a type of "magical" empiricism. Werner
was, for Novalis, a modern magus, who because of his capability to "divine" was a
universal scientist, in contact with the whole of Nature; he was a very similar
figure, indeed, to the teacher in Die Lehrlinge zu Sals. As already discussed, one
of Werner's characteristics was his remarkable sense for natural phenomena. A
further remark in the Das ailgemeine Brouillon explains again how Novalis thought
the modern magus should be, and why he refers to a figure such as Werner in
terms of a "Divinationssinn":
Der physische Magus weifi die Natur zu beleben, und willkührlich, wie semen Leib, zu behandein
(N, 3, 297).
For Novalis the magus can bring Nature to life through "experimentation", both
literally in the laboratory, where Nature's secrets are revealed and her language
and expression are brought forth. Significantly, too, the teacher in Die Lehrlinge
zu Sais brings Nature to life, that is, he reveals her innermost secrets and laws, by
taking the overtly non-conceptual step of placing the stone amongst the other
stones, and thereby, in a process of directly theorizing with phenomena, creates the
pattern, or "Figur" of Nature's inner language. Indeed the key word "Figur"
recalls the verb "figiren", which is an alchemical (and chemical) term. For the
alchemist, substances, in experimentation, take form and are "figirt" (see, for
example, Wedel (123, 40)):
Der Lehrer ... Iegte dieses Steinchen auf einen leeren Platz, der mitten unter andem Steinen lag,
gerade wo wie Strahien viele Reihen sich berührten (N, 1, 81).
The teacher's concrete method of explaining Nature is a paradigm for Novalis's
"Experimentaiphilosophie", just as is "Diogenes Gehn". One may also recall the
lines in Die Lehrlinge zu Sais where the child "plasticizes" Nature:
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In grofie bunte Bilder drangten sich die Wahmehmungen seiner Sinne: er hörte, sah tastete und
dachte zugleich (N, 1, 80).
Bringing Nature to life, for Novalis, is the fundamental act of explaining her, using
her own language, or when man acts as part of Nature, employing concrete images
operating on "Sympathie". Novalis's notion of "Magischer Idealism" (N, 3, 385) is
also this use of concrete notation, the "magic" lying in the marvellous "Sympathie"
upon which ideas and images operate. For Novalis refers to his "Magischer
Idealism" when speaking of a "Höhere Physik, oder höhere Mathematik" (N, 3,
385), and of the latter he maintained:
Der inrnge Zusainmenhang, die Sympathie des Weltalls, 1st ihre Basis (N, 3, 593).
Further, it is because of Novalis's pathological view of knowledge that the
modern magus is able to treat Nature like his body ("willkUhrlich, wie semen
Leib"). Concrete images imply the use of forms of knowing such as "Plastisirung",
"Geftihl" and "Reflection". As the above remark on "Divinationssinn" shows, it is
primarily the "Sinn" for the "Sympathie" in Nature that gives the magus his special
status. That he once named his notion of inquiry "Plotins Physik" is highly
appropriate, given the role "Sympathie" plays in Plotinos's thought.
Moreover, in the aichemical texts on Novalis's book list there are indeed passages
referring to the creative alchemist, a figure closely akin to the magus. One of the
contributors to Quadratum alchymisncwn, Thoma de Vagan, describes the external
creative chaos of the universe and draws the common analogy with the creativeness
of the alchemist's art and laboratory. Here, the notion of generation, or of giving
birth to knowledge, so vital to Novalis, is also apparent:
Der Himmel aber ist die einige Renn=Bahn aller Sterne/ und grofien Lichter/ weiche mit ihren
EinflUssen sich mit denen Dingen/ so entweder urnb/ oder urn der Erden ihr Lager habenl
vermischeti und vereinigt. AlleinJ als noch der Himmel und die Erde miteinander vermenget waren/
konnten sie vor nichts anderes als em CHAOS, gehalten werdenl weiches unsere Kunst gar artig!
und verblümet vorstellen kann. Denn unser Chaos ist gleichsam eine mineralische Erde/ in
Ansehung ihrer Coagulation, abet auch eine fluchtige Lufti in weicher der ganze Philosophische
Himinel stecket] der aus einem selbst=eigenen Mittel=punkt lauter Sterne gebähreti die mit ihrem
Lichter die Fläche der ganzen Erde durchscheinen (87, Tract 4, 12).
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Vagan directly compares the fecundity of the heavens with the alchemist's work. It
is suggested that the alchemist too can give birth to "lauter Sterne" in the "fluchtige
Luft" of his apparatus.
In a similar spirit to Vagan, Wedel too refers to the alchemist's instrument and
apparatus, the "philosophical egg", and its status as a vessel for nurturing matter,
and here once more the creational work of the alchemist is brought to light:
Ins gemein wird es em Philosophisc/zes Ey genannt, weiches aber ebenfalls von doppelter Bedeutung
ist. Denn es bemercket nicht allein eine Aehnlichkeit der Ausbrutung, daB die Materie, als eine
co,uinuirliche Frucht, digeri ret werden, und bis axis Ende wãhren soil, sondern auch em äusserlich
Gefäfi (123, 78).
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Chapter four
Unifying practice
The probability of individual philosophical productivity as a programme for
treating the sciences in terms of practical knowledge.
1. Introduction. Ritter's Beweis as a type of case study. Fact and "Calcül".
Unifying practice as a probable programme for natural philosophical productivity.
2. Galvanism in 1798.
3. The aim of the Beweis.
4. The signcance of the nerve for galvanic theory.
5. Excursus: Galvanism and excitability
6. The role of the diagrams in the Beweis: diagrams as scientific tools.
7. The aesthetics of natural philosophical productivity. Novalis 's interpretation of
Ritter 's diagrams: die Instrumentalsprache ".
8. The role of the nerve in Ritter 's aesthetics of natural philosophical productivity:
the individual 's methodology and theory.
9. Novalis 's views on the individual's natural philosophical productivity: the fact of
the nerve and Experimenrencalcul".
10. Individual natural philosophical productivity as a programme. The role of
Ritter '5 Beweis for Novalis 's programme of practical knowledge.
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1. Introduction. Ritrer's Beweis as a type of case study. Fact and 'Calcül".
Unifying practice as a probable programme for natural philosophical productivity.
The discussion aboutthe possibility of consensus in Novalis's thought is now to be
taken a step further to reveal an area where in all probability Novalis did find his
notion of inquiry realized. Consensus is arguably attained at a more encompassing
level than that discussed in the previous chapter. As will be seen, in this aspect of
Novalis's thought one finds a higher level of consensuality expressed in the
practical nature of the interdisciplinary findings of the individual and in the
individual's own particular use of the subject in "phenomenal" calculus. A little
groundwork is called for now to introduce properly Novalis's notion of a
programme of individual philosophical productivity.
In this notion of a programme for the sciences proposed by Novalis, the urge for
unity in knowledge is fulfilled in the highest sense in the work of an individual.
Indeed, in Ritter's work on galvanism, Novalis found just such an expression of his
interdisciplinary ideal of knowledge. This argues, I would like to maintain, for a
shift in Novalis's thought from the notion of a project, such as espoused in his
encyclopaedism or in his idea of a "symbolische Physik", which approaches the
sciences more "externally" through classification, to a project which seeks to tackle
the sciences "internally", but in an equally interdisciplinary fashion. This is a shift
in Novalis's thought from unifying theory - as seen in Novalis's attempts to
classify the sciences - to the unifying of practice in the realization of the
individual's methodology and the type of theory based upon the practical
knowledge of an interdisciplinary approach to inquiry. The sciences are treated
internally through the concentration of inquiry on the processes revolving around a
particular case. Ritter's particular case is the phenomenon of galvanism (implied,
too, is the nerve), and, as will be seen, in a highly interdisciplinary manner, Ritter
harnesses many areas of knowledge and science in order to investigate this
phenomenon. Particularly pronounced in this internal interdisciplinary project for
the sciences is the role of the individual inquirer and the notion that theoretical
attainment is tightly linked to the subject. In this project, the inquirer is creating
his own science and attempts to pull existing theory together in a new form. The
onus thus lies primarily on the individual inquirer to bring expression to theory.
Consequently, the individual's methodology attains prime importance: in this form
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of natural philosophical productivity, theory is highly dependent on the manner in
which the subjective individual interacts with the phenomena under investigation.
Thus, in Riner's work, we find an example of the special significance of Novalis's
encompassing notion of "phenomenal" calculus for the inquirer. It is the aesthetics
and practical knowledge of the individual which plays so major a role in the
attainment of theory in this particular natural philosophical project. That is not to
say that this form of inquiry is without social implications, rather the point is
heavily stressed that the subject, in Novalis's view, always plays a key role in
inquiry. Importantly, the social implications lie in the significance of the
individual's methodology and fmdings. Ritter's work is a paradigm for the notion
of individual interdisciplinary inquiry which, when applied to scientific endeavour
as a whole, implies that scientists should carry out their investigations according to
such principles of individual natural philosophical productivity. This programme
for the sciences is different to Novalis's notion of a more socially and lower level
consensually oriented programme of a "symbolische Physik", discussed in the
previous chapter. For there Novalis is concerned with first finding the principles
required for consensuality in the sciences. That is a phenomenal calculus which is
concerned more with the programme of the classification and ordering of the
sciences. Of course, in a further step consensual principles are then to be used in
inquiry in an "Experimentencalcul", but this is a lesser level of consensuality than
found in Novalis's programme for individual philosophical productivity. In the
latter progamme the emphasis lies on the fact that the individual inquirer works on
something akin to a case study, which is itself an interdisciplinary activity. This
also places particular emphasis on the way the individual arrives at theory. The
type of practical interdisciplinary theory obtained and the realization of the
individual's methodology are then upheld as a paradigms of inquiry. In other
words, the boundaries between scientific discovery and natural philosophical
theorizing are drawn far closer together.
In this programme, Novalis's "phenomenal" calculus employs the notation of a
key symbol, just as in his programme for the classification of the sciences, which
applies such symbols to inquiry. However, in Novalis's programme for individual
natural philosophical productivity, there is arguably an emphasis on the symbol as
a "fact". This is a "fact" attained and developed through the individual inquirer's
practical knowledge. The term fact (see section 9 below) points to the
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epistemological tightness and coherence of the individual's natural philosophical
productivity as a type of case study.
In a sense, individual natural philosophical productivity can be seen as the
individual's realization of Novalis's encyclopaedic programme. Instead of a
classification of the sciences, one fmds the unifying of theoretical stances in the
issues involved in, and crystallizing around, a type of inquiry akin to a case study.
For Novalis, the realization of individual methodology in Ritter's diagrams of his
experiments and the practical knowledge of his interdisciplinary theory are
paradigms of inquiry. This is, arguably, a more encompassing notion of
consensuality than that of a metaphor, or, at least, gives expression to the tacit
elements of consensuality already found in the idea that consensuality involves the
use of metaphors and models. One can say that just such an encompassing notion
of consensuality is manifest in Ritter's diagrams and theoretical fmdings,
Humboldt's geognostic pasigraphic diagrams and its related theory, in Werner's
geognostical principles, in Goethe's "Urpflanze" and in Schelling's natural
philosophical principles such as "Polarität". In all these cases one can see
expression of a higher level of consensuality found in the realizations of the
individual's methodology and in the practical knowledge of his interdisciplinary
theoretical findings. In all the cases concrete, experiential forms of knowledge
(such as the visualization of theory, ideal types, natural philosophical principles -
all types of aesthetic productivity) are intimately bound up with theory based on
interdisciplinary practical knowledge, and offer a powerful type of consensual
communication for the sciences.
One can further comment that Novalis's idea of a programmatic individual
natural philosophical productivity demands self-reflexivity on the part of the
individual and the sciences themselves. Both individual knowledge and scientific
theory are put to experiment in this process of self-reflexivity: ultimately,
individual knowledge and scientific theory aim to merge into a unity in Novalis's
programme for individual natural philosophical productivity. Thus, in this sense of
social knowledge Novalis, through this encompassing notion of consensuality, is
proposing that the sciences call their methodologies and theory into question, by
viewing both as forms of practical knowledge. In this manner Novalis proposes a
programme for unifying practice as a whole.
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When J.W.Ritter published his Beweis, daft em bestandiger Galvanismus den
Lebensprocefl in dem Thierreich begleite (R) in 1798, a major step was made not
just for galvanic theory but for Romantic science itself. The implications for
natural philosophy in the Beweis were far reaching: it appeared that Ritter had
"proven" a force in Nature that was akin at an empirical level to Schelling's notion
of a "Weitseele". Through his notion of a "constant galvanic force", Ritter
believed that he had demonstrated the empirical grounding for purposiveness in
natural phenomena. His notion of constant galvanic force held for both the organic
and inorganic realms, and this implied that the concepts of "organization" and
"organicism" applied to the whole of Nature, and not only to organization within
organisms proper.
Indeed, Ritter's notion of galvanism as a general organizing force tends to be
overlooked by historians of science, such as Schimank (272), Hüffmeier-von
Hagen (202), Hermann (194), Gower (180), Berg (142) and Richter (261), who
tend to see Ritter purely in the light of electrochemistry or stimulation physiology,
and do not attempt to understand Ritter in the terms of the thought of his own time.
Berg and Richter do see Ritter as the founder of bioelectrocheniistry, but neglect
Rifler's concept of organization. They do however provide important perspectives
on the value of Rifler's work as a precursor of aspects of stimulation physiology.1
Hermann is more thorough in dealing with electrochemistry and its history, and in
having a more complex view of developments in chemistry, and a deeper
perspective, does more justice to Rifler's view of the inorganic than do Berg or
Richter. Clarke also overlooks the notion of organization and falls back upon the
unsatisfactory and unexplanatory view of German natural philosophy as a search
for unity in Nature, and asserts that Rifler's galvanic interests amount to no more
than this (153, 178). Gower deals much with "dynamism" in matter theory. He
sees Rifler in the light of Kant's and Schelling's dynamism (180, 330-331), but
does not touch upon the notion of organization. Gower does however, in
distinction to all the other historians, comment on the significance of Rifler's work
for deep level matter theory, and his pioneering notion of a "constant galvanic
force". Importantly, Gower remarks:
It is possible to discern in Ritter's theories, especially those concerned with galvanism and with his
explanation of why galvanic action, unlike electrical, magnetic or chemical action, is continuous, a
way of using scientific concepts which was novel. In his account of galvanic action, he explicitly
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claims that there is a continuous conversion of one kind of process into another kind of process.
With the benefit of hindsight this could be made clearer by interpreting it as meaning that galvanic
action involves what would be now described as energy transference (180, 337-338).
Gower adds too:
Of greater significance, perhaps, is the fact that Ritter used the concepts of force and process in
some of the same kinds of ways in which the concept of energy later came to be used. For example,
the forces and processes to which he refers in his accounts of galvanism are not specific physical
forces or processes such as electrical forces or chemical processes (180, 338).
Gower continues by observing that the relationship between, on the one hand,
Ritter's notion of fundamental force processes, as implied in a concept such as the
"constant galvanic force", and, "on the other hand the specific magnetic, galvanic,
chemical processes, is analogous to the relation between the energy concept which
appears in, say, the energy conservation principle, and the specific forms of
energy, electrical, chemical, etc." (180, 338).
The important aspects of Ritter's thought for a deeper level of matter theory are
discussed in detail below (see section 4), and, in distinction to Gower, the
usefulness of the notion of organization for matter theory will become apparent.
Finally, a cultural historian such as Wetzels, who, of all the historians, has covered
the natural philosophical aspects of Ritter's thought in the most depth, does none
the less not quite do full justice to Ritter's strategy in the Beweis (see below,
p.310).
For Novalis, however, Ritter's Beweis was also a landmark of method in inquiry,
and none of the historians of Ritter have dealt with this aspect of Ritter's work.
Ritter is commonly enough thought of as cumbersome and inadequate in the
expression of his ideas. 2 Although his literary style is not always lucid in its
expression, his experimental methodology undoubtedly is. In particular, Novalis
saw Ritter's experimental procedure as an archetype of his own methodology. The
young Ritter's empirical and inductive leanings, his caution and his strict reliance
on the phenomena under investigation had much in common with Novalis's view of
experiential knowledge and his progressive, but piecemeal-oriented notion of
inquiry. Indeed, Rifter's Beweis gave more substance to Novalis's view that
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"experiment" had to be reevaluated, and taken account of in scientific method.
Both Ritter's practice and Novalis's theory stressed the use of laboratory
experimentation and the need to remain close to the phenomena under
investigation, but also included the need to account for an "experimental",
cognitive approach to theorizing in direct relation to phenomena. Thus, Ritter's
galvanic theory and practice sought to account for the role of man's 'experimental'
perception in the attainment of knowledge. To Novalis, the Beweis was an example
of how man held the key to the understanding of Nature within himself. Ritter's
method and findings provided solid evidence that concrete forms of knowing, as
espoused in Novalis's notion of "Plastisiren" (N, 3, 123), were themselves
fundaments of scientific inquiry. Furthermore, Ritter's Beweis also presented
Novalis with an empirical picture of his belief in a purposive whole of Nature.
Nature was a great organized entity, or "thãtig" as both Ritter and Novalis express
it. Both Ritter and Novalis view Nature essentially as a Chain of Being, and
galvanism gives this notion a thoroughly novel physical grounding; as Ritter
inspiredly interprets it, the vast galvanic circuit of Nature was a Chain of Being,
"Das organische All":
Fürwahr! ich begreifs nicht; es ist unxnöglich, daB sie [ = die galvanische Krafl] nicht Uberall stati
finde in der ganzen Natur! Wo ist eine Sonne, wo ist em Atom, die nicht Theil ware, der nicht
gehorte zu diesem Organischem ALL, lebend in keiner Zeit, jede Zeizfassend in sich? (R, 171).
Ritter conceives of the entire universe as a single organic entity, united by
galvanism. This wonderfully enthusiastic exclamation, however, rests on detailed
experimentation and profound reflection.
At the biographical level there are significant links between Novalis and Ritter.
Novalis visited Ritter in Jena first in Summer 1799, after the publication of the
Beweis in 1798, and then often in that year: Novalis was thus able to attain a first
hand impression of Ritter's laboratory life (358, 86). They were both young men,
Novalis twenty-seven, Ritter twenty-two, and must have had many thoughts to
share. Ritter was particularly affectionate towards Novalis, obviously not only
because he freely gave Ritter financial assistance, but primarily because their
friendship developed naturally and was genuine. Novalis was "von alien Seiten
StUtze und Bestätigung" (99, 14-16; 261, 33; 358, 87). Novalis's friendship with
Ritter also drew the attention of the other Jena Romantics and Ritter was pulled
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into their circle by Novalis (358, 89; 99, 15). Novalis's death in 1801 was a severe
blow for the young physicist, as can be seen in the following lines of a poem of by
Ritter:
Freunde schien mir der Himmel zu geben,
Einen gab er endlich mir;
Aber kaum, daB er ihn rnir gegeben,
Nahin er wieder ihn hinweg von mir.
Traung Loos! wenn ailes nur beginnet,
DaB es fast beginnend noch zerrinnet.
Seinem Geist allein war ich verbunden,
In der Kunst hab ich jim wiedergefunden (99, 30-31).
It seems that their interests were very much the same, even before their meeting,
and that their friendship probably developed their common concerns. Ritter's
fragments were most probably influenced by conversations with Novalis and by his
reading of Novalis's fragments (261, 32-33). Moreover, after Novalis's death,
Rifler was given Novalis's philosophical and scientific papers by Karl von
Hardenberg (214, 46-49). There is good cause to suppose that Novalis's ideas
influenced Rifler, and that, equally, in their close relationship, they influenced one
another, exchanged ideas, and reinforced one another's views. The exact nature of
their relationship clearly has to be considered in a study and comparison of their
aphorisms: one may assume, given their close friendship and mutual
understanding, that Novalis also had some role to play in the development of
Rifler's science. This present work seeks to study the reception of Rifler's ideas in
Novalis's writings and Rifler's scientific method. This study will show fundamental
points of agreement in their views on experimentation, but it is not the aim of this
study to explore Novalis's specific role for Ritter's work. I wish only to show
points of affinity, and from these significant areas of mutual understanding this
work hopes to provide the basis for an examination of Novalis's role for Rifler's
scientific work. Such an examination would above all entail, as mentioned, the
analysis of Novalis's and Rifler's fragments.
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2. Galvanism in 1798.
To address galvanism in 1798 and to formulate a fair understanding of the various
proponents' views one has to take a broad look down the eighteenth century.
Observing Ritter's case in 1798, one can note a fundamental unity between his
physical (i.e. electrical and chemical) interests and physiological concerns (i.e. the
nerve action). However, this sort of parallelism is not met earlier in the century.
The great and influential physiologist Albrecht von Hailer (1708-1777) made a
clear distinction between electricity and his own particular notion of a nerve fluid:
he believed there was not enough evidence to equate the two (153, 161-2).
However, what does link Ritter back into the context of the earlier eighteenth
century is his belief that galvanism was the life force itself, although the life force
was not always taken in his sense of "general organization". Hailer's physiological
nerve force, the "vis nervosa", is also a principle of life. Electricity was also seen
as the vital source of life in the eighteenth century (265, 28-35). Thus, a life force
was commonly believed in, but in general it was not a force that linked physics to
physiology. It was, first, Galvarn's (1737-1798) experiments in 1791 and his work
De veribus electricitazis in motu musculari. Commentarius (35) which united the
fields of physics and physiology, for Galvani put forward the notion that the nerve
fluid was an electrical fluid. His fmdings are important not just because he
discovered animal electricity, and in doing so argued against the strong views of
those such as the Hallerians and Alexander Munro secundus (153, 162), but also
for the reason that he reawakened interest in electricity in general. The study of
electricity had, since the mid-eighteenth century, undergone a relatively inactive
period (153, 169). However, Galvani's findings, although influential, were
hypothetical: he had taken the common view of a nerve fluid, based upon the
ancient Greek idea of the nerve spirits and upon the widespread eighteenth century
notion that the brain secreted a fluid, and had interpreted it as an electrical fluid
(153, 168).
At this point, Volta (1745-1827) turned his attention to the field of galvanism.
His greater skills overtook Galvani. Galvanism was not now associated with
"physiological electricity" (in the sense of animal electricity) but instead with
"physical electricity" in Volta's notion of contact electricity. In 1793 Volta argued
purely for the notion of "metallic" electricity. He experimented with a whole frog
joined to a bimetallic circuit to show that contractions arose from the contact of
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dissimilar metals. He further discounted Galvani's success in bringing about
contractions through the joining of the crural nerve to the muscle by a single metal.
Instead Volta maintained that this experiment of Galvani's for the "proof" of an
animal electricity could only be explained in terms of his own "metallic"
electricity. He thus claimed that the contractions Galvani brought about by joining
the nerve to the muscle with a single piece of metal were caused not by any
physiological factors, but by the "contact" between the piece of metal and
unobserved impurities in the piece of metal itself (191, 492).
However, in 1794 when Galvani published an account of his new and
fundamental experiment which proved that contraction could take place without
metals (36), Volta had to alter his stance. Volta still essentially saw the organic
side of the galvanic circuit as entirely passive: to him it was made up merely of
conductors of the contact electricity produced by the touch of the two dissimilar
metals. But to cater for Galvani's new findings, Volta claimed that the organic part
of the galvanic circuit was analogous to, but none the less different from the metal
conductors: the muscle and nerve were in his eyes "dissimilar" conductors (194,
42-43; 153, 172; 191, 493). Volta then moved on to see both solid and fluid
conductors as necessary to form the heterogeneity of an active galvanic circuit.
Volta's law of heterogeneity states that three heterogeneous conductors are required
to make up an active circuit, and with this law he retreats from disregarding the
physiological aspects of galvanism (121, 127). None the less, Volta clearly still
supports the notion of a general physical electricity, and not an inherent animal
electricity.
In his Beweis of 1798, following up his laboratory work of 1797, Ritter made a
decisive jump forward in the field of galvanic theory. Instead of postulating a
hypothetical nerve fluid and a form of electricity inherent only in animals, and,
also, instead of viewing electricity hypothetically as a fluid in the manner of
Volta's notion of electricity (as was common in the eighteenth century), Ritter put
forward a dynamic, organic model of galvanism. He spoke of a general force, not
of one just limited to animals, and of a force which was not to be seen in terms of
the above "fluid", but rather as an "organized flow" of matter (see below section
4). It is precisely Ritter's notion of organized matter that, arguably, led galvanism
out of the clutches of hypothesis. What Ritter "proves" in his 1798 Beweis is, as
the title of the work distinctly emphasizes, that the force of galvanism is constant.
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This constancy has profound implications both for an understanding of the force,
and, of course, for matter theory as a whole. By his use of careful experimentation
and a method of endless modifications ("Modifikationen"), reminiscent of Goethe's
demand for "Vermannichfaltigung eines jeden einzelnen Versuches" in Der
Versuch als Verinittler von Objeki und Subjeki (41, 13), and of Novalis's proposal
for "mannichfaltigen Combinationen" in "experimentation" (N, 3, 427), Ritter was
lead to maintain that the discovery of a "constant force" implies that galvanism is
above all an organized process. From here, it is but a short step to his view that
galvanism is to be understood as the life force present throughout Nature. Ritter
agreed with Volta that Galvani's and Humboldt's idea of a life force in their notion
of animal electricity was hypothetical, since they had given no concrete proof of its
existence (R, 128-129) (see below, pp.303-304). However, Volta's argument
against the hypothetical nature of Galvani's and Humboldt's theories was more of
sophist's quibble than a far reaching statement on physical laws: he claimed, since
they used extractions from living organisms, it was surely contradictory to speak of
a life force in dead tissue (153, 173). (Volta's interests did not, in any case, as
must be stressed, lie in the desire to investigate a life force; his interests clearly lay
in physical electricity.) Ritter, on the other hand, impressively shows that, in order
to release the notion of life from the realms of an imaginary force or purely
metaphysical speculation, the inquirer had to target his sights at concrete material
processes, and to seek there signs of organized processes, which could then be
taken as motions of a life force. This is, arguably, Ritter's greatest feat, for he
believed in a life force just as Galvani and Humboldt did, but distinct from them he
believed in a more fundamental life force that spanned the strictly organic as well
as the inorganic realm. It is crucially his belief in a more fundamental life force
that led him to investigate the relationship between inorganic and strictly "organic"
processes. Thus, electrochemistry was for him of great significance for
physiological processes, and contained the highly concrete clue to the workings of
the life force in organisms. In fact, to Riuer, the life force which Galvani and
Humboldt were seeking, and indeed the commonly held notion of "Lebenskraft" in
the eighteenth century, were part and parcel of the electrochemical force. It was,
for Ritter, the same "constant" force of galvanism operating in the strict organic
and inorganic realms, acting in the whole organism of Nature. Indeed, early on in
the Beweis Ritter, even before he gives evidence of and, to his own satisfaction,
"proves" the constant galvanic force, states he is searching for one unifying force:
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Ich wurde immer kraftiger Uberzeugt, daB es nur Eine wahre Theone aller Naturerscheinungen
geben könne, und daB diese alle, durch die kleinsten Umstände erklãren mUsse (R, ix).
In terms of galvanic technique or repertoire, Ritter adds two other new and
important items. Firstly, he pointed out the role of the conductors' affinity for
oxygen in a galvanic circuit (194, 22-46); and secondly, he drew attention to the
significance of the position of the nerve in the circuit. Regarding the first of the
two new galvanic phenomena, Ritter saw how the strength of a particular
conductor's affinity for oxygen was directly linked to the direction of the current in
the galvanic circuit. In the second instance Ritter revealed how the nerve
determined the direction of a galvanic circuit; for the muscle to contract, the
current must run from the nerve-end into the muscle (R, 46-64). While all
historians have pointed out Ritter's discovery of the importance of oxygen affinity,
and hence his status as a pioneer in the field of electrochemistry, not one historian
has alluded to the importance of the nerve to Ritter's galvanic theory, which makes
him an equally important figure in the difficult field of notions of organization.
Thus, these two new additions to the galvanist's repertoire together form the base
of Ritter's physiological electrochemistry. He links the chemical notion of affmity
with the physical notion of the direction of a force in a circuit, and consequently
with the physiological notion of the nerve. It need not be observed that Ritter's
account of biological processes is necessarily crude in comparison with this present
century's; but his views on organization, on the other hand, are highly
sophisticated. Indeed, a sign of his sophistication is its very neglect by historians,
which is explained by their predominantly positivist outlook, which eschews
"speculative" notions such as organization.
Moreover, Ritter's new additions to the galvanist's repertoire were not fields
always linked together by scientists in the eighteenth century. For example,
chemistry and physics in galvanism were for many separate phenomena: in 1798
Volta was still avoiding any chemical concepts when defining galvanism. On the
other hand, another scientist, G.V.M. Fabbrom (1727-1822), saw galvanism
purely in chemical terms, and avoided any electrical notions (26). However,
Ritter's electrochemical view of matter was not without forerunners. Earlier in the
eighteenth century, experiments had been carried out on the relationship of various
substances to the electrical charge brought about by friction electricity, as for
example in the works of Benjamin Franklin (1706-1790) and William Henley (194,
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22-23). Volta himself had drawn up a table of the most effective galvanic
substances in 1792/93 and Christian Heinrich Pfaff (1773-1852) and Philipp
Michealis similarly linked the strength of contractions of the frogs' legs to the
particular metals (194, 24-25; 81; 72). Humboldt, also, in his work of 1797,
Versuche Qber die gereizie Muskel- und Nervenfaser nebst Vermuthungen über den
chemischen Procefi des Lebens in der Thier- und Pflanzenwelt (54), remarked
much on the effect of chemical substances on galvanism. Matter and force were
continually being linked but not in Ritter's sense of an organized dynamic process.
However, Schelling offered an important precedent for such an approach, since he
speculatively linked chemical substances and physical forces in his Ideen zu einer
Philosophie der Narur, where he locates the continuity of electrical behaviour and
chemical activity:
Da die elektrische Matene nichts anderes ist als eine zerlegte Lebensluft, so werden alle Korper
Anziehung gegen sic beweisen, die gegen Warme und Oxygene Anziehung beweisen (106, 136).
This theory of Schelling's, however, remains speculative. In distinction to these
forerunners, what Ritter achieves in the Beweis, is, as indicated, a more precise
basis for such a hypothesis, building it on a knowledge of the electrochemical
activity within galvanic circuits.
In the Beweis Ritter makes it quite clear that he disagrees with Humboldt, who is
essentially a supporter of Galvani (153, 173), and that he sides with Volta,
although with many reservations. Rifler admired Volta's physical interpretation of
galvanism primarily because it linked the mysterious force of galvanism with an
ubiquitous force, electricity (although Volta's theory excluded any notion of an
organic life force). Indeed, in some respects, Rifler's notion of galvanism is an
organic extension of Volta's physical electrical model. Notably, Ritter is in accord
with Volta's two laws of galvanism, and goes to great lengths to defend the laws
against Humboldt's attacks (see below, p.304). Rifler reiterates Volta's two laws in
the Beweis:
Die ... Gesetze für die Bedingungen, unter weichen in einer Galvanischen Kette Action oder nicht,
entstehen kann, sind kUrzlich diese:
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1) In jeder Gal vanischen Kezze, in deren Peripherie zwey Punkie vorhanden sind, durch weichejene
geiheil:. in zwey Halfien zerfaii:, in weichen, wenn man von einem der Theilungspunkte ausgeht. die
BeszinvnungsgrundeJuir die Actionen der Folge und dem Grade nach genau dieselben sind. hat keine
Action st all.
2) Nur in dem enigegengeseizien Fail isi die Moglichkeiz activer Galvanischer Keizen enzhalten, und
zwar sind zur ihrer Bildung wenigs:ens drey der Qualiz& nach verschiedene Galvanische Leiter,
unter denen sich wenigszens einer imfeuchzen oderfiussigen Zusiande befinden mufi, nothwendig
(R, 33).
The first law states the condition for an inactive circuit: no action occurs when the
forces inherent within the conductors on two sides of a galvanic circuit cancel each
other out. The other law states that a galvanic circuit must be made of at least three
heterogeneous conductors, where one of them must be a fluid or solid conductor,
i.e. for galvanism to take place there must be a mixture of solid and fluid
conductors (what Volta calls first and second class conductors). Rifler then
supported Volta's notion of heterogeneity, and more importantly Volta's idea of a
circuit, since this opened up the way to view the whole of nature as a circuit.
Although Rifler appears to be extending Volta's notion of galvanism, Rifler's views
are none the less deeply at odds with Volta's. Rifler agrees with Volta that the
galvanic circuit has to be closed, but his notion of a constant force running through
closed circuits conflicts with Volta's mechanist notion of contact electricity. It was
not just that Volta's notion of galvanism would have deprived Rifler of his concept
of an organizing force, for even at the strict empirical level Volta's theory seemed
inadequate. Volta's static model did not explain the chemical and electrical
phenomena together, and more crucially, for one of the main aims of the Beweis,
Volta's model made no attempt to understand the electrochemistry of physiology.3
Volta viewed galvanic physiology in mechanist terms, as mentioned earlier; to
him, the organic tissues were analogous to dissimilar metals. Volta avoided
directing his attention at the workings of nerves and muscles, he did not allow any
notions of an "organism" to affect his concept of galvanism. He clung to his belief
in contact electricity even when Galvani's experiments showed that there was a
phenomenon that could be called "animal electricity". Galvani's experiments did
not prove that there was an inherent "animal electricity", nor did they prove the
existence of an electrical fluid; however, they did prove that galvanism could not
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be reduced to "metallic" electricity. Volta's silence over such subjects as the
electric fish meant that he never really perceived an organic view of force (194,
42; 153, 161, 176). Indeed, in defending his theory of contact electricity as the
proper explanation of galvanic phenomena, he blocked physiology out. Contact
electricity necessarily implies a static model of forces and nature, and it is precisely
the organic view of phenomena, the notion that things are "living" and changing,
that gives rise to Ritter's organized and dynamic electrochemical theory of matter
in the Beweis.
Indeed, primarily through his notion of organization, Ritter's concept of a
"constant force" foresaw how the Voltaic battery was to work as the process of the
electrochemical solution. It was not strictly felt necessary to explain the battery in
terms of organization, or indeed in terms of Schelling's dynamic polarities, since
Volta's mechanist terminology of "poles" was commonly accepted (194, 42). For a
deep level of matter theory, and hence, for the development of the science of
electrochemistry, Ritter's notion of a constant force has profound implications.
Ritter's theory naturally entails, as does Schelling's, that an electrochemical
solution must be regarded as a dynamic process; and, indeed the proof of this came
later, when it was recognized that there was a constant tension ("Spannung")
between the poles of the Voltaic battery (194, 74f.). Later in 1801, Ritter alludes
to a dynamic, organized electrochemical solution:
Die ganze Batterie ist em Meer von Oxygenität, em Ocean von Hydrogenitãt (96; 98, 2, 160).
To Rifler, the battery is a laboratory model of greater, organized natural processes.
Thus, importantly, as must be emphasized, Ritter's broad organic account of the
battery paved his way in understanding electrochemical processes.
It is interesting to note that in 1800 when Volta had invented his pile he was in no
position to explain it, and so in 1801 when many scientists were attempting to
explain the Voltaic pile, Rifler had by far the most explanatory account. Rifler's
account came out in May 1801, well before Volta's lectures in Paris in November
and December 1801 .4 But because Rifler was young and Volta more senior and
renowned, Ritter's explanation was not well received, even though Volta's
interpretation was far from being explanatory. Rifler also admits he had the means
to invent the pile as well, and that he was very close to discovering it; certainly,
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in his galvanic theory he was the experimenter who came closest to predicting and
inventing the pile (194, 42f., 74f.).
Although Ritter, in his galvanic work, appears to owe much to physical and
chemical notions, as indicated, for instance, in the importance of the physical idea
of a circuit for his own notion of the vast organic circuit of Nature, Ritter also
owes much to the other traditions behind galvanism, those of physiology and
animal electricity. It has been made apparent how the notion of a life force is
cardinal to Ritter's theory of a physiological electrochemistry, yet what
distinguishes him from Galvani and Humboldt is their vital materialism, espoused
in their belief in a nerve fluid. Ritter refers to Humboldt's notion of a nerve fluid
as hypothetical (R, 128-129). He also called Humboldt's materialist way of
viewing matter "absolut", and here "absolut" refers to a substantial notion of
matter (R, 128). It must be added that Humboldt's great strength lay in his
geological and biogeological work. In his work on galvanism he indeed achieved
significant results, which must also have influenced Ritter, but galvanism or
physics were not the central concern of his inquiries. Perhaps it was that Humboldt
had not reflected to the same extent over notions of organization in the case of
galvanism as he clearly did later, and so thoroughly, in his biogeological work.
Indeed, it was common at the time to view matter in the light of Lavoisier's new
chemistry, which was an "elemental", analytical chemistry. As mentioned (see
above p.259), Lavoisier's chemistry did not look deeper into matter than the
quality of a substance; his chemistry avoided looking into the underlying forces of
matter and neglected to observe how matter was dependent upon inner
arrangements and not, as he thought, dependent upon certain properties of its
components. It is in this sense of "elemental" chemistry that Ritter calls
Humboldt's notion of chemical substances "absolut". Humboldt applies this
substantial notion of chemical substances to his galvanic theory to propound the
view that chemical matter itself was a cause of galvanic action: this to Ritter was a
superficial, materialist view of galvanism; for Ritter believed that it was not just
particular substances which caused the frog legs to contract, it was the underlying
dynamic process within matter itself. Ritter uses the term "absolut" to denote how,
in his opinion, Humboldt holds a dogmatic view of matter; for the employment of
a substantial view of matter and a postulated life force are, in effect, the logical
outcome of one another. As soon as a life force is stipulated, or vice-versa, a
substantial view of matter is put forward, then one can only think in terms of
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"absolute", discrete substances, or, accordingly, an "absolute", hypothetical life
force. In defining matter or the life force as separate factors in galvanic processes,
the possibility of viewing matter and forces in unison is blocked off. In essence,
then, the inquirer has, from the outset of his investigations, to have an open,
deeper view of matter, and not an "absolute" one. Thus, if matter is not considered
materialistically, but, instead, if a possibility of organization is assumed in matter
itself, and not in an "external" life force, the doors are opened to deep level matter
theory, which, in Ritter's case, accounts for the internal dynamic processes of
matter. The materialist substance theories, although postulating a life force in
animal electricity, did not, then, particularly inspire Rifler. What they did though
was to keep Ritter's sights aimed at physiology and the notion of "organization".
In viewing galvanic processes in terms of the separate factors of a life force and
substantial matter Galvani's and Humboldt's vital materialism consequently implied
that galvanism was not a universal force. It is here that Ritter sides more with
Volta and defends him against Humboldt. Humboldt claimed to have proven an
inherent animal electricity by revealing that some electrical conductors were not
conductors of galvanism. Rifler shows in the Beweis that Humboldt's results can be
explained by the inability of some conductors to reveal themselves because the
currents may be too low to allow the frog legs to contract (R, 34-40). Rifler does
not go so far in the Beweis of 1798 as to equate galvanism with electricity (R, 34):
he obviously sees their similarities, but, essentially, he sees galvanism as a mixture
of electricity and chemistry. He sees galvanism as the grand life force within which
the other forces were at work. The notion of a closed circuit, derived from
physical electricity, was vital to maintain the notion of a universal galvanic force.
Rifler points out how Humboldt, in his Versuche uber die gereizte Muskel- und
Nervenfaser nebsr Vennuthungen uber den chemischen Procefi des Lebens in der
Thier- und Pflanzenwelt (54), again drew up discrepancies to argue for an inherent
animal electricity by stating that galvanic action could occur in open circuits. Rifler
swiftly discounted this and showed how active open circuits were dependent upon
the relative "irritability" of the organic tissue: if the frog legs were highly
"irritable" they would indeed contract in an open circuit (R, 42-45).
This external, substantial vision of Humboldt's was indeed what hindered him in
making the link between animal electricity and physical electricity in Rifler's sense,
and meant that he did not develop Rifler's notion of physiological electrochemistry.
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Furthermore, to place Humboldt in the broader contemporary context, it is little
wonder that the supporters of Galvani felt they had to remain silent about animal
electricity towards the end of the eighteenth century in the face of Volta's criticism
and his now dominating notion of physical electricity (153, 175). Humboldt's work
of 1797 was a bold step in this context, but, in 1800, when the Voltaic pile was
invented, Humboldt's concept of "animal" electricity was a far cry from Volta's
now "proven" concept of contact electricity based upon a physical, mechanist
model of electricity. Humboldt's model of animal electricity was not based in any
way upon physical electricity, but rather on chemistry alone (153, 175).
Explanations of electricity were now, in general, no longer searched for in
physiology (or, in Humboldt's sense, in a chemistry of physiology), but instead in
the area of physics and chemistry. Before 1800 and the invention of the Voltaic
pile animal electricity had indeed created interest for its uncovering of an electrical
life force, for its physiological implications for the nervous system, and for its
supposed medicinal uses (153, 175). But its ability to contribute to electrical
inquiry was entirely overshadowed by the Voltaic pile with all its immense
practical and technological implications. Moreover, Humboldt's vital materialist
notions could add little to the discussion of electricity because of the hypothetical
nature of the inherent electrical nerve fluid. Ritter's dynamic and organic model of
physiological electrochemistry however could contribute to the electrical debate
because there was nothing hypothetical about his link between the conductors'
affinity for oxygen and the electrical action, nor in the role of the nerve in
conditioning the direction of the current, nor was there anything hypothetical about
the constant force he "proved" through his meticulous experiments.
Ritter indeed kept physiology in the debate on electricity in 1798 because he was
dissatisfied with Volta's mechanist model of nature and wished to prove the
universality of the galvanic life force in both the inorganic and organic realms. By
1801, however, Ritter had enough material on the inorganic realm to be able to
defend his particular dynamic theory of the Voltaic pile without directly resorting
to examples from the organic realm, although he does still of course draw
analogies between the inorganic and the organic. And indeed for the rest of his
life, as well as pursuing strictly physical and chemical subjects, Ritter also pursues
the electrochemistry of physiology and stimulation physiology. In this manner, the
fundamental notion of the galvanic "All-Thier" (R, 171), the idea that the world is
a purposive galvanic entity, is taken up in his later studies. In his work of 1805,
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Dos elektrische System der KOrper (97), the "All-Thier" becomes an electrical
entity. As Wetzels remarks, in this work Ritter investigates penodicity in nature,
and sees the pulse rate of the "cosmic animal", the earth, as 365 days - its orbit
around the sun. Furthermore, galvanic action is viewed in terms of oscillations,
which are seen to mirror planetary cycles (291, 205-206). Unlike the Beweis, this
later work is far less empirical. In order to construct the world's electrical system,
Riner had, as Wetzels remarks, to resort to "generous extrapolations" (291, 205).
In Ritter's fmal work, published posthumously in 1811, 'Elektrische Versuche an
der Mimosa pudica L. in Parallele mit gleichen Versuche an Fröschen' (1(X)), the
notion of the "All-Thier" is rehearsed again, not in terms of physics, but in a
biological context. This work also has far more the empirical qualities of the
Beweis. Ritter investigates the effects of electricity on plants (as a type of
irritability) to come to the view that plants and animals are inverse forms of each
other:
So scheint also, in Hinsicht auf ihre Structur oder ihren Bau, die Pflanze geradezu als das
umgekehrte Thier (1(X), 356).
As Wetzels remarks, Ritter illustrates the correspondences between plant and
animal organs in the light of their reaction to electrical stimulation: in this manner
Ritter is once again arguing that natural phenomena form a whole (291, 69).
Ritter's galvanic work and his status as a scientist were at the early stage of his
career acknowledged by the scientific community. From the summer of 1798 up to
the winter of 1799/1800 he was taken on by A.N.Scherer (1771-1824), worked in
the latter's laboratory in Weimar, and assisted him in bringing out the Ailgemeines
Journal der Chemie (5; 142, 9). L.W.Gilbert (1769-1824), the editor of the
Anna/en der Physik (6), had great respect for Ritter. 6 H.C.Oersted (1777-1851)
was deeply impressed by Ritter's Beweis and remarked:
Es 1st nicht gut geschrieben, aber die Worle darin sind vortrefflich und die Beweise mit einer
Strenge durchgefilhrt, die ich gröfler bei keinem physikalischen Schriftsteller gefunden habe, und
eigentlich mufi ich bekennen, daB ich beim ersten Durchiesen just in die gleiche Stimmung versetzt
wurde wie damals, als ich Euklid das erste Mal las (78, 77).
Goethe too speaks of Ritter with the highest of praise:
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Rittern habe ich gestern [28.9. 18(X)J bei rnir gesehen, es ist eine Erscheinung zum Erstaunen, em
wahrer Wissenshimmel auf Erden (39, IV, 15, 123).
However, although Rifler made a considerable impact on the scientific
community in 1798, his account of the Voltaic pile in 1801 met, as mentioned,
with little response. His notions had no sway against Volta's authority and against
the notion of contact electricity. Yet Ritter's achievements gain status when it is
considered what he had to struggle against in the contemporary context. Rifler's
theories were born just when Volta's theory of electricity was strongly dominating
the sciences. It was many years before Volta's notion of contact electricity was
replaced by Michael Faraday's (1791-1867) theories, which Faraday proposed in
1840 (194, 45). It could therefore be said that Rifler's electrochemistry, in having
important implications for a dynamic theory of matter, was simply ahead of its
time; similarly, as mentioned, his notion of a "constant force" can be seen as some
sort of forerunner of the notion of the conservation of energy. One must also view
Rifler's theories in the light of the fact that physiological electricity itself went
through a long eclipse, only reviving again much later. For an interest in animal
electricity itself, in the sense of electrophysiology (as opposed to electrochemistry),
arose in the mid-nineteenth century in the works of du Bois-Reymond (1818-1896),
Ludimar Hermann (1838-1914) and Hermann Helmholtz (1821-1894) (153, 209-
211). Admittedly, the study of animal electricity had poor "scientific" status at the
end of the eighteenth century because there was no way of measuring it
quantitatively; the subject was swept aside by the growing precision and technology
of physical electricity. This "quantitative" factor, coupled with purely speculative
notions of a life force, such as Humboldt's, and coupled with a dynamic matter
theory, such as Rifler's, which ran against the tide of the matter theory of
"elemental" chemistry, also help explain the decline in interest in animal
electricity, and convey the difficult atmosphere in which Rifler had to operate.
Furthermore one can say generally that the positivist tendencies of the emerging
new sciences of the time easily obfuscate just how resourceful Rifler was in 1798,
having to use crude techniques and having to compete against a less complex but
widely accepted theory of matter. The ability to argue for organic dynamism in
that climate is an achievement in itself, and on all accounts his early success was
well acclaimed, even if after 1803/1804 the scientific community hardened against
him. Yet, although the community in general turned against him, Ritter did still
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continue to be of significance to some major thinkers, as the historian Williams
remarks when he argues for Ritter as the key to understanding the sciences of the
early nineteenth century:
Foremost is an understanding of Ritter's work, for it runs constantly through the literature of the
day. His influence on Hans Christian Oersted was enormous; Davy quotes him frequently; and even
Faraday ... refers again and again to his work (295, 4).
It is important that in 1798 Ritter was really studying not electrochemistry or
animal electricity themselves but a combination of the two, an electrochemical
physiology. Ritter essentially worked on a hypothesis concerning the
electrochemical physiology of the nerve, where, although he could not possibly
have known the internal composition of the nerve, he did "prove" that nerve action
was based upon a "constant force" and a process within matter. Ritter approached
the subject of organization as closely as he could through electrochemistry and
notions of physical electricity. These electrochemical and physical implications can
be seen most explicitly in the experiments on the various conductors' affinity to
oxygen (R, 46-76), for his experiments here reveal how chemical affmity was a
major factor effecting galvanic processes. The strength of the particular
conductor's affinity for oxygen affected the strength of the contractions of the frog
legs and the direction of the current in the circuit (naturally these electrochemical
and physical implications are also implicit in all the experiments). Further, the
"physical" implication of the nerve is made apparent throughout his experiments,
since the nerve plays an important role in conditioning the direction of the current.
Finally, in those experiments where Ritter carefully "modifies" the galvanic
circuits an internal "constant galvanic force" is made visible through the
contractions of the frog legs (particularly figures 67-72, 75 and 76; R, 113-116,
147-154). Here, in these highly significant experiments, Ritter argues for the
physical and electrochemical factors in nerve action. R.itter's notion of organization
is thus continually linked to electrochemical and physical phenomena through his
strict observations of their effects on the frog legs, and indeed, through his
observations on their effects on his own body in his experiments concerning
stimulation physiology.
Linking physics, chemistry and physiology to life through the notion of a
"constant force" was a major step to take in 1798, and it was a long time before
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the field of electrochemical physiology (in distinction to electrophysiology) or, as it
is today called, bioelectrochemistry, was opened up. The exact nature of the
electrochemical processes of life obviously could not be proven outrightly in terms
of physiology in 1798, but Ritter felt sure that the inner dynamic relationships of
conductors in a circuit held the key to the understanding of the electrochemistry of
life, and importantly the "life" of electrochemistry. This is a point where he is in
fact at odds with modern bioelectrochemistry: to him Nature, as indicated, was one
immense electrochemical dynamic organism. The key to purposiveness in natural
phenomena lay in the "organized" electrochemistry of the "Organischen ALL" (R,
171).
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3. The aim of the Beweis.
In Rifler's hands in 1798 galvanism came to mean, then, a dynamic
electrochemical life force which acted in both the organic and inorganic realms.
The Beweis first sets out to prove a constant galvanic force in the organic realm,
and then moves on in the last sections to speculate generally about galvanic theory
(R, § 25-28, 159-174). It is here that Rifler speculates that "galvanism" is present
throughout Nature. He actually goes deeper into inorganic galvanism in 1799 in his
Beweis, daft der Galvanismus auch in der anorgisc/zen Natur zugegen sey (94; 98,
1, 139-164), but it is already clear in the earlier sections of the Beweis of 1798 that
the experiments concerning oxygen affinity (R, 46-76) and those experiments
revealing how inorganic conductors are part of the general dynamic galvanic
process (figures 75-76: R, 147-154), are more than just a step towards an inorganic
understanding of galvanism.
The whole point of "proving" that galvanism constantly "aflends life in the animal
kingdom" is not primarily, as Wetzels puts it, to demonstrate that galvanism can
take place without metals (292, 202) - the implication being that Rifler above all
desired to show that galvanism occurred in the organic realm. This is clearly not
Rifler's true aim. Both implicitly and explicitly he is searching for material to
substantiate his notion that galvanism is the universal force of both the organic and
inorganic realms.
In this sense, the notion of galvanism as a force in the inorganic realm is clearly
implicit throughout the Beweis, since nearly all the experiments deal with circuits
composed of both organic and inorganic conductors. In the early part of the Beweis
Rifler is mainly concerned with investigating the link of oxygen affinity to
galvanism and with considering the direction of the galvanic force. It is only later
in the Beweis after "proving" the constant force of galvanism (in figures 67 to 77),
that Rifler deals with inorganic conductors explicitly as part of a dynamic galvanic
whole (figures 75 and 76). Figures 75 and 76 show particularly how inorganic
conductors are part of the circuits and how they affect the dynamics of the circuit.
For the key phrase in the title of Rifler's 1798 work is the notion of a "constant
force"; proving a general dynamic force in the organic realm necessarily implies
that the force operates in the inorganic realm. The use of a series of metal
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conductors in figure 75 (R, 152) shows how Volta's undynamic, static model of
galvanism did not explain the phenomenon entirely. In figure 75, the galvanic
force does not just arise from the touch of the metal, for here Ritter reveals how
there is always a constant force in the entire closed circuit. Indeed, both Volta's
and Humboldt's "elemental", substantial views are refuted here.
I.'75.
Fig. 4. Ritrer 's galvanic diagrams, figures 1 and 75 (Beweis, 1798).
Figure 75 represents a highly complex form of Ritter's galvanic experiments.
Figure 1 shows the fundamental form of the experiments, where a is the muscle of
the frog's leg (Musculus gaslrocnemius), c the sciatic nerve, b and d are metals,
and 1 is their point of contact. As in all the experiments, the frog's leg is used as a
measuring device, a physiological electroscope, to test the presence of a current by
observing the strength of the muscle's contractions. In Ritter's day, there were no
other means of measuring the minute currents in the galvanic experiments. If in
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figure 75 the circuit is closed in q and the various metals ("Bley k ... Zinn 1, Eisen
m, Kupfer n, Wismuth o, und Silberp ..." (R, 151)) are added there is no
"action". But by adding the metals and then closing the circuit, "action" does take
place. The experiment therefore reveals that in what appears to be an inactive
circuit there is indeed "action"; it also importantly implies that the force in the
circuit is not reliant upon conductors alone, that is upon the addition of the metals,
but upon the constant force in the whole of the circuit, i.e. the dynamic
relationship and behaviour of all the conductors, and how they effect one another
and the circuit as a whole. For the constant force is invisible when the conductors
are introduced after closing in q, but visible to the experimenter (through the
contractions of the frog legs) when the metals are added before closing in q. The
experiments reveal that there is always a finite force ("Action") in closed circuits,
even if there are no contractions:
Hier wird offenbar em Etwas, em > x [x is the action" in a circuit] zerlegt in n Theile, deren
jeder gleich < x ist. Es wird getheilt, und die Theilung ist endlich, damit auch der Theil, me kann
er ubergehen in Nichts, immer bleibt er Etwas ... (R, 152-153).
The metals are varied, each one apparently exhausting the force in the circuit, yet
the introduction of a new metal to the circuit shows how a constant force is still
present in the circuit which works with the new metal conductor to produce
"Action". To Ritter, there is no such thing as an exhausted circuit, for there will
always be a certain force present, however minute. Thus Ritter argues that the
cause of "action" is not the contact of Volta's metals: the prime principle of
galvanism is the "constant force", in relation to which the metals are merely
relative. Thus figure 75 confirms that the constant dynamic force is always in
action, even if the addition of metal to the circuit produces no visible "action".
Hence, at the end of the empirical section of the Beweis, Ritter views the inorganic
substances as part of the galvanic process, and demonstrates how they effect the
process, and how the "action" of the inorganic conductors themselves is dependent
on the dynamics of the whole circuit. At this point, Ritter explicitly refers to the
application of galvanism to inorganic substances as well as to organic ones, when
at the end of the experiments based on figures 75 and 76 he concludes (on the
"proof" of a "constant force" even in apparently inactive circuits):
Unser Beweis gilt also durchaus für jede Galvanische Kette, weicher Art sic auch sey ... (R, 153).
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In effect, Ritter's belief in a universal galvanic force of the organic and inorganic
realms positions him between Galvani and Volta, although, naturally, Ritter's
particular dynamism makes him more than just a mediator between the two other
galvanists. In the context of Galvani's and Volta's theories, Ritter demonstrates
how Galvani's notion of animal electricity operates in the same way as physical
electricity; that is, in Ritter's view the galvanic force operates in closed circuits
with inorganic conductors as well. Furthermore, he demonstrates that Volta's
notion of contact electricity is due not just to the metals (or inorganic conductors in
general), but to a constant force in the entire circuit composed of organic and
inorganic conductors.
Due to the strength of Volta's theory of contact electricity, Ritter had to make it
especially clear that there was a force attributable to the organic tissue itself within
circuits containing both organic and inorganic conductors. 7 In order to do this
Ritter had to conduct experiments with alterations to the organic tissue alone. Of
course, Galvani had already shown that some form of physiological electricity
existed. He did this in his experiment which uses only the muscle and nerve of a
frog's leg to produce galvanic action (36; 153, 172). There is, however, a marked
difference between Galvani's experiment and what are Ritter's most important
experiments for his "proof" of a constant force (figures 67-71; R, 113-114). Most
obviously, Rifler's new view of galvanism as electrochemical organization meant
his experiments had to use organic tissues but account for them in an 'inorganic'
way, that is, he had to show that the organic tissue was part of the whole
electrochemical circuit, and that both the organic and the inorganic conductors
played a role in creating the organizing force in a circuit. In practice, this entailed
his having to find some way of revealing a force within organisms while at the
same time having inorganic conductors in the galvanic circuit as well.
It was Rifler's belief in the general organized dynamic process of Nature that
enabled him to approach the organic in terms of a broad notion of the inorganic,
and, as also mentioned, importantly, he interprets Volta's physical laws of
heterogeneity and closed circuits in terms of an organizing life force. With the
same approach Rifler interprets dynamism (which treats "Physik" and matter, i.e.
the inorganic) in terms of organization. In the speculative section at the end of the
Beweis, Rifler indeed speaks in the dynamist terminology of thinkers such as Kant
and Schelling, describing substances as "Raumerfüllungs-Individuen" ("space-
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filling individuals"). 8
 Ritter describes a chemical action as one where two different
"space-filling individuals" unite to produce a single new "individual" (R, 173). The
electrical process takes place where two "individuals" act upon each other directly,
but restore their dynamic equilibrium without producing a single new "individual",
or more precisely, as Rifler expresses it, the qualitative difference of the two
substances does not go through an entire transition into a new qualitative unity:
"ohne ganzlichen Uebergang der Differenz zur Einheit" (R, 172-173). Galvanism
is described as a process wherethree "individuals" act upon each other directly and
indirectly (i.e. the conductors touch one conductor but not the other) without
producing a new unity:
ohne ganzlichen Uebergang der Dreyheit in Einheit (der Qualität) ... und zwar jedes auf das andere
unmittel- und zugleich mittelbar wirken könnten (R, 172).
Thus, when drawing up and interpreting Volta's laws of galvanism Rifler refers
to forces in the circuit as "dynamische Circulation", and speaks of Nature's
balancing activity:
Sie [the conductors] mufiten verschiedener Qua!itat seyn; denn erst damit sind uberhaupl
Bestinunungsgrundefiir Thatigkei: gegeben. Alles Handein in der Natur geht auf Gleichgewichz aus.
Bey homogener Qualität ist aber schon Gleichgewicht mit sich selbst da, und der GrundfIr
Tha:igkeizfehlr (R, 156).
It can be seen that Rifler inserts a concrete notion of organization both into Volta's
physical electricity and into dynamism. Dynamic forces are given material form by
being seen as processes within matter, and Volta's physical and mechanist
heterogeneity is intepreted as a sensible activity of Nature, driving matter back into
a homogeneous balance of unity. Rifler succeeds both in giving the hotly disputed
dynamic theory of matter substantiality and in accounting for the organic in an
"inorganic" way. Rifler demonstrates how galvanic processes occur invisibly and
inwardly in a dynamic sense, and not merely in an external visible change in the
circuit, and he gives physical electricity more breadth by viewing electricity and
galvanism in terms of organization throughout Nature, and does not just see the
causes of galvanism lying in mechanical contact electricity.
315
In practice, he achieves this confirmation of an organized dynamic process of
matter by meticulously modifying his circuits made up of both organic and
inorganic conductors, and, as mentioned (p.313 above), he had to turn his skills
particularly to the organic part of the circuit to prove that there was an electricity
within animals which was undergoing the same universal galvanic processes as the
inorganic conductors. In this way, and in opposition to Galvani, Ritter could reveal
not a vital substance, but a dynamic life force bound up in matter itself. Galvani's
fundamental experiment (36) served to demonstrate external activity, in the sense
that, although Galvani's nerve fluid is a notion of an internal action, Galvani's
experiment only interprets internal action "materialistically" in the light of
something taking place "externally". For Ritter's modifications to the circuits in
figures 67-71 demonstrate that there is a constant internal dynamic force in the
circuits. In contrast to Galvani's crucial experiment which showed how animal
electricity came into action through the contact of two parts of an organic circuit,
Ritter's experiments show how that, without making a break in the circuit, there is
a constant force in galvanic circuits: the point being that the galvanic force does
not have to display itself externally ("materialistically") in the form of a new
contact (i.e. breaking the circuit and then making a new contact), but that the
galvanic force occurs internally in matter as part of an inner invisible dynamic
process. The experiments in figures 67-71 give visible "proof" of invisible
processes in the circuits. Initially, all the circuits in figures 67-71 are referred to as
inactive; it appears when contact is made with, for example, the metal conductors,
that there is no more force in the circuit, the frogs legs do not contract. However
when the organic part of a whole circuit is altered, not by brealdng the circuit and
making a new point of contact, but merely by changing the shape and points of
contact of the organic part of a whole circuit, contractions do take place. The
circuit is viewed as a whole, within which internal change in the whole takes place,
as opposed to a circuit where "externally" new points of contact are made: the
notion of conductors is thus relativized, and the notion of a whole circuit is
stressed. Merely by changing the form of a whole circuit, not by "externally"
making a new contact, and thereby bringing a new supply of force to the circuit,
Riner reveals that a galvanic process can take place (these experiments are dealt
with in detail below in section 4). The experiments thus imply that there must have
been some force already present in the circuit not caused by any form of contact
"external" to the circuit, and that by merely rearranging the structure of the circuits
the components of the circuits now stand in a different spatial relationship to one
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another and that the new positions of the components of the circuits produced in
themselves enough force to make the muscle contract. It is importantly on
alterations to the organic part of the circuit that Ritter bases his argument, and this
was clearly his strategy in the Beweis. By altering the organic part of a circuit
containing inorganic conductors as well, he could reveal a force within organisms
that was affecting the inner dynamics of the entire circuit. Thus, he could show
that the organic tissue was part of the whole electrochemical circuit, and that both
the organic and the inorganic conductors played a role in creating the "constant
force" in a circuit. It is Ritter's ultimate aim to show that behind his "proof" that
galvanism attends the process of life in the animal kingdom lies the further "proof"
of a deep level matter theory for the inorganic (both in the sense of a constant
"Spannung" and of inorganic "organization"), which could not, at that point of
inquiry in Rifler's day, be shown by employing just inorganic conductors. Hence it
is the alterations to the organic part of the circuit which are of such great
significance to Rifler, for therein, in his view, lay the "proof" of a general
organizing force applicable to Nature in her entirety, of both the organic and
inorganic realms. For Volta's experiments could only account for a mechanical
view of matter, and investigators such as Humboldt and Galvani could only
account for organization in terms of a hypothetical force. Through his experiments
Rifler could show that galvanism was not caused by a materialist "fluid", nor was
galvanism merely brought about by the touch of two metals and the mechanist
notion of contact electricity, nor, indeed, merely by the touch of organic parts.
Galvanism was essentially a "constant" internal process in matter, in the inorganic
and organic realms, a process based as much on a physical force, as on chemical
substances themselves, and as on a life force itself; for Ritter spans both physics,
chemistry and the notion of a life force in his own idea of organized
electrochemistry. The key to his "proof" was the nerve, for Riner based his
"proof" on alterations to the organic part of the circuit by employing the nerve in
particular. His exact use of the nerve needs now to be treated more thoroughly.
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4. The significance of the nerve for galvanic theory.
Ritter succeeded in making advances in galvanic theory primarily through his
work on the nerve and his particular approach to the nerve. It was common at the
end of the eighteenth century to refer to nerve action as an instance of
"Reproductionskraft", or as Ritter appears to call this force, "Propagation" (R, 49-
50). "Reproductionskraft" was used to refer in general to a force governing the
growth and reproduction within organisms. 9 "Reproductionskraft" was used to
account for activity within organisms, and was held to govern life along with the
other major forces of "Sensibilität" and "Irritibilität". Schelling, for instance,
speaks of the notion of "Reproductionskraft" as "Bildungstrieb". The latter term
was actually coined by J.F.Blumenbach (1752-1840). To Schelling,
"Reproductionskraft", or "Bildungstrieb", is the "Bildungskraft" of the inorganic
spurred into organic organization through the "Weitseele" (107, 565-566). The
"Bildungstrieb", for Schelling, together with the forces of irritability and
sensibility, made up life.
Ritter, however, although he appears to be employing the term "Propagation" in
the sense of "Reproductionskraft", was, as indicated, in his Beweis searching for a
general generative force throughout Nature, including the inorganic. Thus he turns
to the organic part of the circuit where "organization" was commonly believed to
take place, and investigates organic organization in terms of electrochemistry. For
he correctly remarks that little attention had been paid to the material composition
of the nerve. What happens, he questions in the Beweis, when instead of
approaching the nerve in terms of a force allocated only to organisms, one
investigates the neglected area of the inner "specific structure" of the nerve? Surely
some answers to the related problems of nerve action and galvanism could be
attained by analyzing the nerve in terms of the inorganic and matter theory? Not
far into the Beweis he remarks (in a not entirely eloquent fashion):
und dieses ist eben das merkwUrdige, bey Bildung der Theorieen über den Galvanismus, aber
auch eben darum zu deren groBen Nachtheil, bisher fast ganz vemachlãfiigte Resultat, was sich aus
jenen Versuchen ziehen 1ãJt - die für Fortpflanzung jener, unmittelbar die Muskelfaser angehenden
Thatigkeit - von der sehr woW die, diese erst erregende, in der Galvanischen Kette statt habende,
die an keine organische Structur u.s.w. des Leiters nothwendig gebunden ist [the elecirochenücal
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action], und die man im Gegensatz der ersteren, die niedere, und jene [Reproductionskrafl or
Propagation "/ die höhere nennen könnte, zu unterscheiden ist, - nothige Bedingung, nemlich den
in der specificken Structur des Nerven und dem gewissen zur Verrichtung des Nerven durchaus
nothigen örtlichen Verhältnifl seiner homo- und heterogenen Theile zu einander bestehenden
ungestorten organischen Zusammenhang des Sensoni mit dem zu bewegenden Muskel vermitteist
seines Nerven ... (R, 49-50).
By demanding that the nerve be understood in terms of the physics and chemistry
of galvanism, Ritter establishes the crucial link between organization within the
organic realm and within the inorganic realm. The "constant galvanic force" is the
single force governing the both realms, and indeed his further findings in the field
of electrochemistry (i.e. not his notion of "organic" electrochemistry alone, but
also his work on inorganic electrochemistry) support his view that there is
"organization" within the inorganic realm as well.
Looking more closely at his experiments now we will see just how the use of the
nerve in the circuits plays so important a role in his "proor. For the nerve is the
organic conductor which Ritter uses to demonstrate how alterations in the organic,
i.e. physiological, part of the circuit cause galvanic action. Ritter's use of the
nerve crucially reveals how a change can be made in the "dynamic" structure of the
circuit, thus causing galvanic action, without necessitating the addition of a new
conductor.
In the experiments illustrated in figures 67-71 (R, 113-114) the nerve is bent
around back on itself or used in some other way to make a new point of contact
and hence a change to the circuit. In figure 67 the nerve end d is made to close the
circuit atfl; in figure 68 the noose of the nervej3 closes on a ; in figure 69 the
double noose of the nerve closes on r and ô in figure 70 the split nerve is closed
in a; in figure 71 the two nerves are closed at a andfl. When these new points of
contact are made "Action" takes place, and contractions follow. At one level,
through the modifications to the nerve, the whole of the circuit is "internally"
altered (without the addition of a new conductor or breaking the circuit), and,
naturally, at another level, change takes place internally in the circuits in the
"invisible" processes of matter.
I have gone into these experiments in some detail in order to demonstrate how
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Fig. 5. Ritter 's galvanic diagrams, figures 67-71 (Beweis, 1798).
important the physical and natural philosophical issues are; it is not enough
concentrating only on the physiological implications, and to interpret the
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experiments as an early discovery of the injury current of the nerve or of
Hermann's demarcation current (153, 172). Galvarn's experiment without the
metals can also be seen in the light of physics, in distinction to physiology, in the
sense that he showed there was a flow of current (153, 164, 172). What Ritter
does, through his detailed experimental technique, is to reveal what Galvani does
not, the constant current, and hence even more so than Galvani, his experiments
cannot be reduced to physiology as statements on bioelectricity, since he "proves",
in his view, a fundamental physical action in the circuits. It is the ability of the
nerve to alter the circuit without adding anything to the circuit or breaking the
circuit which plays the most important role in Ritter's "proof". The modifications
to the nerve lead galvanism away from substance theory and contact forces and
demonstrate how conductors, be they organic or inorganic, are relative factors in
galvanic processes. The invisible internal and "organized" dynamic processes
within conductors and the neglected area of the material make-up of the nerve were
given concrete, visible form through the undeniable existence of the constant force.
In 1798 these were indeed far reaching statements and with them Ritter attained a
deserved recognition.
Further, as mentioned, Ritter's use of the nerve raises fundamental natural
philosophical issues and supplies a coherent base for a natural philosophical
interpretation of galvanic processes. Ritter makes no explicit comment on the
greater significance of the nerve, but the importance of the nerve is implied in both
his theory and practice. To those with interests in the purposiveness of natural
phenomena the nerve would have attracted attention, since it causes action
internally, and not externally in a mechanist sense. It would have appeared as an
example of action at a distance; there was a proportional relationship between
nerve-length and force, for the longer the nerve was the greater the corresponding
contraction of the muscle was. The nerve was a classic case of invisible, but none
the less concrete activity. Moreover, the nerve, in its role in the experiments above
as an organically whole conductor, and not as a distinct conductor, could be seen
to provide a clue to some vast organic closed circuit of Nature. Ritter's
experiments with the form of the circuit point to internal activity in Nature, and the
experiments suggest a link between the "organic" whole form of the nerve, as a
"continual" form, with the continual force of galvanism. In this light Ritter's
experiments can be interpreted as releasing theory both from strict dynamism and
from atomism, and indicate that matter should he viewed as a dynamic, changing
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process, or what could be called a "material flow of form". By analogy, the whole
of Nature is to be interpreted as a closed process where matter changes
dynamically within, just as within the nerve, processes are active. The nerve in this
way appears as a microcosm of Nature.
Furthermore, since Ritter had demonstrated that an organism's most developed
force, the sensibility of the nerves, was based upon a general force, his work also
implied a certain sensibility throughout Nature. The constant galvanic force can
indeed be understood as a notion of a "world soul", akin to the purposive principle
that Schelling sought in his idea of the "Weltseele". When Ritter speaks of Nature
as an "All-Thier" (R, 171) he is, obviously, speaking not of some inert physical
entity, but refers to the body and soul of a single vast purposive organism. "Die
inneren (dynamischen) Verhältnisse" (R, 112) within matter are proof indeed to
him of a universal sensibility in Nature.
A final point concerning "proof" should be made to put Ritter's "discovery" of a
"constant force" into its proper perspective and to elucidate the broader natural
philosophical significance of his employment of the nerve. As indicated, many of
the historians of science approach Ritter from a highly positivistic stance, and refer
not to his discovery of a "constant force" as such, but rather to the electrochemical
implications of his work, or to the physiological aspects, such as the injury current
of the nerve. The remarks above concerning the significance of the nerve for a
notion of matter that seeks to bestride both dynamism and atomism go to the heart
of Ritter's endeavours, for he was, in essence, attempting to "prove" a notion of
deep level matter theory. The words "proof" or "prove" can only with difficulty be
used in this context, and they have therefore, when this context has been referred
to, been inserted in inverted commas. Obviously, in the eighteenth century the
word "proof" was used more liberally than today. What Ritter was seeking to
"prove", and maintained he had "proven", could not today be counted as proof
itself. Yet what he was seeking to prove, on the other hand, has not been proven to
this day. For deep level matter theory or the notion of organization in matter are
questions which still remain unanswered. Naturally, the standards of proof are
higher today, as are the methodological sophistications of verification and
falsification. Inquiry has also come closer to answering those difficult questions,
but this does not lessen Riuer' s achievement when it is considered that he was
working within the limits of his age, and that the questions he was seeking to
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answer were perennial ones. Today scientists are still searching for the fundamental
make-up of matter, and their search manifests itself in the discovery of increasingly
smaller and more fundamental particles, or in the proposal of fundamental units
such as "quarks" (216, 120). On the other hand, some thinkers eschew particles.
Gary Zukav, in his book, The Dancing Wu-Li Masters, suggests that the
continuous existence of particles is probably illusory, and that not the particles
themselves should be studied, but rather their patterns. In a highly dynamic sense,
matter, in Zukav's view, is the momentary manifestation of interacting fields (216,
119-120; 304). Put into this greater context, Ritter's attempt to account for a
"constant force" may not be a "proof', but it is certainly a significant attempt to
formulate a deep level of matter theory. The experiments with the nerve explicitly
suggest a view that proposes matter is made up of an infinite amount of circuits,
large and small, within which organized and dynamic processes of matter are
occurring. This is a stance that does bridge atomism and dynamism, since both
fundamental units are accounted for in the notion of infmite circuits, and forces are
accounted for in the internal dynamics of the circuits. Furthermore, since Ritter
argues for his matter theory using the nerve he stresses the idea of "living",
organized matter, and not just inert matter, for the nerve, as a unit within which
organized, dynamic processes occur, can be seen as symbolic of all circuits.
However, it is not alone what Ritter "proved" that is of relevance to the notion of
"proof', even though his findings in the context of contemporary thought are a
great achievement. Of greater significance to thought today perhaps is his method
of inquiry, which is, as is the main argument of this work, also a major concern of
the early Romantics. However, before moving onto the important notion of
Romantic practice and productivity in the Romantic notion of experimental inquiry,
it is worthwhile making some tentative comments on how Novalis employed
aspects of Ritter's galvanism in his natural philosophical writings of 1799 and
1800.
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5. Ecursus. Galvanism and excitability
The notion of experiment and the issues of inquiry revolving around Ritter's own
method, as are to be discussed in the following sections, provide an instance of
continuity in Novalis's thoughts stretching from his work in the Freiberger
narurwissenschafihiche Srudien and Das aligemeine Brouillon up to his later notes
in 1799 and 1800. Novalis's search for a reliable method of knowledge in his
earlier notes is still carried on, but not with the same intent he had when
undertaking his attempt at the classification of knowledge in the encyclopaedic
project in Das ailgemeine Brouillon. It is in these later notes of 1799 and 1800 that
Novalis also attempts to unite his earlier interests in excitability with Ritter's notion
of galvanism. This is, admittedly, not undertaken on any large scale, but none the
less Novalis's comments on these issues are significant for they give clues to his
overall picture of the human state at this time. Furthermore, Novalis's remarks on
excitability and galvanism could indeed be of use in interpreting his literary works
since they support the view that man was a galvanic being.
Neubauer has shown how Novalis wished to make improvements to medical
theory by uniting the camps of the neuro-pathologists with the humoral pathologists
(337, 110-112). One can build on Neubauer's views to show how Novalis's
knowledge of Ritter's galvanic theory also provided material for such an envisaged
improvement of medical theory. Novalis argues for a pathology which takes a
broad account of the inorganic, going beyond the chemical fluids of the humoral
pathologists to embrace Ritter's galvanic theory, and thereby uses galvanism to
support notions of organization in the inorganic. In doing so, Novalis also
supplements German Brunonian notions of excitability and organization with
elements arising from Ritter's theory of galvanism.
Röschlaub's alterations to Brown's notions of internal and external stimuli
attracted Novalis. Brown maintained there were independent internal stimuli caused
by "muscular contraction, sense, and the energy of the brain in thinking, and
exciting passion and emotion" (15, 2, 134 f.). Röschlaub in distinction stressed the
active receptivity of organisms whereby all internal stimuli were the result of the
transformation of external stimuli. Naturally, Röschlaub's notion of what counted
as external stimuli was correspondingly broad. It included physical impulses,
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thinking, the workings of the "soul" and the affections of the heart (101, § 1424-
1425; 337, 110). Novalis agreed with Röschlaub on this point since it implied that
no distinction was to be made between physiological and psychological stimuli.
They were all converted into internal stimuli through the medium of the body:
In dem Sinn wie Roschlaub, die innern incitirenden Potenzen nimmt, müssen alle äuBre Potenzen,
wozu dann auch die Seele und der Geist gehort - minelsi der inneren incit[irendenj Pot[enzen]
wircksam seyn. D[ie] Summe der innern incitirenden Potenzen ist der Kórper (N, 3, 352).
The grouping together of physiological and psychological impulses led Novalis to
speculate on whether body fluids were animated by the soul. He even went so far
as to say that the fluids were composed in varying degrees of body and soul; that
is, he suggests some form of "fluid" thought:
Solite etwa der Process der Safteveranderung in einer animation der Korpersqfte - eine Mischung
gleichsam der Seelen und Korpersafte bestehen - Je vollk[ommnerj die innern incitirenden Potenzen
sind - desto vollk[ommner] gerath die Mischung und desto voII[komrnner] der neuer AMchuft.
(Das Blut soil belebt seyn, und also werden.)
Die mnern incitirenden Potenzen selbst sind em Compositum - aus Seele und KOrper - in
mannichfachen Verhältnissen (N, 3, 352).
Novalis speculates that the exciting powers are contained within a "Compositum"
of both mind and body. The exciting powers of the mind are part of a continual
process of constitutional changes, whereby the "Korpersafte" are animated
("animation"), and where physical change occurs ("Anschufi").
With these broader notions of excitability and organization in mind, Novalis
suggested a union of humoral and neuro-pathology. Thus, although a remark such
as the following appears to be referring to the strict context of German
Brunonianism and humoral pathology, Novalis's final stance to pathology views
thought and the soul as organized matter. Novalis observes here how humoral
fluids could, in his view, be seen in terms of excitability:
Es giebt Humoralsthenieen und Asthenieen ... (N, 3, 311).
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Thus, in terms of medical practice, the humoral pathological debilitating
treatments, as for example in bloodletting, were to be interpreted in the light of
Brunonian practice as a form of stimulation:
Man kann durch concrete Schwachung stãrken - und umgek[ehrtj (N, 3, 371).
Armed with Röschlaub's notion of internal stimuli and his own concept of the
excited state of the body's fluids, Novalis could then, for example, make remarks
such as the following one, which claim very specific links between mind and
matter:
ber die vorzUgliche Wirckung mancher Gemuilzsaffeczen auf bes[ondrel Organe. Diese
Betrachtung kann uns unendlich instructiv werden. So wirckt der Aerger z.B. auf d[iej Gaile etc (N,
3, 351).
Although, as Neubauer remarks, Novalis was essentially on the sides of the
Brunonians, he believed that the Brunonians reduced pathology to symptoms,
thereby overlooking the fact that the course of the diseases could lie in the fluids of
the body as well (N, 3, 377; 337, 1 10-111). Thus Novalis points out that
Röschlaub had omitted I the category of "Indirecte Sthenie" (N, 3, 327), a category
which refers to a state caused by lack of stimulants and not purely to some inherent
state of excitability. Indeed, in some remarks early in 1798 on the "constitution"
and excitability theory (the other remarks on these subjects cited here were made in
the last half of 1798 or later), Novalis speaks of "C(onstitution) mit mangelnder
Incitation (indirekt sthenisch)" (N, 2, 573). 10 This extends Brown's categories of
excitability by introducing a fourth type of disease (337, 72). Importantly, Novalis
desired a table for possible fluid or chemical causes of disease, just as much as the
already at hand Brunonian scale of excitability:
Es fehien noch Gr[und]S[ätze] Ub[erJ die Reiize ... (N, 3, 377).
Part of Novalis's envisaged union of the two schools is, as Neubauer, points out,
to link excitability theory with "a more exact account of the numerous factors in
the environment and in the body itself" and to give "recognition to the dialectical
interchangeability of opposites" (337, 111). One can add to Neubauer's analysis
that a further part of the union envisaged by Novalis included Ritter's notion of
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galvanism and Novalis's own notion of method in his "Combinatorilc" or
phenomenal calculus. Thus, when Novalis speaks of the union of the humoral
pathologists and neuro-pathologists in the following remark of 1798 he intimates
his notion of phenomenal calculus in the term "Verhältnisformeln"; the term
"Individuum" here refers both to the individual patient, and arguably, as later
comments of Novalis's in 1799/1800 would seem to attest (see below), also to
Bitter's notion of galvanic individuals:
Humoralpathologen sind nichts, als Dogmatiker - objective phil[osophische] Mediciner - Realisten.
Die Andern sind Idealisten, subjfectiveJ phil[osophischel Mediciner.
(Erweiterter Begr[iff] v[onj Humoribus, erweiterter Begr[iff] von Nerven.)
Obj iecti und Subj[ect] entstehn auch hier immer zugleich. In Brown soil eine Vereinigung schon
seyn - und den besten Brownianern schwebt diese Idee auch dunkel vor - aber sie fallen immer in
Einen der vongen Irrthümer in ihren Ausdrücken und Anwendungen zurück indem sie die
allg[emeinen] (lr[und]S[atzej - specifisch und daher wieder eingeschrankt machen - da sie das
Verlahren im Allg[ememenl mit Buchstaben - nicht für jedes Individuum geltend annehmen,
sondern a und b, wie specifische Classen ansehn, und nun den Vorrath v[onJ Krank[heitenl, Mittehi
und Individuen dahinein vertheilen - indem sie nicht wahrhaft relativ - nut allg[ememen]
VerhältniBformeln verfahren (N, 3, 377-378).
Although Novalis felt the Brunonians were too systematic 	 he did believe that
the competent Brunomans were flexible and that they attempted to attain a union of
the two schools of medicine." However, Novalis also censures Brunonians here
for lack of methodological breadth, and argues for more flexible use of their
principles in a way akin to the employment of key phenomena in his notion of
"phenomenal" calculus. In this way Novalis implies that the Brunonians should
"experiment" more with their key principles and turn them into genuine
"Verhältnisformeln" and pay more respect to the individual case. Out of the strict
medical context of the time Novalis's envisaged union of the "Chemiker und
Symptomatiker" (N, 3, 377) means something quite different from the actual
contemporary humoral pathological and neuro-pathological viewpoints. Two
concepts point to Novalis's real views: "Chemiker" and "Individuum". These
terms can be understood in the light of Novalis's awareness of Ritter's
physiological and electrochemical experiments, and the significance Ritter's work
itself had for excitability theory. In Rifler's Beweis firstly the more complex notion
of "Chemiker" is accounted for in affinity, electrochemistry and galvanism, and
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secondly, the notion of organization is given a particular galvanic meaning, as the
individuals which form galvanic circuits. It goes without saying that the
Brunonians and their major theorist, Schelling, pinned their ideas of excitability on
the notion of purposive organization, but the type of direct links between the
chemical and electrical phenomena of galvanism and excitability made by Novalis
were not made by Schelling in 1798 (the time when Novalis referred to the need
for a union of humoral pathologists and neuropathologists).' 2 However, in 1799, in
his Einleizung zu dem Enrwurfeines System der Naturphilosophie, Schelling does
indeed applaud Ritter's notion of galvanism, and points to the need for research
into the links between galvanism and the life force of "Reproduktionskraft" (109,
323, 325 fn). In his Erster Entwurfeines Systems der Narurphilosophie Schelling
links the chemistry of the organism to galvanism, and maintains that galvanism has
far reaching consequences for the organic realm, for galvanism influences all its
forces:
Man mufi a priori behaupten, daB der Galvanismus, ebenso wie er die Sensibilität und Irritabilitat
afficirt, auch die Reproduktionskraft afficirt, daB also alle Secretionen, der Procefi der Assimilation
- selbst die Bildung des Embryo - durch em Gesetz des Galvamsmus geschieht (108, 178 fn).
Schelling, then, like Ritter and Novalis, was proposing notions akin to
bioelectrochemistry.
To deal with the first of the above factors of Ritter's galvanism, the chemical and
electrical issues, it becomes clear in Novalis' writings that, in his view, the
Brunomans did not only overlook the fact that fluids could be the cause of diseases,
but also the notion that man, in a broader sense of the inorganic than fluids, was a
galvanic entity and that there could be diseases due to lack of galvanic action:
Brown hat gar nicht auf die quant[itativen] und qual[itativen] Verhãltnisse des Korpers gesehn - ihn
mcht, als eine höchst zusanimengesezte Maschine angesehn - deren Zustand durch äuBerst
mannichfaltige Ursachen modificirt wird.
Es kann Kr[ankheitenl aus Mangel oder Uberfiufl an Elektricitãt, an galv[anischer] Action etc.
geben (N, 3, 602).
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Novalis further suggested that the Brunonian notion of stimulants could be viewed
in the light of the human electrical machine, since stimulants were forms of
conductors:
Alle sog[enannte] reiizende Subsianzen aufier der Wärme sind KrafiLeiier - also benehmend - die
Lebenskraft erhãlt durch sic Spielraum.
Nährende Mittel sind Haibleiter - Condensatoren.
Nichtreitzende Mittel sind schlechte Leiter - Isolatoren - Kraftbeschrãnkende - comprimirende -
narcotische (in Ruhe seizende) Mittel	 (N, 3, 477).
In this way, according to Novalis, galvanism, as an electrical and chemical
phenomenon, could contribute to medical theory and practice.
Further, another remark of Novalis's refers particularly to some observations that
Ritter makes in the final, speculative part of the Beweis which concern the role of
chemical affmity in physiology within the galvanic organism:
Veränderung des Flussigkeiten durch die Gef4fJe (N, 3, 603).
In the Beweis Ritter proposes a galvanic interpretation of the blood's circulation in
the body, where the changing oxygen content of the blood (causing variations in
the galvanic "action" due to chemical affinity), together with the muscles and the
nerves, all form part of a circuit which ensues in muscle contraction and
consequently the flow of blood:
Abcs noch ems: wenn es etwan in der thierischen Maschine einen Körper gabe, dessen Qualität in
regelmafligen Intervallen sich anderte; wenn dieser Körper Glied einer Kette ware, deren Action
zunãchst gewisse Nerven leicht contrahirbarer Muskein trãfe, wenn etwa diese Muskelfasern zu
GefáBen gehörten, in denen FluBigkeiten durch abwechsetnde Verengerung und Erweiterung ihrer
forthewegt werden soilten, was würde denn wohi die Folge seyn von des durch die Undulation des
Qualität jenes Korpers so regelmaBig bestimmten immer wiederkehrenden Veranderung des Action
des groBen Kette, zu des dieser Körper gehorte? Ohne Zweifel abwechselnde Verengerung und
Erweiterung jener GefBe. Und damit? Fortbewegung des in ihnen enthaltenen FlUfiigkeiten. Giebt
es abcs in des thierischen Oekonomie wohi einen Körper, der obige Eigenschaften besitzt? 0 ja! das
Blut. Beladen mit Sauerstoff (oxydirt) geht es in alle Theile des Korpers, giebt ihn da ab und kehrt,
(desoxydirt) ebenso beladen mit theils von neuem Sauerstoff bindungsfàhigen, theils dem Körper
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UberflU1igen Stoff, nach den Lungen zurUck, hier ändert es seine Qualität abermals urn, urn jenes
Spiel von neuem zu beginnen (R, 165-166).
This is indeed a highly concrete picture of how chemical affinity, in Ritter's view,
effects physiological phenomenon. Here Novalis's notion of pathologists as
"Chemiker" can be understood as going considerably beyond the idea of chemistry
that humoral pathologists stood for.
To deal with the second of the above factors of Ritter's galvanism, the
"individuals" in galvanic circuits, it was not just in the way that man could be
viewed as a galvanic "machine" that Novalis turned to galvanism in order to fmd
solutions to pathology, for at another level Ritter's Beweis gave Novalis the
material to see the body as a circuit within the giant galvanic circuit of organizing
forces, where all the circuits belong to the purposeful whole of the Nature. Ritter
himself describes how the minor circuits belong to the grand organized whole:
Von diesem [the dynamic system of the body] nun 1st das einzelne Organ em Theil, em bestimmtes
dynamisches VerhältniB, und drey dergleichen verschiedene sind es, weiche wirksame Ketten geben.
Aber jenes System ist selbst das was es ist, mcht durch sich ailein, nur in sofern ist es diefi, als es
Theil ist eines höheren dynamischen, des voflkommensten aber organischen System, der Natur, und
daB es uberhaupt ist, verdankt es selbst der Natur. Sie 1st das Ideal ailer organischen Wesen, absolut
in sich beschlossen, ewig in sich, und ewig das was sie ist, bleibend, bleibend - Natur (R, 170-171).
Similarly, Novalis could remark, in respect to circuits of organizations:
Der K[ôrperj ist eine unendliche Kette von lauter Individuen.
Alle Kr[qfteJ sind lauter LokalKr[afte] (N, 3, 612).
Ritter's notion of organization substantiated Novalis's view that man is made up of
organized processes at varying levels; and his notion of treating the patient as an
"Individuum" implies viewing the patient as an organization with the potential to
change through a "Combinatorik" of the organized processes. All the individual
"LokalKräfte" and "Individuen" are to be harnessed to improve the patient's health
as a whole "individual". All these forces and parts of the circuit are linked by the
force of galvanism and it is through the use of this force that Novalis would seem
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to be speculating that patients should be treated. It may be that, in his
"Verhältnififormeln"
Fig. 6. Brown 's disease chart in Gennan.
of organized processes, Novalis was thinking highly practically of a type of hand-
scale or chart, such as Brown's (see above, fig. 6). 13 Instead of Brown's states and
the factors he attributes to excitability, and the mathematical, quantitative nature of
Brown's scale, Novalis seems to be suggesting the ordered listing of the factors
pertaining to the organized processes of matter, physiology, and the mind. A
"Combinatorik" would reveal the relationships between these factors and their
transitions, thus making it possible to view the patient in the broad terms of his
whole "constitution".
Novalis's notion of the "Individuum" clearly spans the organic and inorganic
realms, and his idea of the various "circuits" and levels of organization indeed
fmds in Rifler a strong source. In particular, in those experiments (depicted in
figures 67-71) in the Beweis where the nerve plays so crucial a role in revealing an
internal constant force, Novalis could have seen "proof" of the "individuality" or
"personality" of natural phenomena. Moreover, even in the most basic galvanic
circuits there was "individuality", for, in Novalis's eyes, in galvanic action and in
chemical affinity, by means of a generative act, substances passed on their
"personality" bound up in their material form, to another substance:
Die Aflfinitaetl selbst dunkt mich - der Erzeugungstrieb der Individuen zu seyn. Der Process selbst
- em Generationsact (N, 3, 597).
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Novalis here neatly translates the traditional notion of "Sympathie" into its modem
correlatives in chemistry and biology respectively, with astonishing results, for he
thereby links chemical with biological forces, and grounds the relational force
uniting two "individuals" with the procreational force in a single "individual". His
viewpoint avoids the tricky question of relating chemical to biological processes,
not just by deriving one from the other, but by interpreting them both in terms of
each other.' 4 The resultant view of "affmity" is closer to Goethe's in Die
Wahlverwandtschaften and elsewhere (129, 84-139) than to that of the chemists.
However he goes beyond Goethe's view in envisaging a "circuit" - only distantly
recalled in Goethe's references to Ritter's pendulum experiments (129, 180-187) -,
which is based upon Ritter's idea of the vast organized galvanic circuit of Nature:
Man kann Reitz oder Thätigkeit durch blo& Veranderung der Kettenglieder hervorbringen. Alles ist
Glied einer Kette. Jedes neue Glied veranlafit Repraesenlazionen in den andern Gliedern - dadurch
Thatigkeit ... (N, 3, 612).
Novalis's notion of the "individuality" or "personality" gives Ritter's concept of
dynamic "individuals", "die Raumerfullungs-Individuen" rather more eloquent
form. The term "Repraesentationen" denotes a self-reflexive dimension in the
process. The notion of "Repraesentationen" is reminiscent of another comment
Novalis makes on the generative force in Nature, where he calls it "die innre
chzffrirende Krafi" (N, 3, 627). ' In activity bodies "draw" their forms (due to the
internal creative force in phenomena), affecting other bodies, in an organized
process; on a grand scale Nature is permanently generating "figures". The
purposive virtue of "representation" was given, in Novalis's view, an empirical
basis in Ritter's experiments, for through the mere change in the form of the
galvanic circuits, galvanic action was caused ("Man kann Reitz oder Thatigkeit
durch bloIe Veränderung der Kettenglieder hervorbringen"). In another comment
Novalis goes further to suggest that Ritter's notion of galvanism may indeed be the
key to understanding the purposiveness of phenomena, since in the way it
compounds and enhances the functions of phenomena, galvanism may be seen as
the consciousness or soul of phenomena:
Wenn der Galv[anism] alle Functionen der individuellen Stoffe vermehrt, so 1st er vielleicht nichts,
als höheres BewuBts[eynl - der Natur - Naturseele - Geist des Ganzen - politische Action der
NaturkOi-per (N, 3, 603).
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Rifler's physico-dynamic notion of organization is here elevated into a higher
principle, which entails not just an animating spirit uniting nature, but a universal
consciousness, too.'6
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6. The role of the diagrams in the Beweis: diagrams as scientific tools.
Ritter's discovery of the constant force of galvanism was not the product of some
hypothesis. He was not attempting in hypothetico-deductive fashion to prove a
theory: his discovery followed in essence an inductive type of procedure, based on
a practical knowledge of the phenomena he was dealing with. A focal point for
Ritter's methodological approach are the diagrams of the experiments, and it is the
nerve which once again plays a crucial role here. Novalis was highly aware of the
significance of the diagrams and interpreted them in the light of his own notions of
method and inquiry into knowledge (see below, sections 7, 9 and 10). Before
discussing the diagrams in Novalis's terminology as natural philosophical
productivity, I wish first to contextualize the diagrams in the light of current views
in the history of science.
Present historians of science such as Gooding, Nickles and Pickering argue for
inductive types of inquiry procedures based strongly on the issues concerning
scientific practice itself. The issues they raise are highly relevant to Ritter' s own
method. Highly relevant too for natural philosophical productivity, as shown in the
introduction, is Toulmin's discussion of practical knowledge. As mentioned,
Nickles argues for generative induction and "know-how". In Nickles's view we
come to theories by building on what we already know, and he contrasts this notion
of inquiry with the hypothetico-deductivists' "knowing-that". He remarks how the
seventeenth century "hypotheticalists" or "consequentialists" "held that empirical
support results from successfully testing the predictive consequences of theories, no
matter how these theories were obtained" (248, 304). He further comments that the
hypotheticalists' method in effect "means that all scientific justification reduces to a
claim's record of predictive success" (248, 304). In contrast, the inductivists stress
practice and not theory. Of course an argument against inductive procedures is the
very subjectivity of "know-how" and human skills; for many scientists "know-
how" does not count as objective knowledge. The editors of The uses of experiment
(177) point out that the discovery processes themselves are mostly left out in
reconstructions of experimental and theoretical work, primarily because of a
prejudiced stance:
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Traditionally, philosophers have divorced the unruliness of discovery and discovery arguments from
the logicality of justification (177, 12).
Concerning Gooding's views, the editors further point out the hypothetico-
deductivist epistemological use of experiment actually obfuscates the distinction
between phenomena and theory. For if the scientist is always using experiment to
defend theoretical claims about nature, in effect, the process of inquiry is reduced
to theory alone, and the scientist is only in touch with theory and not nature. The
actual cognitive role of experiment, whereby meaning is found in discovery
processes themselves, and whereby nature herself is questioned, is discarded, and
in its place theory stands, isolated from the phenomena:
But if phenomena are always elicited and rendered, then the distinction between observation and
experiment begins to blur. With it go the reassuring notions that scientists produce natural
phenomena and laws and that they can claim that their representations of those facts correspond to
the way things really are (177, 14).
Moreover, the editors remark how the issues arising out of scientific practice are in
general permanently of value for the sciences since debate is always kept open by
new discoveries:
Traditional philosophical methodologies assume that knowing how to produce a phenomenon or
datum is irrelevant to showing that it the case. All that matters is the theoretical interpretation of
phenomena and data. However, if "closed" debates are always liable to be reopened on all fronts
(for example, by new empirical and theoretical results and instrumental possibilities), then the
"how" never ceases to be important. The competences which enable generative forms of justification
are never as far away as consequentialist philosophies assume (177, 13).
In Ritter's method inductive procedures, experimental skills, the cognitive role of
experimentation, "know-how", and the process of discovery itself, all play a
crucial role. Moreover, his open method accords very much with the point made
above on the importance of scientific practice in general for theory, since in the
construction of his theory of galvanism it is "know-how" which essentially steers
his inquiry, and Ritter is conscious of the importance of issues of practice for
theory. Ritter's inquiry bears many of the characteristics of Toulmin's idea of
practical knowledge. Riuer's know-how can be seen as something akin to
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"phronesis" since aesthetic and moral elements are intimately bound up in his form
of natural philosophical productivity. Further, in the light of Toulmin's thought, as
already discussed, there are links between the interdisciplinary approach to
knowledge found in case studies and Rifler's approach to inquiry. Indeed, Rifler's
work underlines the epistemological value of the case study, for he did attain
significant results by concentrating a variety of theoretical viewpoints around the
case of galvanism, and, in particular, around the phenomenon of the nerve.
A general discussion of the implications of Rifler's diagrams is necessary before
specifically treating the role of the nerve. The seventy-eight diagrams in the Beweis
which are used to illustrate the galvanic experiments are consciously used by Rifler
for theory building. The use of tools or instruments whether they be apparatus or
diagrams is often taken for granted by scientists, as has been made apparent above
in the general neglect of the issues of scientific practice by practitioners
themselves. Rifler sees his diagrams as "Figuren" or "Formein", understanding
them as instruments to assist inquiry. Since he views diagrams as a form of
apparatus assisting inquiry, the diagrams themselves play a different role in his
method than would conventional mimetic diagrams, which do no more than mirror
the phenomena under investigation. Conventional mimetic (or "corporeal")
diagrams are referential; Rifler's diagrams on the other hand are abstractions or
schemes of the empirical world, which are to be treated not as referential but as
representative. Conventional diagrams assume no difficulty in the translation of
phenomena; Rifler's diagrams show his awareness of this difficulty. They are a
specific reading of Nature, justified by the notion that a subjective element is
always present in man's analysis of nature, in other words, looking at nature
involves man's skills, and consequently models of nature are never absolutely
objective but are necessarily intertwined with man's subjectivity. In the
introduction to the Beweis Rifler refers to the importance for him of self-conscious
theorizing and the need for the scientist to be acutely aware of his own subjective
contribution to inquiry:
Wachsarnkeit über seine Thatigkeit mufi also das erste Erfordernifi des Naturforschers ... seyn (R,
x).
It is in the way that the diagrams are a product of man's agency and subjectivity
that the diagrams in the Beweis are non-referential. They are presented as a
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particular interpretation of Nature; and as an embodiment of man's skills they are,
further, "phenomena" in their own right. They are, then, both a form of visual
argument, and the subject of that argument. Their character might best be defined
as symbolic. This is a rhetoric of experiment that emphasizes the epistemological
nature of aesthetic productivity and the idea that the imagination plays a key role in
cognitive gain. The diagrams can, further, be viewed as scientific models. The
diagrams are conceptual models and theoretical tools. However, Ritter's or
Novalis's notion of the diagrams (see below, sections 6 and 8) cannot, for instance,
be equated with a view of modelling such as Pickering proposes. Pickering is a
realist in tendency, and his notion of a "phenomenal model" is too formal and
conceptual to be compared with Ritter's diagrams. Pickering clearly states that his
"phenomenal model" is "a conceptual understanding of whatever aspect of the
phenomenal world is under investigation" (254, 277). Although it can be said that
Pickering's notion of a "phenomenal model" does come close to the way Ritter's
diagrams function, since Pickering sees his "phenomenal model" endowing
"experimental findings with meaning and significance" (254, 277). This is
important because Pickering implies here that knowledge of nature necessarily
entails a mediation between the scientist and the phenomena under observation.
However, the notion of a scientific model espoused in Ritter's diagrams is best
expressed by Gooding's notion of models, and, indeed, highly appropriately by his
account of Faraday's development of field theory. Gooding argues for the
importance of non-verbal forms of knowledge in discovery processes and shows
how Faraday did not have a "verbally articulated expression" of his field theory
until the 1840's (176, 219); up to then Faraday had been expressing his theory
non-verbally, in what Gooding calls "instrumentally useful concepts" (176, 192).
Gooding's notion of a scientific model comes very close to Ritter's concrete
diagrams, and, naturally, the way Faraday used his diagrams of field theory, as
part of a discovery process before formal verbal theory was attained, is
paradigmatic of the way Rifler, from the very start of his Beweis, employs his
diagrams of galvanic processes as instruments for the construction of his theory.
Gooding's argument that Faraday was using "instrumentally useful concepts" in the
non-verbal expression of his theory also underlines how important representation is
to discovery in the context of forms of public demonstration which interact with
laboratory work, and Rifler, in this sense as well, binds representation into his
demonstration and discovery process from the start.
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There are, moreover, several aspects to the way Ritter employs the diagrams as
representations of, and as heuristic tools to obtain, knowledge. In Ritter's work the
diagrams often are used literally as formulas ("Formein") in the conventional
meaning where the values can be exchanged and different results obtained. The
notion of a formula points to the endless variability of the phenomena operating
within a certain scheme and assists the scientist in exploring behind the phenomena
to the internal causes. This process is generally hindered by mimetic diagrams
since the figures have an absolute realistic value. Ritter for example uses his figure
11 many times as a fundamental galvanic scheme operating with different values.
Amongst the subjects he discusses with it are the role of oxygen affmity (R, 59)
and the galvanic experiments on the eyes (R, 90).
I	 Li
Fig. 7. Ritter 's galvanic diagrams, figure 11 as a "formula" (Beweis, 1798).
The further aspect of the diagrams' formularistic character is the way Ritter uses
them to break down compound or muddled phenomena into their component parts.
In this way, the diagrams can be seen not only as literal formulas and as a clear
concrete analysis of phenomena in galvanic schemes, but in addition, in a further
analytical sense, they are employed to break down and represent complex
phenomena in the experiments. Thus figure 40 is analyzed into its component parts
depicted in figure 41a and figure 41b (R, 60). Figures 41a and b split up figure 40
into its circuits and demonstrate more clearly in which direction the galvanic force
is flowing. The diagrams act here as useful tools to the scientist as representative
and analytic formulas.
F. 41.1..1-_p	 j
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Fig. 8. Ritrer 's galvanic diagrams, figures 40, 41a and 41b as "fonnulas" (Beweis,
1798).
Most important, however, is that all the diagrams form part of a practical
demonstration of Ritter's notion of galvanism. Before Ritter set out on his 'proof
and the experiments presented in the Beweis, he had a notion of a dynamic force in
Nature, but did not have the necessary concepts or evidence to substantiate his
view of such a force. In the process of the "proof" the diagrams are developed and
used as a non-verbal form of theory; they are one (extremely important) step
towards the construction of a formal theory. The first step is Ritter's particular
arrangement of the materials and phenomena in the individual experiments as
expressed in his diagrams: from the very start of his "proof' he explains his
theory, through the diagrams, in terms of the positions of the various conductors in
the circuits. In this way Ritter attempts to read Nature in her own language.
Although the diagrams are a reflection of the phenomena they are, as mentioned,
as a product of interpretive skills, "phenomena" in their own right, and in a further
sense "phenomenal", since Rifler uses them, precisely as reflection of phenomena,
to be ever in close contact with the phenomena. The diagrams are themselves a
reflection of what is in fact a highly inductive approach, since it is one which
remains as close to the phenomena under investigation as physically possible. One
can then speak of a progressive method, leading from actual physical phenomena in
the experiments to the semi-abstract or symbolic diagrams, and concluding with the
ultimate, "abstract" expression of theory in his notion of a constant force.
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There is no doubt that Ritter uses the diagrams to give visual expression to his
theory, they are the closest tools he has to the phenomena and give his theory form
in "visual argument" by mediating between abstract theory and the actual
experiments themselves. In this manner, the diagrams could be said to constitute a
"phenomenal theory". In their deployment as a process of visual argument they
provide the means of attaining and expressing his own final "abstract" verbal
argument. That the diagrams are part of the practical demonstration of theory is
particularly evident in figures 64 to 76 (R, 107-154) where Ritter discusses his
theory almost purely in terms of the diagrams. Indeed, on reading the Beweis one
often has the impression that theory is literally left in the diagrams. In figures 64 to
76 Ritter lets the phenomena undergo many "modifications": these alterations to
the circuits are the non-verbal twists and turns in the practical demonstration of his
theory.
Rifler's emphasis on the modifications to the circuits also underpins his
sophisticated awareness of induction. His desire to be faithful to Nature does not
imply that he discards theory. The notion of "Modifikationen" implies that
induction necessarily involves a process of multiplication, exclusion and selection.
Pure induction is a fallacy to Rifler since his process of induction includes
theorizing with the phenomena under investigation. The "crucial" experiments in
figures 67 to 71 are not cases of "pure" induction or, to express it otherwise, of
"deducing directly from the phenomena", although their particular clarity of proof
in their phenomenal rhetoric would suggest this. These experiments only have a
special status when understood in the light of previous modifications. Modification
(implied here is "multiplication" or "variation"), exclusion and selection, viewed as
a general process of theorizing with the phenomena, are the necessary fundamental
activities for anything which resembles "pure" induction. In this sense induction
and practical demonstration are indeed the key to the methodology of the early
Rifler.
Conventional mimetic diagrams such as Humboldt's are not part of the same
demonstrative method, nor are Volta's diagrams, although they are not mimetic,
but representative, like Rifler's diagrams. Volta's diagrams are not however part of
an active process of theory building. They reflect instead a hypothetico-deductive
approach to scientific inquiry. Volta's diagrams merely represent his already
verbalized theory.
I-'.
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Fig. 9. Galvanic diagrams, from left to right, Ritter (Beweis, 1798), Humboldt (in
54, 1797) and Volta (in 121, 1797).
Ritter's diagrams, then, become tools and part of a method where the scientist
can look to them for support, as representational models, and thereby as a
consistent "phenomenal" structure upon which he can develop his theories. In
general the diagrams are symptomatic of a practical non-verbal form of scientific
inquiry. For Ritter, the scientist must be capable of working with non-verbal forms
of theory: to this end experience is essential. The experienced experimenter
working in a new area stands beyond conventional theory and before asserting a
new theory he must be well versed in non-verbal forms of theory. In terms of tacit
knowledge one can say that Ritter is insinuating a form of "expert" knowledge. In
the light of Toulmin's thought Ritter is here relying upon "phronesis". The
experimenter has to have a feel for the practice of the laboratory and be able to see
theory active in the phenomena. Ritter explicifly suggests this when he introduces
figure 73 as a case, in his view, for the experienced galvanist:
Noch will ich einige erfahrneren Expenmentatoren vielleicht nicht unangenehme Modificationen
jener Versuche beschreiben ... (R, 117).
F73.
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Fig. 10. Ritter 's diagrams, figures 65 and 73, "Noch will ich einige erfahrneren
Experimentatoren [...] Modficauonen 1...] beschreiben" (Beweis, 1798).
Figures 65 and 73 are cases where the experimenter must have gone into the area
of phenomenal debate. (Figure 73 is another example showing up the deficiencies
of Volta's theory of contact electricity). Ritter introduces the complications of
figure 73 because the modification above the cut nerve in figure 65 (R, 117) causes
no "action"; in figure 73, Ritter gives an example of a case where "action" is still
shown above the cut in the nerve by introducing the pairs of nerves and muscles cd
and hi. Figure 73 presupposes an experimenter with a fine touch, who is aware of
the practical difficulties and subtleties. In this experiment Ritter is modifying the
"action" in the basic circuit of aef (R, 117-118). "Action" in a has been reduced
because the nerve has been cut at n, but Ritter shows here that although a does not
contract there is a certain amount of constant "action" in this closed circuit. Ritter
shows in figure 73 that there is a relative constant "action" in the primary circuit
aef: the "action" in the muscles h and d, when added to the primary circuit, is not
due to the fact that they have brought a new effect ("Wirkung") to the circuit.
Instead, the contraction of h and d are due to the already constant "action" in the
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primary circuit aef. If the added muscles and nerves hi and cd had brought some
new effect to the circuit, then a should have contracted, but it does not. If a had
contracted then galvanism could be seen as a contact phenomenon. For Ritter, the
introduction of the new pairs of muscles and nerves cd and hi modify the circuit
and cause a change in the inner dynamic process. In this lightfigure 73
presupposes an experimenter who has considerable experience of galvanic activity:
it implies a general knowledge of cutting the nerves and, consequently, of the
modifications of changes of direction of galvanic "action" through the nerve, and
knowledge of the alteration of the nerve's form as depicted in c. It implies also
knowledge of complex combinations of conductors and ways of forming circuits.
In figure 73 Ritter is not merely adding metals or organic conductors to the circuit,
but, instead, with a fine touch, stressing the interplay of organic and inorganic
conductors, and, in particular, observing complex alterations to the organic
conductors.
In this demonstration of practical knowledge, figure 73 indeed exemplifies how
the experimenter in Ritter's view theorizes directly with phenomena; he constructs
theory directly out of Nature. Here demonstration and experience, non-verbal
forms of knowledge and "know-how", are interlaced, and in this way man uses
Nature herself in his own models of phenomena as a tool to support theory, in
what is an inductive form of inquiry, employing "phenomenal" theory. The next
section will treat Ritter's work in terms of Novalis's notions of natural
philosophical productivity.
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7. The aesthetics of natural philosophical productivity. Novalis 's interpretation of
Ritter 's diagrams: "die Instrumentaisprache".
Novalis's important notion of an "Instrumentaisprache" (N, 3, 91) is a direct
response to the way Ritter uses the diagrams. The "Instrumentalsprache" implies
that "instruments" are part of and are reflecting the phenomenal non-verbal debate.
"Sprache" suggests a form of language and communication, and "Instrumental-
sprache" suggests an argument formed by the positions and activity of experimental
apparatus. Novalis's views on scientific method very much cohere with Ritter's
practice. As indicated, in his scientific method Novalis is not a hypothetico-
deductivist, he does not believe in formal theory alone; his notion of an
"Instrumentaisprache" - which involves the employment of symbols of the
imagination - usefully illustrates and elucidates his view on the role of aesthetics in
practical knowledge. The term "Instrumentalsprache" further indicates how he
views scientific practice and theory as a whole, with the scientist, the apparatus and
Nature all playing a role. They all form part of an experiential whole, reasserting
Novalis's understanding of knowledge in his notion "Experimentalphilosophie".
For Novalis, as is also implicit in Ritter's method, what the scientist contributes in
practice is seen as a "phenomenon" in its own right. Man's thoughts alone or as
exhibited in the apparatus and diagrams are just as much a part of Nature as the
rest of the observable phenomena:
Instrumente und Apparate sind reale indirecte Formein. Maschinen sind Fonnein. (Ritters Figuren)
Das Resultat einer vollständigen wissenschaftlichen Universalmaschine würde eine Natur, oder em
Chaos seyn.
Algebr[aischel grammatische Bearbeitung der Instrumentenlehre. Electrischer generalisirter
Apparat, nach Ritters galvanischen Apparat auf dem Papier.
Uber die Kupertafein an mathematischen Büchem ... Ansicht eines Experiments in einer steigenden
Reihe von Gesichtspuncten.
Ubersezzung in die Instrumentaisprache (N, 3, 91).
The diagrams for Novalis are "real" because they are phenomenal, they are man's
"natural" thoughts. The diagrams are "indirect" because they are representations of
natural phenomena. That they are representations does not prevent them,in his
344
view, from being phenomena: they are a part of man's experience and skill. The
diagrams are a type of language and a certain transliteration of Nature. The
language of instruments in Ritter's case has tapped into Nature's galvanic
language, and, as Novalis suggests, if this language were completed, a new
"Nature" would be produced in the sense of a whole or a complex dynamic chaos.
The language of instruments, in its inventiveness and through its "Sympathie" with
the phenomena of Nature, has the potential to create a model of Nature, or as an
experimental, practice-oriented form of theory it mirrors the very creativity of
Nature herself, and her own experimental potential for creating out of chaos. For,
as implicit in the driving forces of "Lust und Unlust" (N, 3, 423), Novalis's idea
of Nature takes account of her changing form: in his view, Nature is continually
"experimenting" and creating new forms operating on the generative force of
"Sympathie". In his threefold view of the history and eschatological progression
Nature was in the second phase of "Chaos", and moving potentially towards the
second Golden Age.' 7 Thus the notion that man can produce a formularistic
translation of nature in a language of instruments introduces an additional
epistemological layer to Novalis's utopian notions. It illuminates how man has an
intimate bond with nature, and that man's subjectivity embodied in his skills is part
of inquiry, and this type of inquiry is on the path to the state of the free
"plasticizing" of the imagination.
Novalis makes his views clear on the phenomenality of language itself in his
piece Monolog (N, 2, 672-673). Here he refers not to a conventional formal
language but to a living language. His view of language does not imply that
language is meaningless, relative or non-referential in a semiotic sense; what it
does imply is that language is an entity and that it attains meaning only in practice
and not in formal discursive use. This sense of language as an active reading of
Nature or form of non-verbal argument (where "verbal" here refers to language in
the conventional sense) is precisely what Novalis sees realized in Ritter's diagrams.
The diagrams are an important example of some hope of returning to the subject in
the broader sense of practical knowledge in inquiry.
The direct reference to Ritter's diagrams in the remark above reveals both what
Novalis saw in his galvanic diagrams and the further potential Novalis saw in
general for inquiry in such practice-oriented modes of discovery. Novalis's notion
of an "Expenmentencalcul" is borne out in Ritter's diagrams:
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Algebr[aischej grammatische Bearbeitung der Instrumentenlehre. Electrischer generalisirter
Apparat, nach Ritters galvanischen Apparat auf dem Papier (N, 3, 91).
The formularistic ("Algebr[aischel "), "grammatical" development of the language
of instruments is a method of speeding up the processes of discovery. Furthermore,
as Novalis comments, he saw in Ritter's diagrams of his experiments potential for
composing and designing a general apparatus for displaying electrical phenomena.
An inventive calculus based on Ritter's galvanic "formulas" of electrochemical and
physiological phenomena meant, in Novalis's view, that the formularistic diagrams
could be used to develop a technological apparatus. He was thus suggesting the
enormous potential technical implications of Ritter's galvanic experiments. Here
Novalis is proposing a highly practical use of a general calculus. In addition, the
reference to mathematical diagrams further substantiates that in Ritter' s diagrams
Novalis saw a potent form of knowledge. To Novalis, Ritter's diagrams display a
power related to the a priori perfection of mathematics, in that they provide a
coherent basis for "algebraical grammatical treatment". Without being
mathematical themselves, they exhibit, in Novalis's view, the same kind of order
and coherence, and Ritter's diagrams do indeed argue cohesively for a new and
better understanding of galvanism. The language and argument of the diagrams are
as concrete as mathematical diagrams, and a "natural" algebra of galvanism. Thus,
in Novalis's view, the language of instruments is an area of knowledge where the
concrete notions of the subject are put into their rightful place as a necessary
prerequisite for inquiry.
Moreover, Novalis's "Instrumentaisprache" importantly emphasizes the actual
process of discovery itself, and his highly practice-oriented notion of
"Experimentencalcul". For in the combination and variation of experiments in his
process of "Experimentencalcul" it is the language of instruments that enables
various theoretical viewpoints to be realized and to be employed as concrete
practical knowledge, and thus he is led to remark:
Ansicht eines Experiments in einer steigenden Reihe von Gesichtspuncten.
Uberseizung in die Instrumenlaisprache (N, 3, 91).
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The language of instruments illuminates how Novalis envisaged an aesthetic and
progressive inductive procedure wherein a mediation between theory and
phenomena occurs in the form of concretizations of the observed phenomena. The
experimenter closes in on the subject of investigation using the tool of instrumental
language "in einer steigenden Reihe von Gesichtspuncten", and here Novalis
implies that it is the language of instruments that is paramount, in the process of
discovery, in enabling the scientist to make representations of natural phenomena
and laws. It is suggested that through a concrete language of instruments the
scientist comes increasingly ( " steigend") closer to the position where he can say
that his theory, i.e. his representation of nature, actually reflects Nature herself.
The language of instruments, crucially, as a concrete form of knowledge, remains
as close to the phenomena as possible, and also, as part of a discovery process,
comes nearer to a proper explanation of phenomena. This sense of "die
Instrumentalsprache" gives Novalis's practice-oriented notion of knowledge and
inquiry a base of considerable significance. Here the rhetoric of experiment
highlights the epistemological value of aesthetics in discovery processes. The
rhetoric also illustrates how aesthetics are not used in the sense of fiction, but
instead as experiential knowledge. In the language of instruments, phenomena are
re-experienced in a form of symbolic knowledge that mediates between theory and
phenomena. Cognitive gain through the use of aesthetics is shown here in the
experiential nature of such symbols and their employment in a progressive form of
inquiry. The instrumental language serves to display just how important the issues
of experimental practice are for theory, and how in Novalis's view, the sciences
should pay attention to the working method of the inquirer himself. In 1800
Novalis remarks, in the same spirit, how significant the practical and technical
aspects of inquiry are:
Ailgemeine Behauptungen gelten in der Naturlehre mcht. Ihr Vortrag muB praclisch, technisch, real
seyn - Schritt vor Schritt entwickelnd - construirend, wie die Beschreibung einer technischen Arbeit
(N, 3, 600).
When Novalis is speaking of a language of instruments or of a form of
"phenomenal calculus" it is clear that he is always referring to the process of
knowledge itself and not the final theoretical statements of a theory. He suggests
that progress in the sciences emerges out of close adherence to practical
procedures; "general claims", i.e. theoretical statements on nature or systems of
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nature do not, in his view, assist progression. It is, instead, detailed ("technisch,
real") procedures which remain close to the phenomena, such as are carried out in
Ritter's diagrams, which have direct practical relevance and are part of a practice-
oriented procedure, which best serve in constructing theories. The language of
instruments, as part of a discovery process, and as the fundament of a concrete,
"phenomenal" calculus, is thus a major notion in Novalis's view of scientific
inquiry, and a major concept in his notion of knowledge in general, since he
essentially demands such a practical and concrete form of thought in all areas of
knowledge. Progression and discovery in all spheres of man's activities are, for
Novalis, governed by a particular closeness to experience itself; knowledge is itself
an instrument of experience, and always has to be "experimental", i.e.
experienced. Thus, the language of instruments offers a particularly coherent
picture of the manner in which aesthetics are employed in inquiry and shows that
aesthetics are a keystone of Novalis's stance to natural philosophical productivity.
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8. The role of the nerve in Ritter's aesthetics of natural philosophical producri vizy:
the individual's methodology and theory.
Up to this point the diagrams have been viewed as part of a general non-verbal
attitude to the investigation of nature and in terms of the aesthetics of natural
philosophical productivity. However, the diagrams, through their depiction of the
nerve, also illustrate the link between the individual inquirer's theory and the
realization of his methodology in the diagrams themselves. The depiction of the
nerve itself illumines its status and particular nature in Ritter's theory of
galvanism; the depiction emphasizes that the nerve symbolizes Ritter's notion of
matter, and, also, his method of inquiry itself. Here we can see the emergence of
the notion of unifying practice, which will be developed in the following sections.
The unification lies in linking concrete, practical forms of theory (the symbolic
role of the nerve for galvanic theory) with the realization of the inquirer's
methodology in the diagrams. This means that a careful analysis of the diagrams is
now called for.
What differentiates Ritter's diagrams from Humboldt's conventional mimetic
diagrams and Volta's representational ones is indeed above all his use and
representation of the nerve. Ritter's diagrams in a sense hover in between the
mimetic (direct depiction of an object) and representational (non-referential,
standing in for an object), for whereas the conductors in his figures can be seen as
abstract, relative and interchangeable, the depiction of the nerve and muscle can
not: the lines standing for the nerve and muscle may be abstract but they are the
one constant phenomenon depicted in the diagrams. In other words, they are the
constant factors in these visual formulas. Since the nerve and the muscle are
constant factors in these otherwise abstract diagrams they are singled out from the
other parts of the "formulas" depicted: they can be seen as the most concrete
among the abstract figures. Further, if one looks at the diagrams as
representations, the nerve and the muscle, because of their relative concreteness,
form the link between the inner forces, i.e. the less visual, more abstract
phenomena, and physical matter. If one looks at the figure of the nerve and the
muscle mimetically it provides a link between matter and the inner forces because
of its relative abstractness. Moreover, if scientific diagrams or apparatus are
models of Nature, it is the figure of the nerve itself, because of its importance for
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galvanic laws, which out of all the galvanic apparatus best represents Nature. The
figure of the nerve can be understood as a concrete "natural" model, in one sense
of this term, reflecting the bond between man and Nature in the visible, concrete
theory of the diagrams. (At another level, our concrete perception of the
phenomenon of the nerve itself, external to the diagrams, when the nerve is
perceived in terms of theory, is a concrete "natural" model, from which one can
directly read off the theory, since the nerve is exemplary of important general laws
of Nature.) As a concrete sign the figure of the nerve is symbolic: symbolic, as
mentioned (see above, section 4), in the particular manner that the nerve is
understood as matter with its own inner dynamics which form part of the constant
force of galvanism in the whole of nature. Further, in Ritter's galvanic diagrams
the straight lines of the nerve going into the triangle of the muscle complete the
symbolic arrow, which symbolizes Ritter's new galvanic law that the current flows
from the nerve into the muscle. Thus the figure of the nerve symbolizes both the
constant force in the organic and inorganic realms and the fact that the force has a
direction within a closed circuit. The figure of the nerve is, additionally,
"symbolic" of Ritter's method in general; just as the figure of the nerve links
phenomena to concrete theory, so does his method in all its aspects. He closes in
on the mysterious phenomenon of constant galvanism, critically and gradually
modifying the phenomena, always supplying the theory with a concrete
representation in his diagrams.
The nerve is, on this interpretation, not an absolute abstract figure; as a 'natural'
model it is a concrete sign: it is a point where theory and Nature meet, or to state it
otherwise, it is where human skills extend into Nature. Man's agency is here so in
tune with Nature that it can be seen as actually entering into its secrets. Rifler's
specific depiction of the nerve (as the straight lines of the symbolic arrow), which
is neither entirely abstract nor entirely mimetic, is opposed to the invisibility or
"abstractness" of Volta's physical force and the visibility or "mimetics" of
Humboldt's idea of a vital substance. The concrete depiction of the nerve "visibly"
symbolizes important galvanic laws occurring internally within phenomena, and, as
the one "constant", concrete figure, as the one recurring symbol in the diagrams, it
further reflects Ritter's notion of galvanism, which is a constant force and an
internal force, inwardly active yet "visible" throughout nature. One can here
perhaps talk of "natural" signs to bring out the notion that, in Rifler's case, the
inquirer's skills act as a medium of natural laws; they are "natural" because they
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are an attempt to imitate natural phenomena. In this imitation they pay respect to
nature by staying as close to the phenomena as possible. "Natural" also refers to
the way such signs, in the type of theory they reflect, also pay respect to
purposiveness in nature. These are key aims of the unification of practice, to seek
out a theory which reflects purposiveness in nature, and to arrive at a form of
knowing in dealing with nature that is itself as "natural" as possible, i.e. reflecting
the way knowledge is part of a greater experiential whole. The experiential and
"natural" form of Rifler's methodology, as manifested in his diagrams, would
attest to this.
The figure of the nerve reflects Ritter's wish to unite a more abstract understand-
ing of matter with a concrete perception of its inner forces. The abstractness of
Volta's conventional representations reflect his interest in the inner force of contact
electricity. The lack of any constant visual factor or permanent concrete reference
in his diagrams betrays his static model of nature. Contact electricity is not a
constant phenomenon and consequently there are no constant factors in his
diagrams. Contact electricity is a polar phenomenon revealed in the static,
mechanical nature of his representations. Humboldt, on the other hand, has a vital
materialist approach: the importance of substances is reflected in his diagrams,
they offer a materialist mimetics of natural phenomena. His diagrams stay, as it
were, on the surface of nature, stressing external factors. In his belief in the
"Nervenfluidum" Humboldt does not "abstract" from the "exciting" substance to a
wider notion of a universal physical and organized force. Humboldt's insistence on
the substance of the "exciting" "Nervenfluidum" and his belief in the "absolute"
(as opposed to relative) effects of the conductors on galvanic action prevents him
from looking inside nature:
Es scheint mir nemlich, als sey das circulirende unbekannte Fluidum zwar allerdings schon in jedem
Theile der Galvanischen Kette excitirend, als auBere sich aber dieser excitirende Kraft, auch bei
gleicher Reizempfng1ichkeit der Organe, in ungleich höherem Grade bei denen, weiche unmitielbar
armirt sind, als bei denen, weiche von den Armaturen entfernter liegen (54, 1, 202).
Humboldt is here referring to local effects of galvanism caused by both the
conductors themselves and the nerve fluid. Humboldt suggests that the force of the
nerve fluid "expresses" itself to a greater extent in those parts of the circuit which
are closest to the poles or points of contact itself. This could he termed a vital
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materialist's answer to contact electricity, which in a tautological fashion,
concentrates only on the external in the experiments. Rifler's method goes on to
explain galvanism further, looking behind the external appearances of effects at the
points of contact to the internal process throughout the active circuit, and searches
for an "abstracter", i.e. internally active, but none the less visible (in Nature's
activities), universal physical and organized force. Ritter's figure 72 (R, 115-116)
(see below) shows for example that there may be apparent local effects but these
are due to inner forces at work in a closed circuit and the effect of the nerve on the
direction of galvanic current. Figure 72 demonstrates how adding a conductor only
causes contractions in the muscles when it affects those parts of the circuit
determining the direction of the current ("... nur in dem der Wirkung der Kette
unmittelbar ausgesetzten Theile ."). The addition of the conductors o and t has no
effect, but n, m and p do cause contractions because they are affecting the primary
closed circuit ("Grundkette")fae. As further "proor Rifler introduces s to the
apparatus which forms a new closed circuit and thus causes the muscles to contract.
E7z
Fig. 11. Ritter's galvanic diagrams, figure 72. The symbolism of the nerve. (Beweis
1798).
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All the conductors added to the initial components in the experiment in figure 72
only cause action by altering the structure of the circuit. The "external" conductors
themselves are relative to the whole inner dynamic process of the closed circuit.
The implicit role of the nerve's symbolic straight lines completing the arrow as a
permanently recurring symbol is important: it highlights the principle of galvanic
action, the constant, "permanent" flow of the current in a particular direction in
closed circuits. The nerve is therefore a "symbolic" determinant of the direction of
the galvanic process and points to the fundamental internal dynamic process of
galvanism: externally the nerve appears to undergo no changes, but because of the
effect it has on circuits there clearly is electrochemical activity occurring within it.
It can be said that what Humboldt does in his diagrams is to "externalize" his
inner material laws. This could be said to make his diagrams tautological.
Humboldt's notion of the inner laws of galvanism is material (the nerve fluid), and
it is not surprising therefore to see no hint in his diagrams of an inner force
process. His materialistic outlook is reflected in the way he unproblematically
depicts Nature in the diagrams. Both Volta and Humboldt have a formal way of
reading Nature. In their work under discussion here, neither of them shows an
awareness of the notion of concrete theorizing in their use of diagrams: human
skills appear to be taken for granted, the way man's skills acts as a medium of
Nature and her laws is never consciously reflected in their diagrams. Ritter's more
problematizing stance is symptomatic of his distrust of hypothesis and theory. His
empiricism may be highly philosophical, but it does (arguably) give Nature more
of a fair reading; moreover, it is his concrete approach to empiricism that enables
him to produce a more complex and (in terms of eighteenth century science) better
theory of galvanism than Volta or Humboldt.
Ritter steers away from hypothesis through what I have referred to as "natural"
practice, which is embodied in one way in the symbolic use of the nerve in the
diagrams. As already intimated, "natural" practice implies, in general, treating
inquiry as just as much an ultimate phenomenon as the galvanic process within
Nature herself: in this sense, "natural" practice demands a truthfulness to Nature,
imitating Nature using concrete "natural" models of it such as our perception of the
nerve itself as a phenomenon (i.e. our awareness when perceiving the nerve that it
is representative of general laws of Nature), and concrete "natural" models such as
Rifler's concrete representation of the nerve in his figures. It is this, which
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involves bringing experience back into theory, that reflects Novalis's reevaluation
of the notion of "experiment". For Ritter's use of the nerve employs a cognitive,
experientially based form of knowledge; it operates "experimentally" according to
Novalis's notion of concrete knowledge. Experience is brought back into theory in
two ways: firstly, through viewing knowledge instrumentally and as a
phenomenon, and, secondly, in constructing theory which remains close to
experience in its imitating of Nature. Here, through the meeting and
interpenetration of the inquirer's methodology and the concrete theory of the
nerve, practice is unified.
In the introduction to the Beweis Ritter specifically refers to his self-conscious
experiential stance, and employs it later in the empirical section of the Beweis:
Wenn nun die Natur überall nach unverbrüchlichen Gesetzen verfáhrt, oder wie wir gewohnlich
sagen, wenn sie Uberall consequent handelt, wenn alles, was Product ihrer Thãtigkeit ist, für uns
Wahrheit seyn mufi, und wenn uns bey aller Naturforschung nur diese Wahrheit zur Grundlage
unserer Schlusse dienen darf, so mufi es blofi an uns liegen, wenn wir auf Widerspruch kommen,
wir müssen nicht consequent verfahren seyn, dens, aus Wahrem kann nur Wahres folgen, und dieB
mit neuer Wahrheit verbunden, muB abermals Wahrheit zum Product geben; - und hierin erblicken
wir für uns die Moglichkeit, auf die einzig moglich wahre Theorie aller Naturerscheinung, durch sie
selbst geleitet zu werden. Wachsamkeit über seine ThAtigkeit mufi also das erste Erfordernifl des
Naturforschers, Bekanntschaft mit Thatsachen, mit den Producten der Thàtigkeit der Natur, das
zweyte seyn. Das erste uns zu verschaffen, steht in unserer Gewalt, und das zweyte kônnen wir
jeden Augenblick haben. Offen und frey handelt die Natur, ihre Werkstãtle hat weder Thüren noch
Schlösser, Ruhetag halt sie auch nicht, denn rastlose Thätigkeit ist ihr Character (R, ix-x).
It has already been discussed how Ritter here is calling upon the scientist to look
closely at his own interpretative activities to supervise how he is theorizing with
the phenomena: "Wachsamkeit über seine Thatigkeit" implies self-conscious
theorizing. It is, however, important to note that Riner also demands that the
scientist should have a sound practical knowledge of the phenomena:
"Bekanntschaft mit den Producten der Thatigkeit der Natur" refers to a knowledge
of the active, organized processes of Nature. Nature herself, in Ritter's view,
offers the inquirer the basis for the possibility of investigation at all, and that is
"durch sie selbst [Nature] geleitet zu werden". It is through the imitation of
Nature, in Ritter's view, that the inquirer can arrive at a more coherent theory of
354
phenomena. Nature herself supplies the basis for a type of theory that mediates
between the natural processes under investigation and strict theory itself.
Knowledge in the sense of practical activity and the activity of Nature herself is the
key to Ritter's scientific matters, and, indeed, it is in this spirit that he remarks that
Nature herself is endlessly active ("denn rastlose Thatigkeit ist ihr Character" (R,
x)). The implication is that both knowledge and Nature are experiential, part of the
same experiential whole, and that their link lies in practical, phenomenal forms of
inquiry. The symbolic role of the nerve reflects the fact that in his work in the
Beweis there is a link between inquiry and Nature, and that the nerve is the focal
point for the dynamic theory of galvanism. Treating inquiry as an activity,
"Thatigkeit", as a phenomenon in itself, requires that theory be espoused in a
concrete form such as the nerve.
The notion that Nature and inquiry form a single entity allows the scientist to take
the view that Nature speaks as an organic whole in the course of his
"experimentation". The experiments in figures 67-71 are presented in such a way
as to let Nature alone appear to do the theorizing, firstly because Ritter's theorizing
leaves Nature intact through the use of concrete symbol, remaining true to Nature,
and secondly for the reason that all the experiments in these figures deal with
wholes, the closed circuit and the nerve. No conductors are added in these
experiments, nor are the circuits broken. The key to Ritter's "proof" is an organic
whole, the nerve, and his theory is the "proof" of the vast organic whole, Nature.
Volta and Humboldt do not think in terms of an organic whole, instead their
experiments and theories point to a separateness in Nature. The "absoluteness" of
Humboldt's conductors, or the specific material nature of his "Nervenfluidum",
and Volta's static polarity of contact electricity all suggest a separateness, in
Humboldt's case a materialistic separateness, in Volta's case a polar separateness.
Further, Riner explicitly refers to the need for a phenomenal base for theory such
as the nerve or the constant galvanic force, calling upon common sense in the
following passage in the Beweis to show the traps of hypotheses and formal,
conceptual theory. For, as mentioned, Volta's mechanical contact electricity
produces a static abstract model of Nature, and also his hypothetical notion of a
perpetuum mobile (194, 43; 142, 30), where galvanic action is paradoxically
purely brought about by the metals (this, as Ritter points out, overlooks the
presence of a finite force in circuits). Humboldt's notion of substantial conductors,
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perhaps, taken to its logical extreme, suggest the theoretical impossibility of an
infinite amount of conductors. Ritter, as well as criticizing the notion of endless
conductors also speaks of the impossibility of an infinite "irritability", or of an
infinite amount, or entire diminishment of "action" in a circuit:
Aber em unendlich hoher Grad von Erregbarkeit ist unmoglich, schon dadurch unmoglich, weil,
wenn es dergleichen wiridich gabe und gegeben hätte, der Uebergang zum endlichen, wie wir ihn
finden, nur in einer unendlichen Zeit, in einer Ewigkeit, d.i. me, geschehen könnte, und somit ist
auch das Ietztere, das unendlich klein Werden von x [the actionl, das Verschwinden desselben
unmoglich, und umgekehrt (R, 144). 18
Rifler's argument here for the necessity, at a methodological level, for a
phenomenal base for theory can be likened to Novalis's view of the role of
phosphorus in chemistry. Thus, in the context of the notion of experimentum
crucis, both Rifler and Novalis (and, of course, Goethe) argue for the centrality of
the concrete substance to theory building. Whereas most science took the idea of
"experiment" from the notion of experimentum crucis in an abstract way, the early
Romantics also the include the concrete substance of the crucial instance.
To conclude, Rifler's symbolic use of the nerve was a profound example of a
theoretical model that evaded the many pitfalls of inquiry. Through the "proof" of
the existence of a "constant force", Rifler's deployment of the nerve as a symbol
both gave natural philosophy valuable material for a notion of organization, and
afforded the strictly empirical sciences a significant leap forward in
electrochemistry. Importantly, Rifler's use of the nerve in his theory of galvanism
and the reflection of its theoretical significance in his diagrams can be described in
terms of the aesthetics - as a concrete form of knowing - of the individual
inquirer's theory and methodology. This forms the base of Novalis's notion of the
individual's natural philosophical productivity which will now be evaluated in the
next section.
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9. Novalis 's views on the individual's natural philosophical productivity: the fact of
the nerve and "Experimentencalcul".
Novalis's argument for the use of aesthetics and practical knowledge in inquiry has
already been discussed in his important notion of "die Instrumentalsprache";
Novalis, however, delves further into the issue of practice and human agency in
inquiry. Next to the comments he makes on the diagrams in the Beweis (see above,
section 7), he remarks that each area of inquiry (the various disciplines and arts)
unifies its form of practice in a specific symbol and that all of man's forms of
practice are generally unified in Nature:
Die Natur ist die Einheit aller Künste und Handwercke. Es giebt aber noch soiche Einheiten für die
Gattungen - und Species und Vielheiten von K[unsten] und H[andwercken]. Eine soiche Einheit ist
für eine Menge K[Unste] und H[andwercke], die Kleidung. Für Andre - das Gebäude u.s. fort (N, 3,
91).
This is another instance which reveals how Novalis links man's thought and
Nature. In the remarks above Novalis is stating man's ability to abstract from his
practical knowledge ("KUnste und Handwercke"): the unities or symbols of man's
practical skills are the result of his ability to produce concrete ideas which remain
true to Nature. The above remark shows Novalis's fundamental interest in
consensuality. The remark can be seen as a base for both Novalis's notions of
consensuality, for the classification of the knowledge and the sciences, and for the
individual's natural philosophical productivity, since both forms fmd their highest
goal in the unity of knowledge with Nature ("Die Natur ist die Einheit aller Künste
und Handwerke"). Novalis had such a unifying symbol in mind for galvanism, to
him the unifying notion is indeed the nerve. Throughout his natural philosophical
notes of 1798-1800 Novalis comes back to the theme of galvanism and makes his
comments with Ritter's Beweis in mind. Novalis was highly aware of the
significance of the nerve for galvanic theory and its role in revealing the inner
dynamic processes of matter, and the importance of approaching nerve action itself
in terms of inorganic activity. In the winter of 1799/1800 he remarks:'9
Nerv ist das chémische, electnsche und galvanische Agens (N, 3, 631).
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Close to his remarks on Rifler's diagrams in the autumn of 1798 Novalis gives the
nerve a special status as a cause of activity within organisms, since the nerve is the
real entity at work behind the muscle contractions, operating on the principle of the
physical and inorganic realm of "actio in distans":
Der Nerv ist ,nehr, als der Muskel ... Der Muskel nemlich zuc*t, während der bewegende Nerv ru/u
Die äufire Wjrcksamkeit - die Sensibilitaet der Wircksamkeit wächst im Verhãltnifi der
Entfernungen vom Mittelpunct oder Innern (N, 3, 101).
Novalis was clearly highly aware of the broader natural philosophical implications
of the nerve, and here observes the proportional relationship between nerve-length
and force. Significantly he emphasizes the idea of an organizing, sensible force
when he refers to how the "Sensibilitaet" of the force increases proportionally to
the distance. Thus Novalis was aware of the physiological and organizational
implications of Rifler's galvanic experiments, and in reading the Beweis he saw the
link between electrochemical phenomena and physiological phenomena, and the
possibility of viewing electrochemistry in terms of organization.
Further, while discussing Rifler's diagrams, and later in the Das ailgemeine
Brouillon, Novalis speaks of "experimental method" and the need to base inquiry
upon some fundamental fact, and proposes that experiments should be conducted as
variations on this fact. In the context of galvanism, the fundamental fact is the
universality of the inner dynamism in Nature, and the nerve is the particular
symbol of this fact, and in this way a symbolic fact:
Reine Erlahrungen ub[erl die Muskel und Nervenbewegung - und Benutzung, Combination -
Classification und Folgerungen. Ausgang von Einigen unbezweifelten Factis - wie in d[erJ
Phil[osophie] (N, 3, 427);
Das universaiste Naturfaktum mufi eine unendliche Reihe variirender Erscheinungen - einzelner
wircklicher Phaenonzene - Erperimen:e - unter sich haben (N, 3, 91).
Novalis is describing a form of induction based around the aesthetics and practical
knowledge of natural philosophical productivity, as evinced in his notion of a
"phenomenal" calculus. It is an inductive procedure that begins with a significant,
irrefutable form of experiential knowledge ("unbezweifelt M , arguably the case with
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the nerve in galvanic theory). Here the human subject's knowledge of a natural
object is based upon experience. As remarked, Novalis argues for the centrality of
the concrete substance in the experimentum crucis, as opposed to taking the idea of
"experiment" in an abstract way from the "crucial instance". Then the familiar,
simpler notion of induction is suggested in "Benutzung". "Combination" refers to
another more complex step of induction, where the experiments are varied in a
form of "phenomenal" calculus, such as implied by Novalis's notion of
"Expenmentencalcul". "Classification" is, obviously, a common term of eighteenth
century inquiry, as espoused by Linnaeus. More pertinent to Novalis here are
Fichte and Werner. The manner in which Fichte lets concepts and phenomena
interact is interpreted by Novalis as part of the classification process in
experimentation (see above, chapter one, section 3). Werner's method of
classification, as has been argued, sets constitutive rules and provides some form of
a presuppositional framework for inquiry. This framework consists, in part, of
both his methodology of directly theorizing with phenomena, and also in
underlining paradigmatic types (such as those of his geognostical theory). Novalis
explicitly points to such a framework when he suggests that Werner's types could
be used in a "phenomenal" calculus. In the above remark, Novalis refers to such
"Classification", and then to a more abstract stage of the procedure of
experimentation, which closes in on the final stage of formulating theory
("Folgerungen"). Particular to Novalis's remarks on "experimental method" are the
points which are part of his notion of "Experimentencalcul" (N, 3, 435). These
points are, respectively, the first stage in the "inductive" procedure, which takes an
accepted, "experiential" fact as its base, and the later stage which employs the fact
in a process of "Combinatorik". In the context of Ritter's work it is significant that
Novalis uses the term "fact" here. Naturally, the fact of the nerve can be used, like
phosphorus, as a consensual symbol for galvanic inquiry. In this manner it could
be used as the phenomenal base of future inquiry for galvanic practitioners.
However, the term fact would appear to point to the higher version of
consensuality found in the individual's natural philosophical productivity. The term
"fact" illustrates the epistemological cohesiveness of Rifler's interdisciplinary
approach. Out of the practical knowledge of the interdisciplinary "case study" he
makes of galvanism Riuer arrives at what he considers to be the central
phenomenon of galvanic inquiry: the fact of the nerve. Through his approach to
galvanism the nerve acquires ever more significance and meaning. In this manner,
the fact of the nerve is the result of the individual inquirer's practical knowledge.
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In the further stage of his inquiry Ritter translates the significance of the nerve into
his diagrams. There the theoretical significance of the nerve is realized in his
scientific method: the theoretical implications of the nerve take concrete form.
Here, the meaning of the individual's natural philosophical productivity is
revealed, and this points to the potential of the diagrams for a higher level of
consensuality. The theoretical implications of the nerve for galvanic theory and the
realization of the nerve's significance in the diagrams make up the type of
consensuality that the individual's natural philosophical productivity is
communicating.
Turning away from the subject of consensuality, there are other issues relating to
Novalis's interest in symbolism and notation, which provide a backdrop to his
agreement with Rifler's form of inquiry. It is worthwhile to discuss Novalis's
notion of a general calculus and his use of the idea of "Sympathie" in this context.
As discussed, Novalis argues that calculus is akin to the process of analogy since it
involves relating things to one another and assumes a link between inquiry and
Nature. Moreover, the "asymptotic" notions of mathematical calculus are also akin
to Novalis's and Rifler's notions of natural philosophical theory and inquiry, which
speak "approximately" or "transcendentally" (and not "absolutely") of nature
through the mediation of notational symbols, drawing on the relationships of things
with another and their "Combinationen":
Der menschl[iche] Geist kann die äuflcrn Symptome und ihre Compositionen approximando
nachmachen - er mufi also Analogie mit den Bestandtheilen und Naturkrafien haben - ... (N, 3,
426).
This is an illuminating statement of Novalis's notion of inquiry, in that it restates
the idea of a "sympathy" between observer and observed in analytical terms.
"Compositionen" and "Bestandtheilen" refer to the constituent parts of a single
phenomenon, which are here considered as "analogically" and "approximately"
related to the inquirer. Accordingly, one can see Ritter's concrete use of the nerve
in the diagrams as an example of a form of theory, depending on a "Sympathie"
which "asymptotes" towards Nature, and that draws on the relationships of things
to one another ("Verwandtschaften"). In the case of the nerve in particular, in
Novalis's sense of analogy, a relationship between knowledge and Nature has been
established. In the way the nerve is employed in a process of inquiry it becomes in
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the broadest sense a fact, "eine Tatsache", literally an "action-thing", since as a
phenomenal archetype it reveals for dynamic theory that inner forces are constantly
at work in Nature. By "imitating" the nerve, inquiry itself becomes a process of
concrete practical knowledge. Using the nerve as a fact, in the above manner (as a
phenomenal base for theory), Ritter, from Novalis's perspective, carries out a
"phenomenal" calculus where he can "predict" what will happen in galvanic
circuits. The nerve becomes the important fundament of the "phenomenal" calculus
of the diagrams, where the "Combinationen" of the individual components of the
diagrams, i.e. the process of drawing relationships of the phenomena with another,
forms a "Combinatorik" of discovery. And indeed, it was Ritter's introduction and
his particular use of the nerve in his galvanic experiments, both in the sense of his
method of inquiry and through viewing nerve action not specifically in the light of
the organic realm, but also as part of the general force of galvanism throughout
Nature, that cleared up the inconsistencies in Volta's and Humboldt's theories.
Furthermore, it enabled Ritter in 1798 (unlike Volta and Humboldt) to develop a
more predictive theory.
Novalis's interpretation of Ritter's diagrams as a "phenomenal" calculus thus
accounts for the diagrams as particular formulas or "Chiffre" of Nature
("Instrumente und Apparate sind reale indirecte Formein. Maschinen sind Formein.
(Ritters Figuren) ..." (N, 3, 91)). The nerve provides the "constant factor" in the
"calculus" of the "Combinationen" of the phenomena under investigation. Seen in
general terms, the dynamic theory of matter implied by the nerve action was the
"constant factor" in the theory of galvanism. Novalis was clearly aware of the
alternative views of Volta. As discussed, Humboldt's substantial conductors and
Volta's polar electricity were not the key to galvanic theory, it was rather that
conductors and the closing of circuits espoused in mechanical contact electricity
were relative factors in the galvanic equation. Novalis remarks:
Voltas Theone des Galvanismus (Elektrfische] Statik und Mechanik) (N, 3, 95).
Here, Novalis implicitly sides with Ritter in distancing himself from Volta, whose
theory, in Novalis's view, reduces galvanism to a mechanical phenomenon.
Within the context of the representative nature of Ritter's diagrams, the symbolic
nerve and the "predictive" nature of Ritter's diagrams, it is further illuminating and
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worthwhile to look at Bergman's affinity tables. In an analogous way they can be
seen as developing the sort of tradition of scientific diagrams which Ritter's belong
to. Bergman's affinity tables may not look similar to Ritter's galvanic diagrams,
and naturally their subject matter was different, yet Bergman's affinity tables, at a
deeper level, provide an important precedent for Ritter's particular type of
diagram. Like Riner's diagrams, his affinity tables were schematic representative
models, and they also can be seen as a kind of "phenomenaF' calculus. Bergman's
programme could, in Novalis's terms, be read as a "calculus" of chemical
relations: if all the diagrams were completed, it should be possible to predict every
chemical relation.
-"f,,c/i,,n,j e(ecs',i-o- ..Jmp/rr.	 Ta1 III
An,d0
Fig. 12. T. O.Bergnan, Affinity table, 2, 1783 (10).
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Moreover, aichemical diagrams in their symbolism, such as the one in
Quadrarum aichymisricum (see above p.234), also form part of the tradition
espoused in Novalis's notion of concrete theorizing in diagrams. In particular, of
course, the Lullian tradition of "Combinatorik", and the way things are related to
one another in its form of "Combinationen" in diagrams, comes close to Novalis's
idea of a "CalcUl" of concrete theorizing. Novalis's notion of a "Combinatorik"
using diagrams is, however, less abstract, since he proposes the use of "imitations"
of Nature, such as Ritter's symbolic nerve. None the less, in general terms of a
"Combinatorik" of concrete knowledge, Novalis's notion of knowledge comes
exceedingly close to Lullism. This is a major cross over point between
Neoplatonism and Novalis's thought.
Furthermore, in the broad context of the representation of theory and concrete
theorizing, Faraday's diagrams for field theory, as Gooding describes them, in the
way they pave the path to a more coherent theory (as do Ritter's diagrams) and in
this sense improve the "predictability" of theory, can also be interpreted as
continuing the tradition of scientific diagrams to which Rifler belongs. Clearly,
too, the examples given here illustrating this tradition of diagrams all have great
consensual potential, for they all communicate theory in a concrete manner and
provide a possible basis for constitutive rules in inquiry.
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10. Individual natural philosophical productivity as a programme. The role of
Ritter's Beweis for Novalis 's programme of practical knowledge.
The consensual significance of Ritter's work, as spelt out in terms of the unifying
of practice in the realization of the individual's methodology and theory based
upon practical knowledge, can also be interpreted in the light of remarks Novalis
makes at a most general level on natural philosophical productivity. Before making
this comparison, it is necessary to provide some backdrop and to illustrate how
Ritter's thought suits Novalis's notions of ontology, and, also, to reflect again how
central the subject and aesthetics are to their form of inquiry.
Importantly, when Novalis made his observation on the proportional relationship
between nerve-length and force, and on the way the "sensibility" of the force
increases proportionally to the distance, he also linked the nerve up to, and
explained it in terms of, his fundamental view of the nature and origins of
knowledge and organization. He remarks:
Der Nerv ist mehr, als der Muskel, weil aller Anfang insensibel ist (N, 3, 101).
The nerve is an example of the ideal creative force in Nature. It can be understood
that, in Novalis's view, the origin of the organized world (obliquely referred to in
"aller Anfang") lies in an "experiment" of the ideal (hence Novalis speaks of
"insensibel" referring to the realm of pure intelligibility). Elsewhere he also refers
to the origins of knowledge in a natural philosophical context, indicating the
"ideal" or "spiritual" basis of physics and concrete Nature:
Der Geisterwelt gehort das erste Capitel in der Physik (N, 3, 601);
Fuga Vacui . / Geschichze der Physik. / (N, 3, 86).
The two notes suggest in different ways that the realm of ideas, determined by a
commonly accepted law of Nature, abhors a vacuum, and by means of a purposive
physical force produces matter. By beginning with the "ideal" realm, but
understanding it in the context of physics, Novalis interprets the Chain of Being as
"Nature" in her entirety. In the light of "Sympathie", and in Plotinos's notion of
the One's self-conscious reflection upon himself, the universe was created out of a
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fundamental "experiment". For Novalis, in this sense, "experiment" is a self-
conscious, concrete thought. Furthermore, in speaking of a fundamental
"experiment", Novalis powerfully conveys his belief that knowledge, method and
science are part of a "spiritual" and historical process. Thus, indeed, "Physik"
arose, which is both knowledge (study of matter) and Nature herself, where matter
is seen as bound up with a purposive force. Novalis saw that Ritter's work on
galvanism strove to explain this historical process through his description of the
purposive force of galvanism. It is precisely in Ritter's method of inquiry, as
expressed in his diagrams, that Novalis felt that Ritter had come so close to an
understanding of Nature's purposiveness. The diagrams are an invented language
of Ritter's, and in terms of Novalis's epistemology of "phenomenal" languages,
and his notion of the "Figuren" and "Chiffernschrift" of Nature, the diagrams
reflect how successfully Ritter had internalized galvanic phenomena in his creative
inquiry. Internalizing Nature, for Novalis, implies an inner experience of Nature:
the diagrams are a product and a reflection of this process. Ritter's diagrams
represent the galvanic language of Nature since they put the inner processes of
Nature into visible form. That Novalis profoundly accepted Ritter's method in the
Beweis is shown further in his comments from the middle of 1800 where he
directly links his epistemological notions with experimental method and refers
explicitly to Ritter:
Ritter sucht durchaus die eigentliche Weitseele der Natur auf. Er will die sichtbaren und
ponderablen Lettern lesen lernen, und das Sezzen der höhern geistigen Kräfte erklären. Alle äuflre
Processe sollen als Symbole und lezte Wirkungen innerer Processe begreiflich werden. Die
Unvollständigkeit jener soil das Organ für diese und die Nothwendigkeit einer Annahme des
Personellen, als lezten Motivs, Resultat jedes Experiments werden (N, 3, 655).
Here, as elsewhere in Novalis, Nature is seen as a language, a "Chiffre". It is the
nerve which is symbolic of the internal galvanic force ("Alle äulre Processe sollen
als Symbole und letzte Wirkungen innerer Processe begreiflich werden"). Novalis
appears to be suggesting that the nerve is a "letter" ("Chiffre"), the reading of
which explains why we postulate ("Setzen") higher forces ("Kräfte"). Novalis also
appears to be punning upon the two meanings of "Setzen", as the "setting" in
printing, and as the act of postulating. In this manner, Nature postulates its forces
in the "language" of its phenomena and their forms. Further, as implied in
Novalis's notion of knowledge, mind and matter, the inquirer's knowledge and
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Nature are uniquely linked in symbols and in the essence of their being: man's
consciousness reflects Nature's purposiveness. Nature is the "Organ" for man's
inquiry, that is, man speaks through Nature in his inquiries. In this sense, Novalis
speaks of "das Personelle" that should be accounted for in "experimentation".
Ritter exemplifies "das Personelle", by individualizing the purposive force of
Nature, both in his method, and in his notion of Nature itself through his internal
constant galvanic force, and consequently in his vision of Nature as an organized,
living whole, "das All-Thier". Ritter makes the higher forces concrete. In this
way, because of the sensual a priori, concrete internalization of Nature in his
diagrams, Novalis saw Ritter as speaking Nature's language and as having created
a language on Nature's terms.
It is this aspect of Ritter's work that provides some solution to the problems
surrounding the role of the subject in inquiry. Romantic subjectivity, when seen in
the form it takes in Ritter's work, does play a major role in the attainment of
knowledge. It has been demonstrated that aesthetics and natural philosophical
productivity do bring about cognitive gain. In his method of inquiry, Ritter relies
upon his practical skills and his practical knowledge of Nature to act as a medium
between man and Nature. Indeed, Rifler's diagrams externalize his subjectivity:
they grant objectivity to subjectivity through their concrete form and act as a useful
tool allowing the experimenter to theorize with the phenomena. Further, a concrete
link between knowledge and phenomena is found in the subject's role in a
continual process of inquiry, where formal truths are not sought. Instead a
practical, concrete form of knowledge is argued for, on a view which accepts the
limits of man's knowledge of the natural world, and which perceives the attainment
of truth as a process within an experiential whole.
That the diagrams are tools in a process of discovery is most important in view of
Novalis's experiential notion of knowledge. If one merely sees Ritter's diagrams as
a reflection of his galvanic theory (and in a sense of the predetermined
predictability of formal calculus) and not as part of a continual process of inquiry,
then they appear as a reflection of a subjective, speculative theory, a theory that
just assumed from the very start that galvanism was a dynamic activity. The
diagrams do, however, reflect a process of discovery, and offer a phenomenal
argument for a new theory: they are part of a continual theorizing with the
phenomena where the subject is not given absolute status in inquiry, but plays the
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role of a mediator. In the process of Ritter's inquiry, the use of the subject is
unavoidable: the subject is permanently interpreting the phenomena until a
completed objective theory is obtained. In the creation of a theory, the subject is
always in contact with the phenomena and must put forward phenomenal, non-
conceptual forms of argument, because formal theory has not yet been obtained.
In this sense the diagrams are used progressively throughout the Beweis to create
a theory and not to prove some hypothesis: as the Beweis goes on, the formal
theory becomes clearer. In terms of Novalis's epistemology, Ritter has not just
concretized theory into a form of "phenomenal" calculus, but has translated
phenomena into a concrete, non-verbal form of theory. In this form of induction,
there lies indeed a role for the subject as the initiator of experiment and theory.
Thus, the aesthetics of natural philosophical productivity, as a method based on the
subject's concrete forms of knowledge, play a key role in Ritter's pioneering work
on galvanism.
Interestingly, Novalis himself drew up a diagram which concretely visualizes
Ritter's thoughts in the fmal, speculative part of the Beweis, where the
relationships between galvanism, electricity and chemistry are treated (R, 172-3).
Novalis's diagram can be seen as a non-verbal representation of Ritter's
speculations, and reflects Ritter's working method (see below Fig. 13).
Figur. vid.Ritter (Kugelform)
Chymie - Galvanism - Elektricitãt - Magnetism (N, 3, 83).
Fig. 13. Novalis 's symbolic representation of Ritter 's notion of galvanism.
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Novalis's diagram symbolizes the union of electricity, chemistry and magnetism
under the over-arching concept of galvanism. Novalis extends Ritter's notion of a
circular circuit of galvanism ("Kreis", R, 172) to a sphere ("Kugelform")
symbolizing the galvanic whole of Nature and includes the force of magnetism. In
the critical edition of Novalis's works a reference is made to Ritter (N, 3, 846,
848), but no explanation is given of the diagrams, nor do any critics remark on the
diagram in terms of Novalis's concrete thought. The arms in the diagram refer to
the various dynamic processes: they symbolize, respectively, the electrical, the
magnetic and the chemical effects of an "action" taking place between conductors.
The bars or partitions which divide the two arms respectively signify the forces of
electricity and magnetism, where action takes place without the production of a
new "individual". The arm where the partition is dropped (and where the line runs
within the bar) symbolizes chemical action; here, the qualities of the two acting
"individuals" have been transformed and a new whole "individual" has been
created. Novalis's diagram is thus a visual formula of the various dynamic actions
in Nature. Its existence bears eloquent testimony to the role of Ritter's work in his
thought, and demonstrates how he actually sought to build on Ritter's
achievements.
Novalis's diagram can be understood as an epitome of Ritter's thought, and to
grasp it fully, one must interpret it within the whole context of Rifler's Beweis. For
when Novalis's diagram is related back to the diagrams in the Beweis, it can be
seen how Rifler's diagrams perfectly illustrate Novalis's entire notion of an
"experiment". As a constituent of completed theory they are, in an epistemological
sense, a formula of Nature; but crucially, as indicated, they are also part of a
"calculus" of discovery, i.e. a process of discussing and interpreting phenomena in
a cognitive way, as expressed in Novalis's notions of "Experimentencalcul" and
"Instrumentalsprache". The diagrams are tools which assist in a "phenomenal"
calculus of discovery, where the experiments themselves, the instruments, and
theoretical view-points are varied and combined. Moreover, in a greater context,
Ritter's Beweis is, for its part, the epitome of Novalis's idea of historical,
progressive, "experimental" inquiry; for Rifler has, in Novalis's sense, sought to
reveal the "Lettern" and "Kräfte" of Nature. Rifler's concrete theory in his
diagrams is, for Novalis, the galvanic language of Nature. Novalis's reference to
"Lettem" and "Symbole" in his remark on Rifler's method (N, 3, 655) can,
significantly, be associated with the terminology Novalis uses in his important
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statement on the Golden Age, in which he relates the coming of the Golden Age to
his own idea of method, "Plastisirung". Here one can see how well Ritter's work
suited Novalis's notion of inquiry, and, ultimately, his views on consensuality and
the programme for individual natural philosophical productivity.
In these important remarks of Novalis on his method (and these can be interpreted
as his fundamental philosophical grounding of consensuality), "Plastisirung" (also
called "die ächte Experimentalmethode") is the process where concrete forms of
knowledge are used. These Novalis refers to as "Figuren" ("Dort waren Figuren
etc. ... nothig"). In the opposite method he suggests, "die Beobachtungsmethode",
a conceptual procedure, Novalis proposes that "Worte" are used ("hier Worte etc.
nöthig" (N, 3, 123)). What Novalis suggests in his theory of concrete language is
that concrete and conceptual procedures of thought and inquiry should be
juxtaposed, and used as steps in coming progressively closer to an entirely concrete
understanding of Nature. It should be stressed that Novalis does not strictly
separate thought into the concrete and the conceptual, and, instead, in his
suggested method, argues for an on-going exchange, unification, and
interpenetration of the concrete and conceptual:
Worte und Figuren bestimmen sich in beständigen Wechsel ... (N, 3, 123)
He then further expresses the interpenetration of the concrete and conceptual when
he introduces the terms "Wortfiguren" and "Figurenworte". Those "Worte" which
are of particular concrete significance he terms "Wortfiguren". The "Wortflguren"
are man's translation and perception of the "figures" of Nature, understood by the
inquirer as the "Worte" (the language) of Nature. The "Wortflguren" can be
understood as idealizations of phenomena, such as Ritter's diagram of the nerve,
where the nerve is selected for its particular significance as a phenomenon:
Die Wortliguren sind die Idealfiguren der anderen Figuren (N, 3, 123).
The pregnance of Novalis's expression allows, too, an understanding of how
language itself is phenomenal, and how phenomena themselves form a language;
for "Wortfiguren" refers both to the particular symbolic significance of an object
such as the nerve (one of Nature's "Figuren"), as a phenomenon itself, and the
meaningful, hieroglyphic nature of Rifler's symbol of the nerve in his diagrams.
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On the other hand, "die Figurworte" are the particularly significant images in the
mmd, which are seen as an ideal language themselves, for here the inquirer is
thinking purely concretely:
Alle Figuren etc. sollen Wort oder Sprachfiguren werden - so wie die Figurenworte - die innern
Bilder etc. die Ideal Worte der ubrigen Gedancken oder Worte sind - indem sic alle innre Bilder
werden sollen (N, 3, 123).
The ideal language ("die ldealWorte") Novalis refers to is a symbolic language of
meaningful images. This is again found in Rifler's use of the nerve in his
diagrams, and, indeed in the general nature of the diagrams in the Beweis; for
these are, in terms of Novalis's thought, an inner concrete language of images,
which have tapped into the language of Nature herself. They are man's inner
"Figurenworte" of phenomena, and reveal the link between the concrete processes
of the mind and the "language" of Nature. The realization of "Figurenworte"
belongs to Novalis's ultimate aim that the inquirer should express his theory in the
language of Nature.
Thus, in the interpenetration and unification of the concrete and the conceptual,
the more conceptual process of "die Beobachtungsmethode" (which uses "Worte"),
becomes the attempt to convert our concrete perception of phenomena, or our
images of phenomena, into "Hieroglyfen". This is the process where the "Figuren"
of phenomena can be "spoken" and "written"; and the concrete process of "die
Expenmentalmethode" becomes the attempt to convert our inner notions into
concrete images and a concrete language. The Golden Age Novalis envisions will
come when knowledge in this way becomes an entirely concrete process:
Das wird die goidne Zeit seyn, wenn alle Worte - Figurenworte - Mythen - und alle Figuren -
Sprachfiguren - Hieroglyfen seyn werden - wenn man Figuren sprechen und schreiben - und Worte
voilkommen plastisiren, und Musiciren lernt (N, 3, 123-124).
It is important to note how Novalis aims to unify the "conceptual" with the
concrete. In essence, phenomena are concretized into "Hieroglyphen", and thought
in general becomes "Figurworte". Crucially, these then take on the full body of
narrative ("Mythen"), which then provides the literary form of the scientific
insight. Novalis's main proposal is that an inner language or logic be constructed
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which is in harmony ("Musiciren") with natural phenomena. He stresses this when
he remarks:
Der Fantasie, die die Figurenworte bildet, kommt daher das Praedicat Genie vorzuglich zu (N, 3,
123).
This would appear to be the crucial step, that man realizes the "Sympathie"
between himself and Nature; this is the step taken by the "Genie" with his
"Geffihi". Without this initial step of a conscious awareness of "Sympathie", the
patterns and "Figuren" of Nature herself have no meaning. Man has to construct an
inner language to convey the universal "Sympathie" of Nature, in order to form a
meaningful relationship between himself and outside phenomena. And it was
Ritter, in Novalis's view, who was such a "Genie". When Novalis speaks of Ritter
reading the "Lettern" of Nature, of his "Setzen" of Nature's language in an inner
language of the mind, and of Ritter's "Symbole", he is referring to these notions of
"Worte" and "Figuren".
One can link Novalis's comments on Ritter's method with his remarks on
"Worte" and "Figuren" in the following way. The "Lettern" of Nature are the
"Figuren" of Nature; the "Setzen" of Nature can also be seen as Nature's
expression of herself in the "Figuren" of phenomena, and as the inquirer's
conversion of natural phenomena into an inner concrete language of the mind. The
"Symbole" are both the "Figurenworte" of man's inner language, and the
phenomenal language of the "Figuren" of Nature. In its combination of theory and
phenomena in an entirely concrete process of knowledge, Ritter's Beweis is a step
towards the Golden Age, the time when the inquirer and Nature will be one.
Thus the dynamic organic whole of Nature and the nerve are in Novalis's view
both phenomena and theory, just as Ritter's diagrams themselves are both theory
and phenomena. The fmal "predictive calculus" of the diagrams, the theory, is
justified by the concrete inductive proof afforded by the cognitive inquiry into
phenomena, which is itself a "phenomenal" calculus operating on the fundamental
"Sympathie" between the genius's thoughts and phenomena. Predictability was
only attained through the discovery process, where Nature's "Figuren" were
translated into man's "Figurworte". In this way, Ritter's work on galvanism is a
paradigm for Novalis's notion of natural philosophical productivity, and fulfilled
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this idea of Novalis's historical, progressive and "experimental" inquiry where
human consciousness becomes one with Nature's purposiveness.
It has become clear just how important aesthetics and practical knowledge are to
Novalis's and Ritter's notions of inquiry. Some aspects, too, of the ethical
elements of early Romantic natural philosophical thought have become apparent in
their concern for experiential knowledge and the manner in which they respect
Nature through their awareness and ability to express her purposiveness in their
forms of inquiry. Finally, Novalis's programme for the unifying of practice is
readily visible in Ritter's galvanic investigations. Theory is viewed as practical
knowledge and approached in an interdisciplinary manner akin to a case study; the
individual's methodology, on the other hand, gives practical expression to theory
in the concrete form it takes. Ultimately, both forms of practice merge in Rifler's
practical understanding of galvanic phenomena. This is a highly significant case of
consensus in Novalis's thought, and, most probably, for early Romantic science as
well. The ramifications of Rifler's work and of Novalis's programme for inquiry
and knowledge will now be further reflected upon in the conclusion.
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Conclusion
Unifying practice: a perspective for intellectual history.
1. Novalis scholarship and Romantic science
2. Intellectual history
2.1 Science and aesthetics: the metaphysical and less metaphysical assumptions of
the rhetoric of "experiment" and "phenomenal" calculus.
2.2. Literature and science: the plurality of discourses and perspectives on a
common intellectual field.
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1. Novalis scholarship and Romantic science.
In the context of Novalis scholarship, this dissertation is one of many that has
attempted to illustrate Novalis's thought in terms of an idea. It has been
demonstrated how, at a variety of levels, Novalis's thoughts cohere and develop
under the notion of "experiment", with all its implications for a general theory of
productivity and knowledge formation. There are certainly other key aspects of
Novalis's thought, such as his utopian notions, or his political, historical, and
literary views. However, since natural philosophy is, arguably, the matrix of his
thought. the explanation of his notion of "experiment" is of significance for his
whole thought. In the light of his notion of "experiment", a development has been
traced in Novalis's thought from a crucial point of reflection over the philosophical
style of Kant, through to Herder, Goethe, and Werner, and to renewed reflections
upon Fichte. Novalis's remark on "Diogenes Gehn" was interpreted as being
emblematic of his attitude to inquiry, which is that knowledge and life have to be
viewed as a continual "experiment". A further major point of reflection was found
in Plotinos, where ontology, epistemology and natural philosophical productivity
all merge as one programme for inquiry. In his reception of Plotinos, Novalis
draws Neoplatonism, empiricism and German Idealism together as the basis for his
notions of "phenomenal" calculus and practical knowledge. It is then, finally, in
Ritter that Novalis finds his idea of inquiry realized.
In the introduction, aspects of postmodernism and intellectual history were
explored in relation to Novalis scholarship. Instead of von Molnár's tendency to an
absolute ethics, although of value for illustrating the practical concerns of
Novalis's poetics, it was proposed that Novalis's natural philosophical thought puts
forward a type of lower level consensuality, of a less demanding nature. The
symbol of phosphorus was taken as an example of a more practicable kind of social
knowledge. It has been considered how Novalis's grasp of phosphorus entails
social dimensions, yet its rhetorical-dramatic use has strong epistemological
elements. Further, some aspects of ethical elements have been found in Novalis's
natural philosophical thought, as intimated by his desire to maintain the essential
experientiality of thought and to respect the purposiveness of Nature. Indeed, it
would appear that the crux of Novalis's notion of a communal language lies within
the realm of his natural philosophical thought. The programme leading to the
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attainment of the Golden Age where humanity can "freely plasticize" is, above all,
a natural philosophical enterprise - in its broadest sense - and this, as has been
argued, is most completely fulfilled in Ritter's work on galvanism.
Novalis's interpretation of phosphorus also raised the idea of pluralism, which is
implicit in Novalis's urge to classify knowledge. In the course of this work, an
attempt has been made to underline two major strands in Novalis's thought: the
unifying of theory, and the unifying of practice. This stance is akin to Neubauer's
view of the centrifugal and centripetal l forces at work in Novalis's understanding
of knowledge. Ultimately, this dissertation argues more for consensus at what
Neubauer calls the centripetal level - but this step is not undertaken by Novalis in
quite so distinct a fashion. Novalis's reception of Ritter's work shows a significant
reflective dimension to the inward direction of the consensus he attained. In the
case study approach, theory is relativized, and the individual inquirer creates
theory anew through practical knowledge. The outcome of such a method of
inquiry cannot, naturally, be seen as a classification of the sciences. This final
pattern of Novalis's thought has an inward motion expressed in the unification of
knowledge in a particular realm of study. Practice is unified by drawing practical
theory and realizations of methodology together, as illustrated, respectively, by the
manner in which Ritter places the nerve at the centre of his new "theory" and also
emphasizes the theoretical significance of the nerve in his diagrams.
As concerns further aspects of Novalis scholarship, in the introduction links were
shown between the views I am proposing and Uerling's notion of narrative
construction. I would like here to reflect further upon a key instance in Novalis
scholarship, that of Frank's interpretation of Novalis's pattern of thought as "Ordo
inversus". Novalis's notion of "experiment" can be accommodated to this
interpretation. "Ordo inversus" implies the manner in which "Gefiihl" and
"Reflexion" in the "Ich" can be employed transreflexively (354, 117; 315, 76).
This pattern of thought very much accords with Novalis's notion of the
interpenetration of "die Experimentalmethode" and "die Beobachtungsmethode", or
of "Figur" and "Wort". In general terms, this is a mediation of the concrete and
the abstract. The notion of "Ordo inversus", as described by Frank, can thus be
viewed in the light of Novalis's natural philosophical productivity: it is a
transreflexive activity, which brings man's consciousness and Nature's
purposiveness closer together.
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As concerns early Romantic science, it has been shown that its major proponents
do have an experimental method. Their concerns are both thoroughly experiential -
knowledge and life are viewed as an experiential whole - and they have a common
methodology, which relates back to the experimental tradition. It is particularly
within the realm of practical knowledge and the aesthetics of their natural
philosophical method that they have been seen to have major affinities, and, it is in
examining this area that the present dissertation offers a modest synthesis of early
Romantic science. Significant, too, was the manner in which Goethe was working
closely to the early Romantics, specifically at the level of method and
methodology.
In this depiction of early Romantic natural philosophy, the danger of relativizing
the Romantics' stance to inquiry has beencombattedby my attempting to illustrate
how their unifying urge is centred around their concern for practice. The open-
endedness of their ideal types has also been seen to be modified by this interest in
practice, and further by their appeal to a real phenomenal base for their ideal types.
The Neoplatonic tradition, it has been seen, has played no small role in their
methodology. The notion of continuity is rehearsed in a variety of ways in their
thought: as the Chain of Being, as a series of experiments, as a series in a
classification system, as a series in the visual language of Ritter's diagrams, and,
also, in language as series of symbols leading to meaning. Novalis's notion of
"Combinatorik" or "phenomenal" calculus is based to a great extent on the notion
of an underlying continuity, and, of course, in particular on the idea of
"Sympathie".
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2. Intellectual history.
2.1 Science and aesthetics: the metaphysical and less metaphysical assumptions of
the rhetoric of "experiment and "phenomenal" calculus.
Novalis's idea of "experiment" has been considered at a variety of levels: in
terms of his thought itself, in terms of contemporary science and thought, and in
terms of modern thought. Novalis's idea of "experiment" has been interpreted as a
tool capable of offering possible solutions to the regresses of postmodernist views
on scientific method and language. Thus, Novalis's idea of "experiment" has, to
some extent, fended off relativism at various levels, such as that found in the idea
of a social construct of knowledge, in the notion of the "Experimenter's Regress",
and in Derrida's linguistic regress.
I wish now to go beyond this point, to employ Jardine's views on aesthetics for
exploring the applicability of Novalis's, and, consequently, of early Romantic
notions of inquiry, to modern views on the role of aesthetics in consensus
attainment in the sciences. Jardine stresses the fundamental role of aesthetics in
interest and network theory. Importantly for this dissertation, he goes on to
consider epistemological aspects of aesthetics. He remarks on interest theory and
network theory:
Both approaches imply the fundamental importance of the process whereby a community of interests
is established between promoters and recipients of claims and techniques. Literary and visual
strategies for the advertisement of advantages accruing from acceptance of claims and techniques
play obvious parts in the establishment of such mutual interests (210, 194-195).
Significant in this context is Jardine's focus on both literary and visual strategies as
points around which scientific debate may revolve. On network theory Jardine
comments further:
In network theory central roles in the attainment of consensus are assigned to the "chains of
command" ... Such chains involve "cascades of representations" in which descriptions of
phenomena are progressively abstracted, simplified, scaled up or down, in the interests of impact,
comprehensiveness and amenability to combination, replication and analysis. Aesthetic and literary
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appeal and sensibility clearly play major parts in the operation of such cascades of representations
(210, 195).
Clearly, network and interest theory, when developed on a large scale, have
considerable potential for explaining the processes leading to consensus attainment.
This dissertation makes no attempt to compete on this scale over strategies
concerning consensus attainment. However, it does wish, tentatively, to contribute
propositions that counter the view that knowledge is a social construct. Jardine,
although concerned with the social factors of aesthetics, is also interested in
epistemological factors. He dedicates a section to "The very possibility of a reliable
aesthetics" (210, 208-224). Accordingly, Jardine also deals with the "intellectual"
aspects of aesthetics. This dimension of his thought I would like to describe as
"active intellectualism". Keeping Jardine's position in view, and before letting
interest and network theorists entirely take hold of the field of investigation into
consensus attainment, I wish now tentatively to explore some epistemological
aspects of consensus attainment: it will be seen that there is such a thing, perhaps,
as cascades of epistemological stances to consensus. Above all, I wish to argue that
the issues of individual knowledge, when combined with the details of inquiry and
seen in the light of epistemology, have, too, a valid role to play in consensus
attainment. In this manner, some bridging points will be provided between the
notion of early Romantic inquiry and a modern view of inquiry such as Jardine's.
Naturally, some cautionary remarks must be made before embarking on this
comparison. For instance, the notion of unifying practice through forms of
continuity or "Sympathie" are clearly too metaphysical a basis to be merged with
Jardine's approach. Besides, the issues involved in case studies and practical
knowledge as discussed in the context of this dissertation may be too broad to be
readily generalizable. The proximity of "res" and "verba" in Novalis's
understanding of Ritter's work seems, again, to be operative more at too
metaphysical a level. Yet notwithstanding these cautions, some accommodation
seems possible.
I wish now to underline some arguably fundamental areas of compatibility
between Jardine's view of the role of aesthetics in inquiry and early Romantic
views of inquiry. I will, first, briefly summarize Jardine's approach and his
arguments for the reliability of aesthetics. "Reliability" refers to the need to
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calibrate the value of aesthetics for inquiry. Calibration itself rests in general upon
the viability of a particular form of inquiry in terms of precedents and standards.
This aspect is important to early Romantic methodology since the Romantics are
highly conscious of the history of knowledge and of nature, and, indeed, of the
"history" of the inquirer's own discovery processes. Jardine feels that aesthetics
have been all too often employed in a negative manner in the history of science:
In assessing the implications of the rhetorical and aesthetic strategies of the sciences it is, I believe,
seriously misleading to concentrate as is the wont of many sociologists of science on the strategies
that are most obviously suspect on the score of reliability (210, 208).
In Jardine's view "there are many rhetorical and aesthetic strategies that have solid
claims to reliability" (210, 208).
When speaking of the amenability to calibration of aesthetic criteria in the
sciences, Jardine further comments that aesthetic theories that emphasize "beautiful
realization and embodiments of functions and processes" obviously favour
calibration (210, 223). This I would like to see as a viewpoint found also in early
Romantic science, where the "embodiments of functions and processes" may be
correlated to the purposiveness of nature. Jardine also comments that aesthetic
theories which "impose strict conditions for aesthetic competence" are also more
amenable to calibration (210, 223). Again, I would like here to point to early
Romantic science and the epistemological rigour of aesthetic elements in their
notion of inquiry, as expressed, for instance, in Novalis's wish for a process of
progressive experimentation. This is a process, embraced in his notion of a
"phenomenal" calculus, which makes explicit use of the inquirer's aesthetic
faculties. It is a process that aims continually to refine the results of
experimentation and the experimenter's own perception of phenomena.
Furthermore, Jardine sees the calibration of methods based on aesthetics as being
"of crucial importance for our estimation of the claims of science to have attained a
modicum of reality in the questions they pose and of truth in the answers they
deliver" (210, 224). Once again, I would like to underline that the early Romantic
consideration and employment of aesthetics in their approach to experiential and
progressive knowledge, as found for example in Ritter's experiments, provides a
possible instance of such a calibration.
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Jardine offers us some "rationales" for aesthetics in the choice of hypotheses and
theories. Firstly, the most central and "obvious rationale involves the assumption
that the aesthetic virtues to which appeal is made are virtues of natural processes or
states of affairs" - Thus, "the truth of theories is held to be indicated by their
aesthetic virtues because true theories reflect the aesthetic virtues of nature
herself". Secondly, when aesthetic virtues are held to be genuine properties of
observed natural processes, then "cognizance of the relevant explanatory or
organizing theory or hypothesis is taken to contribute to an aesthetic competence".
In this manner, for instance, "grasp of the Copernican cosmology contributes to an
aesthetic competence to experience the dynamic harmony and unity of plan in the
night sky". Finally, aesthetic competence "makes possible, or, at least, facilitates
perception of aesthetic virtues in representations of phenomena" (210, 2 15-216).
Again, given the early Romantic concern for aesthetics in scientific productivity,
for the purposiveness of nature, and for the relationship between man's
consciousness and nature's purposiveness, there are grounds for compatibility here.
Novalis's understanding of the parallels between the observer and the observed, as
expressed in his notion of "Sympathie" and frequently refined, especially in
connection with Ritter, represents a close parallel to Jardine's theory. This
provides a release from both relativism and the vicissitudes of postmodernism.
Jardine further lists the common attacks made upon such rationales for aesthetics,
and goes on to defend the rationales. This is not the place for a full response to
these objections, and I will only briefly list the cases he mentions and respond to
them very generally in terms of early Romantic views on the role of aesthetics in
science. The objections are: the primary qualities treated by scientific laws cannot
be related to the secondary qualities treated by aesthetics; the transposition of
aesthetic knowledge is illegitimate; a specific aesthetic stance brings its own
problems; the diversity of aesthetic response cannot be used for scientific purposes;
and, lastly, aesthetic ambivalence cannot produce scientific certainty (210, 216-
224). I will treat these individual points collectively in what is, admittedly, a very
general response. During the course of this dissertation, it has been seen that the
role of aesthetics in early Romantic science is deeply embroiled in the issues
concerning the reliability and the improvement of the inquirer's own aesthetic
capabilities. The employment of ideal types, for instance, points both to the endless
diversity of nature's purposiveness, and to man's response; equally, it points to the
experiential and episternological base of the Romantics' aesthetics and notions of
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productivity. The key characteristic of early Romantic inquiry lies in the mediating
role of the subject in the various forms of productivity and knowledge formation.
In this context, aesthetics are not so much a specific activity as 	 part of a whole
approach to productivity. It is in these areas that one may find a degree of
compatibility with Jardine's own responses; some response in terms of early
Romantic thought itself can thereby be made to the objections raised against
aesthetics in a scientific context.
How practicable is the early Romantic methodology? Although it, to some extent,
fulfills the requirements of Jardine's rationales it is, admittedly, somewhat general.
Add to this the metaphysical assumptions contained in the notion of continuity and
the early Romantic project appears, at first sight, too bound up in its own time,
and too heavily loaded with past traditions, which cannot easily be hauled in and
converted to a less metaphysical programme. This problem of dissociation can
perhaps be resolved by showing how past traditions and precedents are handed
down and altered in a continuum of knowledge. Such a form of interpreting
knowledge argues, incidentally, also against Foucault's notion of the "episteme". If
one unravels the unifying of practice from its higher metaphysical levels down to
more pragmatic ones, it can be seen how the term "practice" holds for a variety of
levels of thought. Beginning with high level theory: the idea of unifying man's
consciousness with the purposiveness of nature (or, as Schelling puts this, "Die
Natur soll der sichtbare Geist, der Geist die unsichthare Natur seyn" (106, 56)) is,
obviously, highly metaphysical. At almost the same level, but slightly beneath this,
we then come to the idea that Nature's figures have some correspondence and
"Sympathie" with man's own figures of the productive imagination. Again this is
highly metaphysical, though more concrete than the earlier idea. We then descend
to the idea of a "phenomenal" calculus, arguably a crossover point between the
more and the less metaphysical. After this, we see how the diagrams of such a
"calculus" may assist discovery. Finally, we can also see how the individual case
study helps activate the beginnings of such a form of inquiry. Thus, descending the
ladder from high-level to lower-level understandings of practice, we can see both
the versatility and the continuity of notions such as productivity and "experiment".
One can thereby trace the paths from metaphysical to less metaphysical
assumptions. This, in its turn, allows one usefully to mediate past and present
methodologies. This entire descent can therefore be seen as a "cascade" rushing
through various levels of epistemology.
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This sketch of a descending path serves to show that the early Romantic
programme can, perhaps, be interpreted at a level which makes it comprehensible
in terms of a less metaphysically oriented discourse. Moreover, if one takes two
factors into account it becomes, I would like to propose tentatively, a practicable
methodology. The first factor is the role of the subject, as expressed in the idea of
individual natural productivity. For a variety of reasons, the re-introduction of the
subject overcomes some of postmodernism's major quandaries, such as have
already been referred to, notably the "Experimenter's Regress" and the linguistic
regress. The second factor lies in the role of the details of contemporary practices
and doctrines. I will make some reference to these in the context of Ritter's work
on galvanism. Once one supplies early Romantic methodology with the details of
local issues, its methodological basis - a general theory of productivity revolving
around the issues of experiential knowledge and the deployment of a "phenomenal"
calculus - can, perhaps, be seen as practicable. To deal with the first point, let us
briefly rehearse the key points in Novalis's rhetoric of experiment, so as to
delineate once more how he makes use of the subject in inquiry. His notion of
experiment is based on the notion of re-experiencing experience in a productive
manner; in an interdisciplinary fashion, a key phenomenon is selected and elevated
to the level of practical knowledge. Such a phenomenon is then employed in
further inquiry, which operates according to the scheme of a "phenomenal"
calculus as a concrete, symbolic form of notation. This pattern of thought was
traced in Ritter's work. If one adds the further details relating to galvanic inquiry
necessary for calibration, one can see how the methodology, if supported by its
context, has some potential as a model for consensus attainment. As such, it is
most applicable to the context of its own time; but the methodology also has
aspects which are not explicitly metaphysical, and which give it some degree of
applicability as a model for inquiry today. Looking at Ritter's work in the light of
precedents and standards, one can note a variety of factors in his method which
enhance the way he attains consensus in the galvanic debate. Ritter used the
commonly employed apparatus for galvanic experimentation, and also the then
current form of an "electroscope", the muscle of the frog's leg. He expanded on
Humboldt's investigation of chemical substances, and explored the notion of a
series of conductors with differing galvanic "effects"; he worked within the realm
of Volta's galvanic laws, accepting Volta's notion of two classes of conductors;
and he attempted to place contemporary debate over animal and physical electricity
under a single common denominator, the "constant galvanic force". One could go
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further, beyond issues of instrumentation, materials and theory, to consider
institutional factors, such as the publishing of experimental fmdings in accepted
journals, or the reading of papers in scientific institutions. One could include, too,
the public performance of galvanic experiments. Of course, Ritter's understanding
of galvanism was actually overtaken by Volta's invention of the battery in 1800;
thus, one can only speak of his paths towards consensus in 1798. None the less, in
a wider perspective, Ritter's ideas on a galvanic circuit and on electrochemistry are
of fundamental importance in the quest for consensus in the field of
electrochemistry.
It must be stressed that this is a highly abbreviated account of the issues
concerning galvanism and is meant only to elucidate the idea of consensus
attainment. However, even given the brevity of this account, one can see that in
Ritter's work of 1798, specific precedents and standards are accounted for,
enabling some degree of consensus. We obtain, too, a picture of consensus in early
Romantic inquiry from the manner in which Rifler and Novalis accord over
methodological issues. By putting these factors together, namely Rifler's reacting
to the issues of galvanic inquiry in 1798 and the shared ideas of early Romantic
methodology in Rifler and Novalis, we can, I think, more readily understand that
the early Romantic notion of inquiry can be seen as practicable at a less
metaphysical level than is often assumed. Goethe's and Humboldt's notion of
inquiry can, of course, also be interpreted in a similar, less metaphysical manner,
when the issues concerning practical knowledge, such as symbolic notation, and
the details of the contemporary scientific debate, are brought into play. It is on this
less metaphysical interpretation that the early Romantic form of inquiry and its
methodology is, to some degree, relevant to science today. The crux of the matter,
I would argue, rests upon the way this methodology can be interpreted as a form of
practical knowledge, and upon the way it attains meaning when applied to the
details of a particular area of inquiry. When so applied, as in the case of Rifler, the
early Romantic notion of inquiry can be seen to be no longer general, but actually
quite specific. In the fmal instance, however, it must be recognized that this is only
a model of inquiry, and practicable only at the level of historical reflection: as
Jardine says, it is up to reflective scientists themselves today to develop their own
approach to aesthetics (210, 224).
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What the early Romantic notion of inquiry might offer modem scientists, then, is
a form of ontological and epistemological security concerning the value of
scientific activities as truth. As Jardine puts this idea when referring to the possible
role of aesthetics in inquiry, it offers the scientist "a modicum of reality" and
"truth" for their inquiries (210, 224). In that sense, a stance such as that of the
early Romantics, supports current practice.
In a broader perspective, I would suggest that one could approach early Romantic
inquiry in terms of the history of the practice of ideas. The latter may be
understood as the history of individually realized methodologies. In this manner,
one can see epistemological cascades running through the history of inquiry. These
form a continuum. Jardine himself argues for the role of local doctrines and
practices for an understanding of inquiry and this, it goes without saying, shows a
highly reflective approach to the idea that science moves progressively towards
truth. For that reason, Jardine's view will probably commend itself more than
scientific absolutism. The role of the individual in inquiry, as developed in early
Romantic science (the use of the subject and the individual's realization of
methodology), adds a further dimension to Jardine's emphasis on local issues: the
role of the individual scientist, and not theory alone is stressed. If one envisages
such an epistemological cascade, one can also see the way "local" ideas are
developed throughout the continuum of inquiry: importantly, this continuum is not
just a history of ideas, it is the history of the practice of ideas. Thus one sees in
Novalis aspects of Neoplatonism, German Idealism, and the modem experimental
tradition. These, in turn, can be grasped and modernized in terms of
postmodernism, tacit knowledge, and the renewed interest today in practical
knowledge. Such a concept of the history of the practice of ideas - with both of
its aspects: the one that illustrates traditions at play within a particular epoch, and
the other that illustrates the development of traditions within the continuum of
inquiry - is, I think, of use for understanding how consensus may be attained. In
fact, such an approach can be found exemplified in celebrated studies in the history
of ideas, which can unproblematically be re-read as studies in the history of the
practice of ideas: a key example of such studies may be found in the work of
Frances Yates.
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2.2. Literature and science. the plurality of discourses and perspectives on a
common intellectual field.
This dissertation's interest in the unifying of practice fits into the current climate of
intellectual history, for both literary theory and the history of science are
concerned with the issues of practice. The epistemological value of "experiment"
particularly suits current views on the role of "performance" in knowledge
formation, of which Elinor Shaffer remarks:
Performance is being linked to traditional skills and to moral knowledge and even to notions of
practical wisdom by the thinkers and actors strongly opposed to the theoretical movements of
structural linguistics and deconstruction which created this opportunity (282, xviii).
Practical knowledge and "rigorous" aesthetics are major themes of this dissertation,
and help to position it in the current debate over literature and science. In studying
practical knowledge, or natural philosophical productivity, the dissertation has
taken a step back into areas of knowledge common to both literature and science.
A step back has also been taken back into a common context, but this is not a
social framework: it is a common intellectual framework. This area can be
understood as a common cultural field or cultural discourse (281, xxiii-xiv). Yet
what has been offered is not so much a study of increasing and decreasing
proximities of discourses; instead, the emphasis has lain on illustrating a common
epistemological or intellectual realm. Particularly when dealing with the history of
science I had to revert to the hybrid sounding term of "active intellectualism" - so
as to underline my intellectualist stance, which is opposed to the idea of knowledge
as a social construct alone - but the issues of practical knowledge allow one
perhaps to talk more naturally of "unifying practice". Thus, the major theme of
this dissertation was the idea of productivity and practice, and the notion that
aesthetics are part of a broader form of knowledge. "Experiment" is a term
pointing to productivity in general, referring to both the arts and science, and their
unity in that realm. I have attempted once to express the idea of productivity by
speaking of an "experimental", symbolic use of language. This was done to
explore possible realms which emphasize the bond between the arts and the
sciences.' A thinker such as Toulmin, who deals with practical knowledge, treats
aspects of the concerns of this work. My examination of an individual's own
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attainment of practical knowledge, be it in the concrete ideal types of a symbolic
notation, or in the interdisciplinarity of a case study where theory is relativized and
pulled together in a new form, can, perhaps, be understood as developing
Toulmin's views. A thinker whose work has a profound meaning for the path taken
in this dissertation is Frances Yates. In her work, notably on Lull, lie the seeds for
the idea of a "phenomenal" calculus and the use of the imagination in notation.
Finally, Adler's work on Goethe represents the type of in-depth study that is
suggested by the notion of the history of the practice of ideas. His book was always
a model for the interpenetrative approach to issues of the arts and sciences
undertaken in this dissertation. Following such studies as these, I have throughout
attempted to show the very cognitive value of the subject matter in hand, and,
consequently, of the historian's interpretations, too.
Thus it is that this dissertation's approach to literature and science is not so much
uni-directional, but can perhaps be seen as an attempt to propose epistemological
premises for both literature and the sciences. Given this attempt, the dissertation
does not, in essence, argue for dominance of either the arts or the sciences, even
given its central concern for Romantic science. My main concern is cognitive gain,
and although literature is not explicitly treated, this thesis has illustrated a type of
thought that may be seen as common to both the arts and the sciences.
Finally, I wish to reflect once more, and briefly, on the possible scope of the
history of the practice of ideas and epistemological cascades. The foregoing
argument has illustrated these notions in Ritter's work, and, in doing so, has traced
aesthetic elements in his science. I will now repeat the results gained in terms of
the history of the practice of ideas so as to make this latter term more cogent. The
units of Rifler's work which form an epistemological cascade are: the series of
experiments themselves, the visualization of the experiments in diagrams, and,
arguably his use of language itself, for in his Beweis he gradually arrives at his
theory in a non-linear form of argument. Finally, if we take Novalis's reception of
Rifler into account, which accords with all the instances here mentioned, we also
encounter the explicit meeting-point of a variety of traditions of thought: as
mentioned, Neoplatonism, German Idealism, and the modern experimental
tradition. All of these forms of practical knowledge, too, form an epistemological
cascade. As these are aspects of knowledge formation which could be used in
conjunction with the socially-oriented notion of knowledge formation found in
interest and network theory, in this manner, the history of the practice of ideas (or
of practical knowledge) could be seen as an epistemological parallel to the socially-
oriented studies in the history of science. In addition, and more of interest to
literature and science studies, one could extend the idea of epistemological
cascades to literary texts themselves, to observe in them the interplay between
literature and science at the level of the practical knowledge. This approach can be
seen, for instance, in the work of Elizabeth Wilkinson on Goethe's Tasso and the
concept of "Steigerung"; in which she reciprocally illuminates a literary text and a
scientific theory (293a). The full scope of the history of the practice of ideas is
thus far more than that illustrated in this dissertation.
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Notes
Introduction
1. A study of the Register volume (N, 5) alone reveals the fact that Novalis uses "experiment"
almost exclusively from his time at Freiberg onwards, and scarcely at all for example in the years
1795-6 during his Fichie Siudien.
2. See Ospovat, 'Romanticism and German Geology' (251), who speaks of the width and depth of
Werner's interests, and how he would have appealed to Romantics through his historical approach
to knowledge.
3. He had read of Brown through Röschlaub's work Uniersuchungen über Pathogenie (1798) (101).
4. Gary Handwerker still finds the often supposed subjectivity and sceptical relativism of Romantic
irony prevalent in a recent volume of the International Comparative Literature Association,
Romantic irony (ed., Frederick Garber, Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadd, 1988). The Romantic concern
for productivity is important for an understanding of Romantic irony. In a thinker such as Novalis
irony can be linked to epistemology, ontology and history. Romantic irony cannot, in the case of
Novalis, be put down as "capricious aestheticism" as Kierkegaard viewed it (183, 282).
5. See e.g.: Neubauer (1985), (246); Elinor Shaffer (1985), (278),; Beer (1989), (139, 18-24),
Rousseau (1989), (266, 48-54); Weininger (1989), (131, xiii-xxiii); Dear (1991), (160, 1-9); Elinor
Shaffer (1991), (281, xv-xxix), (1992), (282, xv-xxvi).
6. For related points of view, see Elinor Shaffer, (281, xxi); Weininger, (131, xxi-xxii).
7. Elinor Shaffer uses Mary Hesse and D.A. Schon as examples (282, xvi). Amrine and Cohen
seem to make a related point: "One fundamental question has to do with the epistemic value of the
metaphor and literature generally: good work on the former has been done by Mary Hesse among
others ..." (131, x). See also Weininger (131, xvi).
8. From a strictly literary perspective Goethe is not seen as a Romantic. However, I adopt the
European convention of treating him with the Romantics, notwithstanding the gulf, because of the
many important similarities.
9. For a discussion of Frank's work see Henrietta Herwig (195, 95-109).
10. See, for example: MahI (331), Jacobs (207), Reis (343), Saul (345; 346').
11. The term "history" can only cautiously be used here, since Schelling views ethics as the proper
area of history. See Jacobs, (207). This is a part of Romantic thought not dealt with in this work
due its prime concern for clarifying Romantic notions of knowledge formation.
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12. See Meyer (242, 146-148), for Schelling's reasoning behind his notion that man can gain a
priori knowledge of Nature. Meyer points to Schelling's prerequisite for his system of natural
philosophy, namely that "das Ganze der Erscheinungen nicht bloB Produkt, sondern zugleich
produktiv ist" (ibid., 147). See also Heckmann (189, 297, 334). Heckmann stresses the difference
between empiricism and Schelling's natural philosophy. He tends to relativize the importance of
experience in Schelling's natural philosophy, remarking that Schelling sees experience as necessary
only for the "context of discovery", but not for the "context of justification" (ibid, 334).
13. See Frank's remarks discussed below, p. 131f. Frank, importantly, comments on the role of
the absolute in Schelling's philosophy. He states that Schelling views the finite as part of the
absolute, and that Schelling's concern with the finite is necessarily part of his attempt to construct
the absolute. In this way, one can see how Schelling's attempt to construct the totality of experience
is essentially a process stretching the notion of experiential knowledge to its limits.
14. For an analysis of Kant's aesthetic and teleological judgement see Pedro (255), chapter two.
15. See Halliburton, (182, 92); and, further, Hannah Arendt (134, 40-41).
16. Cited from Jonsen and Toulmin, (211, 66); Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, VI. viii.9, 1142a.
17. Cited from Jonsen and Toulinin, (211, 66); Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, VI. viii.9, 1 142a.
Jonsen and Toulmin add in a footnote: "This condensed passage from the Ethics has caused
translators and scholars difficulty, perhaps because they read the analogy between ethical and
mathematical "perception" as intended to be closer than Aristotle meant it to be. For, he added,
phronesis in Ethics is different in kind (allo eidos) not just from sense perception but from
mathematical perception also; and in this way he took back some implications of what he had said
just previously. Our reading takes the word eschaion as covering what we earlier called 'a
paradigmatic case'" (211, 360, fn. 34).
18. See Novalis, (N, 3, 179, 441, 445, 469).
19. The passage Janik refers to in Wittgenstein is: (296), part 1, § 201.
20. See Kuhn, (224), chapter 11.
21. See Novalis, (N, 3, 183, 185, 72, 74). These points are all discussed in chapter three of this
thesis.
22. See the comments given above in footnote 12.
23. Schelling had, of course, written some poetry. See e.g. Sue Morgan (244, 34-35), and Frank
(170, 102-103).
24. See Schmid (348, 52) and Werner (126, Vorbencht, xi, and vol.2, 254 ff).
25. The institutional effect of Werner on geology is well known. See e.g. Guntau (181, 33); L.audan
(231, 102-112).
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26. This work, as must often be stressed, treats the early period of Romanticism and the genesis of
Romantic ideas: similarities of doctrine in Romantic thinkers are traced, but always with the notion
of practice in view.
27. See e.g. Koch (219, 49-74).
28. For an overview of Humboldt's geographical thought, see Margarita Bowen (146, 210-259).
29. Rachel Laudan does refer briefly to Humboldt's "ingenious pasigraphic scheme" of 1823 (231,
162-163).
30. See Holder (2(X), 40) for a re-drawn version of one of Voigt's sections in his 1782 work,
Mineralogischen Reisen (12(J).
31. For an example of Trebra's stratigraphic diagrams, see (118, 231, Tafel 2).
32. Werner's influence on Humboldt has been traced by Albury and Oldroyd (130), and Baumgartel
(135), but not in the present terms of this work as a theory of practice. Albury and Oldroyd, for
example, discuss the influence of Werner's geognosy on Humboldt's idea of rock formation (130,
201-206).
33. See also Sepper (276, 70); Kümmerl (226, 209).
34. For a related view of language in this century see also Halliburtons's remarks on Justus
Buchler's notion of the "proceiver" (182, 91-92; 148, 4, 47, 48).
35. Even though critics such as Schmid (348, 14-28), Ospovat and Cardinal (251; 307) have
contributed to a better understanding of Werner - and in particular Ospovat -, the issues of tacit
knowledge have not, as far as I can tell, been applied to the context of Werner's work.
36. Examples of such works are: Lukács, (1920), (328); KOhn (1969), (324); Jacobs (1972), (321).
See further Uerlings's overview on the topic: Uerlings, (354, 453).
37. See Beck (1976), (305) and Stadler (1981), (351). See too Uerlings's remarks (354, 453-4).
38. Major works treating sciences other than medicine are those of Kapitza (1968), (322); Clark
(1975), (308); Neubauer (1978), (339); Mahoney (1980), (332); Hansen (1993), (319). Minor
works, but of significance for Novalis scholarship are, Molnar (1973), (333); Wet.zels (1973),
(356); Löffler (1978), (326); Burwick (1986), (306); Stadler (1989), (352).
39. Karin Clark's work of 1975, 'Das Bud des Wassers bei Novalis im Spiegel seiner
naturwissenschafthchen und philosophischen Fragmente' (308), traces the symbolism of water in
Novalis's thought and works. It is shown how, in contrast to the views of previous Novalis
criticism, Novalis did not believe that water was an element. Instead Novalis employs water as a
symbol for his philosophy of "fluidity". Karin Clark studies Novalis's fragments related to the
subject of water in detail and goes on to give examples of Novalis's fluid symbolism in his literary
works.
40. An exception here is the work of Lohse (327), as Uerlings points out (354, 113).
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41. Frank's work also makes a deconstructionist analysis of Novalis such as Kuzniar's (325)
questionable. A deconstructionist view-point does not account for Novalis's notion of language,
since the latter cannot properly be described as autonomous or entirely temporal.
42. See e.g. MähJ (330, 199).
43. As discussed, Uerlings's view of "narrative Konstruktion" leads to his interpretation of early
Romantic utopia as "narrative Konstruktion einer erhofften Tendenz" (354, 609). This is a subtle
approach for emphasizing the seriousness and productive aspects of Novalis's idea of utopia. In
section 1 of the introduction ways were pointed out as to how Uerling's notion could be applied to
the history of science and how natural philosophy and "experiment" can, arguably, put a new
emphasis on Novalis's views on utopia.
44. Gaier's work is composed in such a fashion that makes it difficult to display the way in which
Novalis received and combined various disciplinary approaches. Gaier's work is split into two
halves: the first deals in great detail with Novalis's notion of knowledge mostly within his own
terms (and the literary ramifications of this). The second half looks at a tradition of thinkers, such
as Plotinos, Becher, Andreae, Fludd, Bacon, Fichte, Hemsterhuis and Herder, who, in Gaier's
view, fit into the tradition of "Konstruktion" that Novalis espouses. While this history of the
tradition of "Konstruktion" is illuminating, Gaier leaves much historiographic work still in need of
completion to see just how Novalis received these thinkers (if at all in some cases) in his own work.
45. Novalis notes down a considerable amount of material from Lambert's works. These jottings
fall into three major categories: knowledge formation or philosophical methodology (N, 3, 130-
132), scientific experimental method (N, 3, 132-133) and language theory (N, 3, 133-134).
Lambert's remarks on scientific method are standard (see N, 3, 132) and Novalis's sources for his
own notion of "experiment" lie equally in Plotinos, Herder, and the philosophers of German
Idealism, and even more so in the scientific practice of Werner, Goethe and Ritter.
46. For a consideration of Frank's intepretation of "ordo inversus" see below, p.374.
47. A further work deserving mention, while not covering the sciences, is White's 'Novalis's
Heinrich von Ofterdingen and the Aesthetics of 'Offenbarung" (357), which treats Novalis's
understanding of revelation. White describes how Novalis argues that old dogma, for example
religious knowledge, should not be dogmatically accepted, but has to be re-experienced through
mediation (357,102-104). White remarks, for instance: "The real point is that, unlike so many of
his contemporaries, Novalis does not have a fixed philosophy of revelation; his relationship to the
issue is much more experimental than this" (357, 94). As White further comments, the revelation
has to be completed by the actual reader of Novalis's works (357, 109). Here White's thesis touches
upon Novalis's concept of "experiment", as a concrete form of knowledge (as opposed to a
conceptual one). Indeed, the "experimental" processes of religious experience, or of reading
Novalis's texts, for they are fragments which have to be completed by the reader, are exemplary of
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6. Yates describes the somewhat gruesome origins of Simomdes' art. He was alerted to the
usefulness of memory when at a banquet he memorized where all the guests were sitting; the roof of
the hall subsequently collapsed, leaving only mangled, unrecognizable corpses. He then employed
his art to ascertain the identities of the corpses, much to the relief of the concerned relatives of the
dead (299, 1-2).
7. Symptomatic of Moser's stance is his one brief footnote which refers to the Romantics' too
aestheticized view of science (245, 78-79, fn.22).
8. Yates also remarks of Bacon when speaking of John Dee, placing Bacon in the tradition of
Hermetic Neoplatonism and their use of magic symbolism: "Published in 1564, with a dedication to
the Emperor Maximilian II, Dee's Monas hieroglyphica describes a sign composed of the signs for
the seven planets and of the zodiac sign Aries, in which he believed he had found a unifying
statement that included the whole universe. The commentary on the Monas combines aichemical,
mathematical, and Cabalistic modes of thought, and was probably expressive for Dee of ascent
through all three worlds described by Agrippa - the elemental, the celestial, the supercelestial - to
the First Cause or the One. Dee always regarded his Monas hieroglyphica as his supreme
achievement. For this man of extraordinary genius who lived within the categories and magical
presuppositions of the Renaissance world of Hermetic Neoplatomsm, it was presumably an
expression in what Francis Bacon or Leibniz might have called 'real characters' - signs believed to
be in actual contact with reality - of some profound unifying experience" (3(Z), 54).
9. Crosland shows how aichemical symbols were taken up and developed by Geoffroy and
Bergman: symbolism was very much incorporated into the affinity tables of the eighteenth century
(158, 228-244). The tables expanded quite significantly: Geoffroy's table of affinity of 1718 had
sixteen columns, Bergman's table of 1775 had already fifty-nine columns. Adler comments on the
significance of the affinity tables for the chemistry of the time, arguing that they were
representative, and part of the ambitious goals of chemical inquiry: "Hinter ihnen stand der
Gedanke, eine vollkommene Tafel aller 'Verwandschaften' wUrde die Beschaffenheit der Matene
und ihre Grundkräfte erklären" (129, 58). Adler shows how the main notion behind the tables, that
of chemical affinity, was a point of great concern for major chemists and scientists such as Macquer
(1718-1784), Cullen (1710-1790), Black (1728-1799) and Berthollet (1754-1822), and how with the
arrival of early electrochemical theory the tradition of the affinity tables then died out (129, 57-73).
But, as the discussion of Ritter's use of diagrams in chapter four shows (see below, chapter 4,
section 9), the affinity tables, at a deeper level, provide an important precedent for Ritter's
particular type of diagram. Bergman's affinity tables, like Ritter's diagrams, were schematic
models, and they also can be seen as a kind of "natural" or "phenomenal" calculus.
10. Novalis's meaning of "GefUhl" is later discussed with reference to his comments on Plotinos
and a method of inquiry (see below, chapter two, section 7).
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Novalis's entire attitude to knowledge. For Novalis believed in a fundamental stock of metaphysics
or knowledge, which ran throughout the ages, and that was constantly re-enacted and expanded
upon: individuals always both allude to and fortify tradition, and in this way both experience and
"experiment" with knowledge.
Chapter One
1. Lakatos differentiates between a psychology and a psychologism of induction: "I want to
distinguish between psychological, plainly second-world concepts, like 'belier, and psychologistic
concepts like 'rational belief' in the sense of 'belief of a clear mind'. While psychology may be
defined as the theory of the mind, psychologism is the theory of a 'healthy', 'normal', 'clear',
'ideal', 'empty', 'purged', 'unbiased', 'objective', 'rational', or 'scientific mind'" (227, 208, fn.5).
2. See Lakatos (227, 198-201) on justificationism, and (227, 221) for his explanation of the
concomitant Humean dogmatism spurred on by Newton's standards and achievements: "Scientific
scepticism, defeated by Newton, degenerated into Humean psychologism and joined forces with
dogmatism: human reason may not give assent to Newton, but human nature must. But then the
study of (unchanging, external, universal) human nature will lead us to a theory of (monolithic)
'healthy' belief."
3. Koyrd remarks on the source of the term experimenzum crucis: "Professor H. W . Turnbull
(Correspondence, I, 104) points out that the expression experimeniwn crucis is a misquotation by
Hooke (Micrographia, p.54) of the Baconian insianzia crucis. Thus, Newton in using it 'is
reminiscing from his reading of Hooke'" (220, 42; 69).
4. Lolme puts Hooke's use of the term experitnenium crucis into its full context of Hooke's optical
investigations, and the term's meaning is clearly that of a key piece of evidential argument, setting
the path for future inquiry. Lohne cites the following from Hooke: "This Experiment [generating
colours by thin plates] therefore will prove such a one as our thrice excellent Verulama calls
Erperimen:um Crucis, serving as a Guide or Land-mark, by which to direct our course in the search
after the true cause of Colours. Affording us this particular negative Information, that for the
production of Colours there is not necessary either a great refraction, as in the Prisme; or Secondly,
a determination of Light and shadow, such as is both in the Prisme and Glass-ball" (236, 179; 53,
54).
5. An examination of Novalis's most important references to "experiment" in the list in Appendix A
shows that the notion of "test" is not always in his mind when he uses the term.
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11. The original source is Diogenes Laertius, who, in his De vizis philosophorum, wrote on the life
of Diogenes of Sinope. The "walking" is one of the many anecdotes described: "Ahnlich machte
er's mit dem, der behauptete, es gebe keine Bewegung: er stand auf und spazierle hin und her" (23,
1, 313; 24,2,263-4(6, 39).
12. Fichte uses the instance of Diogenes to argue how the act of the self automatically argues for its
freedom, thus in the same way that Fichte argues that knowledge is an activity, so too, in his view,
did Diogenes show that motion was continuous by showing it as a fundamental activity: "Diogenes
ging, urn vor der Hand sich selbst - dens die verirrte Speculation war dadurch freilich noch nicht in
ihre Grenze zurUckgewiesen - die geläugnete Moglichkeit der Bewegung zu beweisen. Eben so -
wolit ihr jemand die Freiheit wegvernunfteln, und gelingt es euch wirklich durch eure ScheingrUnde
Zweifel über die in Anspruch genommene Sache zu erregen, so demonstrirt er sic auf der Stelle
durch Realisirung eines Products, das er nur von seinem eigenen freien Handein ableiten kann" (28,
I, 3, 177).
Chapter Two
1. There is an abundance of references in Novalis's writings to the "moral organ" or man's "organ"
in a higher sense. See: N, 2, 365ff, 371 ,375, 562, 577; 3, 264, 361, 385, 403, 466, 513, 517,
520, 563, 570.
2. A detailed analysis of Novalis's idea of the Golden Age in relation to his notions of "Wortfigur"
and "Figurwort" is given above in chapter four, section ten.
3. In 1797 Novalis was just beginning to develop his scientific interests in preparation for his
studies at Freiberg, so he would have had an interest in Kant's scientific views; indeed, in the Kant-
und Escheninayer-Studien (N, 2, 379-394), Novalis made some notes on Kant's Metaphysische
Anfangsgrunde der Naturwissenschafl (N, 2, 392-394); but his scientific outlook had already been
set by his reading of Hernsterhuis. He was searching for a Neoplatonic outlook which he could not
find in Kant. Kant's dynamist view point would naturally have interested him, as his reading of
Escheninayer (1768-1852), another dynamist, in the Kant- und Eschenmayer-Szudien, shows. Yet
again, his concentiation was not really on Kant or on Eschenmayer, but once more on Hemsterhuis,
since Kant's dynamism, as interpreted and expanded by Eschenmayer, showed the essential forces
espoused in Hemsterhuis's works, as Mahl points out: "Die von Escheninayer als ursprunglich
angenommenen Grundkräfte der Materie sind aber nichts anders als der von Hemsterhuis
hervorgehobene Antagonismus von Attraktions- und Zentrifugalkraft, der als Grundgesetz des
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korperlichen wie des seelisch-geistigen Lebens erklärt worden war und der Novalis als Vorstofi zu
einer "symbolischen" Behandlung der Physik besonders angezogen hatte" (N, 2, 332). Four points
govern Novalis's view of the sciences at this time when he was reading Kant and Eschenmayer.
Firstly, his reading of the sciences is ruled by Hemsterhuis's Neoplatonic forces; and secondly, in
1797 Novalis already has the aim of tackling the sciences symbolically in a type of "Combinatorik"
which he actually developed later. Thirdly, his interests in organization are already developing here
as well, since he mentions Brown in the Kant- und Eschenmayer-Siudien. When Eschenmayer
speaks of motion as a principle of matter, Novalis makes a cross reference to Brown and excitability
theory. Novalis notes from Eschenmayer, "Beweglichkeit ist die Grundbestimmung der Mat[ene]",
and then comments "/Vid.Brown - Erregbarkeit./" (N, 2, 385). l.ater, in 1798, Novalis speculates
that excitability theory could be applied to physics (see above, chapter three, section 3.3). Fourthly,
as Mähl has pointed out (N, 2, 332), Novalis turned to Eschenmayer, not only because
Eschenmayer dealt with the subject of dynamism and Kant's natural philosophy, but also for the
reason that Eschenmayer dealt with Fichte, for Escheninayer was attempting to unite the Fichtian
principles of the Wissenschaflslehre with a "Naturphilosophie". Naturally, Novalis had in interest in
seeing how Fichte's notions could be applied to the sciences. Important as this sounds, one must
again bear in mind that Novalis's fundamentally Neoplatonic outlook influenced his understanding
of Fichte as well (see sections 1.7 and 1.8 of this chapter).
4. Novalis by no means outrightly dismissed Kant's thought, but certainly distanced himself from
Kant; the following remark shows that he was highly aware of Kant's achievements, but at the same
time took an ironic view of the philosopher: "Die ganze Kantische Methode - die ganze Kantische
Art zu philosophiren ist einseitig - und man könnte sic vielleicht mcht mit Unrecht Scholasticism
nennen. Freylich ist sic em Maximum in ihrer Art - ems der merckwurdigsten Phaenomene des
menschlichen Geistes" (N, 2, 392).
5. Novalis takes a different approach to the major problem that Kant was trying to solve, i.e. the
possibility of a priori knowledge in theoretical reason. Since Novalis believed in a universal
"sympathy" of things and that ideas and knowledge were part of experience and the make-up of the
world, the general Humean problem of experience and knowledge, i.e. that knowledge can come
only from sense experience, was side-stepped. For, to Novalis, since knowledge was experience,
there was no question of theoretical knowledge having to be "experience free" since he thinks
always in terms of an experiential whole of knowledge for aesthetics and for the sciences. Secondly,
the Humean problem of predictability could, in Novalis's view, be mitigated through the issues of
actual scientific practice. As will be argued, the "phenomenal" calculus of R.itter's diagrams assist in
theory building and in the attainment of "predictability". Kant, on the other hand, was deeply
impressed by Newtonian mechanics, and held that sound theory in its very predictiveness argued for
a deductive approach to theory and not Humean induction. Losee comments on Kant in this way:
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"Immanuel Kant professed to be greatly disturbed by Hume's analysis of causation. Kant conceded
that if the form and content of scientific laws wholly derive from sense experience, as Hume had
urged, then there is no escape from Hume's conclusion. However, Kant was unwilling to grant
Hume's premiss. Against Hume, he argued that although all empirical knowledge 'arises from'
sense impressions, it is not the case that all such knowledge is 'given in' these impressions
According to Kant, Hume's inadequate theory of knowledge was associated with an equally
inadequate theory of science. Kant believed that Hume was preoccupied with inductive
generalization. Kant held that this emphasis draws attention from the most important feature of
science - the attempt to achieve a systematic organization of knowledge. Kant was profoundly
impressed by the scope and power of Euclidean geometry and Newtonian mechanics and he
attributed this scope and power to the deductive structure of these disciplines ... Kant formulated
criteria of acceptability which reflect this emphasis on the systematic organization of experience.
With respect to individual empirical laws, Kant downplayed instance-confirmation, in which
deductive consequences of laws are seen to be in agreement with observations. He believed the
incorporation of laws into deductive systems to be more important. Kant would hold, for instance,
that although Kepler's laws do gain support from data on planetary motions, they gain further, and
more important, support from their 'incorporation' into Newton's theory of mechanics.
With respect to theories, Kant cited as criteria of acceptability predictive power and testability. He
noted that successful theories bind together empirical laws by means of reference to new entities or
relations. Implicit in this systematization is the possibility of extending the interpretation of these
entities or relations to further regions of experience. Kant drew attention to the fertility of scientific
theories. He suggested that those theories are most acceptable which extend our knowledge of
relations among phenomena" (237, 107-108).
6. The essay on Goethe was written between 25 August and 9 September of 1798 (N, 2, 519).
7. The notion of "holy physics" is discussed more fully below in relation to Plotinos (see section
1.7 of this chapter).
8. See, for example, Faust : "Auf einmal seh' ich Rat / Und schreibe getrost: Im Anfang war die
Tat!" (38, 3, 44, line 1237).
9. There is a further aspect to Goethe's and Novalis's notion of the rhetoric of "experiment". In
their concept of "experiment" there is link between dialectics and the idea of a series of phenomena
with its mathematical and Neoplatonic connotations, as will be shown with reference to Plotinos.
The notion of the synthesis of the "higher experience" and the notion of a row of experiments link
both patterns of thought together. See section 1.7 of this chapter.
10. In the following remark Novalis further reveals his broad notion of a concrete "Calcül" of
discovery. In his view, critical philosophy is also a "calculus" since it attempts to set up a model for
future knowledge and inquiry. Fichte's Wissenschaflslehre was, to Novalis. a concrete form of
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"calculus" with predictive potential, it too was not plain theorizing, but discovering: "(Alle
Phil [osophie] oder W[issenschaft] d[erj W[issenschaftl ist Kritik.) (D[ie] Idee v[on] PhilFosophie]
ist em Schema dEer] Zukunft.) (N, 3, 439).)
11. See Mähl (330, 171-206).
12. Mähl remarks that Novalis is speaking here of a "begleitende Symbolisation" in the sense of
Kant's "transzendentales Schema der Einbildungskraft" (N, 3, 982), but adapting Kant's notions in
view of Plotinos.
13. Mähl comments on Tiedemann's censuring of Plotinos. Quoting from Tiedemann, he remarks
that the latter "tadeind vermerken mull, daB Plotin fortwãhrend 'aus der intellektuellen Region
hinüber in die sinnliche' wechsele, daB er in 'mancherley Bilder, und figUrliche Ausdrücke'
ausweiche und danut eine 'Hypostasierung abstrakter Begriffe' vortãusche (N, 3, 982; 117, 294,
362, 411).
14. This refers to Novalis's remark, "ob das nicht der rechte Weg ist, die Physik im aligemeinsten
Sins, schlechterdings Symbolisch zu behandeln?" (N, 4, 255).
15. In addition, it is of interest to note that even though Novalis had only read of Plotinos through
Tiedemann he seems to have hit upon the way Plotinos did, in his own time, work upon a concrete
metaphysics that bound empirical and metaphysical ideas together. This can be seen from the
significance of Plotinos himself for the history of thought, as understood by Adler: "In der
Philosophie Plotins (ca. 205-270) erreichte die 'Sympathie' ihre nächste grofle Entfaltung und nahm
dort eine zentrale Stellung em. Plotin verwendete 'sympatheia', aber auch andere Wörter wie
'symphonia', 'harmoma' und 'analogia'. Für Plotin ist die aus dem 'Einen' entstandene Welt durch
'Sympathien' vereint. Diese reichen hinab von der 'Idee' durch verschiedene Stufen zur Materie und
stellen die Einheit des Ails her. Wie es z.B. in Enneade V. 4, 32 heifit: 'Das Weltall List] em
einheitliches Lebewesen, weiches alle in ihm befindlichen Lebewesen enthãlt'; diese ganze
'Alleinheit' steht in einer 'Wirkungsgemeinschaft' oder 'Sympathie'. Plotins Denken bnngt
wichtige Neuerungen. Darunter: die Erweiterung des physischen Begriffs der Stoa auf Beziehungen
zwischen Geist und Materie und seine Erweiterung auf Sehen und Erkenntnis. Wie Bolus behielt
Plotin aber auch den magischen Aspekt des Begriffs bei. So konnte die 'Sympathie' in doppelter
Form auf die Neuzeit wirken: als empirischer Begriff der Stoa und als Tell eines Ubergreifenden
metaphysichen Systems bei Plotin. In der frUhen Neuzeit treten beiden Stromungen vereint auf"
(129, 39). Adler's source is Karl Keiling (212), 'Uber die Sympathie bei Plotin', pp.11, 13, 24f.,
47f.
16. Mähl draws attention to Novalis's probable source for his view of Socrates in his reading of
Hemsterhuis (N, 3, 970-971). In his Legire sur l'a:héisnw Hemsterhuis writes: "Enfin, Socrate, cet
être prodigieux, parut et s'avisa le premier d'entrer tout de hon en lui-même. II y trouva un monde
tout autrement riche que celui que ses organes physiques lui développoient, oü on ne voit que
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passivement cc qui est produit; tandis que dans l'autre l'homnie sent un peu ce que c'est que
produire ..." (50, 2, 287).
17. Socrates held that ideas were born in debate. See Der kleine Pauly: "Aus den zwei bezeichneten
Ansätzen (a.Erkenntnis kann im Gesprach 'entbunden' werden; b. der Handwerker praktiziert em
bewährtes Wissen, obschon er dessen 'Theorie' mcht zu formulieren mag) hat Platon die
metaphysische Grundlegung alien Wissens postuliert: Alies Werthafte hat Teil an, ja ist gepragt von
ideellen Werten, den Ideen. Sicher dan diese Lehre Platons nicht ohne stãrkste Einschrankung auf
Sokrates zurUckprojiziert werden. Ohne Zweifel war Sokrates auf der Suche nach den Werten;
sicher war sein Weg durchaus inteliektualistisch: Man mufi die Werte 'wissen' können, d.h. dieses
Wissen muB durch em prilfendes Gesprach freigesetzt = entbunden werden können" (162, 5, 252).
See also Taylor (287).
18. Novalis elsewhere comments that he should concentrate more on Fichte's notion of the various
states of mind, and remarks "Uber Fichtes Sehnen etc. - Tendenzen Uberhaupt" (N, 3, 470).
Fichte's psychological approach to thought is revealed in the above terms "Trieb" and "Sehnen"
(28, I, 2, 430-446).)
19. As a consequence, in a broad sense of pathology, all of Novalis's remarks on disease and sin
have to be considered with this in mind. Although he may have been himself dogged by illness, this
does not mean that he equates man's life entirely with the state of sensibility, illness, sin or with a
fallen state. He saw the possibility of man improving his lot, notably by balancing his own
constitution. This is a process where irritability plays just as important a role as sensibility. Novalis
offers moral possibilities, not "absolute" solutions. Physical sthenia and asthenia have to find a
proper balance, just as its mental forms, such as concretization and abstraction. A final goal of the
Golden Age is the union of the concrete and the abstract in a state of permanent concrete theorizing,
the union of the "Figurenworte" and the "Wortfiguren", or in terms of excitability theory, the union
of "Irritabilität" and "Sensibilitãt". The procedure leading to this potential Golden Age is one of
mediation between forces, and between man's capabilities, and, importantly a piecemeal process
that accounts for man's limitations, advancing in limited steps ("HOlier kanns der Mensch mcht
bringen, als da1 er einsieht, welches Wissen sich just für seine Stufe pafit - für die Dauer und
Constitution seines Lebens" (N, 3, 600-1)).
20. One can compare too Volta's highly Newtonian view point in his Letires Philosophiques: "La
cause de cette cause est dans le sein de Dieu. Procedes huc, et non ibi amplius" (122, 440).
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Chapter Three
1. It has already been remarked on in the introduction that the social aspects of Novalis's thought
need to be to be seen in terms of practical knowledge and his own views on utopia. Admittedly, the
utopian aspects of Novalis's thought have been set aside to some extent in this work. This was done
to direct the reader's attention more clearly at epistemological issues. The main thrust of works on
Novalis's idea of utopia, such as Mähl's and Uerlings's fit, in any case, within the epistemological
domain of this present work in the sense that they argue for the transcendent mediation of the
absolute in man's sphere of knowledge. A significant part of Novalis's utopian notions is found,
moreover, in his ideal of natural philosophical productivity - when humans will learn to "plasticize"
freely - a topic naturally dealt with in this present work. This is an aspect of Novalis's idea of
utopia that falls squarely into the spheres of language, perception, practical knowledge and natural
philosophy. The next chapter reveals how the individual inquirer can probably practice Novalis's
notion of inquiry. Under the banner of unifying practice a higher level of consensuality than that
found discussed in this chapter will be argued for.
2. Nor, on the other hand, and obviously, does Novalis argue for another extreme stance, that of
scientific absolutism. On scientific absolutism see Jardine (209, 1-9). Jardine provides an overview
of historiographical works that have argued against scientific absolutism.
3. See the remarks Sepper makes on Goethe's idea of the phenomenal base of a discipline (above,
pp. 19-20).
4. This form of inquiry - the employment of a system of symbols to give strategic guidance to the
sciences - can be related to Schelling's natural philosophical undertakings. The difference between
Novalis and Schelling, however, is that Novalis stresses the idea of productivity. In his natural
philosophical works Schelling offers up an array of potent principles and symbols for inquiry. In
this manner, his work, like Novalis's, is concerned with supplying strict empirical inquiry with
natural philosophical orientation. Naturally for Schelling this takes place on a larger scale than for
Novalis, since he provided substantial systems; his works were published and also influenced the
scientists of his time. However, what Schelling does not approach so much in detail as Novalis is
the methodology needed to employ such natural philosophical principles. Novalis's idea of a
programme for natural philosophical productivity is concerned with the application of natural
philosophical principles in experimental practice, and the interplay between their use in practice and
natural philosophical theory. This theory of application is clearly based around his idea of
"phenomenal' calculus. Furthermore, as commented on earlier, it is precisel y
 this aspect of the
concerns of the early Romantics, productivity, that Broman overlooks. Broman underlines a related
and significant aspect, that of the influence of Romantic natural philosophy on the rise in empirical
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description, but the notion of productivity, arguably, takes our awareness of the meaning of early
Romantic natural philosophy an important step further. As mentioned, Schelling concentrates more
on the productivity involved in evolving and re-aligning strategic initiatives for the natural
philosophical principles of the task of reuniting man's consciousness with Nature. The emphasis of
Novalis's thought lies more distinctly in the realm of the natural philosophical productivity itself
since he speaks directly of his version of its methodology. In the next chapter, however, it will be
argued that Novalis and Schelling come closer to one another when Schelling's thought is viewed in
terms of unifying practice.
5. Novalis reveals his view of the "soulless" French revolution in Die Christenheit oder Europa (N,
3, 507-524): "Frankreich verficht einen weitlichen Protestantismus. Sollten auch weltliche Jesuiten
nun entstehn, und die Geschichte der letzten Jahrhunderte erneuert werden? Soil die Revolution die
französische bleiben, wie die Reformation die Lutherische war? Soil der Protestantismus abermals
widernatürlicherweise, als revolutionaire Regierung fixirt werden? Sollen Buchstaben Buchstaben
Platz machen? Sucht ihr den Keim des Verderbens auch in der alten Einrichtung, dem alten Geiste?
und glaubt euch auf eine bessere Einrichtung, einen bessern Geist zu verstehn? 0! daB der Geist der
Geister euch erfüllte, und ihr ablieBet von diesem thörichtem Bestreben die Geschichte und die
Menscheit zu modem, und eure Richtung ihr zu geben. 1st sie mcht selbstandig, nicht eigenmachtig,
so gut wie unendlich liebenswerth und weissagend? Sie zu studiren, ihr nachzugehn, von ihr zu
lernen, mit ihr gleichem Schritt zu halten, glaubig ihren VerheiBungen und Winken zu folgen -
daran denkt keiner" (N, 3, 518).
6. Cited from Partington (252, 74).
7. See Partington (252, 77).
8. See Partington (252, 92).
9. See Partington (252, 106,108).
10. E.J.Holmyard, when discussing Paracelsus's views remarks that the aichemical primary bodies
were not to be taken literally: "As to material substances, he [Paracelsus] considered them to be
ultimately composed of the four Aristotelian elements, but immediately of three primary bodies, tria
prima, namely salt (body), sulphur (soul), and mercury (spirit). He was thus taking over a
previously existing modification of the old sulphur-mercury theory of metals, extended so as to
apply to all substances, metallic and non-metallic, animal, and vegetable. Salt was the principle of
incombustibility and non-volatility; mercury was the principle of fusibility and volatility; and
sulphur was the principle in virtue of which substances are inflammable. The theory was not be
taken literally; the "sulphur" in wood, for example, is not the same as the "sulphur" in lead, and
neither of them is to be conceived as very closely resembling ordinary sulphur. The iria prima, or,
as they are often known, "hypostatical principles", are indeed nothing more than abstractions of
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qualities, and therefore differ essentially in character from the elements of modern chemistry" (201,
174).
11. An insight into the symbolic significance of phosphorus is gained by studying the painting by
Joseph Wright, An Alchemist, Hennig Brand, Discovers Phosphorus. Wright's oil seems to display
a highly charged combination of religious adoration and scientific investigation, and thus the
discovery of phosphorus is imbued with a symbolism of a greater truth, both of matter, and of the
very essence of inquiry. A copy of the painting is found in Holmyard (201, plate 4).
12. My thanks go here to Herr Ulrich Petzold of the Zentralinstitut für die Geschichte der Technik,
Technische Umversitãt München, for assisting me in the interpretation of the substance in the text.
(Phosphorus was probably too recently discovered to have been fully incorporated into alchemical
symbolism.)
13. See the discussion on scientific diagrams in chapter four, section 9, where the diagrams of the
alchemists, Bergman, Ritter and Faraday are linked together as part of a tradition of concrete
theorizing. Bergman's and Ritter's diagrams in particular can be seen in the light of Novalis's
notion of a "phenomenal" calculus, since they operate by drawing the relationships of things
together.
14. Peter Kapitza adds, referring to Gehler: "In der Praxis seines Werkes, das die physikalischen
wie die chemischen Gesetze behandelt, wird die umfassende Bedeutung des Begriffes Physik am
beaten deutlich" (322, 22).
15. A.N.Scherer remarks also, for example, in 1802, that he was surprised still to find some
resistance to the French chemistry in the work of J.F.A.Gottling. The latter's major work of 1794
attacking the antiphlogistians, Beytrag zur Berichzigung der antiphlogistischen Chemie auf Versuche
gegrundei (42), was by no means his last word on the subject, for in 1801 he was still continuing
his campaign with the article 'Neuere Resultate Uber das Leuchten des Phosphors in verschiedenen
Gasarten' (43), and it was on this article that Scherer comments: "Das Leuchten des Phosphors in
Stickgas hat schon zu einem bekannten Streit Anlafi gegeben. Man solite glauben, die Acten wãren
einmahl abgeschlossen; vielleicht sind sie es auch in den Augen der mehrsten Chemiker. Gottling
fhhrt indefi fort, sich hier von Neuem gegen die Angriffe seiner Gegner zu vertheidigen, und zwar
mit Grunden, die aus den Resultaten der Böckmannschen Versuche gezogen sind. Der Leser wird
indefi gestehen müssen, daB auch diese nicht hinreichend sind, seine Lehre aufrecht zu erhalten" (5,
9, 1802, 27-28). Gottling's nitrogen theory of combustion is discussed later on in this chapter in the
context of the French criticism.
16. Although, as Partington remarks, the term phlogiston had been used before in the same sense
(252, 86-87).
17. Unfortunately for Richter his dynamist view-point markedly hindered his making any impact on
the advancing elemental chemistry. See Partington (252, 178).
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18. For the sake of clarity here is a list of the most relevant scientific works referred to within the
context of pneumatics, most of which Novalis made notes upon, and others which he had in all
likelihood knowledge of; this is not a comprehensive list since there are many other scientific texts
on the book lists in the Novalis critical edition, which could obviously also be of interest for his
notions of pneumatics and chemistry in general (see N, 3, 754, 1002-1010, 1065-1066):
Aligemeines Journal der Chemie, ed. Alexander Nicolaus Scherer, Leipzig and Berlin, 1798-1803
(no. 5).
Neues Journal der Physik, ed. Friedrich Albrecht Carl Gren, Leipzig, 1795- (no. 73).
Berthollet, Claude Louis: 'Beobachtungen über die eudiometrischen Eigenschaften des Phosphors',
in: Aligemeines Journal der Chemie, 1, 1798, 518-528 (no. 12).
Delamdtherie, J.C.: 'De Ia chemie', in:Journal de Physique, de Chemie, d 'Histoire naturelle et des
arts, avec desplanches en taille-douce, ed. J.C. Delamétherie, Paris, 1798, 3, 85-134 (no. 22).
Fourcroy, Antoine Francois de, and Louis Nicolas Vauquelin: 'Nachricht von Foucroys und
Vauquelins Versuche mit dem Knallsalze', in: Neues Journal der Physik, 4, 1797, 238-241 (no.
30).
'Prufung der über das vorgebliche Leuchten des Phosphors im Stickstoffgas angestellten
Untersuchungen; angesteilt von den BUrgern Fourcroy und Vauquelin', in: Ailgemeines Journal der
Chemie, 1, 1798, 492-518 (no. 31).
Gottling, Johann Friedrich August: Beytrag zur Berichzigung der antiphlogistischen Chemie auf
Versuche gegrundel, Jena, 1794 (no. 42).
Gren, Friederich Albrecht Carl: 'Beschreibung eines sehr zuverlässigen und leicht anwendbaren
Eudiometers vom Professor Gren', in: Neues Journal der Physik, 4, 1797, 363-369 (no. 47).
Humboldt, Friedrich Alexander von: 'Abhandlung über die dreyfache Verbindung aus Phosphor,
Stickstoff und Sauerstoff, oder über das Daseyn der Phosphures d'azote oxides', in: Ailgemeines
Journal der Chenüe, 1, 1798, 573-589 (no. 55).
Laplace, Pierre Simon de: Darstellung des Weitsystems durch Peter Simon Laplace. Aus dem
FranzOsischen übersezz von Johann Karl Friedrich Hauff. Theil I-H, Frankfurt a. M.: Varrentrapp
und Wenner, 1797 (no. 68).
Brugnatelli, L.G., Thomas Hoyle, Jean-Baptiste van Mons: 'Neue Beobachtungen Uber die
Verpuffungen der salzsauren und salpetersauren Salze mit verschiedenen Körpern', in: Ailgemeines
Journal der Chemie, 1, 1798, 604-624 (no. 17).
Prevost, Benedict: 'Fourcroy's Auszug aus einer Abhandlung des Burgers Benedict Prevost in Genf,
Mitgliedes d. Gesells. d. Wissens. u. KUnste zu Montanhau, über die Ausflüsse riechender Körper;
oder über die odoroscopischen Wirkungen warmer, kalter, riechender und geruchloser Substanzen',
in: Allgemeines Journal der Chemie, 1, 1798, 143-166 (no. 84).
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Reboul, Heinrich: 'Beschreibung eines atmosphärischen Eudiometers von Herrn Heinrich Reboul',
in: Neues Journal der Physik, 1, 1795, 374-379 (no. 89).
Ritter, Johann Wilhelm: Madame Fuihame's Versuche über die Wiederherstellung der Metalle', in:
Ailgemeines Journal der Chemie, 1, 1798, 420-444 (no. 93).
Rumford, Count Benjamin Thompson: 'Versuche und Beobachtungen uber die Fortplanzung der
Wärme in Flüssigkeiten', in: Neues Journal der Physik, 4, 1797, 418 f(no. 102).
19. Compare, too, Ritter's remarks on hydrogen and light in the context of precursors of a notion of
energy (see above, pp.258-260).
20. The works to which Ritter refers are: Torbern Olof Bergman, (no. 9) Opuscula physica et
chemica, 6 vols., Upsala, 1779-1790; (no. 11) Kleinephysische und chymische Werke, übersetzt
von Heinrich Tabor, 6 vols., Frankfurt a.M., 1782-1790, 3, 519; and Lazzaro Spallanzani, in
Annales de Chemie, 22, 248.
21. See Frances Yates on the Renaissance memory theatres of Giulo Camillo and Robert Fludd
(299, 129-172, 320-341).
22. The letter is of 9. September 1798 (N, 4, 260-262).
23. The "Nervenaether" is a reference to Ritter's attempts to investigate nerve action in terms of
affinity and electrochemistry. This is fully discussed in the next chapter.
24. Adler, when remarking on the genesis of Goethe's interests in affinity comments: "Soweit ich es
Uberblicke, beginnen Goethes Anspielungen auf die chemische "Verwandtschaft" in semen Notizen
von 1793, dem Jahr, in dem er auch Bergmans Schema ubernahm. Ihre Bedeutung ist vielleicht
deswegen nicht erkannt worden, weil Goethe oft das Wort "Affinität" verwendet. Es gibt z.B. eine
Aufzeichnung zur Affiniiaz des gefarbten Lichis zu den Phosphoren. Ebenso gibt es Aufzeichnungen
Uber die "Verwandtschaft" des Lichts" (129, 81; 40, I, 3, 238).
25. There is also a summary of Brugnatelli's work on deflagration in Lorenz Crell's Chemische
Annalen, 1, 1799, 259-271, 'AbgekUrzte Mittheilung der neuen Beobachtungen des Herrn
Brugnatelli über die Art durch Phosphor mit verschiedenen chemischen Körpern mit Knall begleitete
Detonnationen zu bewirken' (16; 19). On the subject of detonation Novalis further may well have
read the article in Gren's Neues Journal der Physik, Nachricht von Foucroys und Vauquelins
Versuche mit dem Knallsalze' (30; 73).
26. Novalis made notes for example on Laplace's comments on attraction in his work, Darsiellung
des Well.syszenis (68), which the latter believed was a universal phenomenon, and, further, that it lay
very much at the heart of chemical inquiry. Novalis noted down the following from Laplace: "Die
Anziehungskraft verschwindet unter Korpern von unbetrãchtlicher Gröfie. Sie scheint aber unter
mannichfach veränderter Gestalt wieder bey ihren Elementen. Die Dichtigkeit der K[orper], ihre
Krystallisation, die Brechung des Lichts, das Steigen und Fallen der Flüssigkeiten in den
Haarröhren, und überhaupt alle chemischen Verhindungen sind Folgen der Anziehungskrafte. Abet
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sind etwa diese Kräfte die in den Raeurnen des Himmels beobachtete Gravitation selbst, auf der
Erde durch die Gestalt des Integrirenden Theile modificirt?" (N, 3, 71; 68, 2, 211). Novalis then
remarks how decisively Laplace had refuted the idea of some that attraction was not universal:
"Diese I.e Sagesche und andrer Behauptung begleitet hier La Place mit sehr treffenden
Bermerkungen, als unnutze und unbequerne Hypothese" (N, 3, 71). As the editor, Gerhard Schulz,
points out, this refers to pages 211-214 of Laplace's work: "Urn diese Hypothese anzunehrnen
müsste bey den KOrpern viel mehr leeren, als erfihliten Raum voraussezen, so dass die Dichtigkeit
ihrer Theilchen unvergleichbar grosser ware, als die niittlere Dichtigkeit ihrer ganzen Massen. Em
sphärisches Element von 0,00001 Fuss Durchmesser rnUsste nine zum werngsten zehntausend
milliardenmal grOssere Dichtigkeit haben, als die mittlere Dichtigkeit der Erde ist, urn auf seiner
Oberfläche eine des Schwere auf der Erde gleiche Attraction zu äussern ... Bey diesen
Ungewissheiten ist das klUgste, was man thun kann, sich an die Bestimmung des Geseze der
Verwandtschaften durch zahireiche Versuche zu halten ..." (68, 2, 211-214). For the importance of
affinity for Laplace, see further Adler (129, 36).
27. Novalis most probably had read this work since, as mentioned, he had made notes on other
articles in Scherer's first volume (for example (55), (93)). There is also a summary of Prevost's
work in Gren's Neues Journal der Physik, 4, 1797, 242f., 'Auszug einer Abhandlung des Herrn
Ben. Prevost in Genf, über die Ausflüsse riechender Korper, und über die Mittel, sie dem Gesicht
bemerkbar zu machen' (83), and also in Crell's Chemische Anna/en, 1800, 2, 232-254, 'Ueber die
odoroskopischen Wirkungen warmer und kalter geruchloser KOrper, und über die riechenden
Substanzen' (85).
28. Bergen's work, which Fourcroy is citing, is Nova ada physico-medica Acadeiniae Naturae
Curiosorum, 1757, 1, 195 f.
29. Phosphorus, as well as playing a major role in Novalis's organic view of Nature, was also of
strict pathological interest to him. In this role, it provided a further link between inorganic and
organic organization. Novalis writes: "Phosphor soIl eine sehr stimulirende Kraft besitzen. In Paris
kUnrt man Impotenzen und ErschOpfungen damit. Es wird Phiosphorl in heiflem Wasser geschuttelt
- dann dieses Wasser in Kaltes gebracht - so schlãgt sich em feines Phosph[orjMehl nieder - dies
wird mit Ey vermischt - odes in Syrup gethan und so in sehr geringen Dosen gegeben" (N, 3, 199).
Here, the medicinal powers of phosphorus establish a direct link between the combustible principle
and the force of human generation: a dose of phosphorus (with a bit of honey) is actually said to
cure impotence! The pathological theme also provides a direct link between Novalis's reading of
Fourcroy and Vauquelin on the combustion of phosphorus and his own thought. Reading Fourcroy
and Vauquelin, he notes: "Fourcroy schlieSt analogisch vom Phosphor auf ähnliche Auflosungen des
Schwefels, der Kohie etc ... in den genannten Luftarten bay niedriger Temperatur" (N, 3, 188).
Subsequently, in the Das ailgemeine Broullion, he remarks: "Im hOchsten Grad auch physiologisch
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merckwQrdig scheint mir die Auflösung des Phosphors, des Schwefels etc. in Luftarten hey
niedriger Temperazur" (N, 3, 472). For Novalis, Fourcroy's chemical observation becomes a matter
of pathological interest.
30. The following alchemical texts are on Novalis's book list, and are all in the library at the
Freiberger Bergakademie (given in the order they were written down in by Novalis):
Libavius, Andreas, Aichymia, Francofurti, 1597.
Meyer, Johann Friedrich, Alchymistische Briefe, Hannover, 1767.
Wedel, Georg Wolffgang, Einleitung zur Aichemie, Berlin, 1724 (No.102).
Becher, Johann Joachim, Psychosophia oder Seelen-Weisheit, Hamburg, 1725.
Rosenkreutz, Christian, Chymische Hochzeit anno 1459, Strassburg, 1616.
Die edelgeborne Jungfrau Aichemia. Nebst einem Zusatze von der Medicina universali, TUbingen
1730.
Geber, Chimia sive zradirio summae perfectionis et investigatio magisierri innwneris locis
emendata, a C.Hornio. Lugd. Bat., 1668.
Quadrazum aichymislicum, das ist: vier auserlesene rare Tractazgen vom Stein der Weisen,
Hamburg, 1705 (No.80).
I have dealt mainly with Wedel's work for the reason that it gives such a clear overview of
alchemy. One should mention, however, that Geber goes into great detail on the possible properties
of the "Stein der Weisen" and also on aichemical practice, and that this would have enriched the
views that Novalis would have gained through a reading of Wedel. For a summary of Geber's
outlook, see Holmyard (201, 134-141). Becher and Rosencreutz would also have been important to
Novalis for alchemical issues, and Rosencreutz's notion of the chemical marriage and the particular
literary form of his work are most probably important sources, perhaps even models, for Novalis's
own idea of a "natural philosophical" literary form, as is obviously found in Heinrich von
Ofierdingen. This, however, is an issue that lies beyond the present inquiry.
31. See the remarks of Crosland and Adler in footnote 9 of chapter one and see also footnote 13 of
this chapter.
Chapter Four
1. See in particular Berg and Richter, (142, 34-35). They point to two laws arising from Ritter's
work, "der Rittersche Offnungstetanus" and "des Pflugerische Zuckungsgesetz". Berg and Richter
treat a whole series of experiments from Ritter's 1798 Beweis in terms of their value for modern
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science, but, understandably, given this stance, do not tackle the key experiments (figures 67-71)
discussed in this present work.
2. See, for example, Berg and Richter, (142, 34).
3. As mentioned (above, p.292), Berg and Richter refer to Ritter's work as "bioelectrochemistry".
4. The lectures are printed in 6, 10 (1802), 389-420 and 421-449.
5. Ritter remarked "Unverzeilich bleibt es mir immer dieser Entdeckung so in der Nähe gewesen zu
seyn, ohne je von dem, was ich täglich in Händen hatte, Anwendung zu machen" (95; 98, 1, 281)).
6. See (6), vol.4 (1800), 2, footnote.
7. Although, as already discussed, Volta did not entirely overlook organic electricity, he was none
the less essentially interested in physical electricity per se and not electricity within organisms. I
wish to stress this point to make the aim and purpose of Ritter's Beweis clear. Ritter clearly had to
argue against Volta's stance, and account for an "organic" notion of galvanism, but this does not
mean that Ritter neglected the "inorganic" aspects of galvanic theory.
8. Gower sees in Ritter's use of the notion "Grundkräfte" an "adaption of Schellingean metaphysical
ideas" (180, 338). He compares Ritter's explanation of galvanic phenomena in terms of dynamic
forces and individuals as a "tripartite scheme, reminiscent of Kant's and Schelling's architectonic
methods ..." (119, 331). Gower, however, although contributing to an understanding of Ritter's
natural philosophical notions in terms of German dynamism, makes little mention of physiology.
But he does, importantly, see "the most interesting feature of his work" in "Ritter's attempt to
deploy a presuppositional framework..." (180, 338-339). This present work aims to delineate such
presuppositions, and, in particular, to illustrate them in the light of early Romantic notions of
practical knowledge. Thus, it is argued that Ritter's contribution to science lies as much in his
methodology as in his actual findings.
9. C.F.Kielmeyer (1765-1844) explains thus: "Reproductionskraft, oder die Fahigkeit der
Organisationen, sich selbst ähnliche Wesen Theilweise oder im Ganzen each- und anzubilden ..."
(63, 251). "Propagation" may not specifically refer to reproduction - it could also refer to
"transmission". Be that as it may, whether as a force of reproduction or of "transmission", it would
apply to activity in organisms alone, and not to a force in the inorganic realm. For a force perhaps
analogous to the one of "transmission" see Kielineyer's "Propulsionskraft". Kielmeyer's five forces
in organisms are: "1. Sensibilität oder die Fahigkeit mit Eindrüken, die auf die Nerven oder sonst
gemacht werden, gleichzeitig Vorstellungen zu erhalten, 2. Irritibilitãt oder die Fahigkeit mancher
Organe, vorzüglich der Muskeln, auf Reize sich zusammenzuziehen, und Bewegungen
hervorzubringen, 3. Reproductionskraft, oder die Fahigkeit der Organisationen, sich selbst
ähnliche Wesen Theilweise oder im Ganzen nach- und anzubilden, 4. Sekretionskraft oder die
Fähigkeit aus der Saftmasse dieser selbst unähnliche Materien von bestinimter Beschaffenheit
wiederholt an bestiminten Orten abzusondern, 5. Propulsionskraft, oder die Fahigkeit, die
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FlUssigkeiten in den vesten Theilen in bestimmter Ordnung zu bewegen und zu vertheilen" (63,
251).
10. Novalis even had notions of a theory of the "constitution", as Neubauer has pointed out (337,
72-73):
"1. Constitution mit mangeinder Reit.zbarkeit. (indirect asth[enisch])
2. C[onstitution mit Uberflüssiger Reitzbarkeit. (direct asth[emsch])
a. C[onstitutionl mit uberflUssiger Incitation (direct sthenisch)
b. C[onstitution] mit mangelnder Incitation (indirect sthenisch). ..." (N, 2, 573). Even in this form
Novalis's notion of the constitution here reveals that he saw many factors at work, and that, in a
fashion typical to him, he was broadening the parameters of theory. Neubauer directs us to the fact
that Novalis's new category in his theory of "constitutions" was a form of "Sthenie". This is of
interest to Novalis's view on the "sthenic", and its counterparts, oxidation and concrete thought: the
above remark would seem to be another instance of this concern of his. In a further comment, for
instance, Novalis speculates that oxidation is the path to the Golden Age: "Luftvemichtung 1st
Herstellung des Reichs Gottes" (N, 3, 659).
11. For an interesting English distinction of this awareness of the reductive nature of Brunonian
principles, see Lawrence (233, 11-12), who describes how Thomas Morrison, a supporter of John
Hunter, attacked Brown for his reduction of life to a principle. Some Brunonians did indeed look at
patients closely, in another sense of the "Individuum", as an individual case. Joseph Frank (1771-
1842), for example, instead of looking at a patient in terms of symptoms or previous diseases, made
a thorough history of the patient, taking account of psychological factors, life-style and environment
(264, 54-57). Franz Anton Mai went further and claimed that case histories were not reliable since
the patient's information was by no means always complete: it was no use just coming to some
diagnosis over the patient's symptoms and then applingBrunonian theory. The patient had to be
closely monitored and in critical stages of an illness visited and reassessed every three hours (264,
60).
12. Schelling's stance to galvanism in 1798 can explain a remark of Novalis's on Schelling that
critics have failed to come to terms with: "Schelling geht nur von dem Irritabilitatsphaenomèn der
Welt aus - er legt den Muskel zum Grunde - Wo bleibt der Nerv - die Adern - das Blut - und die
Haut - der Zellstoff. Warwn geht er, der Chymiker, nicht vom Process aus - von dem Phaenomên
der Beruhrung - der Kette" (N, 3, 470). Neubauer finds this remark confused and confusing (337,
159), and Burwick (3C, 132-133), although taking Ritter into account, oversimplifies Schelling's
view of Nature, since Schelling did not, as Burwick maintains, completely reduce Nature to spasms
or polarities but, was, in his Von der Weliseele of 1798, defending the "dignity" of a purposive
notion of phenomena against mechanist theories. The proper context of this remark of Novalis's is
this: although Schelling sides with Ritter in 1799, he had not in 1798 properly come to terms with
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the issues of galvanism in Ritter's work. In 1798 Schelling defends Humboldt's view of galvanism
as a purposive force in the organic against Volta's notion of contact electricity. In doing so
Schelling takes the view that the final cause of galvanism must lie within the irritable organs: "DaB
der Ietzte Grund der galvanischen Erscheinungen in den irritabein Organen selbst liege, scheint jetzt
durch die Humboldtschen Versuche entschieden, und so ware Galvanis gro& Entdeckung wieder in
die Dignitat eingesetzt, die ihr Voltas Scharffsinn zu rauben drohte" (107, 555). However,
Schelling realized that Humboldt's experiments, although they had reinforced the "dignity" of
Galvani's theory and revealed the inadequacy of Volta's mechanist interpretation, do in themselves
only put forward a hypothetical solution to galvanic action: "Humboldts eigne Theorie beruht auf
einer bloBen Moglichkeit und erklärt eimge Phänomene in der That gar nicht" (107, 557).
Schelling, unlike Humboldt, but like Ritter and Novalis, views galvanism as a universal force, yet,
in contrast to Ritter and Novalis, cannot make any concrete link between the inorganic and the
organic: "Dieser Satz: daB heterogene Metalle entgegengesetzte Beschaffenheiten in N. und M.
(nerve and muscle) - (einen Dualismus der Principien) - erwecken, oder wieder trennen, was im
Leben continuirlich getrennt wird ..., muB als Princip aller weiteren Untersuchung zu Grunde
gelegt werden" (107, 558). Schelling makes the fundamental leap to link the galvanic action in the
inorganic, in the metals, with galvanic action in the organic realm, but was not yet aware of or able
to view the organic in terms of inorganic action, for Schelling does not see the notion of the
chemical "Process" or the physical notion of the closed circuit ("Kette"). Furthermore, although
Schelling indeed points to the importance of the nerve to galvanic action in the sensibility of the
nerve, he seemingly argues for Humboldt's notion of galvanic action in open circuits. He thereby
again was not yet aware of the fundamental physical law of galvanic action which necessarily takes
place in closed circuits, and misses Ritter's idea of a whole "closed" process: "... daB, sage ich, in
allen diesen Fallen Zuckungen entstehen können, weil diese leiseste Veränderung des Nerven den
Dualismus der Principien in N. und M. und dadurch den Procefi wieder anfachen kann, der sogar
oft freiwillig geschieht, wenn das sich selbst überlassene Organ oboe äufleren Stimulus, von selbst
gleichsam sich entladend, in Zuckungen geräth" (107, 558). In the light of Ritter's constant
galvanic action, Schelling's method of viewing galvanism in the organic in terms of the polarities of
irritability and sensibility alone is an inadequate explanation, and Schelling's above interpretation of
the nerve highlights how important Ritter's own understanding of nerve action was. Novalis
reiterates both Ritter's universal and inorganic view of the nerve in the following remark: "Die
Nerven sind GefBe und bestehn eigentlich ganz aus Muskularsubstanz - rnithin mufi der eigentliche
Character des Nerv[sJ, der Grund der SensiblilitaetJ in dem Marke, in der Gehirnsubstanz stecken.
Das Mark ist em Ubergang der flussigen und festen Theile - Es 1st em organisirter Brey" (N, 3,
659). Nerve action should, on his view, be understood in terms of chemistry in its widest sense, as
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organized matter. The nerve for Novalis, as a product of the muscle and marrow, could symbolize
generative action in both the organic and inorganic realm.
13. The chart of Brown's is given in of Neubauer's work (337, 173). The chart is taken from P.
Diepgen, Geschichte der Medizin, 2 vols., Berlin, 1949-1955, 2, pt.i.
14. In another remark Novalis again links up the notion of the generative "Individuum" to the force
of "Sympathie": "Die Individualitaet in der Natur ist ganz unendlich. Wie sehr belebt diese Ansicht
unsre Hoffnungen von der Personalitaet des Universuins. Bemerkungen über das, was die Alten
Sympathie nannten?" (N, 3, 665).
15. On this grand scale "die innre chiffrirende Kraft" is bound up with Novalis's notion of
"Naturgedachtrnfi" (N, 3, 419). Novalis's notion of the process of evolution can, perhaps, be
interpreted in his terms of experiential knowledge, as "experimental". The generative force in the
activities and processes of phenomena can be seen as a teleological "generative induction" of
evolution: in their activities bodies pass on their "personality" to other bodies, and, at the same
time, form new "individuals". Evolution is rooted in what Nature already knows, i.e. her
experiential "know-how", ("Das Gedächtmfl ist der Individualsinn - das Element der Individuation"
(N, 3, 434)). By bringing the notions of memory and experiential knowledge to bear on teleology,
Novalis adds some novel aspects to the Neoplatonic notion of the Chain of Being. Bearing the
notions of memory, experiential knowledge and representation in mind, Novalis's idea of the Chain
of Being can be interpreted not only as a proposal of the Neoplatonic idea of continuity of form, but
also, at the level of representation, it interprets the notion of purposiveness in the Chain of Being in
a highly concrete way, as the physical continuity of "knowledge" in natural phenomena. Novalis's
following remark can perhaps be interpreted itself in terms of the "Representationen" of
phenomena:
Mehrere Stoffe zusammen bilden organische Stoffe -
Mehrere Kräfte zusammengenommen lebendige Kräfte -
Mehrere Contractionen - Empfindungen - Mehrere Sensationen Gedanken - Mehrere Gedanken
Ideen - etc.
Mehrere Menschen	 - Genien.
Mehrere Thiere - Menschen.
Mehrere Pflanzen,	 Thiere.
Mehrere Stoffe - Pflanzen.
Mehrere Elemente	 Stoffe.	 (N, 3, 611).
Ritter's notion of circuits within circuits, within the whole circuit of Nature, fits closely into the
idea of the Chain of Being and Novalis's scheme of things, for the idea of organizations within
organizations allows for development and transitions in the Chain of Being through galvanic
"representation".
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16. In the following remark Novalis speculates, in a vitalist manner, that galvanism itself might be
the soul of nature ("rnnres Licht"): "SolIte der Galv[anisml etwas anders seyn, als innres Licht.
Spur der Empfindung im anorgischen Reiche" (N, 3, 604). The notion of matter theory here also
recalls Plotinos's "inner light" (see chapter two, section 1.7).
17. Mähl and Kapitza both give an analysis of Novalis's triadic vision of the world. For the relation
of this notion to Novalis's reception of Hemsterhuis, see Mähl (331, 278-281). In relation to
Fichte, see MaId (331, 282-286). Kapitza's comments are of particular interest in this context since
he puts forward a "physical" version of Novalis's triadic historicism: "Im anfanglichen Chaos sind
"Mischung und Bewegung" (Stoff und Kraft) noch ems" (N, 3, 246). In einer zweiten Phase - die
Novalis als den gegenwärtigen Zustand annimmt - trennen sich beide und werden durch die Chemie
als die Wissenschaft von den "Stoffmischungen" und die Mechanik als die
"Bewegungsveränderingskunst" (N, 3, 247) jeweils für sich dargesteilt. In einer dritten Phase aber
sollen beide wieder vereinigt sein, und zwar "simultan", "geparrt durch gegenseitige Zueignung",
harmonisch zusammenwirken: "Kraft und Stoff in Harmonie" (N, 3, 247). Eine auf diese Weise
entstehende "verbundete Chemie und Mechanik" (N, 3, 246) hat eine direkte Beziehung zur
"Verwandlung des Chaos in harmonischen Himmel und Erde" (N, 3, 246)" (322, 18).
18. As mentioned, Humboldt's similarity with Goethe, Novalis and Ritter here lies more, I would
argue, emphatically in his geological or biogeological work. Ritter refers to the fallacy of
theoretical and formal impossibilities such as one meets in Volta's and Humboldt's "separate"
notion of Nature in general in the following way: "Wie aber durch bloBe Addition von Nichts und
Nichts, Etwas, wie 0 + 0 1 werden könne, das ist schlechthin unbegreiflich und darum
unnioglich. - Wie das nun aber mit dem Werden eines Etwas aus Nichts, eben so möchte es auch
mit dem Uebergang eines Etwas zurUck in Nichts, oder wie, wenn n eine endliche Zahl bedeutet,
1/n = 0 (die Ziffer) werden könne, der Fall seyn" (R, 145). Humboldt and Volta both argue for
"absolute" factors of galvanism which are relative, and it is the separateness (from concrete reality)
of their factors which makes them relative since they are not constant phenomena, not permanent
concrete references, but in reality, in Ritter's view, relative, changing concrete references. It is the
"constant galvanic force" which is the ultimate "concrete" phenomena.
19. See N, 3, 544 for the dating of this remark.
Conclusion
1. Naturally, the terminology of a thinker such as Frank is more precise in elucidating the type of
language this present work points to.
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Appendix A
Nova/is 's major references to experiment ".
Experimenta/methode der reinen Vernunft (N, 2, 386)
Werner. Experimentiren. (N, 2, 669)
Philosophische Instruction für den Experimentator.
Soilte die Flamme, der Funken, etc. in em neues Reich gehören, das von Pflanzen,
Thier, und Menschenreich verschieden ware. Lebendige Processe.
4 Arten von Flammen - 1. diejenige, deren Excremente - die anorgischen Naturen
sind. 2. deren Excremente - Pflanzen - 3. deren Excremente - Thiere. 4. deren
Excremente - Menschen sind. Je höher die Flamme - Je kunstlicher - desto
complicirter gebildeter das Excrement.
Alles Fressen ist em Assimilationsprocess - Verbindungs - Generationsprocess (N,
3, 84-85).
Das universaiste Naturfaktum mufi eine unendliche Reihe variirender
Erscheinungen - einzelner wircklicher Phaenomene - Experimente - unter sich
haben.
Ansicht eines Experiments in einer steigenden Reihe von Gesichtspuncten.
Ubersetzung in die Instrumentaisprache (N, 3, 91).
Die Plastisirungsmethode 1st die ächte Experimentalmethode (N, 3, 123).
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Zurn Experimentiren gehört Naturgenie, d.ist, wunderartige Fahigkeit den Sinn der
Natur zu treffen - und in ihrem Geiste zu handein. Der ächte Beobachter ist
Ktinsrler - er ahndet das Bedeutende und weifi aus dern seitsamen,
vorüberstreichenden Gemisch von Erscheinungen die Wichtigen herauszufiihlen (N,
3, 179).
Wie wenig Menschen haben Genie zum Experirnentiren. Der ächte Experirnentator
mufi em dunkles GefiAhl der Narur in sich haben, das ihn, je volikomner seine
Anlagen sind, urn so sicherer auf seinern Gange leitet und mit desto gro8erer
Genauigkeit das versteckte entscheidende Phaenomèn fmden und bestimmen laBt.
Die Natur inspirirt gleichsam den ächten Liebhaber und offenbart sich urn so
vollkommner durch ihn - je harmonischer seine Constitution mit ihr ist. Der ächte
Naturliebhaber zeichnet sich eben durch seine Fertigkeit die Experimente zu
vervielfältigen, zu vereinfachen, zu combiniren, und zu Analysiren, zu
romantisiren und popularisiren, durch semen Erfrndungsgeist neuer Experimente -
durch seine Naturgeschmackvolle oder Natursinnreiche Auswahl und Anordnung
derselben, durch Schärfe und Deutlichkeit der Beobachtung, und artistische,
sowohi zusammengefa1te, als ausfiihrliche Beschreibung, oder Darstellung der
Beobachtung aus. Also - Auch Experimentator ist nur das Genie (N, 3, 256).
Wenn der Satz, oder die Verhältnisse - der Gegenst[and] oder der Begriff - richtig
gewählt sind - wircklich Ems sind - so rnu1 auch die Demonstration und Auflosung
- das Experiment und die Erklärung - durchaus Ubereinkomrnen.
Wie das Experiment die blofie Erweiterung - Zertheilung - Vermannichfaltigung -
Verstarckung des Gegenstandes ist, so 1st die Erklärung dasselbe vom Satze - Hier
gilt also der Satz:
Was vom niedern Grade gilt, mufi auch vom hOhern Grade gelten. Was im niedem
Grade durchaus ems ist, mufi auch im hOhern Grade durchaus Ems seyn (N, 3,
353).
EXPERIMENTALLEHRE. Berichtigung vioni Wemers Classificatlionsi System -
Seine Schrift. Unaufhörliche Kritik der Beohachtung - Vergleichung der
Beohachtungen (Vervielfältigung der Versuche)
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Der Beobachtungsprocefi ist em zugl[eich] subj[ectiverl und object[iver] Process -
ideales und reales Experiment zugleich. Satz und Produkt müssen - zugileich]
fertig werden, wenn er recht vollk[ornmenl ist ... (N, 3, 357).
Experimentaiphysik des Geistes (N, 3, 387).
Alles kann zurn Experiment - alles zum Organ werden. Achte Erfahrung entsteht
aus ächten Experimenten. (Versuche sind Experimente.) Fichte lehrt das
GeheirnniB des Experimentirens - er lehrt Thatsachen und Thathandlungen, oder
wirckliche Sachen und Handliungen] - in Experimente und Begriffe verwandlen.
Sachen in entgegenges[etztej Handl[ungen], in Begriffe - Handl[ungen] in
entg[egengesetzte] Sachen - auch in Begriffe. Diese Begriffe hangen zusammen -
die Handl[ungen] und Sachen hangen zusammen - und alle 4 hangen gleichzeitig
zusammen (N, 3, 391).
Soilte es sich bestatigen, daIs der Satz des Widerspruchs der Grundsatz des
Denkvermögens, der Oberste der Logik, sey, so ware dies nur eine Indication , daB
wir mit der Logik allein nicht vie! ausrichten könnten, daB das Denkverm[ogenl
allein keinen (groBen) Nutzen gewahre - sondern, daB wir noch em andres
Vermögen und seine Theorie aufsuchen müBten, die als dem Denkvermögen und
d[erj Logik entgegengesezt und allein eben so nutzlos, als diese, in Verbindung mit
diesen gesezt werden rnüBten, urn daraus em zusammengeseztes Vermögen - und
zusammengesezte, sich gegenseitig complettirende Theorieen und Handl[ungen]
und Resultate zu erlangen und so fort.
Am Ende scheint alles Nachdenken auf ächtes Experimentiren zu ffihren - und die
sog[enannteJ Vernunftlehre - die Nothwendigkeit, Methode, etc. des
Experimentirens und Lebens, als eines beständigen Experimentirens zu enthalten
und beweisen.
Die vollendete Speculation fiihrt zur Natur zurfick.
Das ganze Geheimni13 des Philosophirens liegt in der generalisirten Bacomschen
Sentenz - Philos[ophia] abducit et reducit - die Abduktion ist der Reduktion wegen.
Die Natur 1st aber weit mehr, wenn sie dutch das PhiI[osophischej Organ gegangen
ist (N, 3, 402-403).
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Man geht mit den Erfahrungen und Experimenten noch viel zu sorgios urn - Man
versteht sie nicht zu benutzen - Man betrachtet zu wenig die Erfahrungen - als Data
zur Auflosung und mannichfaltigen Combinationen zum CalcUl - Man Uberlegt die
Erfahrungen, in Beziehung auf SchlUsse, nicht sorgfaltig genug - Man nimmt mcht
jede Erfahrung, als Function und Glied elner Reihe an - man ordnet - vergleicht -
und simplificirt die Erfahrungen mcht genug - man prUft einen Gegenstand nicht
mit alien Reagentien - man vergleicht ihn nicht fleiBig - und mannichiach genug
(N, 3, 427).
Vervielfaltigung - Wiederholung - Zertheilung - ( Addition - Multiplication -
Exponenziation etc.) von Experimenten. Zusammensetzung von Experimenten.
(Expenmentencalcul.)
Experimentiren ist gewissermaaflen nichts, als calculiren.
(Alter Calcül ist Analytisch - inventorisch)
Muster des Experimentirens.(Phosphor - Karnpfer) (N, 3, 435).
Werner hat die Theorie eines speciellen Beobachtungsprocesses geliefert - Auf
diesem Grunde kann man weiter bauen -
Allg[emeineJ Theorie des Beobachtens und Experimentirens - und Einzelne,
specielle Processe, als Beyspiele.
Practische Theorie d[es] B[eobachtensl und Explerimentirens) (N, 3, 437).
Geschichte der Versuche Versuche zu stande zu bnngen. Die Idee eines Versuchs
zu realisiren - gutgeordnete Beschreibungsreihe der Experimentalversuche sind
wohi ebenfalls Synonymen d[er] philLosophischenl Geschichte (N, 3, 439).
Diogenes Gehn- war Experimenralphil[osophieJ - ächtsynthletische] Phil[osophiel
(N, 3, 439).
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Plotin war schon in Betreff der meisten Resultate - kritischer Idealist und
Realist./Fichtes und Kants Methode ist noch nicht vollst[andigj und genau genug
dargestelit. Beyde wissen noch nicht mit Leichtigkeit und Mannichfaltigkeit zu
experimentiren - Uberhaupt mcht poëzisch - Alles ist so steif, so angstlich noch.
Die freye Generationsmethode d[erj Wahrheit kann noch sehr erweitert und
simplificirt - überhaupt verbessert werden. Da ist nun diese ächte
Experimentirkunst - Die Wissenschafi des rharigen Empirismus (N, 3, 445).
Em Phaenomèn muB nothwendig zu andern Phaenomènen fUhren, wie Em
Experiment zu mehreren Experimenten. Die Natur ist em Ganzes - worinn jeder
Theil an sich me ganz verstanden werden kann. Der ächte Naturforscher geht von
irgend einem Puncte aus und verfolgt semen Weg Schritt vor Schritt in die
UnermeBlicheit hinein mit sorgfaltiger Verknüpfung und Aneinanderreihung der
einzelnen Thatsachen.
So z.B. Verfolgung des Verbrennungsprocesses (N, 3, 603).
Ritter sucht durchaus die eigentliche Weitseele der Natur auf. Er will die
sichtbaren und ponderablen Lettern lesen lernen, und das Setzen der höhern
geistigen Kräfte erklären. Alle äut%re Processe sollen als Symbole und lezte
Wirkungen innerer Processe begreiflich werden. Die Unvollständigkeit jener soll
das Organ für diese und die Nothwendigkeit einer Annahme des Personellen, als
lezten Motivs, Resultat jedes Experiments werden (N, 3, 655).
I,, )
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Appendix B
Rifler's galvanic diagrams (Beweis, 1798)
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